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Well before COVID-19, there was growing excitement about the potential of various digital technologies such as tele-health, smartphone apps, or AI chatbots to revolutionize mental healthcare. As the SARS-CoV-2 virus spread across the globe, clinicians warned of the mental illness epidemic within the coronavirus pandemic. Now, funding for digital mental health technologies is surging and many researchers are calling for widespread adoption to address the mental health sequelae of COVID-19. Reckoning with the ethical implications of these technologies is urgent because decisions made today will shape the future of mental health research and care for the foreseeable future. We contend that the most pressing ethical issues concern (1) the extent to which these technologies demonstrably improve mental health outcomes and (2) the likelihood that wide-scale adoption will exacerbate the existing health inequalities laid bare by the pandemic. We argue that the evidence for efficacy is weak and that the likelihood of increasing inequalities is high. First, we review recent trends in digital mental health. Next, we turn to the clinical literature to show that many technologies proposed as a response to COVID-19 are unlikely to improve outcomes. Then, we argue that even evidence-based technologies run the risk of increasing health disparities. We conclude by suggesting that policymakers should not allocate limited resources to the development of many digital mental health tools and should focus instead on evidence-based solutions to address mental health inequalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the activist, feminist and pragmatist Jane Addams (1860-1935) was an experimental philosopher. To defend this claim, I argue for capacious notions of both philosophical pragmatism and experimental philosophy. I begin in Section 2 with a new defence of Rose and Danks' ['In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy'. Metaphilosophy 44, no. 4 (2013): 512-32] argument in favour of a broad conception of experimental philosophy. Koopman ['Pragmatist Resources for Experimental Philosophy: Inquiry in Place of Intuition'. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2012): 1-24] argues that many twentieth-century American pragmatists (e.g. Peirce, James, Dewey) can make important contributions to contemporary experimental philosophy. In Section 3, I argue that while this may be true, it is also true that under the broad conception, many of the pragmatists just were experimental philosophers. In Section 4, I argue that as a pragmatist philosopher in her own right, Jane Addams also fits the bill of an experimental philosopher, broadly construed. My central argument is that working at Hull House rather than the University of Chicago is no reason to think Addams' methods any less rigorous or empirical, nor the problems she addressed any less philosophical. I conclude by responding to potential objections to my even broader conception of experimental philosophy, and I briefly consider how my arguments might inform contemporary feminist criticisms of experimental philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional medical Artificial Intelligence models, approved for clinical use, restrict themselves to single-modal data e.g. images only, limiting their applicability in the complex, multimodal environment of medical diagnosis and treatment. Multimodal Transformer Models in healthcare can effectively process and interpret diverse data forms such as text, images, and structured data. They have demonstrated impressive performance on standard benchmarks like USLME question banks and continue to improve with scale. However, the adoption of these advanced AI models is not without challenges. While multimodal deep learning models like Transformers offer promising advancements in healthcare, their integration requires careful consideration of the accompanying ethical and environmental challenges., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. on behalf of the American Society of Nephrology.)