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Urbanization in low and middle-income nations is characterized by economic and demographic shifts largely understood to be beneficial to women’s empowerment. These changes include increased education and wage-labor opportunities, a disruption of traditional patrilocal residence systems, and reductions in spousal age gap and fertility. However, such changes may drive a “violence backlash,” with men increasing intimate partner violence (IPV) in efforts to challenge women’s shifting status. To date, tests of this idea primarily relate to women’s changing economic status, with less known about the demographic correlates of IPV in urbanizing settings. Addressing this, we conducted a cross-sectional study of IPV behavior and attitudes in an urbanizing community in Mwanza, northern Tanzania ( n = 317). Consistent with a violence backlash, IPV was reported more often among women educated at higher levels than their husband, and women earning similar, rather than lower, wages to their husband were more likely to report that he condones IPV. These findings were independent of women’s absolute education and income. Furthermore, less frequent paternal kin contact, and relatively small spousal age gaps, generally understood to boost women’s empowerment, were associated with an increased risk of experiencing IPV. Less frequent paternal kin contact was also associated with an increased likelihood that a husband condones IPV. Contrary to our predictions, relatively lower fertility, generally linked to higher women’s empowerment, did not predict IPV behavior and women with high, rather than low, fertility were more likely to report that their husband condones IPV. Overall, our results support the notion of a violence backlash corresponding to economic changes for women that accompany urbanization. In contrast, demographic changes associated with urbanization have more variable relationships. Drawing on these results, we suggest future research avenues for better understanding the vulnerability of women to IPV in urbanizing settings.

The marriage of older men to younger women is common across cultures. On one hand, husband-older marriage may serve the interests of both sexes, a conclusion broadly consistent with reported gender differences in mate preferences. On the other hand, men alone may benefit from such marriages at a cost to women if seniority enables men to exert dominance in conflicts of interest. Indeed, in public health large spousal age gaps are generally deemed “pathological”, both as a cause and consequence of gender inequalities harmful to women. We investigate these alternative models of spousal age gap using data from a cross-sectional survey of women in Mwanza, northwestern Tanzania (n = 993). Consistent with the notion that spousal age gaps are a product of sexual conflict, women typically married with a larger age gap than stated ideals. However, adjusting for potential confounds, spousal age gap was not associated with fertility or the risk of divorce. Furthermore, women's mental health and autonomy in household decision-making was higher in husband-older marriages compared to rare cases of same-age or wife-older marriage. Beyond this comparison, the magnitude of spousal age gaps was unrelated to either measure of women's wellbeing among the overwhelming majority of marriages where the husband was older. Together these findings suggest husband-older marriage does not influence marital stability, relatively large spousal age gaps are neither especially costly nor beneficial to women, and that alternative sociodemographic factors are more important in driving variation in women's wellbeing and reproductive success in this context. Our results support neither a model of mutual benefits, nor a pathological conceptualization of spousal age gaps. We conclude by both encouraging evolutionary human scientists to engage more fully with models of sexual conflict in future studies of marriage and mating, and suggesting that public health scholars consider more neutral interpretations of spousal age differences.

Global health studies typically characterise adolescent marriage as a fundamental risk to female wellbeing. In contrast, ethnographic research among communities 'at risk' identifies that early marriage is often viewed as an opportunity weighed against locally feasible alternatives. Addressing this contradiction, we document perceived risks and opportunities of marriage, positioning them among wider concerns facing female adolescents in north-western Tanzania. On the basis of these data, we then provide recommendations for global efforts to end the marriage of minors. Thirteen focus groups and 26 in-depth interviews were conducted in 2019 with female adolescents, young women and men, and parents of female adolescents from a semi-urban community where adolescent marriage is normative. Data were compiled to synthesise narratives of adolescent risk and opportunity. Marriage was viewed as an opportunity for adolescent girls, bringing benefits such as increased social status. Risks sometimes outweighed benefits of marriage, but marriage remained desirable when structural constraints, like poverty, limited feasible alternatives and when adolescents faced similar risks, like pregnancy, outside of marriage. We conclude that remaining unmarried does not shield adolescents from adversity, and campaigns targeting adolescent marriage via criminalisation, without diminishing other risks of adolescence, may further limit rather than expand options for adolescent girls.

Global health interventions increasingly target the abolishment of ‘child marriage’ (marriage under 18 years, hereafter referred to as ‘early marriage’). Guided by human behavioural ecology theory, and drawing on focus groups and in-depth interviews in an urbanising Tanzanian community where female early marriage is normative, we examine the common assumption that it is driven by the interests and coercive actions of parents and/or men. We find limited support for parent–offspring conflict. Parents often encouraged early marriages, but were motivated by the promise of social and economic security for daughters, rather than bridewealth transfers alone. Moreover, forced marriage appears rare, and adolescent girls and young women (AGYW) were active agents in the transition to marriage, sometimes marrying against parental wishes. Support for gendered conflict was stronger. AGYW were described as being lured into unstable relationships by men misrepresenting their long-term intentions. Community members voiced concerns over these marriages. Overall, early marriage appears rooted in limited options, encouraging strategic, but risky choices on the marriage market. Our results highlight plurality and context dependency in drivers of early marriage, even within a single community. We conclude that engaging with the importance of context is fundamental in forging culturally sensitive policies and programs on early marriage.

Summary: Background: The roll-out of antiretroviral therapy (ART) has changed contexts of HIV risk, but the influence on HIV incidence among young women is not clear. We aimed to summarise direct estimates of HIV incidence among adolescent girls and young women since ART and before large investments in targeted prevention for those in sub-Saharan Africa. Methods: We did a systematic review and meta-analysis. We searched MEDLINE, Embase, Web of Science, Global Health, and CINAHL for studies reporting HIV incidence data from serological samples collected among females aged 15–24 years in ten countries (Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) that were selected for DREAMS investment in 2015. We only included articles published in English. Our main outcome was to summarise recent levels and trends in HIV incidence estimates collected between 2005 and 2015, published or received from study authors, by age and sex, and pooled by region. Findings: 51 studies were identified from nine of the ten DREAMS countries; no eligible studies from Lesotho were identified. Directly observed HIV incidence rates were lowest among females aged 13–19 years in Kumi, Uganda (0·38 cases per 100 person-years); and directly observed HIV incidence rates were highest in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa (7·79 per 100 person-years among females aged 15–19 years, and 8·63 in those aged 20–24 years), among fishing communities in Uganda (12·40 per 100 person-years in females aged 15–19 years and 4·70 in those aged 20–24 years), and among female sex workers aged 18–24 years in South Africa (13·20 per 100 person-years) and Zimbabwe (10·80). In pooled rates from the general population studies, the greatest sex differentials were in the youngest age groups—ie, females aged 15–19 years compared with male peers in both southern African (pooled relative risk 5·94, 95% CI 3·39–10·44) and eastern African countries (3·22, 1·51–6·87), and not significantly different among those aged 25–29 years in either region. Incidence often peaked earlier (during teenage years) among high-risk groups compared with general populations. Since 2005, HIV incidence among adolescent girls and young women declined in Rakai (Uganda) and Manicaland (Zimbabwe), and also declined among female sex workers in Kenya, but not in the highest-risk communities in South Africa and Uganda. Interpretation: Few sources of direct estimates of HIV incidence exist in high-burden countries and trend analyses with disaggregated data for age and sex are rare but indicate recent declines among adolescent girls and young women. In some of the highest-risk settings, however, little evidence exists to suggest ART availability and other efforts slowed transmission by 2016. Despite wide geographical diversity in absolute levels of incidence in adolescent girls and young women, risk relative to males persisted in all settings, with the greatest sex differentials in the youngest age groups. To end new infections among the growing population of adolescents in sub-Saharan Africa, prevention programmes must address gender inequalities driving excessive risk among adolescent girls. Funding: This work was conducted as part of a planning grant funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

In high-income, low-fertility (HILF) settings, the mother’s partner is a key provider of childcare. However, it is not clear how mothers without partners draw on other sources of support to raise children. This paper reports the findings from a survey of 1532 women in the United Kingdom and the United States, in which women described who provided childcare for a focal child and how frequently they did so. We use multivariate Bayesian regression models to explore the drivers of support from partners, maternal kin, and other allomothers, as well as the potential impact of allomothering on women’s fertility. Relative to mothers who are in a stable first marriage or cohabitation, mothers who are unpartnered rely more heavily on fewer maternal kin, use more paid help, and have networks which include more non-kin helpers. Repartnered mothers received less help from their partners in the UK and less help from maternal kin in both countries, which US mothers compensated for by relying on other helpers. While repartnered mothers had higher age-adjusted fertility than women in a first partnership, allomaternal support was not clearly related to the mother’s fertility. These findings demonstrate the importance of partners but also of allomothering more broadly in HILF settings.

Approximately 40% of women in sub-Saharan Africa marry before their eighteenth birthday1. Within the international development sector, this phenomenon is referred to as 'child marriage', widely equated to forced marriage, and recognized as damaging to multiple dimensions of female well-being1,2. An escalating global campaign to end early marriage typically assumes that its high prevalence is driven by a conflict of interests between parents and daughters, with parents coercing daughters to marry early for the parents' economic benefit3. However, a parent-offspring conflict model of early marriage has not been explicitly tested. Here we present a study of marriage transitions in rural Tanzania, where marriage before or just after 18 years of age is normative. Consistent with parental coercion, we find that bridewealth transfers are highest for younger brides. However, autonomy in partner choice is very common at all ages, relationships between age at marriage and female well-being are largely equivocal, and women who marry early achieve relatively higher reproductive success. We conclude that, in contexts in which adolescents have autonomy in marriage choices and in which marriage promotes economic and social security, early marriage may be better understood as serving the strategic interests of both parents and daughters.

A global campaign to end “child marriage” has emerged over the last decade as part of growing international commitments to address gender inequities and improve female wellbeing. Campaigns typically assert that young brides have negligible autonomy in the marriage process and that marrying under 18 years has resolutely negative impacts on wellbeing. Yet, surprisingly few studies explore local attitudes towards marriage and its timing within contexts where early marriage is most common. As such our understanding of motivations and potential conflicts of interest leading female adolescents into marriage remain poorly informed by viewpoints of people purportedly at risk. We present an exploratory study of attitudes to early marriage in northwestern Tanzania where marriage before or shortly after 18 years is normative. We use focus group discussions, complimented by a survey of 993 women, to investigate local views on marriage. We explore (i) why people marry, (ii) when marriage is deemed appropriate, and (iii) who guides the marriage process. Contrary to dominant narratives in the end child marriage movement, we find that women are frequently active rather than passive in the selection of when and who to marry. Furthermore, marriage is widely viewed as instrumental in acquiring social status within one’s local community. Our conclusions illuminate why rates of early marriage remain high despite potential negative wellbeing consequences and increasingly restrictive laws. We discuss our results in relation to related qualitative studies in other cultural contexts and consider the policy implications for current efforts to limit early marriage in Tanzania and beyond.

Background The concept of ‘child marriage’ in global health distinguishes ostensibly harmful from healthy ages to marry at a universally-applied threshold of 18-years. With intensifying efforts to end child marriage, targeted communities are increasingly asked to change their perception of such marriages from relatively benign to profoundly problematic. The objective of this study is to understand how this shift in perception is navigated by adolescent girls and young women (AGYW). Methods Using qualitative data collected in 2019 from a semi-urban community in Tanzania where marriage under 18-years is common and campaigns to end child marriage ongoing, we contrast reports of lived experiences of marriage under 18-years among AGYW to views of child marriage as an abstract concept. Thirteen in-depth interviews with AGYW, as part of a wider qualitative study, were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed using a framework analysis approach. Results While many AGYW had heard of child marriage, the concept was routinely conflated with forced marriage, which is rare in the community, and non-marital teenage sex and pregnancy, which are common. As a likely consequence, participants disagreed on whether or not child marriage occurs locally. Furthermore, accounts of real-life marriages under 18 sometimes aligned with, but often departed from, common narratives about the purported causes and harmful consequences inherent to the global health concept of child marriage. Conclusions We argue that engaging with diverse local views and experiences of marrying young is essential to producing culturally-sensitive, effective initiatives addressing the vulnerabilities of female adolescence.

Achieving gender equality fundamentally requires a transfer of power from men to women. Yet data on men's support for women's empowerment (WE) remains scant and limited by reliance on self-report methodologies. Here, we examine men's support for WE as a sexual conflict trait, both via direct surveys (n = 590) and indirectly by asking men's wives (n = 317) to speculate on their husband's views. Data come from a semi-urban community in Mwanza, Tanzania. Consistent with reduced resource competition and increased exposure to relatively egalitarian gender norms, higher socioeconomic status predicted greater support for WE. However, potential demographic indicators of sexual conflict (high fertility, polygyny, large spousal age gap) were largely unrelated to men's support for WE. Contrasting self- and wife-reported measures suggests that men frequently exaggerate their support for women in self-reported attitudes. Discrepancies were especially pronounced among men claiming the highest support for WE, but smallest among men who held a professional occupation and whose wife participated in wage labour, indicating that these factors predict genuine support for WE. We discuss the implications of these results for our understanding of both individual variation and patriarchal gender norms, emphasising the benefits of greater exchange between the evolutionary human sciences and global health research on these themes.

Background: A global campaign to eradicate ‘child marriage’ (Methods: We surveyed USA nationals via the online survey platform MTurk. Participants provided sociodemographic information and answered ten questions about their understanding of child marriage. To identify potential misconceptions and inaccurate beliefs we present descriptive statistics for participant responses paired with correct answers where available.Results: 609 participants provided data for analysis. 59% were women, with a mean age of 37 years, just over half (55%) were university educated, and the majority (79%) were currently employed. Half of those surveyed mistakenly believed that the cut-off for child marriage is younger than the legal threshold of 18 years, and nearly three-quarters incorrectly believed that most child marriages occur at 15 years or below (child marriage primarily takes place in later adolescence). The large majority of participants incorrectly believed that child marriage is illegal throughout the United States (it’s illegal in only two states), and mistakenly believed that child marriage primarily takes place among Muslim-majority regions of the Middle East and North Africa (it is most common in sub Saharan Africa and South Asia). Participants tended to substantially overestimate the prevalence of child marriage in both the USA and abroad.Conclusions: These findings suggest that public understanding of child marriage is not only poor, but also shaped by wider misperceptions of both relatively high and low-income nations. Organizations seeking to empower girls and young women by reducing child marriage need to be cautious of these misunderstandings, and wary of the potential for their own activities to seed misinformation. For example, we suggest the terminology ‘child marriage’, as opposed to ‘teen marriage’ or ‘adolescent marriage’, may contribute to widespread confusion about the typical ages at which child marriages occur.

Variation in parental care by child's sex is evident across cultures. Evolutionary theory provides a functional explanation for this phenomenon, predicting that parents will favour specific children if this results in greater fitness payoffs. Here, we explore evidence for sex-biased parental care in a high-fertility, patriarchal and polygynous population in Tanzania, predicting that both mothers and fathers will favour sons in this cultural setting. Our data come from a cross-sectional study in rural northwestern Tanzania, which included surveys with mothers/guardians of 808 children under age 5. We focus on early childhood, a period with high mortality risk which is fundamental in establishing later-life physical and cognitive development. Examining multiple measures of direct/physical care provision (washing, feeding, playing with, supervising, co-sleeping and caring when sick), we demonstrate that fathers favour sons for washing, feeding and supervising, while maternal care is both more intensive and unrelated to child sex. We find no difference in parental care between girls and boys regarding the allocation of material resources and the duration of breastfeeding; or in terms of parental marital and co-residence status. This bias towards sons may result from higher returns to investment for fathers than mothers, and local gender norms about physical care provision.

For girls and women, marriage under 18 years is commonplace in many low-income nations today and was culturally widespread historically. Global health campaigns refer to marriage below this threshold as ‘child marriage’ and increasingly aim for its universal eradication, citing its apparent negative wellbeing consequences. Here, we outline and evaluate four alternative hypotheses for the persistence of early marriage, despite its associations with poor wellbeing, arising from the theoretical framework of human behavioral ecology. First, early marriage may be adaptive (e.g., it maximizes reproductive success), even if detrimental to wellbeing, when life expectancy is short. Second, parent–offspring conflict may explain early marriage, with parents profiting economically at the expense of their daughter’s best interests. Third, early marriage may be explained by intergenerational conflict, whereby girls marry young to emancipate themselves from continued labor within natal households. Finally, both daughters and parents from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds favor early marriage as a ‘best of a bad job strategy’ when it represents the best option given a lack of feasible alternatives. The explanatory power of each hypothesis is context-dependent, highlighting the complex drivers of life history transitions and reinforcing the need for context-specific policies addressing the vulnerabilities of adolescence worldwide.

Low fertility across Europe highlights the need to understand reproductive decisions in high-income countries better. Availability of support may be one factor influencing reproductive decisions, though within high-income countries availability varies between environments, including socio-economic environments. We test whether receiving higher levels of support, from different sources (informal and formal) and of different types (practical and emotional), is positively correlated with second births in the United Kingdom (UK) Millennium Cohort Study, and whether these relationships differ by socio-economic position (SEP). Our hypothesis is only partially supported: receiving emotional support correlates with higher likelihood of second birth, but the opposite is true for practical support. Availability of different types of support varies across SEP, but relationships between support and fertility are similar, with one exception: kin-provided childcare increases the likelihood of birth only among lower-SEP women. Our results highlight that not all support is equal in the decision to have a second child.

Studies of the association between wealth and fertility in industrial populations have a rich history in the evolutionary literature, and they have been used to argue both for and against a behavioral ecological approach to explaining human variability. We consider that there are strong arguments in favor of measuring fertility (and proxies thereof) in industrial populations, not least because of the wide availability of large-scale secondary databases. Such data sources bring challenges as well as advantages, however. The purpose of this article is to illustrate these by examining the association between wealth and reproductive success in the United States, using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979. We conduct a broad-based exploratory analysis of the relationship between wealth and fertility, employing both cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches, and multiple measures of both wealth (income and net worth) and fertility (lifetime reproductive success and transitions to first, second and third births). We highlight the kinds of decisions that have to be made regarding sample selection, along with the selection and construction of explanatory variables and control measures. Based on our analyses, we find a positive effect of both income and net worth on fertility for men, which is more pronounced for white men and for transitions to first and second births. Income tends to have a negative effect on fertility for women, while net worth is more likely to positively predict fertility. Different reproductive strategies among different groups within the same population highlight the complexity of the reproductive ecology of industrial societies. These results differ in a number of respects from other analyses using the same database. We suggest this reflects the impossibility of producing a definitive analysis, rather than a failure to identify the "correct" analytical strategy. Finally, we discuss how these findings inform us about (mal)adaptive decision-making.

Approximately 40% of women in sub-Saharan Africa marry before their eighteenth birthday

Pepper & Nettle offer a nuanced and humane view on poverty that should be required reading for policy makers, particularly those interested in “behaviour change” policy. We suggest, however, that the emphasis on “future-discounting” in this paper downplays the importance of differences in the payoffs to behavioursin the presentand how these payoffs may be realised in different currencies.

Background: Support from families can reduce costs of reproduction and may therefore be associated with higher fertility for men and women. Family supportiveness, however, varies both between families - some families are more supportive than others - and within families over time - as the needs of recipients and the abilities of support givers change. Distinguishing the effects of time-invariant between-family supportiveness and time-varying within-family supportiveness on fertility can help contribute to an understanding of how family support influences fertility. Objective: We distinguish 'between' and 'within' families for several types of support shared between parents and adult children and test whether between- and within-family variation in support associates with birth timings. Methods: We use seven years of annually collected LISS panel data from the Netherlands on 2,288 reproductive-aged men and women to investigate the timing of first and subsequent births. Results: We find between-family support is more often associated with fertility than is within-family support, particularly for first births and for women. Emotional support is generally associated with earlier first births for both men and women, while results for financial and reciprocal emotional support are mixed. There is some indication that the latter kind of support positively predicts births for men and negatively for women. Conclusions: Our results suggest that feeling supported may be more important than actual support in reproductive decision-making in this high-income setting. Contribution: We apply a method novel to human demography to address both a conceptual and methodological issue in studies of families and fertility.

© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Objectives: The importance of fathers in ensuring child health in rural developing populations is questioned by anthropologists and population health scientists. Existing literature focuses on paternal death and child mortality. A relative lack of studies consider alternative forms of father absence and/or more subtle health outcomes. Here we determine the frequency and form of father absence in northern Tanzania, and its relationship to household food security, wealth, and child anthropometric status. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional survey of 3136 children under 5 years of age from 56 villages. Using multilevel regression we contrast children residing with both parents to those that (i) have experienced paternal death, (ii) reside with their mother but not their living father and (iii) are fostered apart from both living parents. Results: Of the total, 3.5% of children had experienced paternal death. Thirteen percent resided with their mother but away from their living father. Supporting data indicate such cases primarily reflect parental divorce/separation, extra-marital birth, or polygynous fathers residing with an alternative cowife. Paternal death and residing apart from one's living father was associated with lower food security and/or relative poverty and there is suggestive evidence that children in such circumstances achieve lower height-for-age. Six percent of children were fostered, usually with grandparents, and were comparable to children residing with both parents in terms of household food security, wealth, and anthropometric status. Conclusion: Our results highlight diversity in the form and consequences of father absence. We discuss limitations of the current study and wider literature on fatherhood and make suggestions for future research.

Kin are generally expected to behave more cooperatively with their relatives than with unrelated individuals, and this cooperative behavior may result in positive effects on fitness. Such kin effects are likely to be modified by resource availability: in contexts of resource stress, cooperation among kin may disappear or weaken as more energy is required for investment in self. We use the Generations and Gender Survey, a large, multinational demographic survey, to test the following: firstly, how kin availability measures (parental survival status and coresidence with parents) affect measures of women’s fitness (timing of first birth, total fertility, and probability of childlessness); and, secondly, whether wealth (an indicator of resource stress or abundance) modifies kin effects in a high-income, low-fertility setting. We find differing effects of survival status of, and coresidence with, parents on fertility outcomes. Having a living mother tends to be correlated with higher fitness: women with living mothers have earlier first births, and mothers’ death in early life is correlated with a higher probability of childlessness. Fathers’ survival has no effect on any outcome. Coresidence with parents, on the other hand, delays first births and results in lower total fertility and higher probability of childlessness. We additionally find that the negative effects of coresidence on reproductive outcomes are exaggerated for poor women. Our results speak of the role of environment in modifying the relationship between kin and fertility.

Kinship fostering is generally preferred to non-kin fostering by policy makers in the U.S. and elsewhere. Researchers and policy makers alike tend to provide several proximate reasons for why this may be, generally neglecting an ultimate evolutionary framework. However, kin selection theory predicts that in the absence of genetically related parents, care from kin will result in the most similar life history outcomes. In low-fertility settings, parents typically favour increased investment in embodied capital and thus delayed reproductive life history strategy. Using archival data from the original Kinsey survey, collected in the U.S. from 1938 to 1963, we used survival analyses to compare the effects of living with kin and non-kin fosterers in childhood on timings of first sex and marriage. Our results support a kin selection hypothesis showing that while fostered children have accelerated life histories compared to children from "intact families", kin fosterers buffer children from early sexual and reproductive behaviors, compared to children cared for by non-kin. © 2014 The Authors.