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Scholars have shown that integration into the international human rights regime leads countries to exercise greater respect for domestic human rights (e.g. Landman 2005). Particularly, the international human rights covenants that member countries enter into are pivotal to the domestic protection of human rights. However, the effectiveness of these covenants varies significantly within the regime’s member countries. One explanation of these variations provided by scholars focuses on the low capacity of the regime to monitor and enforce these covenants (e.g. Bayefsky 2001). Few studies, however, examine the effect of domestic institutional factors on the implementation of human rights covenants. In this study, we provide important insight into the protection of human rights by examining the role of domestic institutions, specifically constitutional provisions, in the enforcement of international human rights covenants. Using the Comparative Constitutions Project (forthcoming), we conduct a large-N, cross-national analysis of the most recent constitutions of the independent countries on Ward and Gleditsch's (1999) list. We test the effect of constitutionally established treaty supremacy, separation of powers, judicial independence and judicial review, and the interaction of these provisions on the enforcement of human rights covenants and respect for human rights (data derives from Landman (2005) and CIRI Human Rights Dataset (2004)). We argue the adoption of constitutions granting foreign treaties supremacy over legislative and constitutional law, separating treaty making and reviewing power, and providing for independent judiciaries with the power of judicial review lead to better enforcement of human rights covenants and thus greater respect for human rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court is widely credited with launching significant social change. This belief is challenged by Rosenberg (1991, Hollow Hope) who contends that the Court lacks the mechanisms and visibility necessary to affect the public let alone bring about major change. Contradicting Rosenberg, some scholars have found evidence indicating that the Court can affect society, particularly by changing public opinion. Scholars have developed two conflicting theories: legitimacy-conferring and polarization. The legitimacy-conferring theory contends that the Court can shift public opinion favorably towards a policy by conferring its legitimacy upon it (e.g. Hoekstra 1995, APQ 23(1):109-129). Contrastingly, the polarization theory maintains that the Court pushes public opinion towards more extreme positions (e.g. Franklin and Kosaki 1989, APSR 83(3):751-771). This body of literature assumes that people have formulated opinions on an issue. However, not all people possess developed opinions on an issue when a decision is handed down, and this work neglects the Court's affect on those individuals.We seek to fill this absence by examining whether the Court has the ability to effect opinion development in addition to change. In our paper, we test the hypothesis that the Court's decisions can inspire opinion development by examining the effect of Roe v. Wade. We find that knowledge of the Court's decision significantly increases the likelihood that a respondent expresses a fully formed opinion on the issue of abortion and thus conclude that the Court is capable of sparking opinion development. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]