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We proposed the finite-time cycle model of a measurement-based quantum cooler, where the invasive measurement provides the power to drive the cooling cycle. Such a cooler may be regarded as an alternative thought experiment of Maxwell's demon. The measurement-feedback information is capable of moving heat from the cold to hot bath without any work input and even making the maximum coefficient of performance larger than the Carnot limit. The causes that this seemingly paradoxical result does not violate the laws of thermodynamics can be clearly explained through the derivation of a generalized Clausius inequality including the mutual information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers have become sceptical of the use of thought experiments in theorising about personal identity. In large part, this is due to work in experimental philosophy that appears to confirm long‐held philosophical suspicions that thought experiments elicit inconsistent judgements about personal identity and hence judgements that are thought to be the product of cognitive biases. If so, these judgements appear to be useless at informing our theories of personal identity. Using the methods of experimental philosophy, we investigate whether people exhibit inconsistent judgements and, if they do, whether these judgements are likely to be the source of cognitive bias or, instead, sensitivity to some relevant factor. We do not find that people's judgements are sensitive to any of the factors we investigate (relevant or irrelevant), nor that people have inconsistent judgements across cases. Rather, people's judgements are best explained by them having a very minimal account of what it takes for a person to survive. Since this pattern of judgements is no reason to think that we are subject to cognitive bias, we see no reason, as things stand, to be sceptical of our judgements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of near death and dying experiences has been both of popular interest and of scientific speculation. However, the reality of mental perception at the point of death is currently a subjective experience and has not been formally evaluated. While postmortem gene expression, even in humans, has been evaluated, restoration of postmortem brain activity has heretofore only been attempted in animal models, at the molecular and cellular levels. Meanwhile, progress has been made to translate brain activity of living humans into speech and images. This paper proposes two inter-related thought experiments. First, assuming progress and refinement of the technology of translating human brain activity into interpretable speech and images, can an objective analysis of death experiences be obtained by utilizing these technologies on dying humans? Second, can human brain function be revived postmortem and, if so, can the relevant technologies be utilized for communication with (recently) deceased individuals? In this paper, these questions are considered and possible implications explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gravity measurements have uses in a wide range of fields including geological mapping and mine-shaft inspection. The specific application under consideration sets limits on the survey and the amount of information that can be obtained. For example, in a conventional gravity survey at the Earth's surface a gravimeter is translated on a two-dimensional planar grid taking measurements of the vertical component of gravity. If, however, the survey points cannot be chosen so freely, for example if the gravimeter is constrained to operate in a tunnel where only a one-dimensional line of data could be taken, less information will be obtained. To address this situation, we investigate an alternative approach, in the form of an instrument which rotates around a central point measuring the gravitational potential or its radial derivative on the boundary of a sphere. The ability to record additional components of gravity by rotating the gravimeter will give more information than obtained with a single measurement traditionally taken at each point on a survey, consequently reducing ambiguities in interpretation. We term a device which measures the potential, or its radial derivatives, around the surface of a sphere a gravitational eye. In this article we explore ideas of resolution and propose a thought experiment for comparing the performance of diverse types of gravitational eye. We also discuss radial analytic continuation towards sources of gravity and the resulting resolution enhancement, before finally discussing the possibility of using cold-atom gravimetry and gradiometry to construct a gravitational eye. If realised, the gravitational eye will offer revolutionary capability enabling the maximum information to be obtained about features in all directions around it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work is a thought experiment in re-interpreting the virtue of li or ritual/propriety for the contemporary, multi-cultural, world. Using Zhuangzi, the Lunyu, and Zhongyong as my primary points of departure, I re-interpret the Confucian ideas of hierarchy in terms of the Daoist conception of harmony. Many scholars today argue that Confucianism has a relational ontology, yet at the same time, we find that Confucian values can and do lead to rigid and harmful traditions that have historically oppressed marginalized groups like women. As such, I re-imagine what li might look like if we take relational ontology seriously, Drawing from Zhuangzi, I argue that Confucian harmony and order do not necessarily arise out of hierarchy, and that harmony, the most primary goal of li and of the Confucian project, can be best attained through propriety that is influenced by Daoism and feminist values such as equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

10.1119/5.0175922 The rod and slit paradox, as first proposed by Shaw, is revisited. In this paradox, a rod of rest length l0 moves parallel to the horizontal x-axis. Simultaneously, a thin sheet parallel to the horizontal xz-plane with a rod-shaped slit of rest length d < l 0 moves along the vertical y-axis. The rod passes through the slit due to relativistic effects. Earlier papers do not link the thought experiment to the Silberstein/Thomas/Wigner-rotation (STW-rotation), which is essential to its outcome. In this paper, the role of the STW-rotation is discussed, and additional clarifying figures are provided. Some misleading aspects of earlier treatments are pointed out and corrected. Editor's Note: Readers who are familiar with the "barn door" paradox will enjoy this 2D version of it. Imagine a rod, thrown like a javelin, moving at a constant horizontal speed and also falling at a constant vertical speed. As it reaches ground level, it falls precisely through a javelin-length slit in the floor. However, in the reference frame of the javelin, the slit will be length-contracted and the javelin will have its (longer) proper length. So as the ground rises up to meet it, how does it pass through? The authors revisit this classic paradox and present new ideas on its resolution, including the concept of relativistic boost-induced rotations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many liberal philosophers claim that people are free to do as they will by default; any interference must be justified. This supposed presumption of liberty does a significant amount of theoretical work for public reason liberals such as Gerald Gaus and John Rawls. This paper shows that Gaus’s explicit defense of a presumption of liberty fails. Gausa and his many followers repeatedly appeal to a particular thought experiment from Stanley Benn. We argue that this thought experiment fails to show that there is a presumption of liberty, but instead shows, at best, the trivial point that when any particular moral concern is specified to be the only relevant concern, then there is a presumption in favor of that concern. Further, Gaus, along with Shaun Nichols, has tried to demonstrate empirically that the intuitions and conclusions he draws from this example are fairly uniform and universal among other moral agents, but we explain why their experimental results do not vindicate any such conclusion. We conclude that undermining the alleged presumption of liberty places public reason liberalism in serious jeopardy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits the conventional distinction in political science between 'positive' and 'normative' political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and they can provide insights into the practical workings of novel institutional arrangements in the absence of empirical data. The integration of formal models into normative political theory presents challenges, including the development of criteria for evaluating these models and potential shifts in research focus. Integration can also strengthen political theory's tenuous role in the political science discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the main features and goals of the speculative work in modern sciences that has greatly accelerated since World War II due to the exponential increase in computing power and newly available theoretical and conceptual tools. It points to the long historical strand of speculative philosophical work in symbiosis with the sciences, suggests the reasons for its unexpected neglect in contemporary professional philosophy of science, why it should be a major approach, and why such pursuit is not inevitable. Finally, the paper outlines potential topics, fields, and tools for such collaborative work and argues it is likelier to be more fruitful today than at any point in the past hundred years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attribution of causality, a central concept in human cognition theory, is the principal instrument for investigating functional links between events and phenomena. Although the links between causality and moral responsibility are commonly recognized, the scope of studies analysing the practical implications of causality attribution is minimal. This study examines the effect of causality perception on the desired distribution of the generic means of life by utilising thought experiment data collection methodology and non-parametric statistical analysis. The results indicate that: (i) causality perception affects the desired distribution, and (ii) individuals show no tendency to modify their perception of causality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previously, it has been shown that transmissible and harmful misinformation can be viewed as pathogenic, potentially contributing to collective social epidemics. In this study, a biological analogy is developed to allow investigative methods that are applied to biological epidemics to be considered for adaptation to digital and social ones including those associated with misinformation. The model's components include infopathogens, tropes, cognition, memes, and phenotypes. The model can be used for diagnostic, pathologic, and synoptic/taxonomic study of the spread of misinformation. A thought experiment based on a hypothetical riot is used to understand how disinformation spreads. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To a large extent, the evidential base of claims in the philosophy of science has switched from thought experiments to case studies. We argue that abandoning thought experiments was a wrong turn, since they can effectively complement case studies. We make our argument via an analogy with the relationship between experiments and observations within science. Just as experiments and observations can together evidence claims in science, each mitigating the downsides of the other, so too can thought experiments and case studies be mutually supporting. After presenting the main argument, we look at potential concerns about thought experiments, suggesting that a judiciously applied mixed-methods approach can overcome them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thought experiments and normative case studies can play different and complementary roles in moral and political philosophizing. Thought experiments help us to sculpt and refine normative concepts and alert us to contradictions between intuitive judgments and basic principles, or among intuitive judgments, thus informing our reflective equilibrium about what fundamentally matters. Normative case studies assist us in judging how to trade off conflicting values in specified circumstances. Engaging with a sufficient number of well‐wrought normative case studies can thus inform our ultimate judgments about the relative weights of different values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Normative case studies represent empirically grounded phenomena that raise normative philosophical questions. Growth in the popularity of case‐based inquiry in philosophy reflects a recent trend in the field not to shy away from engaging with empirical realities, but instead to advance philosophical projects that recognize and speak directly to these realities, including social inequities endemic to our societies. Yet, as the use of case studies and other empirically engaged philosophical approaches has grown, concerns have been raised about whether these methods risk reducing philosophy to social science and, in turn, burdening philosophy with the constraints of social science research. Responding to these concerns calls for more attention to the methodological dimensions of case‐based inquiry in philosophy. In this article, Rebecca Taylor offers reflections on two core clarifying questions: (1) What makes normative case studies distinct from other related tools for inquiry — in particular, philosophical thought experiments and qualitative case studies? (2) What quality criteria should guide the development of normative case studies? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different why-questions emerge under different contexts and require different information in order to be addressed. Hence a relevance relation can hardly be invariant across contexts. However, what is indeed common under any possible context is that all explananda require scientific information in order to be explained. So no scientific information is in principle explanatorily irrelevant, it only becomes so under certain contexts. In view of this, scientific thought experiments can offer explanations, should we analyze their representational strategies. Their representations involve empirical as well as hypothetical statements. I call this the "representational mingling" which bears scientific information that can explain events. Buchanan's thought experiment from constitutional economics is examined to show how mingled representations explain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Social Anthropology / Anthropologie Sociale is the property of Berghahn Books and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Wodak (2019) persuasively argues that we are not justified in believing that well-being measurements are linear. From this, he infers grave consequences for both political philosophy thought experiments and empirical psychological research. Here I argue that these consequences do not follow. Wodak's challenges to the status of well-being measurements do not affect thought experiments, and well-being empirical researchers may be justified in making average comparisons even if their measurements are not linear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay offers a rationale for deploying ecofeminist science fiction stories as object-oriented thought experiments in science and environmental education, with particular reference to developments in genetics and evolutionary biology, and their implications for human (and more-than-human) reproduction and kinship in the period following the determination of the double helical structure of DNA by scientists affiliated with Cambridge University's Cavendish Laboratory in 1953, and the impact of subsequent gene-centric discourses on the biological sciences and the wider culture. The utility and defensibility of this approach is exemplified by reference to two science fiction novels by the late Naomi Mitchison that foreground and anticipate implications of genetic sciences for matters of concern to ecofeminists, including reproductive rights and responsibilities, population control, human relations with the more-than-human, and problematizing gendered (and other) binaries in everyday speech and popular culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Entanglement exhibits a unique property of quantum theory that is unseen in classical counterparts. The experimental confirmation of Bell's inequalities has surprised many people and revived interest and debate regarding the exact nature of quantum theory, including the wave-particle duality. On the other hand, rapid advancements in computing technology in recent years have provided a new tool for investigating the nature of quantum theory. In this paper, numerical simulation is used to visualize the nonlocality implied in quantum entanglement. In particular, a Gedanken experiment of a discrete approximation of a continuous quantum space is provided, similar to the case of the dual nature of particle/wave in the double-slit experiment. The results are expected to provide a different angle for a deeper understanding of the mysterious nature of quantum correlations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideological expectations from the right and the left saturate higher education. With public controversies detailing historic sexual abuse, research misconduct and plagiarism, how is the PhD positioned in a university sector losing its purpose, meaning and momentum? The doctorate is not only indicative, illustrative or representative of wider societal concerns, but also requires nuanced recognition of its distinctiveness from undergraduate degrees. This article activates a thought experiment to consider what is happening in international higher education, and how this history has been shaped and creased through the (post) pandemic environment. Uberfication is a provocative trope that enables the development of a generational modelling of our universities, spanning the baby boomers, Generation X, and millennials. With three generations circulating in higher education, can the assumptions and expectations be managed and aligned? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of KULT online is the property of Justus Liebig University Giessen and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Wigner's friend thought experiment has gained a resurgence of interest in recent years thanks to no-go theorems that extend it to Bell-like scenarios. One of these, by us and co-workers, showcased the contradiction that arises between quantum theory and a set of assumptions, weaker than those in Bell's theorem, which we named 'Local Friendliness'. Using these assumptions, it is possible to arrive at a set of inequalities for a given scenario, and, in general, some of these inequalities will be harder to violate than the Bell inequalities for the same scenario. A crucial feature of the extended Wigner's friend scenario in our aforementioned work was the ability of a superobserver to reverse the unitary evolution that gives rise to their friend's measurement. Here, we present a new scenario where the superobserver can interact with the friend repeatedly in a single experimental instance, either by asking them directly for their result, thus ending that instance, or by reversing their measurement and instructing them to perform a new one. We show that, in these scenarios, the Local Friendliness inequalities will always be the same as Bell inequalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the dynamics of a class of mechanical systems subjected to non-holonomic constraints by employing a method termed "modified vakonomic method" (MVM), and developed by Llibre, Ramírez and Sadovskaia in 2014. In particular, we test the MVM for the "rolling coin" problem and a variant of the "non-holonomic skate" problem. For our purposes, we divide our work in two parts. For the first one, our point of departure is a paper published in this journal by Lemos in 2022, in which, for the "rolling coin" problem, Kozlov's vakonomic method is shown to lead to inconsistencies with the so-called Lagrange–D'Alembert traditional non-holonomic method (TNHM). In this case, we prove that, if the MVM is used, the equivalence with the TNHM can be restored, and the two methods can be reconciled. In the second part, we formulate a thought experiment consisting of an electrically charged "non-holonomic skate" interacting with a magnetic field, and we examine its dynamics by means of the MVM. In this case, we point out the differences with the predictions of the TNHM, and we propose a reformulation of the MVM capable of retrieving the results obtained with the TNHM. Moreover, we give some insight into the main computational aspects related to the MVM for non-holonomic constraints linear in the generalized velocities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

José Bleger’s paper on the setting (encuadre) is integral to his 1967 book Symbiosis and Ambiguity. Relevant concepts from the book are summarised before examining his view of the setting as a “non-process” consisting of “constants”, complementing the “variables” of the analytic process. Process and setting are related as figure and ground in Gestalt psychology. The ideally maintained setting is studied as a thought experiment, uniting the categories of institution, personality, body schema, and body. Deposited in the setting, the psychotic part of the personality, or “agglutinated nucleus”, is a remnant of early symbiosis with the mother. Bleger distinguishes two settings: the analyst’s and the patient’s. The latter can only be analysed by strictly maintaining the former. Ritualisation of the setting denies temporal reality. De-symbiotisation is not always possible. A concept of “internal” setting is suggested, but Bleger nowhere mentions this and the concept is problematic, leaving open the question of how to listen to the silence of the setting. Bleger’s concept of encuadre can be applied to constants (invariants) in the wider world, the psychotic part of the personality being deposited in everything that is familiar and felt to be constant, including technology, which creates a “platform” for human activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thought experiments feature prominently in both scientific and philosophical methods. In this paper, I investigate two questions surrounding knowledge in the thought experiment process. First, on what implicit knowledge do thought experiments rely? Second, what provides epistemic justification for beliefs acquired through the process? I draw upon neo-Aristotelian metaphysics and Husserlian phenomenology to argue that essence is the object of implicit knowledge that anchors the imagined possibilities involved in thought experiments to the actual world, and that this essentialist knowledge enables the possibility of prima facie justification being conferred by the phenomenological givenness of thought experiment scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A two-dimensional "checkerboard" array employing systematic titration (e.g., serial two-fold dilutions) is a well-established in vitro method for exploring the antibacterial effects of novel drug combinations. Minimum inhibitory concentrations (MICs) on the checkerboard are isoeffective points at which the antibiotic potency is the same. Representations of checkerboard MIC curves for a β-lactam and β-lactamase inhibitor combination are used in hypothetical "thought experiments" and reveal the ways in which current practices can be improved. Because different types of response (i.e., independence vs. additivity vs. one effective agent; interaction vs. noninteraction) produce different MIC curves, data from different strains/isolates should not be pooled indiscriminately, as the composition of a pooled dataset will influence any derived pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic (PK/PD) index. Because the β-lactamase inhibitor threshold concentration (CT) parameter is a function of the β-lactam partner dosing regimen, it is not possible to derive a universal PK/PD index target based on CT. Alternative susceptibility testing methods represent different planes through the checkerboard; a fixed ratio method is less prone to bias for all β-lactam and β-lactamase inhibitor combinations. Susceptibility test MICs will often not reflect the sensitivity of the strain/isolate to the β-lactamase inhibitor, so the use of these MICs to normalize PK/PD indices is inappropriate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 crisis has renewed interest in alternative forms of organizing business and investment but our understanding of how these organizations can transform social systems is limited. The purpose of this article is to contribute to this understanding. In the context of one of the greatest transfers of wealth in global retail history that could see unprecedented numbers of businesses close or sold to distant, private interests, the article performs a thought experiment using the analogy of a commercial trust to encourage new ideas and critical reflection on community wealth building. The article introduces systems hijacking—a process of leveraging incumbent forms and systems in which they are embedded for new purposes—as an analytically useful concept for understanding how alternative organizations can transform social systems. The article finds organizational governance is necessary to transcend structural deficiencies in inherited or borrowed forms to make way for transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author criticizes the thought experiment about survival in a teletransporter. The weakness of the experiment lies in the implicit dualism and the uncritical premise of multiple implementations in the conditions. The assumption about the qualitative identity of bodies after teleportation through the category of mereorganic continuity is criticized.

Recently, Wilcox (JGPS 51: 65–87, 2020) argued against the so-called wide interval view and in favor of the principle of indifference as the correct response to unspecific evidence. Embedded in a formal model of the beliefs of an agent, the former presupposes imprecise probabilities and the latter numerically precise degrees of belief. His argument is illustrated by a thought experiment that comes with a fundamental intuition. According to Wilcox, the wide interval view is incompatible with this intuition and, thus, undermined. In contrast, I show that the intuition behind the thought experiment is, in fact, compatible with the wide interval view if it is embedded into a specific conception of imprecise probabilities as model of belief. This conception is an extension of a framework which I call modified supervaluationism (MSV) and which I recently presented elsewhere (Karge 2021, 175–191). To accommodate the thought experiment's fundamental intuition, it introduces a notion of second-order beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the notion of memory in the philosophy of religion. The area of this problematic is defined by Descartes, who, in a thought experiment, postulates an all-powerful, evil demon capable of falsifying human perception. The problem of solipsism raised here also implies doubt about claims based on memory. Descartes' assumptions are taken up constructively by Alvin Plantinga in his attempt to solve problems in the epistemology of religion by raising the following new question: is belief in God rational, and, if so, is it justified? Peter van Inwagen, for his part, uses memory analysis to construct arguments in support of theodicy. In considering these issues, other key topics within the philosophy of religion, such as the afterlife and the existence of the soul, which are closely related to the analysis of personal identity, inevitably arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that we need to distinguish between three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I provide two lines of argument in support of this account. First, I address three thought experiments that have been troublesome for unified accounts of actual causation, and I show that my account provides a better explanation of corresponding causal intuitions. Second, I provide a functional argument: if we assume that a key purpose of causal concepts is to guide agency, we are better off making a distinction between three concepts of actual causation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When evaluating theories of causation, intuitions should not play a decisive role, not even intuitions in flawlessly-designed thought experiments. Indeed, no coherent theory of causation can respect the typical person's intuitions in redundancy (pre-emption) thought experiments, without disrespecting their intuitions in threat-and-saviour (switching/short-circuit) thought experiments. I provide a deductively sound argument for these claims. Amazingly, this argument assumes absolutely nothing about the nature of causation. I also provide a second argument, whose conclusion is even stronger: the typical person's causal intuitions are thoroughly unreliable. This argument proceeds by raising the neglected question: in what respects is information about intermediate and enabling variables relevant to reliable causal judgment? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay extends my "invisible disagreement" argument for Color Realism (2017) to formulate an argument for Direct Realism. It uses a variation of an "inverted qualia" thought experiment to show that successes in intersubjectively validating empirical claims about colors is proof that a nuanced version of Direct Realism is correct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The semantic analysis of conditional sentences does not entirely align with their morphosyntactic structure. I substantiate this hypothesis with instances from both Czech and English that extend beyond conventional textbook examples. I also highlight that logicians and philosophers often make terminological errors when they disregard the insights from linguistic disciplines. Despite the early analytic philosophy’s emphasis on terminological precision, the practical application falls significantly short of this ideal. I firmly believe that a proper understanding of the morphosyntax and semantics of conditional sentences is a prerequisite for their classification and analysis. In our pursuit of a comprehensive exploration of conditional clauses, we must also grapple with methodological challenges that delve into the very core of the philosophy of language. The primary issue revolves around the fact that two out of the three a priori methods in philosophy rely heavily on the analysis of conditional sentences: thought experiments and modal metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I offer reasons to conclude that either belief impermissivism or credal impermissivism is false. That is to say, I argue against the conjunction of belief impermissivism and credal impermissivism. I defend this conclusion in three ways. First, I show what I take to be an implausible consequence of holding that for any rational credence in p, there is only one correlating rational belief-attitude toward p, given a body of evidence. Second, I provide thought experiments designed to support the intuition that there are at least a few credences in some cases for which more than one belief-attitude is rationally permissible. Third, I provide one possible theoretical grounding for my position by appeal to Jamesian values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article delves into the intriguing disagreement among historians of science regarding the origin of the idea of universal gravity. Prominent researchers of the genesis of Newton's Principia did not believe that he could have come up with this idea in 1666, after observing a falling apple, as he claimed. On the other hand, prominent biographers of Newton did believe. The proposed key to solving this paradox is a thought experiment described in Newton's manuscript, 'The System of the World,' which preceded the creation of his 'Principia.' According to the proposed 'subjunctive' scenario, it was possible to come from the motion of a projectile to the concept of universal gravity, relying only on the knowledge and skills of Galileo in 1611. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Personal identity include both first-person and third-person identities. The objective of the essay is to demonstrate the primitiveness of first-person identity, or self-identity, by re-examining a few wellknown thought experiments that are referred to as 'borderline cases of personal identity'. The primary goal of the essay is to demonstrate that no borderline case poses a significant challenge to first-person identity. The discussion is divided into three sections. The first section motivates the debate. Additionally, the importance of the first-person identity statement 'I am I', which is immune from error through misidentification, is established. In the second section, five well-known thought experiments are evaluated to demonstrate that none of them poses a genuine threat to first-person identity. In the third and final part, some real pathological case studies are analysed to strengthen the main argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experimental ethicists investigate traditional ethical questions with non-traditional means, namely with the methods of the empirical sciences. Studies in this area have made heavy use of philosophical thought experiments such as the well-known trolley cases. Yet, the specific function of these thought experiments within experimental ethics has received little consideration. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap. We begin by describing the function of ethical thought experiments, and show that these thought experiments should not only be classified according to their function but also according to their scope. On this basis we highlight several ways in which the use of thought experiments in experimental ethics can be philosophically relevant. We conclude by arguing that experimental philosophy currently only focuses on a small subcategory of ethical thought experiments and suggest a broadening of its research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The method of cases, i.e. the informal elicitation of judgements in thought experiments for the purpose of philosophical theorising, has been much criticised in recent years. In this paper we point out that the method of cases is not peculiar to philosophy: it can also be found in physics, where it has made a more limited, but still valuable contribution to the probing and formulation of theories. The method of cases per se should therefore not be treated as intrinsically methodologically flawed. This paper has also a narrower goal: to show that when the analogy underlying the so-called 'expertise defence' is drawn between judgements in thought experiments in philosophy and in physics, several objections can be avoided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the concept of creating a Bill of Rights for engineering students to address issues of diversity, equity, and inclusion in engineering education. The author, a Black engineering professor, shares their personal experiences and highlights the need for better support for marginalized students. They propose that a Bill of Rights could establish minimum expectations for undergraduate and graduate education and provide a framework for accountability. The author suggests using Young's Five Faces of Oppression as a conceptual framework to outline rights that address exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. The article emphasizes the importance of implementing a Bill of Rights to address oppressive circumstances and hold individuals accountable, and suggests specific rights and accountability practices to mitigate oppression. The author encourages discussion and engagement within the engineering education community to bring about necessary changes. [Extracted from the article]

The ability to recognize and correct errors in one's explanatory understanding is critically important for learning. However, little is known about the mechanisms that determine when and under what circumstances errors are detected and how they are corrected. The present study investigated thought experiments as a potential tool that can reveal errors and trigger belief revision in the service of error correction. Across two experiments, 1149 participants engaged in reasoning about force and motion (a domain with well‐documented misconceptions) in a pre‐training—training—post‐training design. The two experiments manipulated the type of mental model manipulated in the thought experiments (i.e., whether participants reasoned about forces acting on their own bodies vs. on external objects), as well as the level of relational and argumentative reasoning about the outcomes of the thought experiments. The results showed that: (i) thought experiments can serve as a tool to elicit inconsistencies in one's representations; (ii) the level of relational and argumentative reasoning determines the level of belief revision in the service of error correction; and (iii) the type of mental model manipulated in a thought experiment determines its outcome and its potential to initiate belief revision. Thought experiments can serve as a valuable teaching and learning tool, and they can help us better understand the nature of error detection and correction systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we propose an analysis of the controversy between Geoffrey Jefferson and Alan Turing in terms of a Kuhnian account of thought experiments. In this account, the main task is not to evaluate intuitions or (only) to rearrange concepts. Instead, we propose that the main task is to construct scenarios by proposing relevant experiences in which shared assumptions and conflicting lines of inquiry can be made explicit. From this perspective, we can understand the arguments and assumptions in the Jefferson-Turing thinking machine controversy [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the parallel between Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for abortion rights based on bodily autonomy and the contentious issue of vaccine refusal. Drawing on Thomson's famous thought experiment involving a violinist, I present analogous scenarios involving medical decisions. I argue that if Thomson's reasoning holds, individuals also possess the right to refuse vaccines, even if it entails serious risk to others. The paper underscores the importance of recognizing that medical decisions, including vaccine refusal, should be evaluated within the framework of bodily autonomy and individual rights, challenging the prevailing opinion on this complex issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ereğli Faculty of Education Journal / Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi Ereğli Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Eregli Faculty of Education Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)