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3,118 results on '"Stackelberg game"'

37. Integral Reinforcement Learning Based Robust Anti-disturbance Control of Unmanned Surface Vehicle Based on Stackelberg Game

Author

Zhao, Dong, Ren, Wenjing, Meng, Yizhen, Angrisani, Leopoldo, Series Editor, Arteaga, Marco, Series Editor, Chakraborty, Samarjit, Series Editor, Chen, Shanben, Series Editor, Chen, Tan Kay, Series Editor, Dillmann, Rüdiger, Series Editor, Duan, Haibin, Series Editor, Ferrari, Gianluigi, Series Editor, Ferre, Manuel, Series Editor, Jabbari, Faryar, Series Editor, Jia, Limin, Series Editor, Kacprzyk, Janusz, Series Editor, Khamis, Alaa, Series Editor, Kroeger, Torsten, Series Editor, Li, Yong, Series Editor, Liang, Qilian, Series Editor, Martín, Ferran, Series Editor, Ming, Tan Cher, Series Editor, Minker, Wolfgang, Series Editor, Misra, Pradeep, Series Editor, Mukhopadhyay, Subhas, Series Editor, Ning, Cun-Zheng, Series Editor, Nishida, Toyoaki, Series Editor, Oneto, Luca, Series Editor, Panigrahi, Bijaya Ketan, Series Editor, Pascucci, Federica, Series Editor, Qin, Yong, Series Editor, Seng, Gan Woon, Series Editor, Speidel, Joachim, Series Editor, Veiga, Germano, Series Editor, Wu, Haitao, Series Editor, Zamboni, Walter, Series Editor, Tan, Kay Chen, Series Editor, Yan, Liang, editor, and Deng, Yimin, editor

Published
2025
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38. A Distributed Computation Offloading Scheme Based on Stackelberg Game in MEC

Author

Sun, Weifeng, Qin, Yixing, Zhang, Bowei, Goos, Gerhard, Series Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Chen, Yong, editor, Gao, Xiaofeng, editor, Sun, Xiaoming, editor, and Zhang, An, editor

Published
2025
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39. Transactive Energy Management for Microgrids: Peer-To-Peer Trading Using Stackelberg Game Approach

Author

Kumar, Amit, Jain, Prerna, Harit, Abhishek, Prajesh, Ashish, Angrisani, Leopoldo, Series Editor, Arteaga, Marco, Series Editor, Chakraborty, Samarjit, Series Editor, Chen, Shanben, Series Editor, Chen, Tan Kay, Series Editor, Dillmann, Rüdiger, Series Editor, Duan, Haibin, Series Editor, Ferrari, Gianluigi, Series Editor, Ferre, Manuel, Series Editor, Jabbari, Faryar, Series Editor, Jia, Limin, Series Editor, Kacprzyk, Janusz, Series Editor, Khamis, Alaa, Series Editor, Kroeger, Torsten, Series Editor, Li, Yong, Series Editor, Liang, Qilian, Series Editor, Martín, Ferran, Series Editor, Ming, Tan Cher, Series Editor, Minker, Wolfgang, Series Editor, Misra, Pradeep, Series Editor, Mukhopadhyay, Subhas, Series Editor, Ning, Cun-Zheng, Series Editor, Nishida, Toyoaki, Series Editor, Oneto, Luca, Series Editor, Panigrahi, Bijaya Ketan, Series Editor, Pascucci, Federica, Series Editor, Qin, Yong, Series Editor, Seng, Gan Woon, Series Editor, Speidel, Joachim, Series Editor, Veiga, Germano, Series Editor, Wu, Haitao, Series Editor, Zamboni, Walter, Series Editor, Tan, Kay Chen, Series Editor, Tripathi, Anshuman, editor, Soni, Amit, editor, Tiwari, Manish, editor, Swarnkar, Anil, editor, and Sahariya, Jagrati, editor

Published
2025
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41. OPMUS: A Win-Win Pricing Strategy for Machine Unlearning Service

Author

Tang, Mingjian, Wang, Weiqi, Yu, Shui, Goos, Gerhard, Series Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Sheng, Quan Z., editor, Dobbie, Gill, editor, Jiang, Jing, editor, Zhang, Xuyun, editor, Zhang, Wei Emma, editor, Manolopoulos, Yannis, editor, Wu, Jia, editor, Mansoor, Wathiq, editor, and Ma, Congbo, editor

Published
2025
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42. Operation Optimization Strategy of Multi-energy Microgrid with Shared Energy Storage Based on Stackelberg Game

Author

Zhang, Xi, Xiao, Qian, Li, Tianxiang, Lu, Wenbiao, Mu, Yunfei, Jia, Hongjie, Qiao, Ji, Wang, Xinying, Pu, Tianjiao, Angrisani, Leopoldo, Series Editor, Arteaga, Marco, Series Editor, Chakraborty, Samarjit, Series Editor, Chen, Shanben, Series Editor, Chen, Tan Kay, Series Editor, Dillmann, Rüdiger, Series Editor, Duan, Haibin, Series Editor, Ferrari, Gianluigi, Series Editor, Ferre, Manuel, Series Editor, Jabbari, Faryar, Series Editor, Jia, Limin, Series Editor, Kacprzyk, Janusz, Series Editor, Khamis, Alaa, Series Editor, Kroeger, Torsten, Series Editor, Li, Yong, Series Editor, Liang, Qilian, Series Editor, Martín, Ferran, Series Editor, Ming, Tan Cher, Series Editor, Minker, Wolfgang, Series Editor, Misra, Pradeep, Series Editor, Mukhopadhyay, Subhas, Series Editor, Ning, Cun-Zheng, Series Editor, Nishida, Toyoaki, Series Editor, Oneto, Luca, Series Editor, Panigrahi, Bijaya Ketan, Series Editor, Pascucci, Federica, Series Editor, Qin, Yong, Series Editor, Seng, Gan Woon, Series Editor, Speidel, Joachim, Series Editor, Veiga, Germano, Series Editor, Wu, Haitao, Series Editor, Zamboni, Walter, Series Editor, Tan, Kay Chen, Series Editor, Yang, Qingxin, editor, and Li, Jian, editor

Published
2025
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43. Optimal Pricing Model of Shared Energy Storage Considering Stackelberg Game Based on Prospect Theory

Author

Xin, Fang, Zhiyi, Li, Bin, Tan, Angrisani, Leopoldo, Series Editor, Arteaga, Marco, Series Editor, Chakraborty, Samarjit, Series Editor, Chen, Shanben, Series Editor, Chen, Tan Kay, Series Editor, Dillmann, Rüdiger, Series Editor, Duan, Haibin, Series Editor, Ferrari, Gianluigi, Series Editor, Ferre, Manuel, Series Editor, Jabbari, Faryar, Series Editor, Jia, Limin, Series Editor, Kacprzyk, Janusz, Series Editor, Khamis, Alaa, Series Editor, Kroeger, Torsten, Series Editor, Li, Yong, Series Editor, Liang, Qilian, Series Editor, Martín, Ferran, Series Editor, Ming, Tan Cher, Series Editor, Minker, Wolfgang, Series Editor, Misra, Pradeep, Series Editor, Mukhopadhyay, Subhas, Series Editor, Ning, Cun-Zheng, Series Editor, Nishida, Toyoaki, Series Editor, Oneto, Luca, Series Editor, Panigrahi, Bijaya Ketan, Series Editor, Pascucci, Federica, Series Editor, Qin, Yong, Series Editor, Seng, Gan Woon, Series Editor, Speidel, Joachim, Series Editor, Veiga, Germano, Series Editor, Wu, Haitao, Series Editor, Zamboni, Walter, Series Editor, Tan, Kay Chen, Series Editor, Yang, Qingxin, editor, and Li, Jian, editor

Published
2025
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44. Decision-Making in Closed-Loop Dual-Channel Recycling Supply Chain with Government Regulation

Author

Luo, Min, Chen, Xue, Qi, Xiaorui, Gong, Lei, Zeng, Yinlian, di Prisco, Marco, Series Editor, Chen, Sheng-Hong, Series Editor, Vayas, Ioannis, Series Editor, Kumar Shukla, Sanjay, Series Editor, Sharma, Anuj, Series Editor, Kumar, Nagesh, Series Editor, Wang, Chien Ming, Series Editor, Cui, Zhen-Dong, Series Editor, Lu, Xinzheng, Series Editor, Meng, Lingyun, editor, Qian, Yongsheng, editor, Bai, Yun, editor, Lv, Bin, editor, and Tang, Yuanjie, editor

Published
2025
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45. A Computing Resource Pricing Strategy of Satellite-Earth Double Edge Computing System

Author

Wang, Bo, Xie, XinYing, Huang, Dongyan, Akan, Ozgur, Editorial Board Member, Bellavista, Paolo, Editorial Board Member, Cao, Jiannong, Editorial Board Member, Coulson, Geoffrey, Editorial Board Member, Dressler, Falko, Editorial Board Member, Ferrari, Domenico, Editorial Board Member, Gerla, Mario, Editorial Board Member, Kobayashi, Hisashi, Editorial Board Member, Palazzo, Sergio, Editorial Board Member, Sahni, Sartaj, Editorial Board Member, Shen, Xuemin, Editorial Board Member, Stan, Mircea, Editorial Board Member, Jia, Xiaohua, Editorial Board Member, Zomaya, Albert Y., Editorial Board Member, and Wang, Junyi, editor

Published
2025
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48. Restrictive Clauses in Loan Contracts: A Sequential Stackelberg Game Interpretation.

Author

Breton, Michèle and Nabassaga, Tiguéné

Abstract

We propose a dynamic stochastic game model to assess the value of restrictive clauses in private loan contracts. Restrictive clauses are used by lenders to mitigate their credit risk, for instance, by linking the interest payments of the borrower to some observable performance measure. We show how the value of these clauses for the lender and the borrower corresponds to the solution of a feedback Stackelberg game in discrete time. We consider two instances of restrictive clauses that are commonly found in the syndicated loan market, namely safety covenants and performance pricing, and provide numerical illustrations using representative instances to compare their relative efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2025
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49. Energy interaction strategy for multi-prosumer distribution systems based on game theory.

Author

Lou, Wei, Zhu, Shenglong, Zhuo, Xu, Qin, Shaorui, Li, Baodong, Zhou, Ya, Chen, Jian, and Gao, Qiang

Abstract

In flexible distribution systems, the strong uncertainty of generation and load demand poses challenges for energy interaction and resource coordination. However, existing energy interaction strategies generally focus only on economic benefits, neglecting safety performance, and are insufficient to ensure the reliable operation of the system. To address these issues, this paper proposes an energy interaction strategy for multi-prosumer flexible distribution systems, considering the economic benefits of all parties and the voltage safety of the system. First, a multi-agent energy interaction framework based on the Stackelberg game is established, and a bi-level optimization model for the distribution network operator and prosumers is constructed. Second, the paper innovatively introduces soft open point-based power flow control technology into the energy trading market. Then, the KKT conditions, dual theory, linearization, and relaxation techniques are applied to transform the original bi-level game problem into a single-level mixed-integer second-order cone programming problem, improving computational efficiency. Finally, the improved IEEE 33-bus distribution system is simulated and compared with two other scenarios. The results show that the proposed strategy can significantly improve the economic and safety performance of the energy interaction system, optimize the power flow distribution, and effectively enhance power quality. The approach offers a promising solution to the growing challenges of managing distributed energy resources in the context of flexible and reliable grid operation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2025
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50. Blockchain technology adoption strategies for the shipping costs bearer in the fresh product supply chain.

Author

Zhang, Weisi, Wu, Lin, and Ji, Lulu

Subjects
BLOCKCHAINS, SHIPPING fees, COST allocation, GAME theory, PERISHABLE goods, SUSTAINABILITY, SUPPLY chain management
Abstract

Fresh products are characterized by a certain deterioration rate, and the fresh supply chain typically relies on third-party cold chain logistics companies (3PLs) for transportation. This study constructs a fresh supply chain composed of supplier, retailer, and third-party cold chain logistics company, where shipping costs are borne by either the supplier or the retailer. The shipping costs bearer considers whether to adopt blockchain technology to enhance the transparency of fresh logistics and improve consumers' perceived value. Using game theory, the paper attempts to explore who should bear the shipping costs (supplier or retailer), clarifying the shipping costs bear's blockchain adoption strategy. The results indicate that: First, the 3PL's profit is negatively correlated with the research and development (R&D) cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction (CER) and the deterioration rate of fresh products, while it is positively correlated with consumer low-carbon preferences. When the R&D cost coefficient of CER is high, or the deterioration rate of fresh products is low, or consumer low-carbon preferences are low, the 3PL prefers RCB model, otherwise SNB model. Additionally, the 3PL's carbon reduction level is higher when blockchain technology is adopted, especially with low R&D cost coefficient of CER and high consumer low-carbon preferences. Second, regarding who should bear the shipping costs, when blockchain technology is not adopted, it is optimal for the supplier to bear the shipping costs, maximizing the overall profit of the supply chain. In contrast, when blockchain technology is adopted, having the retailer bear the shipping costs maximizes the overall profit of the supply chain. Specifically, when the R&D cost coefficient of CER is high, regardless of blockchain adoption, the supplier bearing the shipping costs maximizes the overall profit of the supply chain. Finally, concerning whether the bearer should invest in blockchain technology, when the R&D cost coefficient of CER is low and consumer low-carbon preferences are high, adopting blockchain technology leads to Pareto optimal profits for both the supplier and the retailer, regardless of who bears the shipping costs. This study provides a decision framework for optimizing cost allocation and technology adoption in sustainable cold chain management, particularly relevant for perishable goods with short shelf lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2025
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