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The development of environmental law starting in the mid-20th century involved constant tension with private property. Attempts to protect the dwindling natural resources, extinct species of animals, and ecosystems at risk have often encountered obstacles when they demanded interference with private property. Although the theoretical roots of private property do not justify its transformation into an environmental obstacle and, to a large extent, attach importance to environmental values in justifying private property rights, it was private property that stood at the forefront of legal conflicts that revolved around attempts to expand the environmental protection of natural resources. The reason for turning private property into an obstacle to a proper environmental policy stems from adopting a concept according to which private property protects only human interests and values. In contrast, environmental interests that cannot be converted into human terms remain outside private property boundaries. This either–or concept, or as William Baxter termed it in 1974, “peoples or penguins,” harms the ability of courts and other decision-makers to implement a proper and effective environmental policy because it prioritizes human interests over those of nature and its resources. This Article claims there is no reason for the decision-makers to be forced to choose between people and penguins since the interests of both humans and nature can normatively, and practically should, find expression in private property. Private property as a legal institution is an arena for value discussion as well as for making balances between values that are perceived as necessary for society. The exclusion of environmental values from the value clarification conducted to define the scope of property rights is not only a normative failure but also harms the ability to deal effectively and adequately with pressing environmental challenges. The internalization of environmental values into private property, along with human (owner freedom) and social values (such as efficiency and shared welfare), will enable a proper definition of property rights and will provide courts and other decision-makers with the means to formulate, and implement, a proper environmental policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic did not eliminate existing social tensions; rather, it at times intensified them. Thus, it is unsurprising that the tension between the liberal state and illiberal religious communities likewise intensified, as those communities were late to comply with COVID-19 public health regulations issued by state authorities. This Article suggests that alongside the behavioral and psychological explanations for individual non-compliance, illiberal religious communities' late response to the COVID-19 threats stems out of these communities' unique characteristics and deeply held norms. It provides five explanations supporting this argument and argues that all result from the interventionist liberal-centric policies embraced by most Western states for dealing with illiberal religious communities. Since COVID-19 is not expected to be the last health-related crisis, and as other environmental, economic, or security emergencies may still require social adherence to government regulations, liberal states should rethink their policies toward illiberal religious communities. The ability to harness those communities to comply with life-saving regulations may not only save lives within these communities but also reduce threats to areas and neighborhoods adjacent to those communities. This Article suggests that the isolation and fortification processes that illiberal religious communities engage in may be mitigated if states embrace pluralistic-centric policies regarding illiberal religious communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic led all states to issue regulations aiming to limit the spread of the coronavirus and reduce morbidity and mortality. Alongside the impediments that the “stay at home” and social distancing regulations imposed on citizens’ freedom of movement, worship, and leisure, they also interfered, sometimes significantly, with owners’ property rights. Most states ordered closure of non-essential businesses; some prohibited or suspended evictions of residential and commercial rentals, and others restricted beach access, preventing beachfront owners from using their property. The COVID-19 regulations’ harmful economic effects led owners from states all across the country to bring legal challenges to these regulations. Among other claims, owners argued that the regulations violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because the regulations constituted a taking of private property for public use without the payment of just compensation. This article argues that although current takings jurisprudence may pose considerable legal challenges for property owners, establishing owners’ Fifth Amendment claims for compensation for the economic damages resulting from the COVID-19 regulations is not at all unfounded. While regulating property in emergencies is often considered within the state police power, thus relieving the government from paying compensation to owners, there may be circumstances where emergency property regulation would constitute a takings, requiring the government to compensate owners. To further this argument, the article proposes a theory that allows lawmakers and courts to better distinguish between the state’s police power and its eminent domain power. The proposed theory suggests that although the state’s police power is designed to allow the government to regulate property to respond to emergencies efficiently and effectively, such regulation may nevertheless exceed the state police power if it imposes a disproportionate burden on property owners. In such cases, takings claims may become the most significant means by which property owners can cope with emergency property regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three concerns are inherent to the power of eminent domain -- when a government forcibly takes away private property to provide a social good: abuse of this power, unfair distribution of burdens among members of society, and inefficient implementation of the government project. To protect against these undesirable outcomes, expropriation laws in most Western jurisdictions incorporate three safeguards: due process, a public use requirement, and mandatory compensation. While jurisdictions implement these safeguards in different ways, most demand their implementation as a prerequisite for legitimate expropriation. Arguably, the purpose of allowing governments to expropriate private property is to provide for important societal needs. But this conflicts with the idea that the government ought to perfectly adhere to the three aforementioned safeguards at all times. Imperfect circumstances, such as times of crisis, likely require governments to provide for the needs of their citizens, but afford insufficient time for standard due process. Imperfect implementation of the three safeguards may also be necessary when authorities struggle with budgetary limitations that prevent full compensation, or when they are unable to meet a social need without the involvement of private entities. In all these imperfect circumstances, at least one of the safeguards might be compromised if the government is to provide required social needs through expropriation. This Article proposes a novel model to conceptualize eminent domain, which identifies an interplay among expropriation laws ' three safeguards. It further recognizes that each of these safeguards protects, to some extent, against all three of the potential dangers inherent in government's expropriation power. This innovative interplay model legitimizes compromise, such that it is appropriate for there to be only partial implementation of one safeguard as long as the other two are strictly applied. The interplay model proposed in this Article, therefore, allows the government to exercise its expropriation power properly even in imperfect circumstances, while still sufficiently protecting property owners and society from abuse of that power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a clear tension in the law between exercises of state police power in land-use regulation including zoning laws, on the one hand, and takings under the Fifth Amendment, on the other. Courts have struggled to find a dividing line between the two, but for their efforts what we are left only with is a disjointed array of legal tests, each one as flawed as the next. Legal theorists, for their part, must shoulder some of the blame--no single theory can identify the point at which community need outweighs private property rights. Even well-developed theories thus fail to translate into practical application. But this Article is resolved to bridge that gap. This Article presents a novel theory that provides a unified normative framework for evaluating government interference with private property. It seeks to identify the tipping point at which private property rights must give way to the needs of the community at large. This approach, which I refer to as Property's Tipping Point, is a burden-shifting framework that accommodates competing theories of property. It builds on landmark Supreme Court cases to provide a unified standard for courts to apply in resolving cases of regulatory takings and exactions. The approach presented in this Article has both a substantive and a procedural component. It develops two tests that work dynamically to identify the point where community need trumps owner autonomy: the indispensability of needs and the generality of action. The former requires that any government interference with private property is designed to promote community prosperity. The latter test--the generality of action--confines the government to the boundaries of the rule of law. It is only by passing these two tests that a government authority may reach Property's Tipping Point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the laws governing the same-sex marriages in the U.S. focusing on Obergefell v. Hodges court case. Topics discussed include analysis of Obergefell case in which the court held that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; tension between the liberal state and illiberal communities; and Bob Jones University v. United States court case on same.

This Article argues that individuals who live in highly cooperative common interest communities should, in certain instances, be entitled to additional compensation or other remedies when their property is taken through eminent domain. The exclusive takings remedy of monetary compensation equal to the fair market value of the property cannot always account for loss of communality. This Article offers guidelines for allocation of additional remedies (monetary and in-kind) that recognize such loss. This proposal is grounded in a pluralistic conception of property, which holds that the state should support individuals' use of property as a social instrument to fulfill diverse values and beliefs. To that end, the state should balance several factors to determine whether a member of a community, or a community as a whole, should be entitled to remedies for communal loss: (1) the size and scope of the taking with in the comm unity ; (2) the role, if any, of the community's cooperation in its members ' realization of a shared conception of the good; (3) the community's social legitimacy as determined primarily by its structural openness, that is, its members ' ability to simultaneously belong to other communities; and (4) the community's ability to self-rehabilitate as determined by its political and economic strength. The state should also consider these factors in determining which of several types of remedies for communality loss would be most appropriate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals suffering from long-COVID can present with "brain fog", which is characterized by a range of cognitive impairments, such as confusion, short-term memory loss, and difficulty concentrating. To date, several potential interventions for brain fog have been considered. Notably, no systematic review has comprehensively discussed the impact of each intervention type on brain fog symptoms. We included studies on adult (aged > 18 years) individuals with proven long- COVID brain-fog symptoms from PubMed, MEDLINE, Central, Scopus, and Embase. A search limit was set for articles published between 01/2020 and 31/12/2023. We excluded studies lacking an objective assessment of brain fog symptoms and patients with preexisting neurological diseases that affected cognition before COVID-19 infection. This review provided relevant information from 17 studies. The rehabilitation studies utilized diverse approaches, leading to a range of outcomes in terms of the effectiveness of the interventions. Six studies described noninvasive brain stimulation, and all showed improvement in cognitive ability. Three studies described hyperbaric oxygen therapy, all of which showed improvements in cognitive assessment tests and brain perfusion. Two studies showed that the use of Palmitoylethanolamide and Luteolin (PEA-LUT) improved cognitive impairment. Noninvasive brain stimulation and hyperbaric oxygen therapy showed promising results in the treatment of brain fog symptoms caused by long-COVID, with improved perfusion and cortical excitability. Furthermore, both rehabilitation strategies and PEA-LUT administration have been associated with improvements in symptoms of brain fog. Future studies should explore combinations of interventions and include longer follow-up periods to assess the long-term effects of these treatments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background. Technological advancement may bridge gaps between long-practiced medical competencies and modern technologies. Such a domain is the application of digital stethoscopes used for physical examination in telemedicine. This study aimed to validate the level of consensus among physicians regarding the interpretation of remote, digital auscultation of heart and lung sounds. Methods. Seven specialist physicians considered both the technical quality and clinical interpretation of auscultation findings of pre-recorded heart and lung sounds of patients hospitalized in their homes. TytoCareTM system was used as a remote, digital stethoscope. Results. In total, 140 sounds (70 heart and 70 lungs) were presented to seven specialists. The level of agreement was measured using Fleiss' Kappa (FK) variable. Agreement relating to heart sounds reached low-to-moderate consensus: the overall technical quality (FK = 0.199), rhythm regularity (FK = 0.328), presence of murmurs (FK = 0.469), appreciation of sounds as remote (FK = 0.011), and an overall diagnosis as normal or pathologic (FK = 0.304). The interpretation of some of the lung sounds reached a higher consensus: the overall technical quality (FK = 0.169), crepitus (FK = 0.514), wheezing (FK = 0.704), bronchial sounds (FK = 0.034), and an overall diagnosis as normal or pathological (FK = 0.386). Most Fleiss' Kappa values were in the range of "fare consensus", while in the domains of diagnosing lung crepitus and wheezing, the values increased to the "substantial" level. Conclusions. Bio signals, as recorded auscultations of the heart and lung sounds serving the process of clinical assessment of remotely situated patients, do not achieve a high enough level of agreement between specialized physicians. These findings should serve as a catalyzer for improving the process of telemedicine-attained bio-signals and their clinical interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]