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The Brief Loquaciousness and Interpersonal Responsiveness Test (BLIRT) measures the extent to which people respond to others quickly and effusively. The BLIRT displays desirable psychometric properties and distinguishes people who should theoretically score high (e.g., car salespersons) from those who should score low (e.g., librarians). Scores on the scale predict (a) the amount and rapidity of people's verbal responses in an unstructured interaction, (b) how likable and competent people's classmates perceive them to be early in the semester, (c) how quickly people respond to an obnoxious cell-phone user and how physiologically aroused they become, and (d) how quickly and emphatically people respond to a series of personal insults as well as their degree of physiological arousal. Converging evidence indicates that blirtatiousness is unique in its ability to amplify people's qualities, making these qualities more readily observable to perceivers.

Recent interest in the implicit self-esteem construct has led to the creation and use of several new assessment tools whose psychometric properties have not been fully explored. In this article, the authors investigated the reliability and validity of seven implicit self-esteem measures. The different implicit measures did not correlate with each other, and they correlated only weakly with measures of explicit self-esteem. Only some of the implicit measures demonstrated good test-retest reliabilities, and overall, the implicit measures were limited in their ability to predict our criterion variables. Finally, there was some evidence that implicit self-esteem measures are sensitive to context. The implications of these findings for the future of implicit self-esteem research are discussed.

A prospective study of 423 MBA students examined the interplay of identity negotiation and group functioning. The findings revealed that self-verification effects (through which group members brought others to see them as they saw themselves) heightened participants' feelings of connection to their groups (i.e., more identification and social integration and less emotional conflict) and improved group project grades on creative tasks (tasks that benefit from divergent perspectives). Appraisal effects (through which groups brought members to see themselves as the group saw them) facilitated group project grades on computational tasks (tasks that require deriving one correct answer). In addition, self-verification effects were more prevalent than appraisal effects. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the links among self-verification, self-categorization, and group outcomes.

When spouses received feedback that disconfirmed their impressions of their partners, they attempted to undermine that feedback during subsequent interactions with these partners. Such partner verification activities occurred whether partners construed the feedback as overly favorable or overly unfavorable. Furthermore, because spouses tended to see their partners as their partners saw themselves, their efforts to restore their impressions of partners often worked hand-in-hand with partners' efforts to verify their own views. Finally, support for self-verification theory emerged in that participants were more intimate with spouses who verified their self-views, whether their self-views happened to be positive or negative.

A cross-sectional study of dating partners and a longitudinal study of college roommates revealed that the confidence and accuracy of their impressions were often dissociated. For example, relationship length and degree of involvement tended to increase the confidence of people's impressions, but neither variable consistently increased the accuracy of their impressions of their partners' sexual histories, activity preferences, and so on. A third study showed that relationship length and involvement increased the richness of impressions, and richness fostered confidence. The authors conclude that although confidence-accuracy dissociations are surely problematic in some instances, their apparent pervasiveness raises the possibility that confidence may sometimes contribute to relationship quality even when it is unrelated to accuracy.

Do clinically depressed individuals seek favorable or unfavorable information about the self? Self-verification theory makes the counterintuitive prediction that depressed individuals solicit feedback that confirms their negative self-views. To test this prediction, participants were classified on the basis of a structured clinical interview and self-report measures into high-esteem, low self-esteem, and depressed groups. All participants were offered a choice between receiving favorable or unfavorable feedback; 82% of the depressed participants chose the unfavorable feedback, compared to 64% of the low self-esteem participants and 25% of the high self-esteem participants. Additional evidence indicated that depressed individuals also failed to exploit fully an opportunity to acquire favorable evaluations that were self-verifying. The authors discuss how seeking negative evaluations and failing to seek favorable evaluations may help maintain depression.

Three studies were conducted to validate the conceptualization of global self-esteem as consisting of two dimensions: a sense of social worth, or self-liking, and a sense of personal efficacy, or self-competence. In Study 1, confirmatory factor analysis was used to test the a priori structure of the Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale, a self-report instrument designed to measure the two dimensions. In Study 2, a second structural analysis showed the dimensionality of Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale to parallel the proposed dichotomy. In Study 3, self-liking and self-competence were related to several theoretically linked constructs--depression, self-perceived abilities, and perceived parental approval--with the resulting pattern of correlations supporting their conceptualization as substantively distinct dimensions. The implications of these findings for understanding global self-esteem are discussed.

The authors report two longitudinal studies of new college roommates (Ns = 69 and 95 pairs). In both studies, targets' initial self-views predicted changes in perceivers' appraisals of them, and perceivers' initial appraisals predicted changes in targets' self-views, although few dyads displayed both effects. The perceiver-driven and target-driven effects occurred when appraisals and self-views were negative as well as positive. Implications for self-verification theory and symbolic interactionism are discussed, and a less restrictive model of how appraisals influence self-views is proposed.

We proposed that married persons would want their spouses to see them as they saw themselves but that dating persons would want their relationship partners to evaluate them favorably. A survey of 176 married and dating couples tested these predictions. Just as married persons were most intimate with spouses whose evaluations verified their self-views, dating persons were most intimate with partners who evaluated them favorably. For married people with negative self-views, then, intimacy increased as their spouses evaluated them more negatively. Marriage apparently precipitates a shift from a desire for positive evaluations to a desire for self-verifying evaluations.

Whereas earlier research suggests that the fruits of introspection may promote error and misperception, this research suggests that thinking about the self may sometimes foster self-insight. Participants who had opportunity to reflect on themselves were particularly inclined to display self-insight by (a) rating feedback that confirmed their self-views as self-descriptive (Experiments 1 and 3), (b) rating themselves in ways that matched their friends' appraisals of them (Experiment 2), and (c) choosing a self-verifying interaction partner rather than an overly favorable one (Experiment 4). These effects were moderated by the nature of the introspective activity (Experiment 3) and by its duration (Experiment 4). Implications of these findings for the nature of self-knowledge and the worlds people construct around themselves are discussed.

We propose that people with negative self-views are rejected because they gravitate to partners who view them unfavorably. In relation to nondepressed college students (n = 28), depressives (n = 13) preferred interaction partners who evaluated them unfavorably (Study 1). Similarly, in relation to nondepressives (n = 106), depressives (n = 10) preferred friends or dating partners who evaluated them unfavorably (Study 2). Dysphorics (n = 6) were more inclined to seek unfavorable feedback from their roommates than were nondepressives (n = 16); feedback-seeking activities of dysphorics were also associated with later rejection (Study 3). Finally, people with negative self-views (n = 37) preferentially solicited unfavorable feedback, although receiving such feedback made them unhappy, in comparison with people with positive self-views (n = 42; Study 4). It seems a desire for self-verification compels people with negative self-views to seek unfavorable appraisals.

Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992) suggested that depressed and dysphoric persons verify their self-conceptions by seeking rather negative appraisals. Hooley and Richters (1992) and Alloy and Lipman (1992) have worried that (a) idiosyncratic features of Swann et al.'s participants and design may have produced their effects and (b) Swann et al. presented no evidence that self-verification strivings are motivated. We address these issues empirically. Study 1 showed that 20 dysphoric participants preferred interacting with a person who appraised them unfavorably over participating in another study, in comparison with 30 nondysphorics. Study 2 revealed that 26 dysphoric persons responded to feedback that challenged their negative self-view by working to reaffirm their low self-esteem, in comparison with 47 nondysphorics. These findings support the notion that at some level depressed and dysphoric persons want rather negative appraisals.

Although people with negative self-views want to be liked at some level, they repeatedly enact behaviors that alienate their relationship partners. Why? One possibility is that such persons reside in social environments that offer them little insight into what they are doing wrong. Although persons who had negative self-views elicited unfavorable reactions, they did not appreciate this fact because their interaction partners concealed their aversion behind a facade of kind words. To be sure, the interaction partners of people with negative self-views tended to leak their disdain nonverbally. These negative nonverbal messages proved to be uninformative, however, because people with negative self-views overlooked them. These data imply that people with negative self-views may live in social worlds in which they are deprived of corrective feedback that could allow them to improve themselves.

Why do people choose interaction partners who see them as they see themselves? Self-verification theorists propose that a desire to bolster perceptions of predictability and control underlies such activities. In contrast, advocates of positivity strivings argue that people choose such interaction partners in the hope of making themselves feel good. Two studies tested these competing explanations by examining the spontaneous verbalizations of participants as they chose interaction partners. The results suggested that positivity as well as self-verification strivings caused participants with positive self-views to choose partners who appraised them favorably. The epistemic considerations underlying self-verification processes, however, best explained why people with negative self-views chose partners who appraised them unfavorably.

We propose that a preference for favorable social feedback (i.e., self-enhancement) requires only that feedback be characterized as favorable or unfavorable but that a preference for self-confirming feedback (i.e., self-verification) is based on a more elaborate set of cognitive operations that requires both the characterization of feedback and a subsequent comparison of that feedback to a representation of self stored in memory. Study 1 set the stage for testing this hypothesis by showing that depriving people of processing resources interfered with their tendency to access their self-conceptions. In Studies 2 and 3, participants who were deprived of resources preferred the favorable, self-enhancing evaluator, whereas control participants displayed a preference for the self-verifying evaluator, even if that evaluator was relatively unfavorable.

Past research has shown that conventional strategies of persuasion tend to be ineffective against people who are highly certain of their beliefs. To change the beliefs of such individuals, we devised a paradoxical strategy that consisted of posing superattitudinal leading questions (questions that encouraged respondents to make statements that were consistent with, but more extreme than, their own viewpoints). We expected that individuals who were high in belief certainty would resist such questions and, therefore, change their beliefs in the opposite direction. To test this reasoning, we used either a conventional or a paradoxical strategy to change people's beliefs about women's roles. As suggested by earlier research, the conventional strategy was effective in changing the beliefs of targets who were low in belief certainty only. In contrast, the paradoxical strategy was effective in changing the beliefs of targets who were high in belief certainty only. A follow-up investigation replicated this effect and indicated that paradoxical injunctions change people's positions on belief dimensions rather than their perception of the dimension itself. The implications of these findings for an understanding of the interpersonal mechanisms that generate stability and change in people's beliefs are discussed.

When a perceiver forms an expectancy about a target individual that is discrepant with that target's self-conception, whose viewpoint will triumph? Although research on behavioral confirmation argues that perceivers will "win" by causing targets to confirm the expectancy, research on self-verification argues that targets will "win" by bringing perceivers to treat them in a manner that confirms their self-conceptions. The research reported here sought to reconcile these competing viewpoints by considering the certainty of perceivers' expectancies and targets' self-conceptions. Perceivers first formed relatively certain or uncertain expectancies about targets that were inconsistent with targets' self-conceptions. They then interacted with targets, who possessed relatively certain or uncertain self-conceptions, in a series of three successive interview sessions. Analyses of the behavior or targets indicated that self-verification always occurred when targets were certain of their self-conceptions. Self-verification also tended to occur when both perceivers and targets were uncertain of their beliefs. Behavioral confirmation tended to occur only when perceivers were certain of their expectancies and targets were uncertain of their self-conceptions. At the end of the experiment, perceivers had generally abandoned their expectancies, but targets revealed no self-rating change. The conditions under which self-verification versus behavioral confirmation occur are discussed.

Three factors were identified that uniquely contribute to people's global self-esteem: (a) people's tendencies to experience positive and negative affective states, (b) people's specific self-views (i.e., their conceptions of their strengths and weaknesses), and (c) the way people frame their self-views. Framing factors included the relative certainty and importance of people's positive versus negative self-views and the discrepancy between people's actual and ideal self-views. The contribution of importance to people's self-esteem, however, was qualified in 2 ways. First, importance contributed only to the self-esteem of those who perceived that they had relatively few talents. Second, individuals who saw their positive self-views as important were especially likely to be high in self-esteem when they were also highly certain of these positive self-views. The theoretical and therapeutic implications of these findings are discussed.

We proposed that people's intimates may insulate them against self-discrepant feedback. Individuals who possessed low or high self-esteem (targets) reported to the laboratory accompanied by persons with whom they were involved in intimate relationships (intimates). Some intimates perceived targets in a manner that was congruent with targets' self-conceptions; others perceived targets in a manner that was incongruent with targets' self-conceptions. Targets received bogus feedback that was discrepant with their self-esteem and interacted with either their intimate or a stranger. Targets then completed a measure of self-esteem. As expected, targets changed their self-ratings in the direction of the discrepant feedback when they interacted with either an incongruent intimate or a stranger but not when they interacted with a congruent intimate. Moreover, congruent intimates were just as effective in insulating low self-esteem targets against positive feedback as they were in insulating high self-esteem individuals against negative feedback. Finally, the more targets discussed the feedback, the less self-rating change they experienced. Implications for social support processes and attempts to cope with traumatic events are discussed.

Three studies asked why people sometimes seek positive feedback (self-enhance) and sometimes seek subjectively accurate feedback (self-verify). Consistent with self-enhancement theory, people with low self-esteem as well as those with high self-esteem indicated that they preferred feedback pertaining to their positive rather than negative self-views. Consistent with self-verification theory, the very people who sought favorable feedback pertaining to their positive self-conceptions sought unfavorable feedback pertaining to their negative self-views, regardless of their level of global self-esteem. Apparently, although all people prefer to seek feedback regarding their positive self-views, when they seek feedback regarding their negative self-views, they seek unfavorable feedback. Whether people self-enhance or self-verify thus seems to be determined by the positivity of the relevant self-conceptions rather than their level of self-esteem or the type of person they are.

We propose that people simplify their perceptions of their interactions by organizing them into discrete casual chunks. Once formed, these chunks presumably influence the extent to which people are aware of their influence on others, as well as their impressions of others. We anticipated that people would form self-causal chunks (e.g., my action causes my partner's action) when they possessed an offensive set and other-causal chunks when they possessed a defensive set. We also expected that a self-causal chunking strategy would make salient people's influence on their partners and thereby discourage them from concluding that their partner's behaviors reflected underlying dispositions. In contrast, we anticipated that an other-causal chunking strategy would obscure people's influence on their partners, thereby encouraging them to infer that their partners' behaviors reflected underlying dispositions. We tested these hypotheses by inducing participants to develop either a defensive or an offensive set prior to interacting with another person in a simulated arms race. After the interactions, we assessed the manner in which participants chunked their interactions, as well as their impressions of partners. The results supported our predictions. The implications of these findings for understanding conflict and misunderstanding in interpersonal relations are discussed.

Self-consistency theory assumes that people want others to treat them in a predictable manner. Self-enhancement theory contends that people want others to treat them in a positive manner. We attempted to help reconcile the two theories by testing the hypothesis that people's cognitive responses conform to self-consistency theory and their affective responses conform to self-enhancement theory. We presented individuals who possessed either positive or negative self-concepts with either favorable or unfavorable social feedback. We then measured cognitive reactions to the feedback (e.g., perceived self-descriptiveness) and affective reactions to the feedback (e.g., mood states). Cognitive responses were primarily driven by the consistency of the feedback and affective responses were controlled by how enhancing it was. We propose that conceptualizing cognition an affect as partially independent mental systems helps resolve some long-standing paradoxes regarding people's responses to self-relevant social feedback.

This research tested the hypothesis that individuals who tend to form vivid visual images of others (vivid imagers) have more accurate social memories than those who form relatively nonvivid visual images of others (nonvivid imagers). In the first investigation, vivid imagers outperformed nonvivid imagers in remembering details concerning the attitudes, activities, and life history of a woman whom they observed being interviewed. Investigation 2 provided more definitive evidence for the link between visual imagery and social memory by demonstrating that vivid imagers had more accurate memories after seeing an interviewee answer questions, whereas seeing the interviewee had no impact on the memories of nonvivid imagers. The discussion considers the impact that imagery processes may have on a variety of social thought processes.

This article traces a program of research on the interplay between social thought and social interaction. Early investigations of the impact of perceivers' expectancies on the actions of target individuals illuminated the contribution of perceivers to the identity negotiation process but overlooked the role of targets. The research discussed here is based on the assumption that targets play an active role in the identity negotiation process. Specifically, just as perceivers strive to validate their expectancies, targets seek to verify their self-views. The nature and antecedents of the processes through which people verify their self-conceptions as well as the relationship of these activities to self-concept change and self-enhancement processes are discussed. This research suggests that perceivers and targets enter their interactions with independent and sometimes conflicting agendas that are resolved through a process of identity negotiation. The identity negotiation process therefore provides a theoretical context in which the interplay between other-perception and self-perception can be understood.