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Despite the ubiquitous interdependence between one’s own decisions and others’ welfare, and the controversial evidence on the behavioral effect of choosing for others, the neural bases of making decisions for another versus oneself remain unexplored. We investigated whether loss aversion (LA; the tendency to avoid losses over approaching equivalent gains) is modulated by (i) choosing for oneself, other individuals, or both; (ii) knowing or not knowing the other recipients; or (iii) an interaction between these factors. We used fMRI to assess the brain activations associated with choosing whether to accept or reject mixed gambles, either for oneself, for another player, or both, in 2 groups of 28 participants who had or had not briefly interacted with the other players before scanning. Participants displayed higher LA for choices involving their payoff compared with those affecting only the payoff of other, known, players. This “social” modulation of decision-making was found to engage the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and its inhibitory connectivity to the middle cingulate cortex. This pattern might underpin decision-making for known others via self-other distinction processes associated with dorsomedial prefrontal areas, with this in turn promoting the inhibition of socially oriented responses through the downregulation of the midcingulate node of the empathy network.

Investigation of neural and behavioral correlates of loneliness

Social decision making is a highly complex process that involves diverse cognitive mechanisms, and it is driven by the precise processing of information from both the environment and from the internal state. On the one hand, successful social decisions require close monitoring of others' behavior, in order to track their intentions; this can guide not only decisions involving other people, but also one's own choices and preferences. On the other hand, internal states such as own reward or changes in hormonal and neurotransmitter states shape social decisions and their underlying neural function. Here, we review the current literature on modulators and determinants of human social decisions.

The study explores the expectations and cooperative behaviours of men and women in a lab-in-the-field experiment by means of citizen science practices in the public space. It specifically examines the influence of gender-based pairings on the decisions to cooperate or defect in a framed and discrete Prisoner’s Dilemma game after visual contact. Overall, we found that when gender is considered behavioural differences emerge in expectations of cooperation, cooperative behaviours, and their decision time depending on whom the partner is. Men pairs are the ones with the lowest expectations and cooperation rates. After visual contact women infer men’s behaviour with the highest accuracy. Also, women take significantly more time to defect than to cooperate, compared to men. Finally, when the interacting partners have the opposite gender they expect significantly more cooperation and they achieve the best collective outcome. Together, the findings suggest that non verbal signals may influence men and women differently, offering novel interpretations to the context-dependence of gender differences in social decision tasks.

In the article the information on a systematic review as a form of analytical production is collected, analyzed and systematized. Characteristics of its main specific features and common ones with that of an analytical review are given, its short history is described. There is an original definition of a systematic review as an analytical product, with a volume of a large scientific article prepared on the basis of the results of a special scientific study, carried out according to special methods and designed to make the right clinical or social decision. The method of its preparing consisting of seven stages is described in detail, and the role of the library staff in each of them is defined. All presented data prove that a library employee can not only act as an organizer, but also as a member of a research group for preparing up-todate systematic reviews.

This paper overviews the research on social decision criteria under uncertainty and attempts to provide insights for future directions.

Research shows the increasing tendency of partisan considerations to influence decisions outside the context of politics, including residential choice. Scholars attribute this tendency to affective distaste for members of the other party. However, little work has investigated the relative influence of political and nonpolitical factors in these situations—and it has not sufficiently ruled out alternative explanations for these phenomena. Do people mainly choose to socially avoid members of the other party for political reasons, or is partisanship simply perceived to be correlated with relevant nonpolitical considerations? In some settings, political affiliation may serve primarily as a cue for other factors. As a result, studies that manipulate partisanship but fail to include other individuating information may exaggerate partisanship’s importance in these decisions. To address this shortcoming, I assess the impact of political and nonpolitical considerations on roommate selection via conjoint analysis. I find that partisanship strongly influences this social decision even in the presence of nonpolitical-but-politically-correlated individuating information. Partisan preferences are also moderated by roommates’ perceived levels of political interest. Finally, other social traits do matter, but how they matter depends on partisanship. Specifically, partisans report increased willingness to live with counter-stereotypic out-partisans. This suggests that partisan social divides may be more easily bridged by individuals with cross-cutting identities.

Choosing to cooperate or to compete is a regular and important social decision. Certain scenarios call for one over the other, but people do not always behave logically. The present study describes trends to irrationally compete when cooperation is the means to success. A paradigm similar to the Kagan and Madsen (1971) checkers-style game was used in which cooperation resulted in mutual benefit and competition resulted in nothing. The participants in this 25-year observational study were adult university students and coaches, and though they are presumed to be rational thinkers, the large majority of them contradictorily competed. In the rare cases of cooperation during these games, at least one person in the pair tended to come from a rural or community-oriented background; this is a phenomenon worth acknowledging. To be successful, it is essential to understand the full context of a situation in order to recognize mutually beneficial situations. It is necessary to understand cooperative and competitive behaviors to meaningfully advance societal activities as well as maximizing individual benefits.

Effective complements to human judgment, artificial intelligence techniques have started to aid human decisions in complicated social decision problems across the world. Automated machine learning/deep learning(ML/DL) classification models, through quantitative modeling, have the potential to improve upon human decisions in a wide range of decision problems on social resource allocation such as Medicaid and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program(SNAP, commonly referred to as Food Stamps). However, given the limitations in ML/DL model design, these algorithms may fail to leverage various factors for decision making, resulting in improper decisions that allocate resources to individuals who may not be in the most need of such resource. In view of such an issue, we propose in this paper the strategy of fairgroups, based on the legal doctrine of disparate impact, to improve fairness in prediction outcomes. Experiments on various datasets demonstrate that our fairgroup construction method effectively boosts the fairness in automated decision making, while maintaining high prediction accuracy.

One of the typical campus scenes is the social interaction between college couples, and the lesson couples must keep learning is to adapt to each other. This fMRI study investigated the shopping interactions of 30 college couples, one lying inside and the other outside the scanner, beholding the same item from two connected PCs, making preference ratings and subsequent buy/not-buy decisions. The behavioral results showed the clear modulation of significant others’ preferences onto one’s own decisions, and the contrast of the “shop-together vs. shop-alone”, and the “congruent (both liked or disliked the item, 68%) vs. incongruent (one liked but the other disliked, and vice versa)” together trials, both revealed bilateral temporal parietal junction (TPJ) among other reward-related regions, likely reflecting mentalizing during preference harmony. Moreover, when contrasting “own-high/other-low vs. own-low/other-high” incongruent trials, left anterior inferior parietal lobule (l-aIPL) was parametrically mapped, and the “yield (e.g., own-high/not-buy) vs. insist (e.g., own-low/not-buy)” modulation further revealed left lateral-IPL (l-lIPL), together with left TPJ forming a local social decision network that was further constrained by the mediation analysis among left TPJ-lIPL-aIPL. In sum, these results exemplify, via the two-person fMRI, the neural substrate of shopping interactions between couples.

We combine macro and microeconomic perspectives in an agent-based endogenous growth model that uses individual satisfaction as a driver of human capital accumulation. The micro perspective is based on individual satisfaction: an utility function computed from the income variation in space (relative to others) and time. The macro perspective emerges from micro decisions that, at an aggregate level, determine an important social decision about the share of the working population engaged in producing ideas (i.e. skilled workers). Underlying our analysis is the Easterlin hypothesis (Easterlin, in: David, Melvin (eds) Nations and households in economic growth: essays in Honor of Moses Abramowitz, Academic Press, New York, 1974, J Econ Behav Organ 27(1):35–47, 1995) which states that individuals care much more about their relative income than about increases in their own income, weakening the link between growth and income. Simulations show that growth and satisfaction levels are higher when relative and absolute incomes are equally weighted in satisfaction computation and are lower when satisfaction only depends on relative incomes.

We study social decision schemes (SDSs), i.e., functions that map a collection of individual preferences over alternatives to a lottery over the alternatives. Depending on how preferences over alternatives are extended to preferences over lotteries, there are varying degrees of efficiency and strategyproofness. In this paper, we consider four such preference extensions: stochastic dominance (SD), a strengthening of SD based on pairwise comparisons (PC), a weakening of SD called bilinear dominance (BD), and an even weaker extension based on Savage's sure-thing principle (ST). While random serial dictatorships are PC-strategyproof, they only satisfy ex post efficiency. On the other hand, we show that strict maximal lotteries are PC-efficient and ST-strategyproof. We also prove the incompatibility of (i) PC-efficiency and PC-strategyproofness for anonymous and neutral SDSs, (ii) ex post efficiency and BD-strategyproofness for pairwise SDSs, and (iii) ex post efficiency and BD-group-strategyproofness for anonymous and neutral SDSs.

A number of empirical studies have suggested that individual differences in asocial exploration tendencies in animals may be related to those in social information use. However, because the ‘exploration tendency' in most previous studies has been measured without considering the information-gathering processes, it is yet hard to conclude that the animal asocial exploration strategies may be tied to social information use. Here, we studied human learning behaviour in both asocial and social two-armed bandit tasks. By fitting reinforcement learning models including asocial and/or social decision processes, we measured each individual's (1) asocial exploration tendency and (2) social information use. We found consistent individual differences in the exploration tendency in the asocial tasks. We also found substantive heterogeneity in the adopted learning strategies in the social task: Nearly one-third of participants used predominantly the copy-when-uncertain strategy, while the remaining two-thirds were most likely to have relied only on asocial learning. However, we found no significant individual association between the exploration frequency in the asocial task and the use of the social information in the social task. Our results suggest that the social learning strategies may be independent from the asocial exploration strategies in humans.

The paper reports the formulation, the design, and the results of a serious game developed for structuring negotiations concerning the redevelopment of a university campus with various stakeholders. The main aim of this research was to formulate the redevelopment planning problem as an abstract and discrete decision-making problem involving multiple actions, multiple actors with preconceived gains and losses with respect to the comprising actions, and decisions as combinations of actions. Using fictitious and yet realistic scenarios and stakeholders as simulation, the results evidence how different levels of democratic participation and different modes of moderation can affect reaching a consensus and present in a mathematical characterisation of a consensus as a state of equilibrium. The small set of actions and actors enabled a chance to compute a theoretically optimal state of consensus, where the efficiency and the effectiveness of different modes of moderation and participatory rights could be observed and analysed.

The paper reports the formulation, the design, and the results of a serious game developed for structuring negotiations concerning the redevelopment of a university campus with various stakeholders. The main aim of this research was to formulate the redevelopment planning problem as an abstract and discrete decision-making problem involving multiple actions, multiple actors with preconceived gains and losses with respect to the comprising actions, and decisions as combinations of actions. Using fictitious and yet realistic scenarios and stakeholders as simulation, the results evidence how different levels of democratic participation and different modes of moderation can affect reaching a consensus and present in a mathematical characterisation of a consensus as a state of equilibrium. The small set of actions and actors enabled a chance to compute a theoretically optimal state of consensus, where the efficiency and the effectiveness of different modes of moderation and participatory rights could be observed and analysed.

The success story continues making Nudge well read and much applied. The key message is that people are irrational on their decision making and need to be guided by policy markers, which are able to have useful insights from Psychology and Behavioral Economics about how to elaborate choice structures to rationalize people’s financial behavior. Inertia is one popular of these insights and refers to the tendency of humans to procrastinate in making choices. This tendency is acknowledged but not understood and explained. The same occurs with other reported insights. In contrast, the present paper proposes any decision guaranteeing the individual biological; psychological and social homeostasis are rational despite being or not the expected decision supported by any formal model. Most of the important human decisions are about keeping homeostasis within boundaries promoting well being, hence resulting from complex analyses of benefits; risks and costs from both the personal and social point of view as carried out by two different Personal and Social Decision Networks. Rational choice selects, therefore, high beneficial goods or services for promoting homeostasis at lowest risk and cost from both personal and social point of views. A decision neural model for decision making is presented and used to illustrate how rational choices are computed to guarantee individual homeostasis, and to propose that individuals seem to be irrational because the proposed economic formal theories take into consideration just the policy maker point of view disregarding the individual needs.

Highlights • Amygdala neurons are sensitive to background reward (contingency). • Amygdala neurons code principal decision variables: reward amount and timing. • Amygdala neurons signal economic decision processes. • Amygdala neurons predict the length of planned reward-acquiring sequences. • Amygdala neurons simulate economic decisions of social partners., Long implicated in aversive processing, the amygdala is now recognized as a key component of the brain systems that process rewards. Beyond reward valuation, recent findings from single-neuron recordings in monkeys indicate that primate amygdala neurons also play an important role in decision-making. The reward value signals encoded by amygdala neurons constitute suitable inputs to economic decision processes by being sensitive to reward contingency, relative reward quantity and temporal reward structure. During reward-based decisions, individual amygdala neurons encode both the value inputs and corresponding choice outputs of economic decision processes. The presence of such value-to-choice transitions in single amygdala neurons, together with other well-defined signatures of decision computation, indicate that a decision mechanism may be implemented locally within the primate amygdala. During social observation, specific amygdala neurons spontaneously encode these decision signatures to predict the choices of social partners, suggesting neural simulation of the partner’s decision-making. The activity of these ‘simulation neurons’ could arise naturally from convergence between value neurons and social, self-other discriminating neurons. These findings identify single-neuron building blocks and computational architectures for decision-making and social behavior in the primate amygdala. An emerging understanding of the decision function of primate amygdala neurons can help identify potential vulnerabilities for amygdala dysfunction in human conditions afflicting social cognition and mental health.

Preference aggregation is here investigated for a society defined as a measure space of individuals and called a measure society. Individual preferences are represented through continuous v nm utilities. It is shown that aggregating preferences in an utilitarian way for any kind of measure society is possible under adapted Pareto conditions.

This chapter is concerned with the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules. The chapter provides a characterization for an important subclass of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules; and derives maximally sufficient conditions for transitivity for the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules and for its subclass of rules satisfying the Pareto-criterion.

A simple game social decision rule is defined by the condition that under it an alternative x is socially preferred to another alternative y iff all individuals belonging to some winning coalition unanimously prefer x to y. This chapter provides a characterization for the class of social decision rules that are simple games as well as for the subclass that are strong simple games and derives Inada-type necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under the rules belonging to the class.

First, this article describes the concepts and tools most widely used for economic evaluation in healthcare. Second, it discusses some elements that must be taken into account in the social decision about how much we are willing to spend to prolong a person's life by one year. Third, it describes the criteria recommended for the critical analysis of publications that evaluate the economic aspects of health interventions. Finally, several studies about ultrasound screening for aneurysms of the abdominal aorta are used as illustrative examples to show how these elements and criteria can be applied.

James M. Buchanan’s and Vincent Ostrom’s contributions to the field of Constitutional Political Economy spanned 60+ years as they explored how individuals come together in democratic societies to design social decision processes capable of protecting individual liberty. This chapter examines a set of rules frequently associated with such protective processes—votes, vetoes, voice, and exit—in order to compare how these scholars’ approaches to constitutional choice overlapped and where their perspectives differed slightly. It concludes with an examination of their treatments of US federalism and their concerns for the future viability of this institutional form.