Search

In coalition governments, parties invest much effort to manage delegation costs to individual ministers. In this article, we examine an intra-executive mechanism for managing delegation costs: Assigning ministerial co-responsibility in cabinet decisions. Using data of cabinet decisions in Israel, we test when and under what conditions co-responsibility is assigned. We find that co-responsibility is assigned strategically by cabinet members weighing the risk of a drift against the costs of imposing co-responsibility. These findings demonstrate an understudied mechanism through which coalition governments narrow ministerial autonomy and informational advantage once policies reach the cabinet. In doing so, this research contributes to a better understanding of policymaking in coalition governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this age of wide migration waves all over the world, when schools' populations become more diverse, educators often make policies regarding groups of immigrant students (from the same origin) with unique needs. Perceptions of homogeneity of the group, as well as perceptions of similarity between the decision maker and the group members are likely to have a major influence on these policies. Although research has shown that perceptions of great similarity between the decision maker and a target group enhance empathy and promote decisions in favor of the group; results of the current research, examining immigrant students' integration policy in schools, suggest that inaccurate high similarity perceptions (on a relevant domain) might decrease the ability to understand the targets' diverse needs and may lead to decisions that do not serve the group, or the decision maker's goals. Two studies were conducted to examine the effect of perceived homogeneity and similarity on immigrant integration policy in schools. In the first study, lay people recommended fewer programs for immigrants students when those where judged to be more similar to themselves and more homogenous. Similar results were obtained in the second study, examining school principals' reports of existing programs for immigrant students in their schools. Implications on policy making are discussed.

During a crisis, the public expects the government to handle the situation. In parliamentary democracies, these expectations are directed to the cabinet and its ministers. Cabinet ministers are expected to be highly involved in policy making under their jurisdiction and in general. During periods of politics as usual, ministers differ in their policy involvement. This paper asks whether that changes during a crisis. Based on an analysis of cabinet ministers in Israel during the first wave of the COVID19 crisis, this paper finds that ministers' policy involvement during a crisis is relatively low. Most ministers are little involved in issues outside their jurisdiction. Ministers less central to the crisis management are also little involved in issues under their jurisdiction. Ministers central to the crisis management are highly involved in introducing decisions on issues under their jurisdiction, but not necessarily in other aspects of policy making. These findings have implications for issues of accountability and trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cabinet ministers in parliamentary democracies have significant agenda‐setting power. However, not all ministers use it equally. This paper examines what affects the ministers' use of their agenda‐setting power. It explores this question based on the case of Israel, using three measures of agenda change and in‐depth interviews with former ministers. The paper finds that limited agenda capacity constrains the ministers' agenda‐setting power. However, the ministers themselves do not see this as a significant constraint and point at motivation instead. Ministers holding a portfolio that is salient to their party are not likely to change the agenda more. Ministers from small parties change the agenda less, and so do ministers in ministries where a significant proportion of services are provided by street level bureaucrats. Ministers in ministries that are seen as more salient change the agenda more. These findings are consequential for understanding policy responsiveness and proportionality in policy response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the agenda-setting process, prior to the decision-making process, there is a predecisional process whereby some issues are systematically blocked by powerful actors from being placed on the formal agenda. These issues are termed "nondecisions". This article argues that the predecisional process exists not only at the issue level but also at the level of problem definitions. Because of the empirical challenge of studying problem definitions that are not on the formal agenda, the article suggests examining problem definitions that were on the formal agenda and then disappeared from it. Such problem definitions can be termed nondecisions when their disappearance is due to latent power mechanisms, such as anticipated reactions or information control. The article tests these arguments using two American policy cases: prescription drug prices and child care. In so doing, it sheds light on the predecisional process and expands our understanding of the politics of problem definitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important phases of case-oriented research is identifying the relevant population of cases. The best practice scheme suggests first identifying the positive and then the negative cases, based on the assumption that the population is small and known. This scheme is inapplicable when the population is unknown, as is the case with many public administration and public policy outcomes, which are often less visible. However, most research either ignores this difficulty or recommends a single case study. This article suggests that when the population is unknown scholars can apply the possibility principle to identify the relevant population of cases. In order to do so, a large dataset is required. In policy studies, the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) can serve this aim. This article highlights CAP's applicability for case selection based on the possibility principle in two less visible policy outcomes: conversion and drift. In that, it not only addresses an overlooked challenge but also promotes both CAP as a useful tool for qualitative researchers and the expansion of comparative work on conversion and drift. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]