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Po koncu 2. svetovne vojne, ko je politično oblast v Jugoslaviji v svoje roke v celoti prevzela Komunistična partija, ki je z avtoritarnimi prijemi izvedla radikalno preobrazbo političnega in gospodarskega sistema, je del jugoslovanske politične in vojaške emigracije ob podpori tujih obveščevalno-varnostnih služb z organiziranjem oziroma s povezovanjem že organiziranih ilegalnih skupin želel z oboroženim prevratom zrušiti novonastali komunistični režim. Na območju Slovenije so bile v obdobju prvih povojnih let med oboroženimi subverzivnimi skupinami najaktivnejše skupine »Matjaževe vojske«, ki so izvedle številne teroristične napade. V diplomskem delu so prikazane nekatere poglavitne metode, ki se jih je v boju zoper tem skupinam posluževal »Oddelek za zaščito ljudstva« oziroma od leta 1946 naprej »Uprava državne varnosti« kot osrednja služba tedanjega slovenskega obveščevalno-varnostnega sistema, ki je imela v postopkih zoper osumljence terorističnih kaznivih dejanj absolutno pristojnost ter je pri tem z usmeritvami določala tudi delo ostalih varnostnih organov. To delo je temeljilo na različnih tajnih oblikah delovanja, zlasti na uporabi tajnih sodelavcev. After the end of Second World War, when political power in Yugoslavia was completely taken over by the Communist Party, which carried out a radical transformation of the political and economic system with authoritarian approaches, a part of Yugoslav political and military emigration wanted to violently overthrow the newly formed communist regime. With the support of foreign intelligence-security services, they tried to either organize or unite already organized illegal groups for the purpose of an armed coup. Among the most active armed subversive groups in post-war Slovenia there were groups of so-called »Matjaž army«, which carried out numerous terrorist attacks. The diploma thesis presents some of the main methods, used in the fight against those groups by the Department for the Protection of the People and, since 1946, by the State Security Administration, the central service of the Slovenian intelligence-security system at that time. In proceedings against suspects of terrorist offenses, the State Security Administration had absolute jurisdiction and, as such, determined the work of other security bodies. That work was based on various forms of covert activities, particularly in the use of secret collaborators.

Autor u radu na temelju dostupne arhivske građe i relevantne literature analizira metode djelovanja komunističkoga represivnog aparata u Narodnoj Republici / Socijalističkoj Republici Hrvatskoj protiv Katoličke crkve od 1951. do 1965. godine. U radu se prvi put navode brojčani podaci o suradnicima Udbe iz crkvenih redova te organizacija i pojedinaca usko povezanih s Katoličkom crkvom., After the establishment of communist rule in Yugoslavia and the elimination of all political opponents, the Catholic Church remained the only strong and well-organised institution in which the communists saw a possible opponent. This is why the communist authorities carried out a series of repressive and political measures in order to prevent its public activities and weaken its influence in society. Bishops and priests were assassinated or imprisoned, Church property was confiscated, religious publications and seminaries were banned, religious schools were closed and ordinands pressured to give up on studying for priestly vocations, a propaganda campaign was launched against the Church and its priests, priests were scrutinized (especially through clerical associations) and recruited as informants for the secret services, and a series of other measures was carried out with the goal of weakening the influence of the Church in society. The main operational role in the implementation of these measures was played by law enforcement services, primarily the State Security Administration and the other services of the Secretariat of the Interior as well as the Counterintelligence Service, which concerned itself mostly with ecclesiastical persons performing compulsory military service in the Yugoslav People’s Army. These services’ annual reports for Croatia from 1951 to 1965 and their analyses and studies, which only became available to the public in the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb in 2017, offer us insights into law enforcement’s views on the conditions in the Catholic Church, their assessments of its ‘hostile’ activities, and the ways in which they planned their activities and carried out certain anti-Church measures. In addition, this paper is the first to present the actual numerical indicators of priests and other Church officials or persons closely connected to the work of the Church who were in various ways employed as a part of the collaborator networks of communist secret services in their activities regarding the Catholic Church in the stated period. It is important to highlight that the vast majority of these persons agreed to collaborate due to pressure or blackmail, for the most part failed to produce the results that the State Security Administration had expected of them, and were therefore often removed from the collaborator network. The State Security Administration benefited little from this network, and the fact that it failed to achieve its goals in its struggle against the Catholic Church confirms this.

Med letoma 1946 in 1991 je okoli 350.000 Hrvatov emigriralo v zahodne in čezoceanske države, bodisi iz ekonomskih ali političnih razlogov. Organizacije hrvaške politične emigracije na zahodu po drugi svetovni vojni bi lahko razdelili na legalne, pollegalne in nelegalne. Tiste, ki so se pri svojem delovanju posluževale teroristično-diverzantskih akcij, so načeloma bile nelegalne, vendar včasih le pogojno, saj je ta nelegalnost služila zgolj kot obramba pred morebitno jugoslovansko intervencijo pri tamkajšnjih oblasteh. Osnovna značilnost vseh emigrantskih organizacij je bil nacionalizem in šovinizem. Ker pa so bili emigranti različnih miselnosti in političnih prepričanj, je za hrvaško politično emigracijo bila značilna razdvojenost. Ta nasprotja so emigraciji preprečila vse napore, da bi se uspešno povezala pod eno zastavo oz. organizacijo. Emigrantske organizacije so se razlikovale po načinu delovanja, številčnosti in organiziranosti. Nekatere organizacije so se za dosego svojih ciljev posluževale predvsem propagande, druge so edino sredstvo za dosego ciljev videle v terorističnih in diverzantskih akcijah. Glavni cilj hrvaške politične emigracije je bila samostojna hrvaška država, pri čemer se je velik del opiral na ustaštvo. Jugoslovanske varnostnoobveščevalne službe so hrvaško politično emigracijo bolj ali manj uspešno nadzirale. Pri tem so se posluževale različnih prijemov. Najpogostejše je bilo delo s t.i. sodelavci ali agenti pod krinko, ki so se uspešno prikradli med predstavnike emigracije. Tako je varnostnoobveščevalna služba vnašala nemir in razdor znotraj emigrantskih vrst. Ko pa so bili izčrpani vsi koraki, je preostala le še ena možnost: ugrabitev ali atentat. Between 1946 and 1991 approximately 350.000 Croatians emigrated to the western and overseas countries due to economic or political reasons. The Croatian organisations of political migration in the west after the Second World War can be categorised as legal, semi-legal and illegal. Those that engaged in terrorist-diversionary actions were chiefly illegal although sometimes only conditionally for this illegality served merely as a defence against a possible Yugoslavian intervention against the authorities of the said countries. The main characteristic of all emigrant organisations was nationalism and chauvinism, but since the emigrants were of different mentality and political beliefs, the Croatian political emigration was marked by division. These oppositions prevented the emigration from all the efforts to successfully form into one organisation or to be presented under one flag. The emigration organisations were different action-, number- and organisation wise. To achieve their goals, some made use of propaganda while the others saw the only means for fulfilling their ambitions in terrorist and diversionary actions. The primary goal of the Croatian political emigration was an independent Croatian country. In achieving it, a significant part of the emigration relied on Ustashism. The Yugoslavian security and intelligence agencies more or less successfully controlled Croatian political emigration by means of diverse activities. The commonest was working with the so-called undercover agents who successfully infiltrated among the emigration representatives, thus stirring up disorder and discord. But when all the alternatives were exhausted, there was one final option left: abduction or assassination.