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We present a model of the job market where the number of workers and companies is uncertain, representing the job search activity as a Poisson game. We allow for heterogeneity of workers and companies and show that in equilibrium more productive types choose higher terms of trade. The Poisson search model gives rise to multiple, possibly inefficient equilibria.

In questo capitolo: • introdurremo il problema della rappresentazione e codifica digitale del testo • faremo una panoramica di alcuni metodi di critica letteraria assistita da strumenti computazionali • illustreremo il concetto di distant reading contestualizzan- dolo nel dibattito sui digital literary studies • presenteremo alcune possibilità offerte dalle tecnologie di- gitali per la creazione di opere letterarie, con riferimento ai concetti di digital fiction ed electronic literature • analizzeremo come il cambiamento delle modalità di lettura e scrittura portato dai media digitali (fanfiction e digital social reading) abbia effetto sull’esperienza estetica e sulla lette- ratura come istituzione (canone, ricezione, scuola)

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented

We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one is for negative plurality games. The second one is for approval games under the condition that the number of candidates is equal to three. These results are combined with the analogous one obtained in De Sinopoli (2001) for plurality rule to show that, for generic utilities, three of the most well-known scoring rules, plurality, negative plurality and approval, induce finite sets of equilibrium outcomes in their corresponding derived games - at least when the number of candidates is equal to three. This is a necessary requirement for the development of a systematic comparison amongst these three voting rules and a useful aid to compute the stable sets of equilibria (Mertens, 1989) of the induced voting games. To conclude, we provide some examples of voting environments with three candidates where we carry out this comparison

We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one is for negative plurality games. The second one is for approval games under the condition that the number of candidates is equal to three. These results are combined with the analogous one obtained in De Sinopoli (2001) for plurality rule to show that, for generic utilities, three of the most well-known scoring rules, plurality, negative plurality and approval, induce finite sets of equilibrium outcomes in their corresponding derived games - at least when the number of candidates is equal to three. This is a necessary requirement for the development of a systematic comparison amongst these three voting rules and a useful aid to compute the stable sets of equilibria (Mertens, 1989) of the induced voting games. To conclude, we provide some examples of voting environments with three candidates where we carry out this comparison

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters, in that it a¤ects the outcome. We also show how a subset of strategic voters changes his voting be- havior to balance the ideological players? votes. However, they can only partially adjust. Strategic voters will vote accordingly to this cutpoint outcome: any strategic voter on its right votes for the right- most party and any strategic voter on its left votes for the leftmost party

We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one is for negative plurality games. The second one is for approval games under the condition that the number of candidates is equal to three. These results are combined with the analogous one obtained in De Sinopoli (Games Econ Behav 34:270–286, 2001) for plurality rule to show that, for generic utilities, three of the most well-known scoring rules, plurality, negative plurality and approval, induce finite sets of equilibrium outcomes in their corresponding derived games—at least when the number of candidates is equal to three. This is a necessary requirement for the development of a systematic comparison amongst these three voting rules and a useful aid to compute the stable sets of equilibria Mertens (Math Oper Res 14:575–625, 1989) of the induced voting games. To conclude, we provide some examples of voting environments with three candidates where we carry out this comparison.

We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model.

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented.

We present a model where a society elects candidates belonging to two parties to a national parliament. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. The policy outcome is a function of the number of seats the two parties win in the election. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single district proportional. We prove that under both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. We compare the outcomes under the two systems

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strate- gic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under proportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under proportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.

We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the policy outcome is simply a function of the number of seats parties take in the election. We prove that in both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. Finally, we compare the outcomes in the two systems.

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a spatial model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria., Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where similar voters make similar voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria.

In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their shares of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. © Springer-Verlag 2007., In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy.

In a recent paper Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000) investigate a model of meetings with costly participation. Their main result is that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme. In particular, when the policy space is one-dimensional and the policy outcome is the median of participants' positions, they conclude that the number of attendees is even. The proof is flawed. We construct an example with an odd number of attendees. Oddness of the number of participants has a dramatic consequence on how equilibria look like.

In a recent paper Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000) investigate a model of meetings with costly participation. Their main result is that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme. In particular, when the policy space is one-dimensional and the policy outcome is the median of participants' positions, they conclude that the number of attendees is even. The proof is flawed. We construct an example with an odd number of attendees. Oddness of the number of participants has a dramatic consequence on how equilibria look like.

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

In this paper we prove that for generic (noncooperative) voting games under plurality rule the set of equilibria that induce a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e., with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is finite and, furthermore, each of these equilibria is regular. From that we deduce the finiteness of the set of equilibrium distributions over outcomes. Furthermore we offer an example (S. Govindan and A. McLennan, 1997, "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," mimeo) that shows the impossibility of extending such results to a general framework, even just to voting games. Classification Numbers: C72, D72. (C) 2001 Academic Press.