Search

Die Arbeit geht der Frage nach, wie die meisten EU-Mitgliedstaaten eigenständige Regelungen für die Kontrolle ausländischer Direktinvestitionen haben können, obgleich ausländische Direktinvestitionen seit 2009 der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik der EU zuzuordnen sind. Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik ist eine ausschließliche Kompetenz der EU und schließt damit die Mitgliedstaaten von der Rechtsset-zung aus. Mit der Verordnung (EU) 2019/452 (Screening-Verordnung) werden den Mitgliedstaaten kaum Vorgaben gemacht, weshalb die Screening-Verordnung nicht als Ermächtigung der Mitgliedstaa-ten qualifiziert werden kann. Zunächst bestimmt die Arbeit die Weite der Kompetenzübertragung in Art. 207 AEUV im Bereich der autonomen Maßnahmen in Bezug auf ausländische Direktinvestitionen. Nachdem die Zuordnungskrite-rien der Rechtsprechung zur gemeinsamen Handelspolitik auf die neue Sachmaterie der ausländischen Direktinvestitionen übertragen wurde, werden verbreitete autonome Maßnahmen in Bezug auf auslän-dische Direktinvestitionen der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik zugeordnet. Unter Berücksichtigung des Art. 207 Abs. 2 AEUV stellt die Arbeit fest, dass die ausschließliche Kompetenz der EU im Bereich der autonomen Handelspolitik auf eine Rahmenrechtssetzungskompe-tenz beschränkt ist. Im Anschluss daran werden Kriterien für die Abgrenzung von Rahmenrechtsakten entwickelt. Sodann wird festgestellt, dass Art. 64 Abs. 2 AEUV eine geteilte Kompetenz für Vollrege-lungen für autonome Maßnahmen in Bezug auf ausländische Direktinvestitionen enthält und die aus-schließliche Rahmenrechtssetzungskompetenz der EU ergänzt. In Randbereichen kann sich ein Kompetenzvorbehalt zu Gunsten der Mitgliedstaaten ergeben. Die Arbeit untersucht daher die Regelungen zur nationalen Sicherheit in Art. 4 Abs. 2 EUV und Art. 346 Abs. 1 AEUV sowie den Eigentumsvorbehalt in Art. 345 AEUV. Abschließend stellt die Arbeit die Screening-Verordnung als Rahmenrechtsakt im Sinne des Art. 207 Abs. 2 AEUV dar., The thesis examines the question of how most EU Member States can have independent regulations for the control of foreign direct investments, although foreign direct investments have become part of the EU's common commercial policy in 2009. The common commercial policy is an exclusive compe-tence of the EU and therefore excludes the member states from legislation in this field. Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (Screening Regulation) hardly sets any requirements for the member states, which is why the Screening Regulation cannot be qualified as an empowerment of the member states. First, the thesis determines the scope of the delegation of powers in Article 207 (1) TFEU in the area of autonomous measures in relation to foreign direct investments. After the classification criteria of the case law on the common commercial policy have been transferred to the new subject matter of foreign direct investments, widespread autonomous measures in relation to foreign direct investment are classified to the common commercial policy. Taking into account Article 207 (2) TFEU, the thesis establishes that the exclusive competence of the EU in the area of autonomous common commercial policy is limited to the competence to adopt framework regulations. Subsequently, criteria for framework regulations are developed. It is then es-tablished that Article 64 (2) TFEU contains a shared competence for regulations that goes beyond the scope of framework regulations for the autonomous regulation of foreign direct investment and supp-lements the EU's exclusive competence for framework regulations. In marginal areas, there may be a reservation of competence in favor of the member states. Therefo-re, the thesis examines the regulations on national security in Article 4 (2) TEU and Article 346 (1) TFEU as well as the reservation of ownership in Article 345 TFEU. Finally, the work presents the Screening Regulation as a framework regulation within the meaning of Article 207 (2) TFEU.

In this Paper, I address the question of whether and under what circumstances the deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) can reduce violence against civilians, specifically in the Sahel. My analysis - based on a literature review and case studies on Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria - suggests that rather than representing a solution, PGMs tend to become part of the problem. In most cases, PGMs actively carry out acts of violence against civilians or passively contribute to an increase in violence. According to my analysis, PGMs most tend to contribute to violence against civilians when: \ they are aligned with a government that shows little respect for human rights and makes little effort to curb violence against civilians by its own security forces; \ they take on offensive roles and cooperate with state security forces; \ they are a group of ethnically homogenous members that are armed by the state. Only when PGMs are socially embedded in the communities they aim to protect and are at least normatively controlled by local authorities, as well as defensively oriented and predominantly unarmed, do they - for example in Cameroon - contribute to a decrease in violence against civilians. The findings presented in this Paper have implications for German development policy. As outlined, PGMs can - under very specific circumstances - help to strengthen the resilience of the local population in armed conflicts. However, in view of the negative effects of most PGMs, transitional development assistance programmes must be tailored according to the risk arising from the presence of PGMs. Furthermore, since many of these groups prevail past the end of the armed conflict in question, they need to be considered in post-conflict reconstruction processes, especially in demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programmes and security sector reforms (SSR) to allow sustainable peace and development.Finally, the findings also have implications for Germ

Seit 2000 wird am 25. November der Internationale Tag zur Beseitigung der Gewalt gegen Frauen begangen. Er sollte ein Zeichen setzen, "Rechte und Freiheiten im Falle von Gewalt gegen Frauen zu schützen und zu fördern." Die Autorinnen des BICC-Kommentars sehen die Welt von diesem Ziel immer noch weit entfernt. Denn wenn es um empirische Analyse der Zusammenhänge von Gender-Balance, Militarisierung und Gewalt gegen Frauen geht, gibt es ein Riesenproblem: Es fehlen die Daten!

In contrast to the United States' unilateral China policy under President Donald Trump, the Joe Biden administration has renewed its ties with European and Asian allies. In its struggle with China for supremacy, the US strives to build a "united front" based on similar values. Although European countries share many values with the US, the China policies of the European Union and some of its member states substantially differ, not least due to diverging threat perceptions and economic interests. Against all expectations, the Biden administration continued Trump's policy of containing China's development through tariffs, exports controls, investment blockades, and visa restrictions. With the US CHIPS and Science Act and new export controls, the US government seeks to slow down China's further technological rise. Security issues have become more important in both the US and EU approach. European countries are, however, still reluctant to apply the same threat assessment for China as for Russia and to disengage from China. Europe's dependency on China as a key market and production base is still high, and most EU member states are not yet prepared for an economic decoupling. Although governments and research institutes in Europe have become more aware of the risks of science and technology cooperation with China, to discontinue it is not seen as an option. Despite the US and EU attempting to coordinate their China policies, the new US export controls on semiconductors were criticised by many European companies as unilateral decisions. The US and EU struggle to align their diverging interests on important topics such as the use of subsidies to support their economies. Therefore, the chances of them developing a unified China policy remain limited. The relationship between the US and China has turned into a new Cold War in which the coexistence of different economic and political systems does not seem possible. For European countries, decoupling from China would undermine

Der Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine 2022 gilt als Moment der strategischen Wahrheit für die Europäer, die nun nicht ­länger die Augen vor der Wiederkehr revisionistischer Machtpolitik ­verschließen könnten. Zwar gilt ihre Hauptsorge weiterhin ­Russland. Wer aber strategisch denkt, sorgt sich auch um eine zweite Gefahrenquelle: den gewaltsamen Revisionismus im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum. Die sich zusammenbrauenden ­Konflikte erfordern eine Antwort aus Europa.

Leadership, along with discipline, ethics, organisational culture and specific socialisation practices, is one of the most important pillars (Brown, Treviño, 2006) of the military profession. As such, professional military leadership is one of the key aspects emphasised at strategic level. One prominent example in this respect is the Romanian Military Strategy of 2021 (2021, pp. 3-4) which views it as one of the means of securing organisational and national resilience in a volatile, complex, and uncertain environment. Furthermore, as the 2020-2024 Romanian National Defence Strategy states (2020, p. 32), resilience is one of the key areas targeted by the NATO-EU cooperation agenda where Romania pledges to contribute. Following the strategic acknowledgment that professional military leadership is needed in order to meet future challenges in the defence and security field, the current article discusses the ways and means by which professional military leadership development can further the end of securing organisational resilience in the defence and security field, and hence that of consolidating national resilience.

In the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Azer­baijan achieved a decisive victory over Armenia. Quite sur­prisingly, Israel was a key player in this conflict, providing Azerbaijan with exten­sive support in the form of technology and arms. This support is part of a bigger research puzzle: How can Israel’s involve­ment in this conflict be explained? This report offers an explanation by showing how both geo­political factors and identity struggle are inter­twined. Using the lens of critical geo­political analysis, the report argues that not only realist factors, but also social con­structions of security as well as natio­nal and cul­tural iden­tity play into Israel’s inte­rest in the region.

The Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) is facing 'omni-directional' threats, including a risk of war with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). South Korea is building up an appropriate level of military force to be able to counter threats from any direction across regions and operational domains. In addition, the ROK Armed Forces are eager to contribute to a mutually complementary and robust ROK-US alliance to strengthen deterrence and territorial defense. At the same time, South Korea aims to bolster its role on the international stage by increasing its contributions to overseas deployments and out-of-area operations. It actively supports global responses against threats to the international norms and order. In South Korea, the idea that the two goals of national- and international-oriented security are complementary enjoys very broad support.

Deutschlands wichtigste Verbündete haben ihre Rollen bei der Gestaltung des Cyberraums definiert. Die USA betrachten sich als demokratische, werteorientierte Cybermacht, die bereit sind, gegen Gegner hart vorzugehen. Großbritannien will als verantwortungsvolle Cybermacht rücksichtsloses Verhalten unterbinden. Frankreich will sich als stabilisierende Kraft böswilligen Akteuren entgegenstellen. Und Deutschland? In seiner ersten Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie könnte es Ideen für künftige Aktivitäten im Cyberraum entwickeln, indem es den Fokus auf Zuverlässigkeit und die Abstimmung mit Partnern richtet. Dafür sollte die Bundesregierung die im Folgenden genannten Schritte angehen.

Since its appearance in 1949, NATO has gradually transformed from a collective defense organization into a community providing security. NATO has been and will continue to remain a vital security commitment between Europe and the U.S., equally appreciated by both parties. The Alliance’s evolutionary perspectives equally interested its members and nonetheless other important players in world geopolitics. Currently, NATO is involved in a wide range of activities designed to promote cooperation with a number of countries outside NATO and pro-actively tackle new security challenges of the XXI century. The most relevant aspect of NATO transformation is focused on promoting enhanced political dialogue, both within the organization and in relation with its partners.

Das längst überfällige neue Strategische Konzept der NATO, das auf dem Madrider Gipfel im Juni 2022 angenommen wurde, bietet mittelfristig klare Leitlinien für das Atlantische Bündnis. Der Krieg in der Ukraine hat den Alliierten einen starken Impuls gegeben, die Identität der NATO, ihre Kernaufgaben sowie ihren Blick auf Russland und China zu überdenken. Der neue abschreckungs- und verteidigungszentrierte Ansatz der NATO hat bereits zu einer großen Veränderung unserer Sicherheitsarchitektur geführt, insbesondere an der Ostflanke Europas. Ohne seine historische Neutralität zu untergraben, könnte Österreich sie angesichts des "Neustarts" der NATO neu interpretieren und diese Gelegenheit nutzen, um seine Partnerschaft mit dem Bündnis neu zu beleben., Adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the long-overdue NATO's new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Atlantic Alliance in a mid-term perspective. The war in Ukraine has provided the Allies with a powerful catalyst to reconsider NATO's identity, core missions, as well as their vision of Russia and China. NATO's new deterrence and defence-centric approach has already entailed a major shift in our security architecture, especially on Europe's eastern flank. Without undermining its historical neutrality, Austria might reinterpret it in light of NATO's "reset" and use this opportunity to reinvigorate its partnership with the Alliance.