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Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-pus-10.1177_09636625231154131 for Partisanship and anti-elite worldviews as correlates of science and health beliefs in the multi-party system of Spain by Anna Katharina Spälti, Benjamin Lyons, Florian Stoeckel, Sabrina Stöckli, Paula Szewach, Vittorio Mérola, Christine Stednitz, Paola López González and Jason Reifler in Public Understanding of Science

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many residents of high-income countries (HICs) were eligible for COVID-19 vaccine boosters, while many residents of lower-income countries (LICs) had not yet received a first dose. HICs made some efforts to contribute to COVID-19 vaccination efforts in LICs, but these efforts were limited in scale. A new literature discusses the normative importance of an international redistribution of vaccines. Our analysis contributes an empirical perspective on the willingness of citizens in a HIC to contribute to such efforts (which we term international vaccine solidarity). We analyse the levels and predictors of international vaccine solidarity. We surveyed a representative sample of German adults (n = 2019) who participated in a two-wave YouGov online survey (w1: Sep 13-21, 2021 and w2: Oct 4-13, 2021). International vaccine solidarity is measured by asking respondents preferences for sharing vaccine supplies internationally versus using that supply as boosters for the domestic population. We examine a set of pre-registered hypotheses. Almost half of the respondents in our sample (48%) prioritize giving doses to citizens in less developed countries. A third of respondents (33%) prefer to use available doses as boosters domestically, and a fifth of respondents (19%) did not report a preference. In line with our hypotheses, respondents higher in cosmopolitanism and empathy, and those who support domestic redistribution exhibit more support for international dose-sharing. Older respondents (who might be more at risk) do not consistently show less support for vaccine solidarity. These results help us to get a better understanding of the way citizens' form preferences about a mechanism that redistributes medical supplies internationally during a global crisis.

In this project we examine what makes people from a high income country more/less likely to support international vaccine solidarity, focusing on the following research questions: RQ1: Which individual level characteristics are associated with support for donating vaccine doses to low income countries? RQ2: Do people who score high in conspiratorial thinking exhibit less support for distribution of vaccine doses to “less developed countries”? RQ3: Does cosmopolitanism condition the association of empathy with citizens’ willingness to distribute vaccine doses to “less developed countries”?

This project aims to examine the following research questions: Does second-order information about climate change and environmental policy have a lasting effect on second-order climate beliefs? Does second-order information about climate change and environmental policy have a lasting effect on other second-order political beliefs?

In this project we examine following questions: RQ1: Do voters think that governing coalitions that are more objectively plausible are more likely to be formed following an election? RQ2 Do voters think that governing coalitions that include their preferred parties, or include the party to which they are most attached, are more likely to be formed following an election? RQ3: Do voters think that governing coalitions in which the leading partner is among their preferred parties, or is the party to which they are most attached, are more likely to be formed following an election? RQ4: Do voters shift their governing coalition expectations over time to reflect the results of the actual election?

The purpose of this study is to assess public opinion, (false) beliefs, and behavioral intentions surrounding the coronavirus, COVID 19. Along with a more the exploratory approach described above, we also have included a few experiments in our survey to test the following questions: 1) Are there differences in public opinion, (false) beliefs, and behavioral intentions between the political left and right in the U.S.? 2) Do partisan (i.e. pro vs. anti-trump) primes increase these differences in public opinion, (false beliefs), and behavioral intentions? 3) Does asking questions about fears surrounding coronavirus prime increased likelihood to to comply with measures (i.e. behavioral intensions)? 4) Are people more willing to test a new vaccine for coronavirus (if it were to be invented) if it was developed by scientists vs. pharmaceutical companies? 5) Do response mode categories affect participants' estimates of infection rates? We hope to run this study at least one more time in the weeks to come in order to assess how changes in the political landscape and the impact of the pandemic change public opinion, (false) beliefs, and behavioral intentions.

The effect of group identities on political behaviour are well-researched. We know that even in minimal group settings; in-groups dislike and discriminate against out-group members (Tajfel 1971). The threshold to supporting violence (or even engaging in it) is low. A large body of research in the motivated reasoning tradition has shown that group dynamics also affect cognition: Individuals are motivated to defend their groups; and this motivation often leads to ‘fact polarization’ (Kahan 2016): Group divisions over matters of fact. Less is known about how to mitigate affective polarization and fact polarization. Building on findings from Ahler and Sood (2016) this project tests the effect of prompting individuals to think of the out-group as a more diverse group of individuals in which only a minority conform to stereotypes while most look and think like one’s own group. We hypothesize that this will reduce affective polarization and fact polarization. We test this hypothesis in the context of a conflict shaped by entrenched stereotypes, deep distrust, and regular outbreaks of hostility: the Catalonia conflict. We ask all respondents to estimate the share of out-group members who conform to certain stereotypes (either DEMOGRAPHIC stereotypes or stereotypes about EXTREME OPINIONS). We test the effect of three treatments: Respondents in the ASK treatment are asked to estimate the share of out-group members who conform to certain stereotypes (either DEMOGRAPHIC stereotypes or stereotypes about EXTREME OPINIONS). Respondents in the THINK treatment are asked the same questions but first see a prompt warning them not to go with the first answer that pops into their head but to think carefully. Respondents in the TELL treatment are also asked about their perceptions of the share of out-group members conforming to stereotypes but then see the actual statistics. Respondents in the CONTROL group skip the stereotypes at the beginning of the survey but see them later on, at the very end and after a set of buffer questions designed to distract them. We test the effect on two sets of outcome variables: i. support for hostility and ii. i. belief in false claims that affirm pro or anti-independence views. We expect our treatments to affect not only respondents’ own views but the perceived share of out-group members who hold those views, e.g. the share of out-group members who support violent behaviour toward one’s in-group. (We call these ‘second-order beliefs’). We investigate these hypotheses in a survey experiment fielded by YouGov to a representative sample of n=5000 Spanish respondents in late May/ early June 2020. Because we expect most of our respondents to oppose Catalonia’s independence, we focus on their views (and we only assigned any separatists to the CONTROL or the ASK group, in order to ensure statistical power for this comparison). If our hypotheses are correct, that is, if introducing nuances into a rigid idea of an out-group (in this case by learning about the individuals on the other side of a political conflict) mitigates hostility and/or fact polarization then those results would highlight two things: a) the danger of disassociating with those who have other opinions and b) the importance for teachers, journalists, and public broadcasters to report in a nuanced way and not only on group, but on individual characteristics. References Ahler, D. J., & Sood, G. (2018). The parties in our heads: Misperceptions about party composition and their consequences. Journal of Politics, 80(3), 964–981. Kahan, D. M. (2016). The Politically Motivated Reasoning Paradigm. Emerging Trends in Social & Behavioral Sciences, 1–16. Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1(2), 149–178.

In late 2020, biopharmaceutical companies announced that they had successfully developed effective vaccinations against Covid-19 (SARS-CoV-2). The vaccines may be the solution to the pandemic. However, in order for them to be affective at stopping the spread of Covid-19 the majority of the world's population must be vaccinated. Unfortunately, it seems that some people are hesitant to receive the vaccine. Our study aims to asses people's views about potential Covid-19 vaccines, specifically about which characteristics of the vaccine lead to higher acceptance levels than others. Using a conjoint design (also known as a discrete choice experiment), we ask participants to choose between two potential vaccines with randomized profiles. Using this data, we can test which characteristics within each profile lead to higher acceptance of the vaccine.