Search

Several studies have recently highlighted the importance of European courts for EU politics. According to this strand of the literature, national courts have become a driving force for European integration and even for democratic governance in Europe. In addition, litigation before national courts is regularly presented as a promising instrument to remedy problems related to the implementation of EU legislation. At the same time, however, policy-oriented analyses have repeatedly shown that such litigation may have quite diverse effects on the implementation of EU law. How can such differential effects of national litigation be explained? In this paper, I try to tackle this question by presenting a theoretical account supported by new empirical evidence. I argue that differential effects of public interest group litigation can be explained through a 'stage model' that focuses on three interconnected 'stages': (1) public interest group litigation; (2) interpretation of national courts; (3) reaction of the competent authorities. As these elements differ widely across Member States, the possibilities to enforce European law through courts vary considerably. This has important consequences for European integration and the possibility of democratic governance through courts. In order to illustrate the theoretical argument, the paper presents empirical evidence from an in-depth study on public interest group litigation in the field of EU nature conservation law - the Natura 2000 Directives - in Germany, France and the Netherlands. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]