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This paper examines one often overlooked aspect of Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics : the analogy he makes between firms and states. Specifically, I contrast this 'states as firms' analogy adopted by Waltz with the state of nature analogy that has often been attributed to him. I make three separate but interrelated claims: (1) the state of nature analogy is not only different from the states as firms analogy, but may also be an inappropriate one for structural realism in the sense that it fails to account for some of the theory's key theses; (2) the states as firms analogy helps us to better understand, if not to fully embrace, how Waltz arrives at certain central premises of his theory; and (3) the states as firms analogy provides a more comprehensive account of dynamic effects of the international system, including the transformation of state attributes that would have been neglected by those who subscribe to the state of nature analogy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper corrects a historical injustice that has been perpetrated against Kant for some time now. Mostly on good grounds, Kantian ethics has been accused of neglecting the role played by the emotions in moral deliberation and in morally informed action. However, the contemporary moral philosophers who have put forth such a claim tend to bypass textual sources, on the one hand, and to downplay the role played by the anthropological writings on Kant’s practical philosophy as a whole, on the other. Relying on highly relevant pre-critical texts in which Kant sketches future argumentative patterns and discusses the role of a negative emotion like shame on the improvement of the human species, I address a mistaken conclusion about Kantian ethics as a whole that is common in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. I also raise paradoxical conclusions that follow from Kant’s argument, once its implicit premises have been brought to light. I conclude that Kant did indeed think seriously about a so-called ‘shame-instinct’, however much his central ideas diverge from contemporary readings of the emotion, and fall short of fulfilling the ultimate target one can assume his insights would be drawing at

Locke bases his moral and political philosophy on his doctrine of the 'law of nature'. Scholars have debated the content and grounding of this law and its relationship to Christian theology. The ambiguities of the Lockean natural law's content are traceable to an unclear grammatical construction in a crucial passage of the Treatises of Government, which can be resolved by following out a related set of arguments in that work. The ambiguities of the Lockean natural law's grounding can then be resolved by the hypothesis, strongly supported by textual evidence, that Locke relies tacitly on the reasoning of a parallel passage in Hobbes. Lockean natural law rests on neither atheistic nor specifically Christian premises but on a hypothetical natural theology. Locke's conclusions from that natural theology represent an attempt to follow out Hobbesian logic while also tightening it up on one important point on which Hobbes himself appears to vacillate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Social Sciences Research / Sosyal Bilimler Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of ODU Journal of Social Sciences Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Michel Serres's natural contract is not merely a proposal for an alternative legal or political paradigm. It offers something deeper: a new imaginary to unsettle and confront the deep assumptions of classical social contract theories and their retrojected justification: the state of nature. The argument of this article is that Serres systematically unpicks the conditions of possibility of the contractual paradigm in the modern social imaginary, replacing them with an original noise, a primacy of parasitic relationships and a telos of symbiosis. This reframes the natural contract as the visible profile of a comprehensive social and natural imaginary that radically refigures society and ecology otherwise than on the basis of primacy of reciprocal exchange relationships between self-sufficient individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with Thomas Hobbes' conception of the state of nature. Deviating from its interpretation as a logically indispensable hypothesis for the purpose of the individualist-contractualist legitimation of the state, the article directs the discussion away from the question of the state of nature's status within Hobbes' anthropological or legal framework and towards the issue of where and what kind of evidence for this narrative is supposed to be found. If one interrogates this narrative in epistemological terms, an interpretative perspective is opened up in which ordinary forms of competitive and exploitative behaviour as well as of unmediated rule are of central importance, and the consideration of the state of nature as both a situational-relational and gradual concept is made possible as well as necessary. This contribution not only shows how such interpretative possibility is substantiated by the primary sources, but also asks how it relates to Hobbes' own reflections on knowledge and scientific method. It is shown that what is crucial here is not the distinction between empirical and idealist approach, but the one between two kinds of experience, the second of which corresponds to a nominalist view of knowledge about politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Yıldırım Beyazıt Law Review (YBLR) is the property of Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University Law School and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We approach law with deep ambivalence. On the one hand, we take immense pride in living under the rule of law. On the other hand, we often catch ourselves lamenting the existence of law. When we lament the existence of law, we are not just saying that there is too much of it. We are not just complaining about the amount of law. Rather, our complaint goes to the very nature of law itself. We complain that its rules are constraining, that its generality ignores the particularity of each situation, that its coercive force rides roughshod over our autonomy, and the list goes on. However, notwithstanding the frustration with law, it is not that we want to get rid of it. This paper seeks to express and explain our conflicting sentiments about law – why we sometimes view law as a monumental moral achievement and why we are sometimes so frustrated with it. The answer, as this paper will argue, lies in the nature of norms. The value and limit of law is traceable to the value and limit of norms. Kierkegaard helps us see that. This paper will argue that our ambivalence about law mirrors Kierkegaard's ambivalence about ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper corrects a historical injustice that has been perpetrated against Kant for some time now. Mostly on good grounds, Kantian ethics has been accused of neglecting the role played by the emotions in moral deliberation and in morally informed action. However, the contemporary moral philosophers who have put forth such a claim tend to bypass textual sources, on the one hand, and to downplay the role played by the anthropological writings on Kant's practical philosophy as a whole, on the other. Relying on highly relevant pre-critical texts in which Kant sketches future argumentative patterns and discusses the role of a negative emotion like shame on the improvement of the human species, I address a mistaken conclusion about Kantian ethics as a whole that is common in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. I also raise paradoxical conclusions that follow from Kant's argument, once its implicit premises have been brought to light. I conclude that Kant did indeed think seriously about a so-called 'shame-instinct', however much his central ideas diverge from contemporary readings of the emotion, and fall short of fulfilling the ultimate target one can assume his insights would be drawing at. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The formal requirements of the rule of law embody some of the most cherished principles of liberalism, namely: equality before the law, security in the enjoyment of individual rights, and predictability in the application of sanctions. The establishment of the state in Locke's political thought precisely aims to achieve these ends. In line with his theory, this article seeks to show the necessity of setting up a public authority to fulfill the formal requirements of the rule of law and to argue that Nozick's libertarian conception of a minimal state is incapable of satisfying them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study offers a new hypothesis about the genesis of civil power in Thomas Hobbes, based on the study of the classical passage from the state of nature to the civil state. We consider that this passage, beyond the canonical interpretations, is a topos, found in the rhetorical tradition, especially in Cícero, in his De inventione. In this context, eloquent discourse appears as an original and fundamental element of the civil state. This appropriation by Hobbes emerges from a perspective that treats the art of rhetoric as a source of knowledge, overlaying the question of the ornateness of language in such a way as to make up an important element within his conception of civil power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy is upheld through the principle of majority rule. To validate the application of democracy, it is imperative to assess the sincerity of voter decisions. When voter sincerity is compromised, manipulation may occur, thereby undermining the legitimacy of democratic processes. This paper presents a general version of a symmetric dichotomous choice model. Using simple majority rule, we show that when a voter receives one or more private signals, sincere voting is an equilibrium behavior. A slight change to this basic model may create an incentive to vote insincerely. We show that even in a more restricted model where every voter receives only one private signal whose level of precision is the same for all the voters but depends on the state of nature, voters may have an incentive to vote insincerely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The justice debate is not an issue that can be resolved or exhausted at once. Many justifications of justice that have been put forward for a long time are a clear indication of this situation. As a matter of fact, one of them is Thomas Hobbes's justification of justice, which is the subject of this study. Hobbes's philosophy as a whole rises on a material basis and does not accept any given value, regardless of its source. Therefore, there is no room for any given value in this system, including justice. Whatever is accepted as value reaches a standard or acquires a real existence with the birth of Leviathan, that is, the state. Hobbes's 'justice' is based on Leviathan. The birth of Leviathan is the birth of justice; its foundations are the foundations of justice. This justification, which begins with a selfish description of human nature, is completed with the declaration of Leviathan as the absolute standard of justice. Before Leviathan, there was neither justice nor injustice; In an environment where everyone has the right to everything, such qualifications are meaningless. When Leviathan is established, justice or injustice can then be talked about, because the ultimate measure of just and unfair is its commands/laws. In this study that aims to reveal Hobbes's justification of justice; the process leading to Leviathan's 'justice' will be analyzed and it will be shown how this conclusion was reached. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Anbar University for Law & Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista MAD is the property of Revista MAD and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politische Theorie is the property of Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Itobiad: Journal of the Human & Social Science Researches / İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Itobiad: Journal of the Human & Social Science Researches and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper connects Hobbes the political philosopher with Kierkegaard the existentialist philosopher through the prism of the state of nature. It compares Kierkegaard's account of the emergence of ethical norms from the aesthetic stage of life with Hobbes's account of the emergence of legal norms from the state of nature. The paper argues that the transition from the state of nature to the state of civil society involves, not only a change of state, but also a transformation of self. This view of the relationship between the self and the state sees the Hobbesian state through the lens of the Kierkegaardian self. An internal change takes place within the self when we move from the state of nature to the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we intend to re-read and re-expose the work of Thomas Hobbes, with the aim of reinterpreting it from a particular field of knowledge, namely, the history of economic thought. We will depart from the following two hypothesis, while we try to justify them: 1) In a context of secularization of politics, reality and knowledge, within which religion begins to lose effect as a guarantee of moral viability, the authors of political philosophy, such as Hobbes, are wondering about the ground that guarantees the viability of this modern society; and, 2) Hobbes, in his state of nature, is performing a stylization of an individual that is specifically mercantile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Long before Thomas Hobbes wrote systematic works on political philosophy, he produced the first English translation of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War directly from Greek. Published in 1629, it was a result of several of his formative years spent in Thucydides' close company. Starting from the premise that such an experience could have informed Hobbes's own ideas to a certain extent, this article tries to establish points of connection between Thucydides' text and Hobbes's conception of the state of nature. The aim is to identify ideas that might be at work behind different aspects of one of the focal points of Hobbes's political thought. The analysis begins with Thucydides' Archaeology depicting the manner of life of the ancient Hellenes; moves to 'the three greatest things' that, working on both individual and collective levels, impelled Athens to build an Empire and consequently trigger the war with Sparta; subsequently turns to the disintegration of Corcyraean polis during stasis; and in the end engages with the same problem that in Athens was caused by the plague. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the various statements related to the political philosophy of the Laozi《老子》, Chapter 80 is distinguished by its particular depiction of what may be dubbed an ideal state. By examining the viewpoints of various authors in both English and Chinese works, the chapter will be analyzed and compared with three concepts independently discussed in political philosophy: (1) the call for returning to the past, also referred to as nostalgia; (2) utopianism; and (3) the state of nature. It is probably more than evident that the ideal state is at least reminiscent of these theories. Despite the possible and hypothetical similarities, however, this article will attempt to show that it is acceptable to claim that there is neither sufficient evidence nor support for the argument that the Laozi advocates returning to the past, proposes utopia, or describes a state of nature, and, moreover, that some of its statements are not completely adequate for such interpretations. The thesis that this article will support is that the ideal state is only a metaphorical description of a better world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy is upheld through the principle of majority rule. To validate the application of democracy, it is imperative to assess the sincerity of voter decisions. When voter sincerity is compromised, manipulation may occur, thereby undermining the legitimacy of democratic processes. This paper presents a general version of a symmetric dichotomous choice model. Using simple majority rule, we show that when a voter receives one or more private signals, sincere voting is an equilibrium behavior. A slight change to this basic model may create an incentive to vote insincerely. We show that even in a more restricted model where every voter receives only one private signal whose level of precision is the same for all the voters but depends on the state of nature, voters may have an incentive to vote insincerely.

Discussions about politics and human power, including discussions about the concept of the state, have been a discussion that has been going on since Greek times until the time of the growth of Islamic philosophy. The overemphasis on the power of reason led early modern Western societies to reject religion in all political discourse. At this stage, all views of man, power, the constitution, and the state eventually ceased to be associated with God. On the other hand, especially among Muslims, religion is still connected with discussions of politics and human power. This paper will reveal how secularization in political thought grew and developed through principles such as the state of nature and the social contract. Then, based on the thought of one of the influential Muslim scholars, Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, the author tries to provide a critique of the views of Western thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and other philosophers, by presenting the concept of the ideal state form derived from the concept of tamaddun formulated by Al-Attas. This research is literature review research using the descriptive method. The findings of this research show that secularization is a product purely born by Western secular thinkers and not taken from any religious teachings, so Western political concepts cannot always be applied, especially in Muslim societies.

Critical approaches to the canon of Western political and legal thought from the point of view of race or gender have developed in recent years, as have studies highlighting the connections between supposedly universalist philosophies and their role in sustaining or legitimizing imperial and colonial conquests. On social contract theory in particular, seminal works include Charles Mills' The Racial Contract and Carole Pateman's The Sexual Contract. The importance of this type of work cannot be understated, and Mills is right to insist on the "blinding whiteness of the discipline." In the case of Hobbes, I argue, the privilege established in his texts is better qualified as "civilizational" rather than "racial." Hobbes's texts construct a certain image of civilization, a form of exclusion and domination that eschews biological determinism in favor of social, historical bias. This "civilizational" thinking certainly can work – and will work later on in conjunction with modern racism and white privilege – to exclude many. The racial contract – as per Mills – is only a late installment on a more fundamental one, the civilizing contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Praxis Filosófica is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this study is to examine in detail Robert Nozick's argument against traditional distribution theories. In addition, from the perspective of this argument based on the relationship of rights and property, it is aimed to evaluate the political capability of the empowerment theory of justice and to point out its limitations. Nozick argues that the fairness of a distribution depends on how the relevant public action unfolds. On the other hand, according to him, equality, need, entitlement, or justice, as in Rawls' difference principle, depend on distribution relations or schemas. Various objections have been made to these categorical forms of distribution because of their shortcomings. For this, Nozick first referred to the theory of empowerment, which is concerned with respecting people's rights, particularly property rights and self-ownership. His empowerment-focused theory of justice includes three ideas: fairness in winning, fairness in transfer, and rectification of injustice. However, Nozick's perspective of empowerment has received serious criticism for its shaky foundation and lack of practice. Therefore, this article attempts to evaluate Nozick's theory to highlight some perceived strengths, flaws, inconsistencies, or limitations and suggest some remedial solutions where necessary. It is claimed that this philosophy, which finally brings liberal values to the agenda with new possibilities, contains arguments that may be valid for our contemporary political world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper questions Waldow reading of Rousseau's 'Letter to M D'Alembert' [Letter]. It claims that Waldow fails to address the social and political argument that lies behind Rousseau's critique of the theatre and, as a result, her conclusions are misplaced. First, Rousseau does not seek to quench critique rather his aim is to show that the theatre distracts us from our real concerns in life and thus quells discontent and, indeed, the possibility of dissent. Second, Rousseau does not refer to the naturally intact morals of the Genevans but argues that the Genevans are closer to the state of nature and thus less corrupt. Finally, his account of the state of nature in the Letter is not at odds with his own views about the state of nature. Just as in his other writings, he uses the state of nature as a heuristic device to justify his claim that social relations give rise to vice and virtue. It is a necessary fiction that provides us with the principle of hope that things could be otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Hobbes’s England was deeply troubled by the successive plague visitations regularly occurring in the late 16th and 17th centuries. The catastrophic outbreak in 1625 found Hobbes working on the first ever direct translation of Thucydides’ History from Greek to English. This fact allows for the supposition that Hobbes paid special attention to Thucydides’ masterful account of the plague at Athens and its social and political consequences. These circumstances authorise the here proposed enquiry into the relation between Hobbes’s understanding of the state of nature in Leviathan and the epidemics, mediated by his experience of the plague and the translation of the plague narrative in Thucydides’ History. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to consider a series of politico-symbolic aspects in a specific politicized dystopia of the twentieth century: Lord of the Flies (1954) by William Golding (1911–1993). This analysis is paired with a brief overview of the relationship between utopian fictions and politics.

Long before Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion Theory, Thomas Hobbes's account of self-interest and risk assessment formed the basis of a powerful argument for the benefits of negative appeals. Dismissing the pursuit of highest and final goods as inherently incapable of yielding collective action, Hobbes proposed a method focusing instead on the highest evil, something that individuals with different goals could agree on as a barrier to their respective pursuits. In his own theory, that evil was violent death in the dystopian setting of his notorious state of nature. The staying power of Hobbes's memorable image itself validates Hobbes's rationale and offers important reminders regarding the limits of utopian appeals to collective action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In my paper, I will argue that, although it is common knowledge that Hobbes and Locke strongly and openly disagree about the desirable form of government, and equally have different description of the state of nature, the careful reader might notice that after all the needed qualifications are added and the colours of persuasion removed (i.e. the violence of homo homini lupus for Hobbes and the idyllic peace and abundance of resources for Locke), the state of nature à la Hobbes is not significantly different from the state of nature à la Locke. Which makes room for the subsequent question that I plan to address here: if the starting point is in both cases (almost) the same, how could the desired (and somehow resulting) forms of government be so different? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work examines the relationship between Kant’s notion of freedom and the legal duty to leave the state of nature and enter the civil state in his theory of law and politics. As opposed to ethical duties, the fulfilment of legal duties can be forced upon a person. Coercion is important in the context of this paper because, according to Kant, right is always connected with an authorization to use coercion. The right of intelligible possession as an acquired right already existing in the state of nature is the basis of the legal duty to leave the state of nature and enter the civil state. The right of intelligible possession, which refers to the possession of external objects, or possession independent of the empirical conditions, implies the duty of all others to refrain from using the objects we first possess, but also the moral authorization of coercion over those who refuse to do so. However, since in the state of nature there is no public authority which enforces the law through general laws, coercion is arbitrary and depends on particular interpretations of legal situations. The arbitrariness of coercion implies the possibility that the freedom of the individual, which is externally manifested through the right of intelligible possession, will be endangered. For this reason, others can be forced to enter the civil state with me, submitting to the public authority under the same conditions. The public authority makes rights of possession explicit and secures them, and is thus a necessary condition for the fullness of human freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Thomas Hobbes, like other early modern social contract theorists, has been accused of promoting racist views in his philosophy – ideas used to justify European imperialism and the devastation of Indigenous peoples. I argue that his philosophy does not assume or promote a naturalized racial hierarchy. I demonstrate that the logic of Hobbes's project requires rejecting a racially essentialist conception of human nature. His is a thoroughgoing and unrepentant anti-essentialism; he claims that there are no objective, immutable, necessary differences between 'civilized' people and 'savages.' Instead, I locate Hobbes's bias in his reliance on culturally-specific notions of government. Finally, I suggest that the Hobbes's natural law requirement of 'acknowledging' equality can be applied to questions about race. Though this was not its purpose, this requirement might provide a useful – and distinctively Hobbesian – tool to combat the impulse behind the problematic and persistent desire to find 'real' differences among racial groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I argue that Thomas Hobbes's theory of the "state of nature" should be understood as describing a thoroughly political situation. Hobbes's exemplification of the state of nature by resorting to the "savages" of America should be taken in its ultimately paradoxical character, one that puts in question the stark opposition between a prepolitical natural state and the properly political state resulting from the "social contract." Through the lenses of ethnographic studies and anthropological theory, I propose a reinterpretation of Hobbes's characterization of the state of nature as a state of war. In the first section, I present my interpretation of Hobbes's understanding of war, arguing that war is characterized not by actual battle but by the uncertainty of conflict, already entailing a social dimension to it. In the second section, I engage with Pierre Clastres's theory of the society against the State to discuss how, for Amerindian peoples, war not only has a social character but is itself the basis of sociality. In the last section, I discuss Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's theory of potential affinity to propose that Hobbes's state of nature is also a form of schematization of alterity as enmity. I conclude by showing how this provides an understanding of peace as a precarious situation, one that is the outcome of ethical practices ultimately independent from the State. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]