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This is the third in a series of three working papers on the Sino-Indian border dispute. This Section III deals with the period from early 1961 through the time of the most serious clashes in autumn 1962. An appendix discusses Sino-Pakistani border negotiations from 1960 to 1963.

Territorial disputes have played a major role in the relationship between India and China since the formation of both nationalist governments in 1947 and 1949 respectively. The incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China and unclear borderlines established by the British Empire during their colonization of India set the stage for conflict between the two countries. This conflict culminated in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. China's resulting victory provides an opportunity to study how they achieved success through the lens of operational art. This study explores the nature of Chinese objectives from policy down to the tactical level and the relationship between these objectives. It also discovers what process, if any, the Chinese used to derive complementary objectives, and finally, whether their victory was the result of this process or other circumstances. This study addresses six structured, focused questions in an attempt to establish a clear linkage between political and military objectives, and whether the People's Liberation Army of China arranged their operations in time, space, and purpose to achieve these objectives. This study produced valuable insight into the theory of operational art and provided an opportunity for greater understanding of the art of translating strategic objectives into the arrangement of tactical actions aimed at a common purpose. In the end, Chinese military commanders successfully executed operational art, merging political and military considerations to achieve an outcome that left China in an enhanced bargaining position against India. Their selective application of military force against limited objectives destroyed the image of India as a rising Asian power and exposed many of its strategic shortcomings. Successful military action against India allotted China the political initiative throughout the short war, allowing them to conclude it at the time and in the manner of their choosing, resulting from the effective

As China's influence on international affairs has continued to grow, more and more people have become concerned about the intentions behind Chinese actions. Several theories offer potential insights into the reasons behind Chinese actions in places like the South China Sea. Shih is one of those concepts. Shih is a holistic idea that refers to the advantage gained from manipulation of context. This study seeks to determine whether or not the concept of shih influenced the operational art conducted by political leaders in the People's Republic of China and commanders in the People's Liberation Army. Four characteristics help determine whether or not shih was a factor in a given conflict. These include leaders seeking to manipulate context, build troop morale through context, use an indirect approach, and exploit propensity within a given situation. This study examined two case studies including the Chinese winter offensives in the Korean War and the Sino Indian War and concludes that shih did influence Chinese leaders as they conducted operational art. Shih offers a lens through which to interpret future Chinese actions. Additionally, shih provides a contextual approach to operational design that would be a useful addition to US military doctrine and education.

The Sino-Indian border dispute is the result of the failure of India and China to agree upon the exact delimitation of their boundary within the complexities of the Himalayas. India maintains that there were treaties between India and Tibet delimiting certain sections, while the rest of the boundary was well-known and established through custom and tradition. The Chinese question Tibet's past authority to conclude treaties, and insist that the Sino-Indian boundary still requires delimitation. At present in the West, China occupies the Aksai Chin plateau, which India disputes; in the East, China claims territory in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. This study traces the origin and genesis of this vexing issue which remains a major hurdle in attempts to improve bilateral relations. It analyzes the conflicting claims in context of their historical perspective, and more importantly, in light of emerging geo-political realities and changing imperatives. The growing U.S. strategic convergence with India has also been taken into account. The study critically examines India's options to resolve the dispute. The option recommended takes into account the strategic compulsions of both sides and reflects the spirit of ‘mutual understanding and accommodation.’