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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022 marks a security policy paradigm shift akin to ‘9/11’ for Europe. For the international community of security experts, the invasion represents an anomaly for their rational choice analysis. Their ‘logic of consequence’ must be replaced by the alternative ‘logic of appropriateness’. Hence, the author of this paper employs a broad approach to strategic culture stressing Kremlin regime security as Putin’s operational code. Under this approach, interventionism characterizes the Russian ‘way of war’ as does sheer brutality. The decision to invade Ukraine resulted from Putin’s personal hubris and idiosyncrasies as much as groupthink within the Russian security elite. Putin’s calculus behind invading Ukraine is reconstructed as geopolitical and geo-economic imperialism, along with domestic concerns for pacifying Russia. The first year of war exposed a dysfunctional Russian strategic culture - a collapsing Blitzkrieg effort and a failure to prevail in the subsequent battle for Donbas. The Russian conduct of war reiterated the signature Russian strategic culture of massive destruction and unpunished war crimes. Putin often doubles down and escalates, as seen in the partial mobilization on 21st September 2022. The winter of 2022–2023 brought both systematic Russian attacks on critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure and fierce battles in Vuhledar, Soledar and Bakhmut in which Russia used meatgrinder tactics. The Russian military performance improved during the second year of the war due to the construction of massive fortifications along the frontline. Putin’s strategy has thus turned in favour of a long war of attrition seeking to outlast the combined effect of successive Western upgrading of the weapons supplied to Ukraine and the stamina of the Ukrainians themselves. The Ukrainian counteroffensive shows Ukraine to have the initiative, but progress is painfully slow. This reflects the fact that the war is a war of attrition between two different militaries supported by two dissimilar coalitions of productive power and high-tech innovative capacity.

Military doctrine is a form of organisational knowledge. Scholars argue that beneath written doctrine lies a set of deeply held beliefs about war and warfare that do not change even if the written doctrine does. This article explores the relationship between written military doctrine, the underlying beliefs about doctrine that govern its interpretation and application, and ultimately how militaries operate. The analysis is based on fieldwork at a NATO division and 33 interviews with commanders and senior staff officers. It suggests a typology that can be used to understand variances in doctrine and operational differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1858 and 1863, a naval rearmament movement developed in Spain that coordinated the efforts of the commercial bourgeoisie, the parliamentary and intellectual elites of liberalism, a sector of the officers of the Navy, the municipalities, the communities of Spanish emigrants in the Americas and the press. The article analyses how these actors favoured the growth of the Real Armada, defending its use as an instrument of Spanish power around the globe. For this reason, certain organic intellectuals devoted themselves to systematising these demands, defining major strategic schemes that influenced the policies adopted by the Ministries of the Navy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the national security strategies of EU member states in the 2009–2018 period, and conceptualizes three security strategies EU member states have adopted toward Russia – flexible accommodation, cooperative deterrence, and calibrated confrontation. It tests strategic culture hypotheses against those of realism and commercial liberalism to explain the variation of EU member states' security strategies toward Russia. While a realist explanation would predict EU member states geographically proximate to Russia would possess more confrontational security strategies, geographic proximity and confrontational security strategies toward Russia are not positively correlated. Bilateral economic interdependence with Russia, the presence of populist parties in EU member states governing coalitions, and EU member states' alignment or status as an occupied state during the Cold War also do not explain EU member states' security strategies toward Russia. A more consistent explanation of the variance in EU member states' policy on Russia revolves around the strategic culture of the state in question. States with a more Atlanticist perspective tend to be more confrontation with Russia than their more Europeanist counterparts, regardless of geographic proximity or economic interdependence with Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, German foreign and security policy has been under intense pressure to adapt to a much more threatening geopolitical setting. Notwithstanding the leadership's decision to embrace change, the crisis has exposed some persistence in Germany's antecedent 'civilian power' paradigm, or culture of restraint. A culturalist analytical approach finds that durable historical and ideational factors in identity formation, the embeddedness of foreign policy in domestic institutions and the close association of European integration with the core tenets of Germany's identity constrain its capacity to act decisively and without equivocation, even under dramatically changed circumstances summarised in the concept of Zeitenwende. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the growing emphasis on integrating collaborative problem-solving (CPS) into science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education, a comprehensive understanding of the critical factors that affect the effectiveness of this educational approach remains a challenge. This study aims to identify effective strategic and behavioral factors in course design and assess how these factors contribute to students' learning performance. This study collected data from 106 students enrolled in seventh-grade science classes by using a mixed-method approach. First, the t-test results indicate that students' learning performance was improved through CPS-based STEM learning. A path analysis shows that CPS awareness and several behavioral factors had direct effects, while several strategic factors had indirect effects on the improvement of learning performance. Finally, a dialog analysis indicates that students' integrative use of CPS skills, especially task regulation skills used along with other skills, helped improve learning performance. This study not only bridges the gap in understanding the effectiveness of CPS in STEM education but also provides specific suggestions for improving instructional design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amidst the complex, dynamic and highly relevant landscape of the European Union (EU) - Africa relations, the partnership on peace and security constitutes a pivotal aspect, with the EU being an active supporter and substantial funder of national, regional and continental initiatives within this domain. While the vast majority of current research and debates frame the EU-Africa partnership on peace and security within the context of global power competition, this article explores the potential explanatory role of the strategic culture approach on this topic. Therefore, it looks at the main events and trends influencing the partnership after 2022, assessing whether the EU's security actions in Africa reflect a coherent strategic culture. The article concludes that the strategic culture framework helps understand European preferences, constraints and effectiveness regarding its security behaviour in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past two decades, the United Arab Emirates has pursued the goal of its military modernization through various reforms that were driven by the aspirations of its rulers for self-sufficiency and strategic autonomy. This meant a greater emphasis on building local skills and resources allowing Abu Dhabi to claim the indigenous character of that transformation. A stronger focus on indigenous capacities implied a decrease of that country's dependence on Western patronage. However, the study of the Emirati military transformation reveals a complex and somewhat contradictory reality: the push for a local military reform still relying for the most part on foreign advisors. This article argues that this transformation may have strengthened the technical effectiveness of the Emirati military apparatus, but it did so, not by abandoning past ties to Western powers, but merely by adapting these ties. In fact, the "Emiratisation" of the country's national security relied on the use of foreign expertise at all levels: from the training and education of officers to the command of military elite units and the development of local military industries. Such reliance on outside expertise eventually compromises the initial goal of the UAE for greater autonomous capability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Classic theory of civil-military relations was mostly limited to empirical-descriptive studies, while theoretical starting point of such studies was rudimentary. The end of the Cold War brought about new challenges and questions, causing the need for theoretic grounds and expansion of research agenda of civil-military relations. Consequently, the subject of this paper encompasses the overview of the evolution of the theoretical framework and research agenda of civil-military relations, starting from the classical theory towards theoretical paradigms of the constructivists. The primary objective of the paper is to establish theoretical grounds of civil-military relations on the principles of Constructivism and strategic culture, as a fruitful analytical framework for the study of those relations as a dependent variable. In this paper, the method used is the overview of academic literature to achieve a systematic insight into relevant theoretical positions of the author which thematise strategic culture and civil-military relations on the principles of Constructivism. Two basic perspectives of strategic culture study have been singled out that determine the way of shaping those relations as a dependent variable. In concrete terms, civil-military relations can be analysed as a product of unique ideational elements of national culture, tradition and history of a nation, and as a product of discursive practices of political and military elites. Overall, the study of strategic culture enables overcoming anachronistic perspective of civil-military relations, offering and innovative theoretical and analytical framework that enables opening research agenda for new questions and subjects.

The article examines the strategic culture of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, with the focus on the dominance of military elites in the political life of this state. The author’s goal is to analyze the factors that led to the rise of the army in the specific political and security environment of Pakistan. The generalship has done more than merely determine the main directions of the security policy and make principled decisions of a strategic nature; it has fully controlled all aspects of Pakistani society. This has been the case not only during military coups and direct military rule, but also when civilian governments were in power. Crucial decisions have been made only with the consent of or even as initiated by the army leadership. Moreover, from the very beginning of its independence, Pakistan has been nurturing its own version of the "army + Islam" formula, in which one component complemented and upheld the other. This "duet" was deeply rooted in the very emergence of Pakistani identity as a Muslim state of South Asia, i.e., a state established on a religious basis. After highlighting the preceding historical factors of the formation of such a specific culture, the study then explores its manifestations in the contemporary state through examples illustrating the influence of military leaders on the internal development and international behavior of the country. The author argues that for the 75 years of its independence, the Pakistani army has been a guarantor of social stability, which has brought it significant support from the population. On the other hand, the generalship has been repeatedly criticized for inhibiting the development of democratic institutions in the country and active interference in domestic policies and the life of the population. The author places a special emphasis on investigating the strategic behavior of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in the context of the development of Ukrainian-Pakistani relations. The army has the power to influence bilateral cooperation and Pakistan’s official neutral position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war by adjusting this attitude.

The primary objective of the article is to evaluate the significance of status and allied reputation within Denmark’s strategic culture. Amongst Danish international relations scholars, there is a well-established notion that one of the key motivations for the use of military force in Danish foreign policy was the aspiration to cultivate special relations with the United States and achieve the status of a privileged ally. This status would confirm guarantees for Denmark’s national security, provide the country with an opportunity for distinctive influence in decision-making and agenda-setting in NATO, the EU, and transatlantic cooperation. A qualitative content analysis of the 2017—2018, 2019—2020 and 2022 Danish foreign policy strategies was carried out to determine the effect of such expert perceptions on the texts of the guiding foreign policy documents. The analysis highlighted and confirmed the ‘super Atlanticism’ tendencies in Denmark’s contemporary strategic culture, revealing its close ties with the Danish perception of the US as the safeguard for the liberal world order and associated multilateral institutions. Denmark’s value-driven militarised foreign political activism in the post-Cold War era is thus not only pragmatic but also ideological as it seeks to promote liberal values, democracy and human rights under American leadership. The article concludes that factoring in status and reputation in strategic culture studies may complement the explanations of security community formation, alliance strategies and the dynamics behind relations within different types of alliances.

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This study has tried to answer the question of what effect the components of strategic culture have on the behavior patterns of Russian statesmen with a qualitative method and a descriptiveanalytical approach. And the American in response to the crisis in Ukraine 2022? The hypothesis raised in front of the mentioned question points out that the conflict between the two countries in the Ukrainian scene can be considered strongly influenced by the cultural, value, geopolitical and historical foundations of the two countries, and based on this, war, resort to force, deterrence and strategy Meaning has been found. The findings of the research indicate that in the Ukraine crisis, the dream of great power and the return to the glory of the empire, geopolitical issues, negative attitude towards the intentions of rival activists, traditions related to the Orthodox Church and Russian nationalism, in contrast to the belief in the absolute power of the United States in the field of politics and International relations, and the continuation of the war until the unconditional surrender of the enemy have been placed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article demonstrates that the Danish Armed Forces based its decision to establish the Joint Arctic Command in 2012 on a desire to rationalise and cut defence spending in general rather than in an attempt to strengthen Denmark's military posture in the Artic. We make this argument by employing the concept of strategic culture to make sense of these decisions and to provide an understanding of the overall strategic logic behind Denmark's military presence. Based on eight interviews with key informants involved in the establishment of the new joint command, supplemented with published and other written sources, we argue that cost-cutting arguments weighed heavier than strategic rationales during the process leading up to the creation of the Joint Arctic Command. Using strategic culture as our analytical framework allows us to provide an alternative explanation to that usually found in the literature, in which the establishment of JACO is held to be an index of a stronger Arctic focus in Danish foreign and security policy. This analysis prompts further consideration of what we can expect from the Danish Armed Forces in the years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article demonstrates that the Danish Armed Forces based its decision to establish the Joint Arctic Command in 2012 on a desire to rationalise and cut defence spending in general rather than in an attempt to strengthen Denmark’s military posture in the Artic. We make this argument by employing the concept of strategic culture to make sense of these decisions and to provide an understanding of the overall strategic logic behind Denmark’s military presence. Based on eight interviews with key informants involved in the establishment of the new joint command, supplemented with published and other written sources, we argue that cost-cutting arguments weighed heavier than strategic rationales during the process leading up to the creation of the Joint Arctic Command. Using strategic culture as our analytical framework allows us to provide an alternative explanation to that usually found in the literature, in which the establishment of JACO is held to be an index of a stronger Arctic focus in Danish foreign and security policy. This analysis prompts further consideration of what we can expect from the Danish Armed Forces in the years to come.

The aim of the article is to reveal the intention of “strategic culture”, which has a significant cognitive potential for studying the political course of the main players in the modern world. In modern-day Russia, the study of this phenomenon is characterized by inconsistency and ambiguity, which has disorienting consequences and makes it difficult to use the concept to identify political phenomena and processes. The situation is further complicated by the lack of clarity about what a political strategy is. The article gives the author’s vision of the strategy and reveals how the strategic culture is determined by the historical past of the nation, including its military experience. Therefore, the concept of “strategic culture” refers to the dependence of the subject’s political behavior on their perception of security. This perception is determined by the historical experience of the use of military force and the attitude towards it. Therefore, in practice, strategic culture is expressed in preferences when choosing ways and means of the subject’s response to changes in the environment.The comprehension of a specific strategic culture is complicated by the fact that, while existing and being insufficiently studied and explained, it can be perceived as an irrational phenomenon. Understanding the strategic culture requires the perception of value meanings, symbols, and motives of political players. It leads to increased requirements for the choice of methodology and research methods. The study of strategic culture and related phenomena involves the complex use of applied and specific methods. Among them, discourse analysis and content analysis, cross-cultural, semantic and semiotic analysis, study of documents, analysis of performance results should be singled out.

This article deals with the problem of assessing and interpreting expansionist elements in Poland’s international political behaviour. The problem is approached using the concept of the strategic culture of states, which covers beliefs, perceptions, and the language states use to describe their own and other countries’ actions. The study examines what expansionist types of strategic culture have developed in Poland, how relevant they are in the current political landscape, and describes their differences and similarities. To this end, the intellectual origins of foreign policy ideas prevalent in Poland (Rzeczpospolita) are traced, and the challenges of the external environment are correlated with the way they have been perceived in the course of Poland’s historical development. Two historically contingent expansionist types of strategic culture were identified. Firstly, as a medium-sized state that has faced military defeats, the Polish state has hardly embraced ideas bearing on the ‘besieged fortress’ concept. Secondly, the very culture of limited power politics has assumed some unique characteristics in the country: greater readiness to take risks and fascination with power actions. This state of affairs is largely a result of the contours of the regional project having been drawn for the neighbouring states mostly based on the negative type of consolidation (against the Muslims and later the Bolsheviks) and therefore never reaching a sufficient level of detail.

This paper examines the strategic cultures of India and Pakistan, their development through time, and their relative effects on South Asia’s strategic stability. It explains the distinctive components that make up each nation’s strategic culture, influenced by historical events, political processes, national identities, and geopolitical circumstances, via in-depth research. The research highlights essential contrasts in the strategic cultures of Pakistan and India and attributes these differences to the divergence in their distinct national trajectories and political evolutions. The historical non-alignment, democratic ethos, economic objectives, and geopolitical factors are used to examine the Indian strategic culture. The paper also considers how these different strategic cultures affect the intricate connection between these nuclear-armed neighbors by building on this basis. It broadens the discussion to consider how Pakistani and Indian strategic cultures may affect South Asia’s regional stability. The research highlights strategic cultures’ crucial role in determining regional dynamics and interstate interactions.

Russia is using the Black Sea as a diplomatic tool in its foreign policy to achieve its maritime and foreign policy objectives, which are also linked with the country's strategic culture. This research investigates the significance of the Black Sea in Russia's Maritime Strategy for achieving its foreign policy objectives by using the balance of interest theory. This research employs two conceptual schemas. Firstly, with the help of maritime diplomacy, it analyses a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives in the waters. Secondly, the research uses the concept of strategic culture, which helps explore the diplomatic importance of the Black Sea in Russian foreign policy through the perspective of history and attitudes of decision-makers. This research highlights the case of the Black Sea for Russian maritime strategy, which also has a great economic significance for the region and world. It also highlights the importance of the Black Sea in the Russian maritime doctrine (2022) and links between maritime strategic culture and foreign policy objectives. It concludes that Russia is successfully pursuing its cooperative, coercive, and persuasive maritime diplomacy in the Black Sea region by providing humanitarian assistance, blocking Ukrainian access, and operating a stronghold at Sevastopol port as its naval base. In conclusion, this paper argues that strategic culture plays a vital role in employing the three diplomatic dimensions for achieving maritime objectives in the Black Sea. Bibliography Entry Fatima Sherazi, Anees. 2023. "Role of Maritime Strategy in Russian Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Black Sea." Margalla Papers 27 (2): 115-124.

The article reconsiders the notion of strategic culture using fundamental categories of general and social semiotics, which make it possible to systematise and instrumentalise this concept while preserving its broad scope. The proposed framework suggests a relationalist reconceptualisation of strategic culture based on Charles Peirce's semiotic theory, thereby helping to transcend the existing controversy about how culture-as-ideas, culture-as-artefacts, and culture-as-behaviour are related to each other in strategic culture. The suggested approach helps to clarify the problematic aspects of the notion of strategic culture by redefining strategic culture as a logonomic system (a system of rules of meaning-making) that constrains interactions in strategic affairs. Such reconceptualisation helps to study how strategic cultures are reproduced not only through verbal discourse but also through other artefacts and actions. Semiotic categories also make it possible to account for important distinctions between various elements of strategic culture and formulate principles that can guide the studies of this phenomenon. The article provides some examples from the Russian strategic culture to demonstrate how the proposed framework can be applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In September 2021, Australia, the US, and the United Kingdom entered into a new trilateral security pact, AUKUS. Central to AUKUS is Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, scheduled to begin delivery in the 2030s. AUKUS was announced by Australia's previous conservative government, but it has also won the strong support of the new Labor government. The rationale behind AUKUS emphasizes growing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and the advantages of joint capabilities and interoperability in the context of China's growing assertiveness in the region. This article examines AUKUS through the lens of China's rise and the contradictory economic and security imperatives that the agreement poses for Australia. We argue that AUKUS is the latest expression of Australia's strategic culture, which is premised on a fear of abandonment and a conviction that Australia's core security interests can only be guaranteed by the support of the US. Yet this position harbours risks that are not widely acknowledged. These include risks to Australia's sovereignty and other risks arising from the uncertainties of the US position in Asia and the volatility of US domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past two decades, the Turkish government has been seeking strategic autonomy in international relations by trying different foreign policy styles. Throughout that time, Turkey strongly prioritized its own interests in relations with other regional and global powers, and pursued a multilateral and balanced policy, seeing it as a window for more opportunities to maneuver in foreign policy. Part of Turkey's approach to strategic autonomy relied on hedging, even if it resulted in the emergence of asymmetric relations with others. For example, Turkey developed not always economically and politically symmetric relations with Russia that had strong implications for the Middle East, South Caucasus, Black Sea region and Central Asia. On 24 February 2022, after Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, Turkey did not join in with Western sanctions against Russia, and instead attempted to mediate between Kyiv and Moscow. This decision was not spontaneous, as it was premised on years of building and strengthening bilateral ties with Russia, despite some devastating incidents between the two. This article is an inquiry into the search for strategic autonomy in Turkey's foreign policy with a focus on its relations with Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text brings to the fore an exploratory research. On one hand, the article sets out to explore the emergence of potential strategic subcultures in China. On the other hand, the article tries to frontload two different research approaches on the strategic (sub)cultures of a given state, namely, an inside-out way of investigation and an outside-in one. Even if it relies on an exploratory research, the text is not a descriptive one. It rests on a minimal research design, that is, research questions, literature review, and empirical data. The explanatory paradigm that this text employs is neoclassical realism, a meta-theory that has emerged at the intersection of realism with constructivism. According to this paradigm, a series of subsistemic factors, among which lies also the dominant strategic subculture, may account for a certain autonomy of a given state’s political elites when faced with regional or international pressures. The main concept that this text puts forward is that of dominant strategic subculture, which emerges as an outgrowth of elite competition in a certain state.

Strategic success is usually associated with having deliberate intentions, prior stated goals and a comprehensively formulated plan for effective execution. This way of thinking is driven by a means-ends logic and underpinned by the cognitivist assumption that conscious thought and consequential reasoning drive effective action: such privileging of thought over action is endemic in strategic theorizing. Our purpose in this paper is to demonstrate the plausibility of other, precognitive logics of strategic action and 'intention' as alternative explanatory bases for strategic success. We identify three such logics and their associated forms of intentionality. A 'logic of practices' views collectively shared habitus rather than conscious cognition/deliberate intention as the basis of effective strategic action. A 'logic of situation' emphasizes how situational momentum, tendencies and affordances themselves contain pre-cognitive 'in-tensional' impulses that actively elicit appropriate strategic responses. Finally, a 'logic of potential' associated with what Friedrich Nietzsche termed 'will to power'. It is with this fourth logic, we suggest, that strategic intention becomes most effective. In will to power, strategy entails the relentless expanding of degrees of freedom from environmental constraints without presuming cognitive separation from it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia is using the Black Sea as a diplomatic tool in its foreign policy to achieve its maritime and foreign policy objectives, which are also linked with the country's strategic culture. This research investigates the significance of the Black Sea in Russia's Maritime Strategy for achieving its foreign policy objectives by using the balance of interest theory. This research employs two conceptual schemas. Firstly, with the help of maritime diplomacy, it analyses a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives in the waters. Secondly, the research uses the concept of strategic culture, which helps explore the diplomatic importance of the Black Sea in Russian foreign policy through the perspective of history and attitudes of decision-makers. This research highlights the case of the Black Sea for Russian maritime strategy, which also has a great economic significance for the region and world. It also highlights the importance of the Black Sea in the Russian maritime doctrine (2022) and links between maritime strategic culture and foreign policy objectives. It concludes that Russia is successfully pursuing its cooperative, coercive, and persuasive maritime diplomacy in the Black Sea region by providing humanitarian assistance, blocking Ukrainian access, and operating a stronghold at Sevastopol port as its naval base. In conclusion, this paper argues that strategic culture plays a vital role in employing the three diplomatic dimensions for achieving maritime objectives in the Black Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India's strategic culture is the crystallization of its civilized values and political culture. As a product of India's history, geo-politics and socio-economic factors, India's strategic culture is rooted in ancient political and philosophical ideas. One of the factors that create uniqueness and consistency is the geographical difference, social diversity, the diversity in the unity of the culture, and the brilliance of the civilized values over 4000 years of history. India's strategic culture has both assimilation and continuity. Through the methods of historical research and policy analysis, the research results show that the influence of India's strategic culture on foreign policy is reflected in the idea of global inclusion. Through the concept of Veda Upanishad (Upanishads - considered important representatives of philosophical thought, mythology, religion, and ancient Indian literature,) with the values "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam" (The world is one family) and Satyameva Jayate (Truth alone triumphs) - an ancient Indian canonical truth engraved on the national emblem of India, symbolizing profound cultural characteristics and values. This strategic culture has made India truly a strong nation, with a strong economy and a glorious culture based on the power of knowledge and morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Throughout history, Serbs and Albanians have had periods of coexistence and cooperation, but more often than not there have been periods of conflicts, wih the long-standing one regarding the control over the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Nevertheless, almost half a century since the appearance of the concept, there have been no significant efforts to define basic characteristics of Albanian strategic culture, which are evident shortcomings of Serbian strategic studies. This paper has the aim to initiate a process of systematic study of the abovementioned research problem, with the aim to objectively and rationally obtain basic characteristics of Albanian strategic culture by applying almost all scientific methods, especially hypothetico-deductive method. The paper's main hypothesis states as follows: basic characteristics of Albanian strategic culture are predominantly "mercantile" approach towards diplomacy with strong support from diaspora, by which they seek to support persistent aspirations for the control over the territory with the majority of Albanian population, whereby they do not hesitate to use political violence, while the military force is engaged exclusively with previously provided support from great powers. Basic characteristics of Albanian strategic culture point to the necessity to reevaluate our strategic approach towards Albanians.

The paper theoretically investigates the phenomena of ontological security and collective identity through the prism of strategic culture, with an empirical elaboration of the case study of Kosovo and Metohija. The authors supplement the realistic understanding of security with a social-constructivist perspective, emphasizing the influence of values, ideas, perceptions and culture in general in the shaping of collective identity, which is closely related to the subjective sense of security. The main hypothesis is that the solidity of the collective identity survives regardless of external pressures and reshaping tendencies because its survival is perceived as an inseparable essence of ontological security. The authors conclude that the strength of collective identity in certain situations overcomes the problems of collapsed institutions and the absence of actors who advocate the basic values of that identity. Kosovo and Metohija is more than a material part of the territory, strongly building the foundations of collective identity. An individual who feels a sense of belonging to such a collective identity will almost instinctively reject any solution which affects that identity, so he will perceive an attack on those values, no matter how intense, as a feeling of personal insecurity.

The article deals with the «total defense» concept considering it to be part of Sweden’s strategic culture and provides an overview of how this concept defines Sweden’s approach towards the defense cooperation within the EU. «Total defence» remains staple in the Swedish defence planning and the perception of risks to national security, but has not yet received sufficient attention from Russian researchers. The announced restoration of the effective total defense system potentially comparable to that of the period of bipolar confrontation is associated with significant difficulties due to the gradual reduction in defense spending after the end of the Cold War and the decentralization of the national crisis preparedness structures which was initiated in the early 2000s. The total defense itself also reveals tensions between the demands for consolidation and centralized decision-making and the liberal, open nature of the Swedish society and national economy, as well as the principles of responsibility, subsidiarity and similarity that underline the present Swedish emergency response system. The total defense, is, therefore, regarded as an attempt at creating an effective crisis preparedness system that would function successfully in a democratic society, both under the conditions of peace and potential armed conflict, without the need to declare an emergency and endow individual bodies or a selected group of individuals with exclusive powers. The Swedish strategic culture, therefore, stipulates that it is important not only to resolve a crisis effectively, but also to do so in a way which would not endanger the regular functioning of political institutions and the rule of law. Within the EU Sweden has earned credit for developing civilian or non-military elements of crisis management, while «more hardware» defense cooperation within PESCO and the European Defense Fund is defined by the pragmatic economic interests of Swedish defense companies rather than by strategic considerations. The Swedish Experience with «total defence» will continue to face the same dilemma – the need to rebuild a robust and self-reliant national defence while preserving the liberal principles in politics as well as in economy.

As the US shifts from counterterrorism to strategic competition against state rivals, the role of its special operations forces is also changing. David H Ucko explores the promise and limitations of special operations in this new era, identifying their contribution but also the need for a broader response. Indeed, because strategic competition is primarily non-violent, with instruments of state weaponised to offset military inferiority, an effective response will similarly require a diversification of statecraft away from the military. This requirement poses challenges to an American strategic culture still reliant on armed superiority and, for two decades, direct action by elite forces.◼ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines Russia's strategic culture and its behaviour in Russia Ukraine conflict between February 2014 and February 2023. It identifies and examines traditional elements of Russian strategic culture, such as territorial expansionism, a tendency towards offensive military action, the perception of the use of military force as an appropriate means to achieve political goals, a paranoid threat perception - the image of the besieged fortress and distrust of the West, fear of coloured revolutions, and the idea of Russia's greatness and pursuit of international great power status. As the article shows, traditional elements of Russian strategic culture are reflected in and explain Russian Federation's behaviour in the Russia Ukraine conflict. This pattern confirms the continuity within Russian strategic culture, as its traditional elements are still present and define the contemporary strategic culture of the Russian Federation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article attempts to explain the specifics of Romania's policy toward Ukraine after the Russian invasion of the country. The author traces the origins of this policy to the myth of the "Latin island," which was the main founding myth for the Romanian national community. It evokes certain foreign policy attitudes: a desire to stay in the mainstream of Western politics, a perception of Russia as a threat to one's sovereignty, and a distance from the Eastern Slavs in general. The author points out that these defined both the conservative policy toward Ukraine immediately after the Russian invasion and the rapprochement in mutual relations that occurred in the fall of 2023. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: In late 2021, Western intelligence services began issuing warnings about Moscow's readiness to invade Ukraine, although Russian elites, including Putin, denied the claim. But to the dismay of observers and the concern of Western nations, he ordered an invasion in February 2022. At first, this action was supposed to be a short and decisive operation with the aim of overthrowing the Zelenskyi government. But the field calculations were wrong and Moscow admitted that every war has its own path and does not necessarily follow the pre-planned path and the plan of the military commanders. The 2022 Russian war on Ukraine sparked different and even contradictory analyses. Some believe that because of NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's desire to join this security alliance, the Kremlin is opposed to any option except war. Other scholars believe that Putin attacked Ukraine because of Moscow's strong desire to be recognized and respected as a "great power" or because of elements of Russia's strategic culture. Other studies have focused on Putin's personal characteristics and ambitions as the main source of the attack. This article examines the role of Putin's perceptions and miscalculations in relation to the issue of war. Research Question: The key question of the study is: How have Putin's misperceptions affected his policy towards Kyiv? There are also a few minor questions, such as: How Putin understands the international position of Russia and its relations with other countries, and how he perceives the intentions of other great powers. Research Hypothesis: This study hypothesizes that Putin's misperceptions of Russia's military might, Ukraine's will and power to resist, his misperception of Ukraine's intentions and his misunderstanding of the reactions of third parties critically contributed to and precipitated his decision to go to war. Methodology (and theoretical framework if there are): To determine the main variables of the research, a conceptual framework, based on the findings of some key scholars of the psychology of International Politics, namely Jack Levy and Martin White, has been adopted. According to the conceptual framework, 3 main categories of misperceptions play an important role in leading countries to war: 1) Misperception of oneself and enemy's military capabilities; 2) Misperception on the enemy's intentions and the degree of its animosity, and 3) Misperception on the intentions and reactions of the third parties. The second tier of the conceptual framework includes two key elements of Russian strategic culture, "fear" and "arrogance" which according to Martin White, are the main elements of a war. All of these factors could pave the way for a costly and all-out war. To investigate the role of these factors in the 2022 war in Ukraine, the research method of qualitative content analysis has been used. Directed qualitative content analysis, unlike conventional inductive approaches, is a comparative research approach. In this method, the researcher uses the existing theory and literature to determine the key concepts and variables. Based on those concepts and variables, the researcher begins to collect, code, decode and analyze the data. In the current study, according to the variables of the conceptual framework, the author has directly and indirectly pointed out Putin's views in this field in order to extract his possible misconceptions about Ukraine crisis. In collecting information related to Putin's words, the writer has referred to the interviews and documents published by the Russian Foreign Ministry. To strengthen the reliability of the research, the findings of the existing literature have also been examined. The collected data has been coded, decoded and analyzed in the conceptual framework. Results and Discussion: Cognitive and psychological factors have played a significant role in creating the ground for the war in Ukraine. There is some evidence that highlights the role of the misperceived Russian elites, mainly Putin, in the war against Kyiv. These misconceptions are: 1) Misunderstanding of Ukraine's own and military capabilities, a) overestimating Moscow's military capabilities and b) underestimating Ukraine's military capabilities 2) Misperception on the intentions of Kyiv; including a) Overestimating the animosity and evil intentions of Ukraine, and b) Underestimating the enemy's will and courage to resist and 3) Misunderstanding of EU and US response to ongoing events, mainly underestimating their harsh and long-term response. These misconceptions, combined with two key elements of Russian strategic culture, fear and arrogance, led Russia to escalate the crisis into an all-out war. These findings contribute to the literature by articulating a meaningful conceptual framework. Combining cognitive factors with elements of Russian strategic culture can be useful for explaining some fascinating and illusory issues of Russian foreign policy. Conclusion: Russia invaded Ukraine for a variety of reasons. Geopolitical, geo-economics, geo-strategic and even geo-cultural factors played a role in pushing Moscow on the path to war. These factors had taken roots for a long time and didn't appear suddenly. The findings of this paper help to explain why Putin chose the war path despite previous restraints. Elements of Russia's strategic culture highlighted Moscow's perceived threats and called for an immediate response. In the process of orchestrating a credible and decisive response to threats, elements of this misperception helped significantly to convince Putin that the time had come for a military strike. The role of these misconceptions in the form, tactics, and objectives of the initial mobilization of Russian forces is quite clear. In short, Putin and other military elites' misperceptions, along with fear and arrogance, paved the way for his war in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how non-expansionist types of strategic culture emerged and gradually developed in Poland. The study aims to identify the features of non-expansionist types of Polish strategic culture for a more objective analysis of the country's modern foreign and security policy. The article begins by describing the emergence and use of the concept of strategic culture, offering a typology of strategic cultures based on the work of the 'cultural realist' Alastair Johnston. Then it employs a qualitative method of process tracing to outline the sequence of events and the ideological constructs that led to the emergence or degradation of the corresponding types of strategic culture. The strategic culture of neutrality, exposed to external influences and revised republicanism ideas, is shown to have laid the foundation for a strategic culture of political fortification (or an outpost) in Poland. This strategic culture has its origins in the idea of the ethical superiority of the Polish state, although the details of this superiority may differ dramatically in specific situations. At the same time, none of the types of the accommodation culture has yet emerged in Poland, albeit accommodation seems to be a promising lead for the further development of the country’s strategic culture.

Until today, the European Union (EU) has associated its foreign policy with normative power, which is the main instrument of soſt power. However, the crisis of global governance has affected the global strategy of the EU. The article explores the most pressing of these changes. The research was based on official publications made by various European think tanks and individual analysts. The EU has an effective mechanism for interaction between think tanks and political leaders. As a result, the European analytics can justify various concepts and approaches that later acquire legislative forms. Also, the scientific analytics makes it possible to test the decisions being made. The article focuses on the following EU issues: new strategic culture; geopolitics and normative power in strategic documents; strategic autonomy; differentiation and fragmentation as policy tools; the end of unanimity in making responsible decisions; the concept of pragmatic federalism; military development; the so-called Strategic Compass; the Russian military special operation and the concept of world order, etc.

Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to concern about the implications for Arctic governance and stability. The Arctic Council has been temporarily suspended and the security tension between Russia and the seven other Western Arctic states has intensified. A more isolated Russia under Western sanctions leans even more towards the East, where China, especially, figures as an attractive strategic partner. In this article, we set out to examine the prospects for Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation in the Arctic. We introduce a social constructivist perspective highlighting how strategic culture may serve as a lens through which to analyse developments in states’ strategies – specifically their ends, ways and means. Applying our culturally applicable ends-ways-means (EWM) model, we show how Russian and Chinese strategic cultures set distinct limits to their strategic cooperation in the Arctic. The two states’ identity-driven urge to secure and display their great power position will increasingly collide. It is therefore our prediction that Russia and China will eventually act in ways that will gradually come to undermine their strategic cooperation in the region.