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TNTRODUCTION 915 I. OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY AND THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL AND FEASIBLE OPTIONS 921 II. OUTCOME REASONS AND PROCESS REASONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 931 A. The Distinction Between Outcome Reasons and [...], Constitutional theory is a mess. Disagreements about originalism and living constitutionalism have become intractable. Constitutional theorists make some arguments that seem clearly fallacious and advance proposals that are pie in the sky. One of the reasons for the mess is an overreliance by constitutional theorists on "outcome reasons,"justifications that rely on the theorist's beliefs about what outcomes are good and what outcomes are bad. This outcome-drive approach is exemplified by the so-called "canonical cases" argument, which evaluates positions in normative constitutional theory on the basis of their counterfactual implications for a handful of prior decisions of the Supreme Court. Among the many problems with "outcome reductionism" (exclusive reliance on outcome reasons) is the reality that none of the fundamental and feasible options for normative constitutional theory can guarantee outcomes that that most citizens would find acceptable, much less optimal. Living constitutionalism produces constitutional outcomes that reflect the moral values and political ideology of Supreme Court Justices, but over the long run there is no guarantee that the Justices will do what any individual believes is required by justice. Decades ago, the Justices established a constitutional right to abortion, but recently they reversed course. Dramatic changes in constitutional law are inevitable given that the Justices are selected by the President and Congress, institutions that will change their political makeup in unpredictable ways over time. Outcome reductionism is not a sensible method for normative constitutional theory, but there is a better approach. Outcome reasons can be supplemented by process reasons such as legitimacy, the rule of law, and institutional capacities. The way forward for constitutional theory involves a holistic assessment of both outcome reasons and process reasons via the method of reflective equilibrium. The way forward requires a frank acknowledgement of the consequences of deep and persistent disagreement about fundamental questions concerning justice and the common good. And therefore, the way forward will require an acknowledgement that a legitimate constitutional order will require compromise.

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1349 I. ORIGINALIST METHODOLOGY 1353 II. THE ORIGINAL MEANINGS OF "CITIZENS" AND "CONTROVERSIES" 1357 III. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF ARTICLE III PARTIES 1361 A. The General [...], Federal courts control an outsize share of big-ticket corporate litigation. And that control rests, to a significant degree, on the Supreme Court's extension of Article Ill's Diversity of Citizenship Clause to corporations. Yet, critics have questioned the constitutionality of corporate diversity jurisdiction from the beginning. In this Article and a previous one, we develop the first sustained critique of corporate diversity jurisdiction. Our previous article demonstrated that corporations are not "citizens" given the original meaning of that word. But we noted this finding alone doesn't sink general corporate diversity jurisdiction. The ranks of corporate shareholders include many undoubted "citizens." And so corporate litigants might preserve their access to diversity jurisdiction if that jurisdiction can vest through diverse shareholder citizenship. In this Article, we consider whether corporations can indeed preserve access to diversity jurisdiction through this route. We conclude they cannot. From an originalist perspective, shareholders are not parties to Article III "controversies" that proceed in the corporate name. In such controversies, shareholder citizenship cannot establish diversity jurisdiction. The result of our analysis is that corporations are not citizens, and they normally can't use shareholder citizenship to access diversity jurisdiction either. It follows that general corporate diversity jurisdiction is not authorized by the constitutional text.

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 289 I. FIRST THEME: CONSTRAINT BY THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 290 A. A Short Introduction to Originalism and Living Constitutionalism 290 1. Public Meaning [...], Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court by Professor Richard Fallon explores the relationship between normative legitimacy and the Supreme Court's role in constitutional interpretation and construction. This essay interrogates Fallon's ideas in the context of the great debate between originalism and living constitutionalism via the development of the themes. The first theme focuses on the relationship between Fallon's views and the originalist claim that constitutional interpretation and construction should be constrained by the original public meaning of the constitutional text. The second theme focuses on Fallon s development of the idea of reflective equilibrium as a method for constitutional theory and practice. The third theme focuses on the structure of normative constitutional legitimacy, contrasting Fallon's focus on the substantive justice of constitutional norms with an alternative approach that conceptualizes constitutional legitimacy as a multidimensional process value. The essay begins and ends with praise for Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court: Fallon's book is important, wide-ranging, and deep; it is essential reading for constitutional scholars.

ABSTRACT Thomas Cooley's A Treatise on The Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union was the most influential treatise of constitutional law [...]

In three recent cases, the constitutional concepts of history and tradition have played important roles in the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization relied on history and tradition to overrule Roe v. Wade. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen articulated a history and tradition test for the validity of laws regulating the right to bear arms recognized by the Second Amendment. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District looked to history and tradition in formulating the test for the consistency of state action with the Establishment Clause. These cases raise important questions about the Court's approach to constitutional interpretation and construction. Do Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy represent a new theory of constitutional interpretation and construction based on history and tradition? In the alternative, should the references to history and tradition in these opinions be understood through the lens of Constitutional Pluralism as modalities of constitutional argument? Finally, can the use of history and tradition in Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy be reconciled with the Supreme Court's embrace of Public Meaning Originalism? Part I of this Article elucidates the constitutional concepts of history and tradition. Part II lays out four distinct roles that history and tradition can play: (1) as evidence of original meaning and purpose, (2) as modalities of constitutional argument within a constitutional pluralist framework, (3) as a novel constitutional theory, which we call "Historical Traditionalism," and (4) as an implementing doctrine. Part III investigates the roles of history and tradition in Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy. Part IV articulates a comprehensive strategy for the incorporation of history and tradition in constitutional jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

c. The Type-Meaning Fallacy At this point, we have laid out the type-token distinction and related that distinction to the Fixation Thesis. We are now in a position to understand [...]

"Original public meaning" has become increasingly important in constitutional discourse. This Article investigates the nature of original public meaning in three steps. First, each word in the phrase "original public meaning" is explicated and clarified. The word "original" represents the idea that the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified. The word "public" signifies that the relevant meaning is ordinary meaning, the understanding of the text conveyed to the public at the time each provision was framed and ratified. The word "meaning" refers to the set of ideas (concepts and propositions) that constitute the communicative content of the constitutional text. The second step situates original public meaning in the context of normative constitutional theory, explaining its role in both Public Meaning Originalism and nonoriginalist constitutional theories. The third and final step investigates the foundations of original public meaning in the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, via an exploration of the distinctions between (a) speaker's meaning and sentence meaning, (b) semantics and pragmatics, (c) sense and reference, and (d) conceptual meaning versus prototypical meaning. Each of the three steps contributes to the articulation of a conception of original public meaning that aims at conceptual clarity, precision, and theoretical depth. The original public meaning of the constitutional text is the communicative content (the set of concepts and propositions) that was conveyed to the public at the time each provision was drafted, proposed, and ratified. Both semantics (the meaning of words and phrases) and pragmatics (meaning conveyed by context) play essential roles in the complex multistage process by which constitutional communication occurs. For public meaning originalists, the original public meaning of the text ought to bind constitutional actors, including judges, legislators, and executive officials. Sometimes, the recovery of original public meaning is relatively easy--the absence of linguistic drift, common sense, and the immediate context make the meaning of the constitutional text readily accessible to contemporary readers. But sometimes, the original public meaning of the constitutional text is difficult to discern, requiring both a deep reading of the constitutional record and careful application of the methods of historical linguistics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

INTRODUCTION: FROM ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO ARTIFICIAL MEANING As artificial intelligences (AI) become more powerful and pervasive, communication by, with, and among AIs has become a common feature of everyday life. [...]

There is another basis for the contention that the Commerce Clause reasoning in Parts III-A and III-D in Justice Roberts's opinion was necessary to the result in NFIB. What was [...]

INTRODUCTION This Essay investigates a familiar set of questions about the relationship between legal texts (e.g., constitutions, statutes, opinions, orders, and contracts) and the content of the law (e.g., norms, [...]