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Проаналізовано чинну систему стандартизації України, окреслено здійснені напрями її реформування та визначено перспективи удосконалення системи стандартизації. Зазначені перспективи вказують на необхідність врахування нових вимог інноваційного розвитку економіки країни та виникнення нових галузей економіки, зниження технічних бар’єрів під час виходу на світові ринки в зонах високих технологій. Окремо досліджено стан розвитку системи стандартизації у нафтогазовому комплексі України. В Україні нафтогазовий комплекс представлений підприємствами з видобування, перероблення, транспортування газу та нафти. Найефективніше та найрезультативніше працює галузь транспортування газу, значний виробничий потенціал мають сфери переробки та зберігання газу, а видобуток нафти є найменш прибутковим. Здійснено порівняльний розрахунок тарифу за зберігання нафти відповідно до існуючого та запропонованого підходу та зроблено висновки щодо завищення оплати за зберігання нафти на сучасному ринку нафти і нафтопродуктів. In the article, the authors analyzed the current system of standardization of Ukraine, outlined the directions of its reform and identified the prospects for improving the standardization system. According to the conducted analysis the need to take into account the new requirements of the innovative development of the country's economy and the emergence of new sectors of the economy, reducing technical barriers when entering the world markets in high technology zones was proved. In addition to this, the authors examined the state of development of the standardization system in the oil and gas complex of Ukraine. In Ukraine, the oil and gas complex is represented by enterprises for the extraction, processing, transportation of gas and oil. The gas transportation industry operates most effectively and efficiently; the oil extraction is the least profitable area. Due to the dynamic development of economic processes and a decrease in the level of financing for the formaulation of national standards and regulatory documents of the level of enterprises, there is a backlog in providing the oil and gas complex with regulatory documents of an international level. Another important problem for the industry remains the transparency of the conclusion of contracts and the definition of tariffs for services performed. Based on the analysis of actual information on the existence of legal disputes between market operators and the presence of abuses on it, it was proved necessary to develop a unified methodological basis for determining the tariffs for oil storage services. Such a framework should be recognized as a normative document for use by all enterprises, organizations and structural subdivisions, which have in their composition respective tank farms and can undertake contractual storage of oil. The establishment of tariffs for oil storage services should be transparent and provide the enterprise with tariff revenues sufficient to cover economically justified costs of oil storage; obtaining the net profit necessary for the provision of production and economic activity; payment of all taxes and obligatory payments in accordance with the current legislation of Ukraine. In determining the size of the tariff for the service of storage of oil the organization should be guided by ensuring the value of the planned tariff revenues. The size of the planned tariff revenues should cover the company's total expenses for oil storage operations, payment of taxes (excluding VAT) and compulsory payments provided for by the current legislation of Ukraine and create a planned net profit corresponding to the approved rate of return. The total expenses, however, include only expenditures related to oil storage services. The most controversial point in determining the tariff for storing oil is traditionally considered a methodological approach to justifying the planned profit of an enterprise that provides the relevant services. Organizations of the oil and gas complex of Ukraine to the value of profit include two components: an investment component, which involves compensation of investment costs and the planned rate of profitability. This definition of planned profit can be considered as a double count, which overestimates the planned profit and, accordingly, the value of the tariff for the storage of oil. The authors carried out a comparative calculation of the oil storage tariff in accordance with the existing and proposed approach and found that oil storage charges are on the modern oil market.

The preference utilization ratio, i.e., the share of imports under preferential tariff schemes out of total imports, has been a popular indicator for measuring the usage of preferential tariffs vis-à-vis tariffs on a most-favored-nation basis. A crucial shortcoming of this measure is the data requirements, particularly for import value data classified by tariff schemes, which are not available in most countries. This study proposes an alternative measure for preferential tariff utilization, termed the "tariff exemption ratio." This measure offers the unique advantage of needing only publicly available data, such as those provided by the World Development Indicators, for its computations. We can thus calculate this measure for most countries for an international comparison. Our finding is that tariff exemption ratios differ widely across countries, with a global average of approximately 50%.

The main message of this report is that if Kazakhstan wants to take advantage of global integration and diversification opportunities, the government needs to improve its trade policy framework, its management, and its regulations. It is also finalizing accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) while its trade strategy includes a number of free trade agreements to be negotiated. It is an active member of the Central Asia Region Economic Cooperation (CAREC). This report is composed of three policy notes that discuss how to improve the trade policy framework, management, and regulations: note one is on the trade policy framework and recommends joining the WTO on a tariff schedule that is more liberal than Russia’s; note two postulates that to benefit more fully from the WTO membership and future regional or bilateral agreements, the institutional framework for trade policy management will need a clearer strategic vision, better coordination within the government and with private sector, and enhanced human capacity; and note three suggests that for the private sector to benefit from global integration and diversification, the government should ease the burden of regulations that affect trade (non-tariff measures (NTMs)).

This paper views tariff-cutting formulas as a potential solution to the free-rider problem that arises when market opening is negotiated bilaterally and extended on a most-favored-nation basis. The negotiators in the Doha Agenda chose formulas that are ideal from an economic efficiency viewpoint in that they most sharply reduce the highest and most economically-costly tariffs. When the political support that gave rise to the original tariffs is considered, however, this approach appears to generate very high political costs per unit of gain in economic efficiency. The political costs associated with the formulas appear to have led to strong pressure for many, complex exceptions, which both lowered and increased uncertainty about members’ market access gains. Where tariff cuts focus on applied rates, it seems likely that a proportional cut rule would reduce the political costs of securing agreements. However, detailed examination of the Doha proposals with their product exceptions suggests that negotiators are likely to find cuts with exceptions politically attractive but economically costly when cuts are based on bound tariffs with different degrees of binding overhang.

To evaluate and reflect the sustainability of services in the region, an overall sector sustainability assessment was done, taking into account four main dimensions: access to services, quality of services, efficiency of services, and financing of services. Each of these dimensions is measured through three simple and objective indicators. For each indicator, best practice values are established by looking at the best performers in the region, and countries closest to those best performers are deemed to have a more mature sector. A more complete description of the methodology to assess sector sustainability is included in the Annex of the State of the Sector Regional Report from the Danube Water Program. The outcomes of this assessment for Hungary’s water sector are displayed, which also shows average and best practices in the Danube region. The Hungarian sector sustainability score is 74, which is far above the Danube average sustainability of 64, and is among the best practices in the region. The assessment shows that, on average, the country performs well in terms of continuity of access to piped water and flush toilet, collection ratio, nonrevenue water and staffing level. The main deficiencies of Hungary’s water sector identified through the sector sustainability assessment are the operating cost ratio, affordability, and investments. The main sector challenges are: achieving full cost recovery; preventing the degradation of assets in the long term; and preparing for the risks caused by climate change.

Classification JEL : C8; F13; F17; Q17; Many trade negotiations involve large cuts in high tariffs, while allowing smaller cuts for an agreed share of politically sensitive products. The effects of these flexibilities on market access opportunities are difficult to predict, creating particular problems for developing countries in assessing whether to support a proposed trade agreement. Some widely used ad hoc approaches for identifying likely sensitive products—such as the highest-bound-tariff rule—suggest that the impact of a limited number of such exceptions on average tariffs and market access is likely to be minor. Applying a rigorous specification based on the apparent objectives of policymakers in setting the prenegotiation tariff enables more accurate assessment of the implications of sensitive-product provisions for average agricultural tariffs, economic welfare, and market access under the Doha negotiations. The analysis concludes that highest-tariff rules are likely to seriously underestimate the impacts on average tariffs and that treating even 2 percent of tariff lines as sensitive is likely to have a sharply adverse impact on economic welfare. The impacts on market access are also adverse, but much smaller, perhaps reflecting the mercantilist focus of the negotiating process.; L’approche basée sur une formule de coupe tarifaire suivie dans de nombreuses négociations commerciales combine de fortes coupes pour les droits de douane élevés dans le cadre de la formule avec des flexibilités permettant des coupes moindres sur certains produits choisis. La difficulté à évaluer les conséquences de telles exceptions est à l’origine de problèmes importants. Les auteurs utilisent une approche d’économie politique du protectionnisme, appliquée sur une base de données détaillée, pour évaluer les implications de cette approche en termes de bien-être et d’accès au marché. Les auteurs trouvent que certaines évaluations simplifiées couramment utilisées sous-estiment grandement ces implications et que le fait de traiter comme « sensibles » un petit nombre de lignes tarifaires en les soumettant à des coupes réduites aurait un impact négatif substantiel sur le bien-être, mais un effet négatif nettement moindre sur l’accès au marché.

This paper analyzes the economic effects of agricultural price and merchandise trade policies around the world as of 2004 on global markets, net farm incomes, and national and regional economic welfare and poverty, using the global economy wide Linkage model, new estimates of agricultural price distortions for developing countries, and poverty elasticity's approach. It addresses two questions: to what extent are policies as of 2004 still reducing rewards from farming in developing countries and thereby adding to inequality across countries in farm household incomes? Are they depressing value added more in primary agriculture than in the rest of the economy of developing countries, and earnings of unskilled workers more than of owners of other factors of production, thereby potentially contributing to inequality and poverty within developing countries (given that farm incomes are well below non-farm incomes in most developing countries and that agriculture there is intensive in the use of unskilled labor)? Results are presented for the key countries and regions of the world and for the world as a whole. They reveal that, by moving to free markets, income inequality between countries will be reduced at least slightly, all but one-sixth of the gains to developing countries will come from agricultural policy reform, unskilled workers in developing countries the majority of whom work on farms will benefit most from reform, net farm incomes in developing countries will rise by 6 percent compared with 2 percent for non-agricultural value added, and the number of people surviving on less than US$1 a day will drop 3 percent globally.

This paper analyzes the poverty and inequality implications of removing agricultural and non-agricultural price distortions in the domestic market of the Philippines and abroad. Liberalization in the rest of the world is poverty and inequality reducing, whereas full domestic liberalization increases national poverty and inequality. Poverty declines while inequality increases marginally in the combined scenario of both global and domestic agriculture reform. Although the reduction in the national poverty headcount is small in the latter scenario, the poorest of the poor, particularly those living in the rural areas, emerge as 'winners', given their strong reliance on agricultural production and unskilled labor wages.

The Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations stalled in 2008 owing in no small degree to a lack of agreement on the terms of substantially reducing trade-distorting support for agricultural products and to what extent this will be beneficial to developing countries. Nicaragua presents an interesting case in point, being one of the poorest economies in Latin America with still a relatively large agricultural sector and high degrees of rural poverty. In 2005, the country signed a free trade agreement with the United States. This chapter provides a quantitative analysis addressing that question. It does so using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Nicaragua coupled with a micro-simulation methodology. The first section provides background information on trade reform policies and macroeconomic trends in Nicaragua, with special reference to the agricultural sector and rural poverty. The section that follows describes the main features of the CGE model and the micro-simulation methodology used to assess the impact on poverty and inequality. The author then lay out the model scenarios considered, which include liberalizations of agricultural and all merchandise goods trade by the rest of the world and by Nicaragua itself. That is followed by a summary analysis of results. This analysis includes tests for the sensitivity of the results with respect to assumptions regarding the responsiveness of trade to price liberalization, as identified through the relevant trade elasticities. The final section provides conclusions and possible policy implications.

Britain contrary to received wisdom was not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, despite repeal of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the French until the last quarter of the century. War with Louis fourteenth from 1689 led to the end of all trade between Britain and France for a quarter of a century. The creation of powerful protected interests both at home and abroad led to the imposition of prohibitively high tariffs on French imports notably on wine and spirits, when trade with France resumed in 1714. Protection of domestic interests from import competition allowed the state to raise domestic excises which provided increased government revenues despite almost no increases in the taxes on land and income in Britain. The state ensured compliance not simply through the threat of lower tariffs on foreign substitutes but also through the encouragement of a trend towards monopoly production in brewing and restricted retail sales of beer. This history is analyzed in terms of its effects on British fiscal and commercial policy from the early 1700s to the end of the nineteenth century. The result is a fuller, albeit revisionist account of the rise of the modern state that calls into question a variety of theses in economics and political science that draw on the naive view of a liberal Britain unilaterally moving to free trade in the nineteenth century.

Low tax revenue and slow economic growth are two central concerns in developing countries. However, policies that raise tax revenue also harm economic growth. With tax revenue coming mainly from large capital-intensive firms, and with a large informal sector, policies that aid large firms and policies that discourage entry of new firms both help increase tax revenue. Entrepreneurial activity as a result is discouraged, lowering growth. There is a basic tension in policy design between current tax revenue and economic growth. In fact, a loss in tax revenue can itself reduce growth, due to less spending on education and infrastructure. It can also undermine political support for the reforms from the poor and from government bureaucrats, both of whom are key beneficiaries of government expenditures. What policies encourage growth without undue loss of current expenditures? One is debt finance, but this creates the risk of a financial crisis if tax revenue rises too slowly to repay this debt. A second is user fees, but such fees still undermine political support from the poor. A third is partial reform, maintaining both higher taxes on and some protection for easily taxed firms, even while barriers to entry are eased.

We study a two-country model where two firms, one domestic and the other foreign, must decide when to introduce their new product into a market. The home government may apply an import tariff, an administrative delay, or both to the product of the foreign firm. An administrative delay imposes a waiting period between the time when the quality of the foreign product is determined and the time when the product can actually be sold. Our main interest is the differential effect of the tariff and the administrative delay on the timing of new product introductions and the resulting change in home, foreign and world welfare. We show that administrative delays are less efficient instruments for maximizing home welfare than tariffs. With a tariff, the home government can affect the timing of entry to ensure that the domestic firm moves first at the socially optimal date. Although an optimally chosen delay can achieve the same pattern of introduction, it does not yield any tariff revenues. As a result, if the tariff may be set optimally, administrative delays are not used in a discriminatory manner. If trade liberalization constrains the import tariff to be below its domestically optimal level, discriminatory administrative delays may become part of the optimal policy of the home country. As the optimal delay policy leads to lower levels of world welfare than the optimal tariff, trade liberalization can be welfare decreasing.

This chapter examines the arguments for and against a uniform tariff structure. Arguments against uniformity are: terms of trade; ‘strategic,’ infant or restructuring industry considerations, revenue or balance of payments purposes, and tariffs as a negotiating tool at the WTO. Arguments in favor of uniformity are: political economy considerations; administrative convenience; and reduction of smuggling and corruption in customs. The author maintain that tariff uniformity is the best choice in practice. A uniform tariff conveys a number of advantages, the most important of which is that if the tariff is uniform, the gains to industry lobbying are much smaller (and may be negative), creating a kind of free-rider problem for the lobbying industry and dramatically reduces the incentive to lobby for protection. Then: (1) the level of protection is likely to be lower (the recent experience of Chile is a dramatic case in point); (2) there is a direct saving of resources from the reduced lobbying; (3) the reduction to the gains from lobbying for protection provides a vastly improved signal to valuable entrepreneurial talent which will thus be encouraged to create better and cheaper products; and (4) the reduction in resources devoted to lobbying will result in less corruption in government, which may have positive spillover effects into other dimensions of government activity.