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Following the 2009 EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED), Norway has overachieved its national renewables target and taken the European lead in new wind power. This seems puzzling as Norway had a surplus of renewable energy and the government opposed the EU-induced national target. Employing a dynamic approach to implementation and its consequences, we examine three explanations. From an EU adaptation-pressure perspective, the RED enabled joint implementation, which Norway utilized through its flexible certificate system with Sweden. From a domestic politics perspective, internal pressures led to favourable depreciation rules that stimulated pro-windpower interests. Third, from a policy feedback perspective, protests from municipalities resulted in a reform of the licensing system. These explanations proved complementary, and more persuasive than the main alternative explanation of drastic cost reductions in windpower technology. Our findings speak to the energy democracy, energy policy and implementation literatures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship has argued that effective and credible national climate policy mixes should encompass measures that promote new low-carbon technologies alongside those instruments aimed at constraining and phasing out support for existing polluting industries. The creative and disruptive policy measures in Norway´s climate policy mix are analysed by focusing on both national and international climate mitigation efforts. Norway´s climate policy mix at home has been more ambitious in the transport sector with a growing electric vehicle market than in the energy sector where niche support and disruptive policies have remained weak. Abroad, Norway has been increasingly active in supporting new low-carbon technologies and disrupting the fossil-fuel industry, especially coal. This is explained by the consensus-seeking and oil and gas dominated small-state social-investment political economy in Norway, combined with a forward-looking foreign policy based on norm-setting and multilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How have petroleum and power companies and their European industry associations responded to the EU emissions trading system (ETS)? Responses can be political, directed externally towards the initiation and reforms of the EU ETS itself, or internally and market-based, directed at low-carbon solutions. Proactive response strategies shape companies’ leadership potential. Variation in responses is explained by two models that differ in assumptions about corporate behaviour as well as the wider multilevel regulatory context in which companies operate. Responses are found to have converged within the two industries, with reactive companies following the proactive ones. Secondly, responses between the two industries increasingly diverge, with the power industry becoming much more proactive than the petroleum industry. The main explanation is found in the differing relevance of the two models and the wider regulatory context, particularly differing exposure to international competition and weak international climate agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Union (EU) climate/energy targets and policies are poised for the first full climate policy cycle - from adoption and implementation of the policy package for 2020, to reform for 2030. A dynamic approach to the ways in which EU policies affect policy development is developed by applying theories of domestic implementation, policy feedback and integration. Implementation experiences in Poland - the ‘least climate ambitious’ EU member state - affected Polish preferences for reformed EU policies. Existing EU policies, their ‘fit’ with Poland’s energy interests and change in anticipation of future EU policies explain much of the variation in preferences. Second, policy feedback from Poland significantly affected the EU 2030 climate and energy framework. As yet, the EU has succeeded only partly in gathering momentum through a ‘snowball’ effect whereby positive policy feedback from implementation generates further steps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission has played a crucial role in promoting ambitious EU climate targets and policies that boost the credibility of EU leadership-by-example efforts internationally. The approach has gradually shifted from leadership toward more strategic behavior that reflects the preferences of the member states. Reduced uncertainty concerning member-state preferences and solutions accounts for much of the change in leadership. Uncertainty has decreased as climate policies have become more mature and member states have gained experience from implementing them. Asymmetries in member-state preferences, decision-making procedures, and impatience caused by the international context are all important conditions for the European Commission's leadership. These observations lend support to apparently contradictory theories that have seen EU climate policy as propelled either by autonomous supranational institutions or by increasingly ambitious member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strong rhetorical differences between the European Union and the United States on climate matters have been evident for almost two decades. Since the mid-2000s, such differences are becoming visible in their respective climate policies as well. We propose three explanations for differences in climate policy outcomes in the EU and the US. First, the agenda-setting privileges of their policy-makers are significantly different, influencing how agenda setters shape policies and link issues, such as energy and climate policy. Second, while issue linkage has helped overcome distributional obstacles in the EU, it has led to more complexity and greater policy obstacles in the US. Finally, legislative rules, procedures, and norms have constrained the coalition-building efforts of lawmakers in the two systems in different ways, affecting negotiation processes and outcomes. Such differences in agenda-setting privileges, potential for issue linkages, and legislative procedures in the EU and the US have left them wide apart in international climate negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains why the significant changes in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) for the 2013-2020 phase were adopted in 2008. The combination of a more stringent EU-wide cap, allocation of emission allowances for payment, and limits on imports of credits from third countries have strengthened the system for the post-2012 period. This will promote reduction in greenhouse gases compared to the old system. The main reasons for these changes are, first, changes in the positions of the member states due to unsatisfactory experience with performance of the EU ETS so far. Second, a "package approach" where the EU ETS reform was integrated into wider energy and climate policy facilitated agreement on the changes. Third, changes in the position of nonstate actors and a desire to affect the international climate negotiations contributed to the reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the cornerstone of EU climate policy, a grand policy experiment, as the first and largest international emissions trading system in the world. In this article, we seek to provide a broad overview of the initiation, decision-making and implementation of the EU ETS so far. We explore why the EU changed from a laggard to a leader in emissions trading, how it managed to establish the system rapidly, and the consequences to date, leading up to the 2008 proposal for a revised ET Directive for the post- 2012 period. We apply three explanatory approaches, focusing on the roles of the EU member states, the EU institutions and the international climate regime, and conclude that all three approaches are needed to understand what happened, how and why. This also reveals that what happened in the early days of developing the system had significant consequences for the problems experienced in practice and the prospects ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Irrespective of mitigation efforts, adaptation measures will be needed in most parts of the world. The greatest challenge will be for developing countries. The estimated needs for adaptation funding in developing countries are considered in the context of the status and 'delivery' of the current financing efforts made under the UN regime and the anticipated Adaptation Fund. A considerable gap exists between the actual (as well as projected) supply of funding and estimated adaptation needs. A number of alternative financial mechanisms are suggested to close the gap between estimated needs and actual delivery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article investigates major oil companies in terms of climate strategies and their implementation. It is stated that empirical evidence indicates a generally high degree of consistency between what these companies say and what they do. The oil companies involved in the research were Shell Oil Co., BP, and ExxonMobil Corp. The relationship between rhetoric and action regarding investments in climate-friendly activities. Furthermore, the oil companies offered understanding and analytical categories for assessing how well and why multinational entities put into practice stated objectives.

The article compares the interplay between soft law institutions and those based on hard law in international efforts to protect the North Sea, reduce trans-boundary air pollution, and discipline fisheries subsidies. Our cases confirm that ambitious norms are more easily achieved in soft law institutions than in legally binding ones, but not primarily because they bypass domestic ratification or fail to raise concerns for compliance costs. More important is the greater flexibility offered by soft law instruments with respect to participation and sectoral emphasis. Second, ambitious soft law regimes put political pressure on laggards in negotiations over binding rules, but this effect is contingent on factors such as political saliency and reasonably consensual risk and option assessment. Third, hard-law instruments are subject to more thorough negotiation and preparation which, unless substantive targets have been watered down, makes behavioral change and problem solving more likely. Finally, although most of the evidence presented here confirms the implementation edge conventionally ascribed to hard law institutions, the structures for intrusive verification and review that provide part of the explanation can also be created within soft law institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines whether the study of regime-effectiveness contributes to address the problem with the causal relationships between the environmental policy of the European Union (EU) and the state of the European environment. Focus of a typical study of the EU environmental policy; Importance of regime analysis perspective in understanding the effect of the interaction between EU directives and international environmental regimes; Limitations in the domestic context.

Compares the different climate policy strategies of oil companies Shell Group and Exxon Mobil. Analysis of analytical models of corporate strategy; Amount of crude oil produced by both companies; Details on the environmental reputation of the companies; Discussion of societal demands for action on climate change.

There is a long and continuing debate in the literature on corporate political power about whether businesses that advocate public-interest regulation do so for strategic political reasons or because they anticipate economic gains. Previous research on Big Oil's strategies in climate politics has largely converged on the first view, arguing that global majors feign support for moderate carbon pricing largely to prevent the adoption of more drastic and costly policies. In contrast, this article argues that Big Oil's growing stake in natural gas expansion is its economic motive for supporting favorably designed carbon pricing. The article finds that policy, technology, and energy market changes have paved the way for a shift toward natural gas and that a moderate carbon price, by triggering coal-to-gas switching, supports the realization of a gray transition in which "Big Gas" can expand its market share at the expense of coal and become a major bridge fuel next to renewables. Our findings underscore the importance of studying the competitive rivalry that underpins evolving industry demands for climate policy and regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]