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Social media's capacity to quickly and inexpensively reach large audiences almost simultaneously has the potential to promote electoral accountability. Beyond increasing direct exposure to information, high saturation campaigns—which target substantial fractions of an electorate—may induce or amplify information diffusion, persuasion, or coordination between voters. Randomizing saturation across municipalities, we evaluate the electoral impact of non-partisan Facebook ads informing millions of Mexican citizens of municipal expenditure irregularities in 2018. The vote shares of incumbent parties that engaged in zero/negligible irregularities increased by 6–7 percentage points in directly-targeted electoral precincts. This direct effect, but also the indirect effect in untargeted precincts within treated municipalities, were significantly greater where ads targeted 80%—rather than 20%—of the municipal electorate. The amplifying effects of high saturation campaigns are driven by citizens within more socially-connected municipalities, rather than responses by politicians or media outlets. These findings demonstrate how mass media can ignite social interactions to promote political accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social spending by central governments in Latin America has, in recent decades, become increasingly insulated from political manipulation. Focusing on the 3x1 Program in Mexico in 2002-2007, we show that social spending by local government is, in contrast, highly politicized. The 3x1 Program funds municipal public works, with each level of government – municipal, state, and central – matching collective remittances. Our analysis shows that 3x1 municipal spending is shaped by political criteria. First, municipalities time disbursements according to the electoral cycle. Second, when matching collective remittances, municipalities protect personnel salaries, instead adjusting budget items that are less visible to the public such as debt. Third, municipalities spend more on 3x1 projects when their partisanship matches that of the state government. Beyond the 3x1 Program, our findings highlight the considerable influence that increasing political and economic decentralization can have on local government incentives and spending choices, in Mexico and beyond.

Election-season handouts of goods and services by political parties are endemic in Mexico's new democracy, and the practice appears to be increasing since 2000. Using information from a 2018 election-season panel data set of ordinary citizens, we provide the most detailed examination yet available of vote-buying attempts in Mexico. Such efforts were practiced by nearly all parties, involved millions of citizens, included a variety of material offers, and attempted to induce voters to alter their electoral behavior in myriad ways. Nevertheless, descriptive evidence implies that compliance with political machines' wishes may have been low because many recipients had a muddled understanding of what they were asked to do and did not fear retribution from the vote buying party. In addition, circumstantial evidence suggests that vote-buying efforts were insufficient to overturn the winning candidate's advantage in the presidential election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]