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Addressing climate change requires societies to transition away from fossil fuels toward low-carbon energy, including renewables. Unfortunately, large wind projects have proven politically controversial, with groups opposing them across advanced economies. To date, there are few large-scale, systematic studies to identify the prevalence and predictors of opposition to wind energy projects. Here, we analyzed a dataset of wind energy projects across the United States and Canada between 2000 and 2016. We found that during this period, in the United States, 17% of wind projects faced significant opposition, and in Canada, 18% faced opposition, with rates in both countries growing over time. Opposition was concentrated regionally in the Northeastern United States and in Ontario, Canada. In both countries, larger projects with more turbines were more likely to be opposed. In the United States, opposition was more likely and more intense in areas with a higher proportion of White people, and a smaller proportion of Hispanic people. In Canada, opposition was more likely and more intense in wealthier communities. The most common tactics used to oppose wind energy were court cases, legislation, and physical protests. The number of people engaging in opposition to wind projects is likely small: Across articles that cited the number of individuals engaging in protests, the median number was 23 in the United States and 34 in Canada. When wealthier, Whiter communities oppose wind projects, this slows down the transition away from fossil fuel projects in poorer communities and communities of color, an environmental injustice we call "energy privilege. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article evaluates the internet voting's effect on voter turnout and electoral reforms aim to reduce voting costs by increasing convenience and electoral rules have been shown to account for variations in turnout across advanced democracies.

International environmental negotiations often involve conflicts between developed and developing countries. However, considering environmental cooperation in a North-South dichotomy obscures important variation within the Global South, particularly as emerging economies become more important politically, economically, and environmentally. This article examines change in the Southern coalition in environmental negotiations, using the recently concluded Minamata Convention on Mercury as its primary case. Focusing on India and China, we argue that three key factors explain divergence in their positions as the negotiations progressed: domestic resources and regulatory politics, development constraints, and domestic scientific and technological capacity. We conclude that the intersection between scientific and technological development and domestic policy is of increasing importance in shaping emerging economies' engagement in international environmental negotiations. We also discuss how this divergence is affecting international environmental cooperation on other issues, including the ozone and climate negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Retrospective voting studies typically examine policies where the public has common interests. By contrast, climate policy has broad public support but concentrated opposition in communities where costs are imposed. This spatial distribution of weak supporters and strong local opponents mirrors opposition to other policies with diffuse public benefits and concentrated local costs. I use a natural experiment to investigate whether citizens living in proximity to wind energy projects retrospectively punished an incumbent government because of its climate policy. Using both fixed effects and instrumental variable estimators, I identify electoral losses for the incumbent party ranging from 4 to 10%, with the effect persisting 3 km from wind turbines. There is also evidence that voters are informed, only punishing the government responsible for the policy. I conclude that the spatial distribution of citizens' policy preferences can affect democratic accountability through 'spatially distorted signalling', which can exacerbate political barriers to addressing climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore implications of the United Nations Minamata Convention on Mercury for emissions from Asian coal-fired power generation, and resulting changes to deposition worldwide by 2050. We use engineering analysis, document analysis, and interviews to construct plausible technology' scenarios consistent with the Convention. We translate these scenarios into emissions projections for 2050, and use the GEOS-Chem model to calculate global mercury deposition. Where technology requirements in the Convention are flexibly defined, under a global energy and development scenario that relies heavily on coal, we project ∼90 and 150 Mg·y-1 of avoided power sector emissions for China and India, respectively, in 2050, compared to a scenario in which only current technologies are used. Benefits of this avoided emissions growth are primarily captured regionally, with projected changes in annual average gross deposition over China and India ∼2 and 13 μg·m-2 lower, respectively, than the current technology case. Stricter, but technologically feasible, mercury control requirements in both countries could lead to a combined additional 170 Mg y-1 avoided emissions. Assuming only current technologies but a global transition away from coal avoids 6% and 36% more emissions than this strict technology scenario under heavy coal use for China and India, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Animal release has long been a component of Buddhist practice, although it is little studied contemporarily. This paper examines the historical roots of these rituals, arguing that they may ultimately have been adopted into Chinese Buddhist practices. A short survey of contemporary Buddhist practice in various traditions is given, including references to important scriptural authority. Practices involving large-scale, ritualized animal release is then argued to have a number of unintended negative environmental repercussions, resulting in potential new, non-native invasive species. These practices are also considered from contemporary economic and public health perspectives, culminating in the argument that their compassionate intentions are often lost in the act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislative staff link Members of Congress and their constituents, theoretically facilitating democratic representation. Yet, little research has examined whether Congressional staff actually recognize the preferences of their Members' constituents. Using an original survey of senior US Congressional staffers, we show that staff systematically mis-estimate constituent opinions. We then evaluate the sources of these misperceptions, using observational analyses and two survey experiments. Staffers who rely more heavily on conservative and business interest groups for policy information have more skewed perceptions of constituent opinion. Egocentric biases also shape staff perceptions. Our findings complicate assumptions that Congress represents constituent opinion, and help to explain why Congress often appears so unresponsive to ordinary citizens. We conclude that scholars should focus more closely on legislative aides as key actors in the policymaking process, both in the United States and across other advanced democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A correction is offered to the article "Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress," by Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Matto Mildenberger and Leah C. Stokes, which appeared in volume 113, issue 1, in the February 2019 issue.

While climate scientists have developed high resolution data sets on the distribution of climate risks, we still lack comparable data on the local distribution of public climate change opinions. This paper provides the first effort to estimate local climate and energy opinion variability outside the United States. Using a multi-level regression and post-stratification (MRP) approach, we estimate opinion in federal electoral districts and provinces. We demonstrate that a majority of the Canadian public consistently believes that climate change is happening. Belief in climate change’s causes varies geographically, with more people attributing it to human activity in urban as opposed to rural areas. Most prominently, we find majority support for carbon cap and trade policy in every province and district. By contrast, support for carbon taxation is more heterogeneous. Compared to the distribution of US climate opinions, Canadians believe climate change is happening at higher levels. This new opinion data set will support climate policy analysis and climate policy decision making at national, provincial and local levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resistance to adopting a cap on greenhouse gas emissions internationally, and across various national contexts, has encouraged alternative climate change mitigation proposals. These proposals include separately targeting clean energy uptake and demand-side efficiency in individual end-use sectors, an approach to climate change mitigation which we characterize as segmental and technology-centered. A debate has ensued on the detailed implementation of these policies in particular national contexts, but less attention has been paid to the general factors determining the effectiveness of a segmental approach to emissions reduction. We address this topic by probing the interdependencies of segmental policies and their collective ability to control emissions. First, we show for the case of U.S. electricity how the set of suitable energy technologies depends on demand-side efficiency, and changes with the stringency of climate targets. Under a high-efficiency scenario, carbonfree technologies must supply 60-80% of U.S. electricity demand to meet an emissions reduction target of 80% below 1990 levels by midcentury. Second, we quantify the enhanced propensity to exceed any intended emissions target with this approach, even if goals are set on both the supply and demand side, due to the multiplicative accumulation of emissions error. For example, a 10% error in complying with separate policies on the demand and supply side would combine to result in a 20% error in emissions. Third, we discuss why despite these risks, the enhanced planning capability of a segmental approach may help counteract growing infrastructural inertia. The emissions reduction impediment due to infrastructural inertia is significant in the electricity sectors of each of the greatest emitters: China, the U.S., and Europe. Commonly cited climate targets are still within reach but, as we show, would require more than a 50% reduction in the carbon intensity of new power plants built in these regions over the next decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]