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Recent studies of state-building in the post-colonial world have suggested anumber of explanations for how tribes may inhibit the ability of central authorities toextend a monopoly of violence over their peripheral territories. Because work in thisliterature tends to view state-building at the macro-level, these theories cannot adequatelyaccount for the fact that the creation of institutions to govern tribes is in fact often anuneven and non-linear process. In this paper I examine the relationship between tribesand states in two ways. First, I draw on literatures from anthropology, history, law, andeconomics to derive hypotheses about why and how tribes shape the operation ofinstitutions of taxation and policing. Second, I examine the plausibility of thesehypotheses by looking at local variation in the success of the British in governing tribesduring the military occupation and civil administration of Iraq (1914-1920). In particular,I find that three factors provide considerable leverage in understanding the uneven resultsof British institution building in Iraq: 1) the extent to which tribes are mobile, 2) theexistence of conflicting property rights systems, and 3) the existence and severity offeuding. I conclude by discussing what this analysis teaches us about the broader studyof tribes and state-building. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on ways to be considered by Islamic opposition parties in Arab countries to overcome commitment problems in emerging democracies. Background on the consolidation of democracy; Factors that affect the ability of parties to commit to democracy; Occurrence of problem on the compatibility of religious politics and democracy.

Why are some communities able to prevent actions that harm the viability of public goods, while others are not? In this paper, I outline a theory that shows how the extent to which third-party governance is embedded in local norms and networks can explain sub-national variation in the availability of public goods and the effectiveness of law-enforcement institutions. Ethnographic and historical evidence reveals that in the Laikipia Region of rural Kenya, the position of Maasai elders in local networks allows them to prevent public bads and enforce norms and laws more effectively than the Kenyan Provincial Administration. Analysis of data from a large-scale field experiment supports the conclusions of the ethnographic research, finding that anti-littering rules enforced jointly by government agents and local elders lead to cleaner villages and lower rates of littering. The more general theoretical implication of these combined findings is that law enforcement does matter for public goods outcomes, but that law enforcement institutions must be locally embedded in order to maintain the availability of public goods over time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]