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This research integrates transaction cost and relational exchange theories to depict a more nuanced explanation of exporter-importer exchange relationships when exporters operate from a developing country. Our study examines whether exporters’ investments in specific assets directly influence perceived importer opportunism, or whether these perceptions are driven by the mediating effects of interpersonal and inter-organizational trust and power. Contrary to the general transaction cost argument, we did not find any direct effect of exporter specific assets on perceived importer opportunism. Instead, we found that perceived importer power and exporter inter-organizational trust jointly mediate the exporter specific assets – perceived importer opportunism relationship. By incorporating a dimensional view of trust, we help to resolve conflicting theoretical specifications and empirical results found in the extant literature. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0CONTACT A. F. M. Jalal Ahamed jalal.ahamed@his.se School of Business, University of Skövde, Högskolevägen 8, Skövde SE-541 28, Sweden. The author is thankful for generous support provided under a USFQ-CADE grant 2018.

The aim of the present study is to understand contractual relations through the complementarity of the Transaction Costs Theory, Measurement Costs Theory, and the Resource-Based View. Initially, we sought to define an analytical model appropriate to the complementarity objective, considering the categories of each approach. The proposition was: given the possibility of measuring the attributes of products, the contractual relationship can be used to guarantee property rights over assets of high specificity and strategic value, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. Secondly, a qualitative descriptive cross-cut (2014 and 2015) study was carried out. In this phase, the complementarity proposition was analyzed based on data obtained through semi-structured interviews with logistics, production, and purchasing managers of automakers located in the state of Parana, and some of their direct suppliers. Our proposition indicates that when there is the possibility of measuring product attributes, the contractual relationship can be used to secure property rights of high-specificity assets and strategic resources, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. This proposition was verified because, in the case of high-specificity auto parts, the measurability of their dimensions ensures protection of specific and residual property rights. In the case of strategic resources, when there is a possibility of measurement and control, contracting is allowed, even including the acquisition of innovations that bring competitive advantage (Bluetooth, integrated GPS with SD card, back-up sensor, air bags). It was observed that, even though competitive advantages constitute valuable and rare resources for automakers at their launch, this did not prevent contracting. Verification can offer an alternative path to rational Transaction Costs Theory, as proposed by Williamson, and the use of vertical integration as a form of controlling strategic resources, recommended by the Resource-Based View, which still requires further studies in order to overcome persistent limitations in the model.

В статье анализируются сетевые структуры двух лидеров мировой автомобильной промышленности — Volkswagen AG (Германия) и Ford Motors Company (США). Сравниваются такие параметры сетей, как принципы формирования состава участников, стадии создания стоимости, способы координации деятельности участников сети, основания власти фокального участника, способы извлечения ценности, устойчивость сети. Для каждой из сетей определяется ее тип и перечисляются участники первого уровня. Выявлены общие черты сетей создания стоимости в автомобилестроении: существенные размеры (количество участников всех уровней), использование стандартизации как ведущего способа координации деятельности, существенная рыночная доля интегратора и вложения партнеров в специфические активы как основание власти интегратора, использование участников сети для выхода на новые рынки, локализация производства в странах с относительно дешевой рабочей силой, высокие требования к репутации поставщиков и субподрядчиков, концентрация основных исследовательских и конструкторских разработок в рамках фокальной компании при передаче на аутсорсинг значительной части логистических, маркетинговых и дистрибьютерских функций. Определены также существенные различия в принципах формирования сетей. К ним относятся: число участников первого уровня (различается на два порядка), стабильность участия (высокая для Ford Motors и относительно низкая для Volkswagen AG), опора на помощь правительства (полное исключение для компании Ford и активное использование компанией Volkswagen AG), значительная доля рынка при низкой рентабельности (Volkswagen AG) или меньшая доля рынка при высокой рентабельности (Ford Motors Company)., The article examines network structures of two leaders of the global automotive industry: Volkswagen AG (Germany) and Ford Motors Company (USA). The author compares such features of the networks as principles of including the participants, stages of value creation, methods of coordinating the activities of network participants, fundamentals of the power of the focal participant, methods of extracting value and sustainability of the network. For each of the networks the author determines its type and lists the participants of the first tier. The general features of value networks in the automotive industry are revealed. These include: a significant size (number of participants at all levels), the use of standardization as a leading method of coordinating activities, a significant market share of the integrator and partners’ investment in specific assets as the basis of the integrator’s power, use of network members for entering new markets, localization of production in countries with relatively cheap labor, high requirements for suppliers and subcontractors, performing research and development within a focal company while outsourcing a significant part of logistics, marketing and distribution functions. Significant differences in the principles of network formation have also been identified. These include: the number of first-tier participants (differs by 2 orders), stability of participation (high for Ford Motors and relatively low for Volkswagen AG), reliance on government assistance (not possible for Ford and high for Volkswagen AG), a significant market share with low profitability (Volkswagen AG) or a lower market share with high profitability (Ford Motors Company)., Бизнес. Образование. Право, Выпуск 4 (53) 2020

Service provider opportunism is a serious concern in third party logistics (3PL) relationships. However, our knowledge about antecedents of 3PL providers' opportunism is limited. According to transaction cost economics (TCE), increased transaction costs give rise to opportunism. This study incorporates key constructs (i.e., environmental uncertainty, specific asset, and opportunism) from TCE and conducts a transaction cost analysis. We argue that environmental uncertainty and specific asset create exchange hazards that result in opportunism. Meanwhile, specific asset reduces coordination costs raised by environmental uncertainty. Building on the arguments, this study tests a model, which hypothesizes that environmental uncertainty (demand, supply, and technology uncertainty), and specific asset (user and supplier specific asset) are positively related to opportunism, and that environmental uncertainty is positively related to specific asset. Structural equation modeling is used to examine data from 247 3PL relationships from China. The results show that demand uncertainty decreases opportunism, supply uncertainty increases opportunism, and technology uncertainty does not have a significant effect. User specific asset increases opportunism, while provider specific asset decreases opportunism. Demand and supply uncertainty have positive effects on user specific asset, but non-significant effects on provider user asset, while technology uncertainty does not have a significant impact on user or provider specific asset. In general, our findings are supported by the rationale of TCE and some surprising findings may be explained by industrial or cultural distinctions. This study contributes to 3PL literature and practices.

Разработана концепция о природе возникновения кластера как специфической формы организационного объединения, основанной на выборе альтернативного механизма, который за счет усиления инфраструктурных связей способен снизить трансакционные издержки в обмене правами собственности на различные специфические активы организации. С позиции институционального подхода предложена обобщенная классификация рыночных структур, действующих на рынке монополистической конкуренции, в которой кластер является альтернативной формой рыночной организации. Представлена обобщенная модель формирования инфраструктурных связей между организациями на конкурентном рынке. Рассмотрена классификация специфических активов, используемых субъектами рыночных отношений. С точки зрения выбора механизмов, направленных на снижение трансакционных издержек, возникающих в процессе формирования и реализации бизнеса, объяснено имеющееся многообразие его организационных форм. Рассмотрена трансакционная основа деятельности и типы применяемых контрактов субъектами рыночных отношений. Уточнены место и роль кластера в развитии рыночных отношений, а также рассмотрены институциональные предпосылки его возникновения. Проанализированы критерии формирования кластера. Представлена концепция формирования кластеров как организационных структур рыночных отношений. Кластер рассматривается как специфическая форма рыночных отношений, которая позволяет достигнуть максимальной рыночной власти за счет способности снижения трансакционных издержек инфраструктурных связей. Важно отметить, что использование инфраструктурных связей представляет собой обмен правомочиями на специфические активы в виде реализации различных типов трансакций. Рассмотрены обобщенные типы институциональной ренты. При этом возможность снижения различных видов инфраструктурных издержек формирует отдельный вид институциональной ренты – инфраструктурную ренту. Возможность извлечения монопольного дохода от использования инфраструктурной ренты рассматривается в качестве основной предпосылки возникновения кластеров на рынке монополистической конкуренции. Представлены условия формирования границ деятельности организационных структур на рынке монополистической конкуренции. Рассмотрены общие условия обменов, которые позволяют приблизиться к пониманию природы возникновения кластеров, а также предложена методологическая основа дальнейшего анализа их экономической деятельности в различных секторах экономики., We have developed a concept on the nature of cluster formation as a specific type of organizational structure based on the choice of an alternative mechanism that, by strengthening infrastructural links, can reduce transaction costs in the exchange of ownership rights for various specific assets. We have proposed a generalized classification of market structures operating in the market of monopolistic competition from the standpoint of institutional approach, with the cluster considered as an alternative form of market organization. We have presented a generalized model of formation of infrastructure links between organizations in a competitive market. The classification of specific assets used by market entities has been considered. The variety of organizational forms of business has been explained from the standpoint of choice of mechanisms aimed at reducing the transaction costs that arise in the process of creating and running the business. We have considered the transactional basis of activity and the types of contracts used by the subjects of market relations. The article clarifies the place and role of the cluster in the development of market relations and also examines the institutional prerequisites for its genesis. The criteria for cluster formation have been analyzed. The concept of forming clusters as organizational structures of market relations has been presented. The cluster is considered as a specific form of market relations allowing to achieve maximum market power by reducing transaction costs of infrastructure connections. Notably, using infrastructure links is an exchange of powers for specific assets by implementing various types of transactions. We have considered generalized types of institutional rent. At the same time, reducing various types of infrastructure costs forms a separate type of institutional rent: infrastructure rent. Extracting monopoly revenue from using infrastructure rent is regarded as the main prerequisite for emergence of clusters in the market of monopolistic competition. We have presented the conditions in which the boundaries of activity of organizational structures form in the market of monopolistic competition. We have examined the general conditions for the exchanges allowing to better understand the origin of clusters, as well as to offer a methodological basis for further analysis of their economic activities in various sectors of economy.

The aim of the present study is to understand contractual relations through the complementarity of the Transaction Costs Theory, Measurement Costs Theory, and the Resource-Based View. Initially, we sought to define an analytical model appropriate to the complementarity objective, considering the categories of each approach. The proposition was: given the possibility of measuring the attributes of products, the contractual relationship can be used to guarantee property rights over assets of high specificity and strategic value, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. Secondly, a qualitative descriptive cross-cut (2014 and 2015) study was carried out. In this phase, the complementarity proposition was analyzed based on data obtained through semi-structured interviews with logistics, production, and purchasing managers of automakers located in the state of Paraná, and some of their direct suppliers. Our proposition indicates that when there is the possibility of measuring product attributes, the contractual relationship can be used to secure property rights of high-specificity assets and strategic resources, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. This proposition was verified because, in the case of high-specificity auto parts, the measurability of their dimensions ensures protection of specific and residual property rights. In the case of strategic resources, when there is a possibility of measurement and control, contracting is allowed, even including the acquisition of innovations that bring competitive advantage (Bluetooth, integrated GPS with SD card, back-up sensor, air bags). It was observed that, even though competitive advantages constitute valuable and rare resources for automakers at their launch, this did not prevent contracting. Verification can offer an alternative path to rational Transaction Costs Theory, as proposed by Williamson, and the use of vertical integration as a form of controlling strategic resources, recommended by the Resource-Based View, which still requires further studies in order to overcome persistent limitations in the model. Resumo Neste artigo, objetivou-se compreender as relações contratuais por meio da complementaridade da Teoria dos Custos de Transação, Teoria dos Custos de Mensuração e Visão Baseada em Recursos. Para tanto, buscou-se definir um modelo analítico adequado ao objetivo de complementaridade, considerando-se as categorias de cada abordagem. A proposição elaborada indica que, na possibilidade de mensuração dos atributos dos produtos, a relação contratual pode ser utilizada para garantir os direitos de propriedade sobre ativos de elevada especificidade e recursos estratégicos, evitando-se os custos da integração vertical. Em um segundo momento, a partir de uma pesquisa qualitativa descritiva, com recorte no ano de 2015, realizou-se a fase empírica da proposta. Nessa fase, analisou-se a proposição de complementaridade a partir de dados obtidos por meio de entrevistas semiestruturadas com gerentes de logísticas, produção e compras das montadoras automotivas localizadas no Estado do Paraná, e alguns de seus fornecedores diretos. A proposição foi ratificada ao se constatar que, no caso de autopeças de elevada especificidade, a capacidade de mensuração de suas dimensões garante a proteção de direitos de propriedade específicos e residuais. No caso dos recursos estratégicos, na possibilidade de mensuração e controle, a contratação permitiu a aquisição de diversas inovações geradoras de vantagem competitiva (bluetooth, o GPS integrado no veiculo, com cartão SD, o sensor de ré, air bags). Observou-se que, mesmo se constituindo em recursos valiosos e raros para as montadoras no seu lançamento, esse fato não impediu que esses fossem adquiridos por intermédio da contratação. Conclui-se que essa ratificação pode oferecer um caminho alternativo ao racional da TCT, proposto por Williamson, e à orientação pela integração de recursos, como forma de controle, preconizado pela VBR, o que ainda carece de maiores estudos visando a superar as limitações ainda presentes no modelo apresentado. Resumen El propósito en este artículo es entender las relaciones contractuales por medio de la complementariedad de la Teoría de los Costos de Transacción, Teoría de los Costos de Medición y de Visión Basada en los Recursos. Para ello, se ha buscado establecer un modelo analítico apropiado al objetivo de complementariedad, teniendo en cuenta las categorías de cada enfoque. La proposición elaborada indica que, en la posibilidad de medición de los atributos del producto, la relación contractual puede utilizarse para asegurar los derechos de propiedad de activos de alta especificidad y recursos estratégicos, evitándose los costos de la integración vertical. En una segunda etapa, a partir de un estudio cualitativo descriptivo, con sección en el año 2015, se ha llevado a cabo la fase empírica de la proposición. En esta fase, se ha analizado la proposición complementaria, a partir de datos obtenidos por medio de entrevistas semiestructuradas con los directores de logística, producción y adquisición de plantas ensambladoras automotrices ubicadas en el estado de Paraná, y algunos de sus proveedores directos. La proposición ha sido ratificada por la constatación de que, en el caso de autopartes de alta especificidad, la capacidad de medición de sus dimensiones asegura la protección de los derechos de propiedad específicos y residuales. En cuanto a los recursos estratégicos, en la posibilidad de medición y control, la contratación ha permitido la adquisición de una serie de innovaciones generadoras de ventaja competitiva (bluetooth, GPS integrado en el vehículo, con tarjeta SD, sensor de marcha atrás, air bags). Se advierte que, aunque constituyan recursos valiosos y raros para los fabricantes de automóviles en su lanzamiento, este hecho no ha impedido que éstos fueran adquiridos por medio de la contratación. Se concluye que dicha comprobación puede ofrecer un medio alternativo al camino racional de la TCT, propuesto por Williamson, y a la orientación hacia la integración de los recursos, como medio de control, preconizado por la VBR. Es necesario que se realicen más estudios para superar las limitaciones todavía presentes en el modelo.

The reasons for the necessity of using of a new institutional economic theory for the further development of accounting in Ukraine is grounded. The institutionalists’ tendency of the transition from the research of the role of transaction costs in the enterprise activity to the analysis of the peculiarities of investments in specific assets of the enterprise is identified. The types of the selected assets, depending on the level of their specificity, are analyzed. The types of assets classified according to their specifics, and are substantiated. The role of the concept of specific assets for the further development of accounting are revealed. The three main directions of application of the concept of the specific assets in the context of the development of accounting science are highlighted and substantiated; they are: 1) the allocation of specific assets in the general structure of the assets of the enterprise; 2) the development of accounting outsourcing in the context of understanding of the accounting service staff as one of the types of specific resources; 3) the understanding of accounting information as a specific asset of the enterprise., Обґрунтовано причини необхідності використання неоінституційної економічної теорії для подальшого розвитку бухгалтерського обліку в Україні. Виділено тенденцію переходу від дослідження вченими-інституціоналістами ролі трансакційних витрат у діяльності підприємства до аналізу особливостей здійснення інвестицій у специфічні активи підприємства. Проаналізовано види активів, виокремлених, залежно від рівня їх специфічності. Класифіковано активи за типами їх специфіки та обґрунтовано сутність кожного з виокремлених видів. Розкрито роль концепції специфічних активів для подальшого розвитку бухгалтерського обліку. Виділено та обґрунтовано три основних напрямки застосування концепції специфічних активів у контексті розвитку бухгалтерської науки: 1) виділення специфічних активів у загальній структурі активів підприємства; 2) розвиток бухгалтерського аутсорсингу в контексті розуміння працівників бухгалтерської служби як одного з видів специфічних ресурсів; 3) розуміння бухгалтерської інформації як специфічного активу підприємства

Very little work has been carried out exploring the factors influencing the decision making for hotel activities outsourcing. For this reason the current research, by focusing on TCE, seeks to understand and identify the factors that influence managers’ decision making about hotel activities outsourcing. From among the three dimensions involved in TCE, Specific Assets is selected as the focal point of the study. Each of the six types of assets, discussed by Williams, is investigated for its influence on the outsourcing decision making. Therefore, six hypotheses are defined to test the linkage between each type of the specific assets and activities outsourcing. The research method is survey, conducted by questionnaire and semi- structured interviews. Spearman’s bivariate correlation test is performed to explore existence of meaningful relationships among variables. Findings refute two hypotheses and approve four of them. Temporal and physical specific assets are found to have no meaningful relationship with activities outsourcing; and hotels prefer to perform these activities themselves. The other four types of assets may cause hotel managers to outsource their activities.

[EN] This paper examines formalized contracts between outsourcing logistics providers and companies in the perishable food industry by evaluating relationships with specificity and uncertainty. A sample of 55 outsourcing agreements were analyzed and found that exchanges are characterized by positive transaction costs arising from contractual problems such as investments in specific assets and information asymmetries. There are several types of specificity and the impact varies depending upon the company. Contractual agreements which are designed to address each type of specificity can provide firms a safeguard mechanism.

It is generally agreed that the relationship quality (RELQUAL) in business exchange situations is important. However, there does not appear to be a consensus on the conceptualisation and measurement of the many dimensions of this construct. This may be due to the difficulty in measuring many dimensions in one empirical study. This raises a concern regarding the understanding of the interaction among the various dimensions. Using data gathered in a survey of Canadian managers and executives the present study investigates how focal dimensions pertaining to RELQUAL inter-relate. A model consisting of the following ten dimensions derived from RELQUAL literature was tested: continuity, satisfaction, trust, commitment, opportunism, cooperation, coordination, formalisation, dependence, specific assets. All recommended guidelines for convergent, discriminant and nomological validity, as well as construct reliability, were met.

In this paper, we first establish the core, fundamental concepts of Williamson’s TCE, examining the different governance structures or the institutional alternatives that TCE theory proposes. We go on to describe some critical considerations and theoretical proposals that correspond fundamentally to Williamson’s heuristic model, the integration of incentives in organizational forms, idiosyncratic demand, and how the concept of transaction is conceived in general.

Supply chain coordination and collaboration in general requires dedicated investments by the members of the chain in order to decrease cost, increase capacity or mitigate risks. Common assumptions in the literature include predefined contractual structures, common information on capacity, costs and the value added through the intended action. On the other hand, evidence suggests that the extent of supply chain collaboration is still not as prevalent as theory would predict, indicating that true decision-makers may operate under different assumptions. Ina stylized dyadic supply chain model we prove the existence of equilibria under which information asymmetry between supplier and manufacturer is preferred to information sharing when relation-specific investment information is involved. We use a Stackelberg model for the single-period interaction between two parties when the downstream party has to undertake a relationship-specific investment. Both parties have outside options to avoid monopsony-monopoly rents. The supplier uses his Bayesian belief regarding the relationship-specific investment cost, leading to a tradeoff between rent extraction and sharing of coordination benefits. We provide closed form results for the supplier's contract and resulting information rent distribution when the belief follows common distribution functions such as those with increasing failure rates A numerical instance illustrates the results.

The question of financing innovative small business is determinant in the current context. Giving the share that they represent in the market, they contribute to increase productivity of the economy. The problems of financing the SME’s are related to the almost intangible specificity of their assets that give them only a limited access to the traditional financing channels. Moreover, the financing becomes risky as the decision maker has no history to assess the potential of development on the basis of previous results. The traditional funding channels are incompatible with the context of a value creation based on innovation. Private equity activity is in this regard a better mode of financing innovative enterprises added to the advantage of assuming the risk associated with their specific characteristics. From an economic point of view, private equity funds can boost and contribute to the value creation process.

This paper analyses the question of the counterparts that governments should claim from firms and/or economic sectors supported by vertical industrial policy. This is a discussion that still have to advance because everything indicate that the set of current counterparts (goals of costs, productivity, exportation, etc.) still may be increased and improved, what will facilitate the assessment of industrial policy execution by society and the verification of its efficacy in order to yielding more possibilities of economic growth for a country or region. To reinforce the commitment credibility of the agents supported by industrial policy, this paper proposes to maintain the counterparts meant before and that such agents will be stimulated to commit specific assets in their activities that are supported by govern. It is shown that, without use more public resources than the used currently, this new counterpart may reinforce substantially the incentives that the firms supported by vertical industrial policy have it to execute the traditional counterparts assumed by them, and with it guarantee the best possible use of public resources.

Este artículo analiza el comportamiento inversor de una muestra de empresas españolas que cotizan en bolsa a través de un modelo dinámico. La inversión es explicada con características financieras como, liquidez, costes de quiebra, ahorro fiscal y activos específicos de las empresas. Los resultados obtenidos son dos principalmente. El primero es una fuerte relación entre la inversión y la deuda, además el efecto endeudamiento sobre la inversión es mayor en las empresas con activos menos líquidos que en las empresas con activos más líquidos, lo que puede indicar, restricciones financieras. El segundo resultado es que la relación entre liquidez y valor de liquidación de los activos en caso de quiebra es negativa. This paper analyzes the investment behavior of Spanish firms through a dynamic model where investment is explained by financial characteristics such as, liquidity, bankruptcy costs, tax shield and specific assets of the firms. The model is estimated for a sample of Spanish quoted manufacturing firms during 1991-1995. Two main results arise. First, a strong relationship between investment and debt has been found. Moreover, indebtedness rate effects on investment are larger in less liquid asset firms than in more liquid asset firms. That seemingly indicates that those are financial constraints. Secondly, a negative relationship between liquidity and scrapping value of assets (in the case of bankruptcy). In this case, the firm uses internal financial resources to extend liquidity and to make optimal investment decisions.