Search

Do patents facilitate or frustrate innovation? Our starting point for exploring this question is the recognition that patent systems are products of battles over the economic surplus created by innovation. The features of these systems take shape as contending interests at different points in the production chain seek advantage in any way they can, and consequently they are riven with imperfections. The most interesting intellectual issue is not how patent systems are imperfect, but why historically US-style patent systems with all their imperfections have come to dominate other methods of encouraging inventive activity. The essays that follow this introduction suggest that the creation of a tradable but temporary property right facilitates the transfer of technological knowledge and thus fosters a highly productive decentralized ecology of inventors and firms.

This essay is the introduction to a book of the same title, forthcoming in summer of 2021 from Oxford University Press. The purpose is to document the ways in which patent systems are products of battles over the economic surplus from innovation. The features of these systems take shape as interests at different points in the production chain seek advantage in any way they can, and consequently, they are riven with imperfections. The interesting historical question is why US-style patent systems with all their imperfections have come to dominate other methods of encouraging inventive activity. The essays in the book suggest that the creation of a tradable but temporary property right facilitates the transfer of technological knowledge and thus fosters a highly productive decentralized ecology of inventors and firms.

We offer a theory that explains the wide variance in levels of economic development around the planet, accounts for its geographic clustering, and makes plain why these patterns only emerged over the past two centuries. Its mechanics focus on the fundamental challenge of survival that faced all human societies prior to the 19th century: insuring against starvation. Local factor endowments conditioned how societies could respond to that challenge, thereby shaping pre-1800 forms of social organization. Those forms of social organization, in turn, conditioned how quickly societies could respond to the next great challenge they all faced: absorbing rapidly a broad suite of mutually dependent, post-1800 technologies that were crucial to economic development and geopolitical competition in the modern world. We develop novel datasets to put the predictions of the theory to the test. We find that a vector of exogenous factors that were binding constraints on food production, transport, and post-harvest storage (conditional on 18th century technologies) within the densely populated nuclei from which nation states later emerged account for 60 percent of the cross-country variance in per capita GDP today. Importantly, we also find that this vector of exogenous factors accounts for progressively less of the variance in levels of economic development (as measured by urbanization ratios) going back in time, such that circa 1500-1700 they account for almost none of the variance. We also discover that a particular complex combination of ecological factors that permitted some societies to insure against starvation through local trade is associated with faster economic growth from 1800 to 2000, faster development of market towns from 1500 to 1800, higher levels of investment in trade-related human capital circa 1800, faster absorption of 19th century technologies, and lower probability of being colonized.

An influential literature argues that dispersed patent ownership may lead to royalty stacking and excessive running royalties, thus increasing the long-run marginal cost of manufacturing phones and their prices. One set of estimates claims that the royalty stack is on the order of 20–40 percent of the value of the average phone. In order to assess this claim, we estimate the average cumulative royalty yield—the sum total of patent royalty payments earned by licensors, divided by the total value of mobile phones shipped— in the world mobile phone industry between 2007 and 2016. We “follow the money” and identify, with varying accuracy, 39 potential licensors in the smartphone value chain. We find that, of these, only 29 charged royalties in 2016, running from a low of $1.6 million to a high of $7.7 billion, summing to $14.2 billion in total, which compares with $425.1 billion in mobile phone sales. The average cumulative royalty yield in 2016 was 3.3 percent or $7.20 per phone. If we restrict this only to smartphones, the result would be $9.60 per phone, roughly 3.4 percent of the average selling price. A sensitivity analysis shows that even under a very restrictive set of assumptions, the average cumulative royalty yield on a smartphone would not exceed 5.6 percent.

Después de la crisis de 1995 el sistema bancario mexicano experimentó cambios considerables en sus normas contables. La mayoría de estos cambios ocurrió entre 1996 y 2001, y tuvo un gran efecto en la estructura y la interpretación de la información financiera de los bancos. Este documento explica los cambios principales en la contabilidad bancaria, su propósito y estructura, y analiza su efecto en la información financiera presentada por los bancos mexicanos. También proporciona el equivalente en inglés de los principales términos contables utilizados por los bancos mexicanos. El propósito principal de este documento es ofrecer una guía estandarizada para entender mejor la información financiera producida antes y después de la crisis, en el contexto actual de la internacionalización de la propiedad de los bancos mexicanos.

Patent-holdup theory avers that the patent system threatens the rate of innovation in the U.S. economy, particularly in information technology industries that are heavily reliant on standard-essential patents. We show that arrays of empirical tests falsify the core predictions of the theory. We therefore examine the logic of patent-holdup theory. We show that patent-holdup theory conflates two mutually inconsistent economic mechanisms: holdup (the appropriation of a quasi rent) and the exercise of monopoly power (to set the market price to extract a monopoly rent). Moreover, three fallacies underpin patent-holdup theory: (1) that patent holdup is a straightforward variant of holdup as it is understood in transaction-cost economics; (2) that royalty stacking is holdup repeated multiple times on the same product; and (3) that standard-essential patents contribute little or no value to the markets they help create. These fallacies give rise to a theory that is logically inconsistent and incomplete, and that ignores economic fundamentals. The flaws in logic of patent-holdup theory, and its lack of fit with the evidence, suggest that a new theory about the mechanics and dynamics of SEP-intensive IT industries is called for, both as a matter of science and as a guide to antitrust and patent policies.

We argue that in adjudicating SEP royalty rates, courts should do what they do in pricing other assets or the flows of income they produce: rely on information from the market about the value of comparable assets or their rental rates. The comparables method is based on price theory, which explains where value comes from and how it is distributed among factors of production, including intellectual property. Courts should not employ the “bottom up” or “top down” techniques of royalty apportionment. Both are based on the theory of patent holdup and royalty stacking, which assumes that any observed royalty is the result of “excessive royalties” wrought by the additional monopoly power conferred by standardization. This theory has been shown to be logically inconsistent and logically incomplete, and its predictions have been rejected by systematic empirical tests. As a practical matter, the bottom up technique cannot actually be operationalized. Top down techniques can be operationalized, but employing them requires a court to reject the implications of price theory.

Recent work suggests that Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs)—or “patent trolls”—are a new form of financial intermediary. According to this view, individual patent holders are unable to contract with large manufacturers because they lack the financial resources necessary to litigate against infringement. Since individual patent holders are heterogeneous in their constraints and preferences, the market function of PAEs should depend on their specific demands. We conducted an experiment in which subjects from a population of interest were each assigned patents that were infringed by large manufacturers in a hypothetical scenario. We relaxed the financial constraints of some patent holders and evaluated whether this randomized intervention subsequently reduced the demand for PAEs relative to costly litigation. Our results indicate that PAEs served an intermediary function for two groups in our sample: subjects who identified as inventors rather than entrepreneurs, and subjects who were relatively more sensitive to financial losses.

A large theoretical literature asserts that standard-essential patents (SEPs) allow their owners to “hold up” innovation by charging fees that exceed their incremental contribution to a final product. We evaluate two central, interrelated predictions of this SEP holdup hypothesis: (1) SEP-reliant industries should experience more stagnant quality-adjusted prices than non-SEP-reliant industries; and (2) court decisions that reduce the excessive power of SEP holders should accelerate innovation in SEP-reliant industries. We find no empirical support for either prediction. Indeed, SEP-reliant industries have the fastest quality-adjusted price declines in the U.S. economy.

A large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy. Extant cross-country regressions, however, assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions. Because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable, this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships. Numerous sources of bias may be driving the results, the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity. To address these problems, we develop unique historical datasets, employ time-series centric techniques, and operationalize explicitly specified counterfactuals. We test to see if there is a long-run relationship between resource reliance and regime type within countries over time, both on a country-by-country basis and across several different panels. We find that increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism. In fact, in many specifications we generate results that suggest a resource blessing.

A large literature asserts that standard essential patents (SEPs) allow their owners to “hold up” innovation by charging fees that exceed their incremental contribution to a final product. We evaluate two central, interrelated predictions of this SEP hold-up hypothesis: (1) SEP-reliant industries should experience more stagnant quality-adjusted prices than similar non-SEP-reliant industries; and (2) court decisions that reduce the excessive power of SEP holders should accelerate innovation in SEP-reliant industries. We find no empirical support for either prediction. Indeed, SEP-reliant industries have the fastest quality-adjusted price declines in the U.S. economy.

A large literature asserts that standard essential patents (SEPs) allow their owners to “hold up” innovation by charging fees that exceed their incremental contribution to a final product. We evaluate two central, interrelated predictions of this SEP hold-up hypothesis: (1) SEP-reliant industries should experience more stagnant quality-adjusted prices than similar non-SEP-reliant industries; and (2) court decisions that reduce the excessive power of SEP holders should accelerate innovation in SEP-reliant industries. We find no empirical support for either prediction. Indeed, SEP-reliant industries have the fastest quality-adjusted price declines in the U.S. economy.

Why do individual patent holders assign their patents to "trolls" rather than license their technologies directly to manufacturers or assert them through litigation? We explore the hypothesis that an asymmetry in financial resources between individual patent holders and manufacturers prevents individuals from making a credible threat to litigate against infringement. First, individuals may not be able to cover the upfront costs associated with litigation. Second, unsuccessful litigation can result in legal fees so large as to bankrupt the individual. Therefore, a primary reason why individual patent holders sell to PAEs is that they offer insurance and liquidity. We test this hypothesis by experimentally manipulating these financial constraints on a representative sample of inventors and entrepreneurs affiliated with academic institutions that are particularly known for their innovative activity: Stanford University and the University of California, Berkeley. We find that in the absence of these constraints, subjects were significantly less likely to sell their patent to a PAE in a hypothetical scenario. Furthermore, treatment effects were significant only for subjects who were hypothesized to be most sensitive to these constraints.

During the 1990s Mexico conducted two experiments with its banking system. In the first experiment (1991–96) it privatized the banks. This experiment took place with weak institutions to enforce contract rights. It also took place without institutions that encourage prudent behavior by bankers. The result was reckless behavior by banks, and a collapse of the banking system. In the second experiment (1997–2003), Mexico reformed many of the institutions that promoted bank monitoring and it opened up the industry to foreign investment. It was less successful, however, in reforming the institutions that promote the enforcement of contract rights. The result was that bankers behaved prudently, but prudent behavior in the context of weak contract rights implies that banks are reluctant to extend credit to firms and households.

Changes in formal institutions do not always affect economic outcomes. When an industry has specific technological features that limit a government's ability to expropriate it, or when the industry is able to call on foreign governments to enforce its de facto property rights, economic agents can easily mitigate changes in formal institutions designed to reduce these property rights. We explore the Mexican oil industry from 1911 to 1929 and demonstrate that informal rather than formal institutions were key, permitting oil companies to coordinate their responses to increases in taxes or the redefinition of their de jure property rights.

Si el sistema financiero es importante para el crecimiento como se ha demostrado en la bibliografía, entonces es pertinente preguntarse por qué hay una gran varianza en el desarrollo financiero entre los países. En otras palabras, ¿por qué los gobiernos no han impulsado las políticas públicas apropiadas para desarrollar el sector financiero y con ello el crecimiento?El artículo intenta responder estas preguntas explorando el desarrollo del sistema financiero mexicano desde 1880 hasta el presente. El argumento es que las instituciones que motivan a impulsar este desarrollo no pueden ser creadas de la noche a la mañana. La creación de esas instituciones depende en gran medida de otras instituciones que limitan la autoridad y discreción del propio gobierno. En suma, las instituciones políticas que limitan el accionar discrecional del gobierno son una condición necesaria para impulsar el desarrollo financiero y por ende el crecimiento económico.

This article employs previously unused data sources and techniques in order to estimate labour productivity and total factor productivity in the Mexican cotton textile industry over the period 1850–1933. Our findings indicate: (1) substantial productivity growth prior to the Porfiriato; (2) rapid productivity growth throughout the Porfiriato; (3) a swift, though incomplete, recovery from the Revolution during the 1920s; and, (4) an insignificant impact on productivity from the Great Depression. We also find evidence that the large, joint stock, limited liability firms that were founded during the Porfiriato had higher levels of total factor productivity than privately owned firms, but only for a short period of time, which suggests that these firms might have been sub-optimally large. Our results also indicate that labour markets in Porfirian Mexico were efficient. This suggests that manufacturers may not have had the monopsony power in labour markets that the literature indicates.

What is the relationship between political instability and economic growth? This article examines this question using insights from the new institutional economics applied to a canonical case: revolutionary Mexico. The authors argue that investment and growth during and after the revolution were less affected by political instability than one might predict based on the extant theoretical and empirical literature. They find that while investor expectations, output, and productivity were sensitive to the interdiction of factor and product markets during the years of intense revolutionary violence (1914-17), the periods of political instability before (1910-13) and afterward (1918-34) had relatively minor effects on investor confidence, investments in new plant and equipment, rates of entry and exit by firms, industrial structure, and productivity growth.

This article argues that there is a strong relationship between the efficiency with which a country mobilized capital for industrial development and the industrial structure that country developed. Differences in capital market development were a function of government regulatory policies and the costs of obtaining information. The analysis suggests that the development of financial institutions was not endogenous to the process of economic growth. In the case of Mexico, tight government regulatory policies coupled with high information costs gave rise to highly imperfect capital markets, which in turn were transmuted into imperfections in product markets.

In 1997, the Mexican government reversed long-standing policies and allowed foreign banks to purchase Mexico’s largest commercial banks and relaxed restrictions on the founding of new, foreign-owned banks. The result has been a dramatic shift in the ownership structure of Mexico’s banks. For instance, while in 1991 only one percent of bank assets in Mexico were foreign owned, today they control 74 percent of assets. In no other country in the world has the penetration of foreign banks been as rapid or as far-reaching as in Mexico. In this work we examine some of the important implications of foreign bank entry for social welfare in Mexico. Did liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the supply of credit? Did liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the cost of credit? Did liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the stability of the banking system? In order to answer these questions, we must first ask, “increase (or decrease), measured on what basis?” There are, in fact, two distinct conceptual frameworks through which one can assess the impact of foreign bank entry. One is concerned with measuring the short-run impacts of foreign entry on credit abundance, pricing, and observable stability using reduced form regressions. The other is an institutional economics conception of how to measure performance. It is focused on understanding whether foreign entry gave rise to difficult-to-reverse changes in the political economy of bank regulation, which will affect competition and stability in the long term, outside the period that may be observed empirically. We employ both conceptions in this paper.

Why are some societies characterized by enduring democracy, while other societies are either persistently autocratic or experiment with democracy but then quickly fall back into autocracy? I find that there is a systematic, non-linear relationship between rainfall levels, human capital, property rights institutions and regime types such that stable democracies overwhelmingly cluster in a band of moderate rainfall (540 to 1200 mm of precipitation per year). I advance a theory to explain this outcome that focuses on how differences in the crops that could be grown in different rainfall bands affected societies’ institutional paths of development. I then test that theory against a unique cross-country dataset, a comparison of democracies and autocracies in antiquity, and a series of natural experiments.This paper builds upon an earlier collaboration with Victor Menaldo (University of Washington). Our joint paper, “Rainfall, Human Capital, and Democracy,” is available on SSRN. I also gratefully acknowledge discussions with Ran Abramitzky, Isa Chavez, Roy Elis, Stanley Engerman, Rob Fleck, Avner Greif, Tim Guinnane, Mark Kleinman, Dorothy Kronick, Naomi Lamoreaux, Ross Levine, Joseph Manning, Ian Morris, Josh Ober, Robert Packenham, Paul Sniderman, William Summerhill, and Barry Weingast. Nicholas Baldo, Kevin Cook, Roy Elis, Anne Given, and Scott Khamphoune, Dorothy Kronick, and Cole Lupoli, provided invaluable research assistance.