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The article examines the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the economic development of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in recent decades. It is shown that the high rates of economic growth achieved by these countries in the pre-crisis years were closely linked to large foreign loans. The governments placed special emphasis on the attraction of FDI in high-tech export industries having very high growth rates (motor vehicles, machinery, equipment, computers, electronics and optics). For this purpose, central banks maintained an undervalued exchange rate of national currencies. As a result, adverse foreign trade balance in each of the three countries has shown a surplus in recent years. Furthermore, the disadvantages of excessive foreign loans are listed: high interest and dividend payments to foreign investors, reduction of national and economic sovereignty. For example, more than half of the Czech economy is under the control of foreign investors. Foreign direct investment in the Russian economy is also briefly discussed. It is shown by comparing the data of the Bank of Russia and the Eurostat that more than half of FDI in Russia is made through so-called special purpose entities (SPE) and would be only formally considered a direct investment.

The article describes that after the periphery PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) joined the Eurozone, several factors previously improving PIGS' export competitiveness (undervalued national currency, protective customs duty, low compensation of employees) no longer work. It is revealed that in the pre-crisis years the rapid GDP growth in PIGS took place considerably by means of foreign loans. Moreover, external debt bubbles grew: high rates of economic growth facilitated the inflow of new foreign money used for both reinvestment and current external debt service. Besides, the share of «tradable» goods (that can be moved between countries and internationally traded) decreased in the GDP structures of PIGS. During the crisis, the PIGS' economic situation got worse (growth of external and public debts, decline in the GDP and in the investments, high unemployment). Conclusion: the Eurozone should either strengthen the integration (to increase the unification of laws in the economic and social spheres, to tighten control by the Eurozone central authorities), or get rid of the troubled countries. Otherwise, the current crisis, repeatedly flaring and fading, will persist for a long time.

We investigate the claim that national labor markets have become more globally interconnected in recent decades. We do so by deriving estimates over time of three different notions of interconnection: (i) the share of labor demand that is export induced (i.e., all labor demand created by foreign entities buying products exported by the home country) - we provide estimates for 40 countries; (ii) the share of workers employed in sectors producing tradable goods or services - 68 countries; and (iii) the ratio of the number of jobs that are either located in a tradable sector, or that are involved in producing services that are required by these tradable sectors, to all jobs in the economy, which we call the trade-linked employment share - 40 countries. Our estimates lead to the conclusion that the evidence of a large increase in the interconnections between national labor markets is far weaker than commonly asserted: levels of interconnectivity, and the direction of changes over time, vary across notions of interconnection and countries. The main reasons for this are labordisplacing productivity growth in tradable sectors of each economy and the diminishing fraction of national labor forces hired into manufacturing jobs worldwide. We also discuss the implications of our results for different policy debates that each of the three measures is associated with: international coordination of macroeconomic policies (export-induced labor demand), currency devaluations (share of workers producing tradables), and education and labor protection (trade-linked share).

Over the last decades, productivity in the tradable sector rose substantially, while in the non-tradable sector, output per worker has remained the same, despite a similar increase in human capital in both sectors. This paper emphasizes that duality in higher education as well as heterogeneous ability of individuals can explain the differences in labor productivity between tradable and non-tradable industries. The duality in the higher-education sector enables a separation of individuals by their ability, and in consequence, human capital in both industries is different. The heterogeneity in human capital can explain that despite an increase in human capital in both sectors, there is still a gap in productivity. In other words, the productivity gap between tradable and non-tradable sectors is fueled by the duality in higher education, leading to heterogeneity in human capital. In consequence, there is a contrast between on one hand, more mobility across countries, and on the other hand, less mobility between sectors.

We put forward the hypothesis that increasing specialisation in the production of non-tradable output has a negative impact on the current account balance. This tradability hypothesis is directly derived from a two-sector inter-temporal current account model. To test it empirically we develop a value-added based tradability index which captures the tradability of a country's output. Applied to a large sample of European countries, our empirical model provides strong evidence for a positive relationship between the current account balance and the tradability index. The main policy implication is that the anxieties about 'de-industrialisation' in large parts of Europe seem justified with a view to growing external imbalances.

The pattern of debt flows to peripheral European Monetary Union members seems puzzling: they are mostly indirect and channeled through the large countries of the European Monetary Union. This paper examines to what extent the introduction of the euro and the elimination of the intra-area currency risk can explain this puzzle. A three-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework with endogenous portfolio choice and two currencies is developed. In the equilibrium, the core members of the European Monetary Union emerge as the main group of lenders to the peripheral European Monetary Union members. Outside lenders are pushed from the periphery debt markets because of currency risk. The model generates a pattern of debt flows consistent with the data despite the absence of any exogenous frictions or market segmentations.

After presenting the institutional construction during the pre-accession and post-accession to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the exchange rate mechanisms (ERM) in several countries and the convergence criteria, we go on with a brief analysis of the way the CEE countries cope with the convergence criteria in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty. Then, the study deals with a topic often discussed in the scientific literature and included on the agenda of decision-makers at various levels, in order to clarify the following major issues: a shorter transition to the euro, the exchange rate equilibrium versus the inflation rate diminution and the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the exchange rates and the exchange rate deviation index, evidences concerning the real exchange rate equilibrium and the appreciation of the exchange rate in the CEE countries.

International supply chains require the coordination of numerous activities across multiple countries and firms. This paper develops a theoretical model of supply chains in which the measure of tasks completed within a firm is determined by parameters that define transaction costs and the cost of coordinating more activities within the firm. The structural parameters that govern these costs explain variation in supply chain length as well as cross-country variation in gross-output-to-value-added ratios. The structural parameters are linked to comparative advantage along and across supply chains. The paper provides an analytical treatment of trade and welfare responses to trade cost change in a simple two-country model. To explore the models implications in a richer setting, the model is calibrated to match key observables in East Asia, and the calibrated model is used to evaluate implications of changes in model parameters for trade, welfare, the length of supply chains, and countries relative position within them.

The main message of this report is that if Kazakhstan wants to take advantage of global integration and diversification opportunities, the government needs to improve its trade policy framework, its management, and its regulations. It is also finalizing accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) while its trade strategy includes a number of free trade agreements to be negotiated. It is an active member of the Central Asia Region Economic Cooperation (CAREC). This report is composed of three policy notes that discuss how to improve the trade policy framework, management, and regulations: note one is on the trade policy framework and recommends joining the WTO on a tariff schedule that is more liberal than Russia’s; note two postulates that to benefit more fully from the WTO membership and future regional or bilateral agreements, the institutional framework for trade policy management will need a clearer strategic vision, better coordination within the government and with private sector, and enhanced human capacity; and note three suggests that for the private sector to benefit from global integration and diversification, the government should ease the burden of regulations that affect trade (non-tariff measures (NTMs)).

La inflación, considerada uno de los principales indicadores de bienestar económico, resulta ser uno de los elementos a tener en cuenta a la hora de tomar decisiones de política económica. Colombia no es la excepción, existen numerosos estudios orientados a encontrar las causas de la variación en los precios, con el fin de proporcionar herramientas suficientes para la toma de decisiones y así cumplir, entre otras cosas, con el mandato constitucional de la autoridad monetaria en referencia al control del nivel de precios dentro de la economía para garantizar el poder adquisitivo de la población. En Colombia, la política monetaria ha sido muy juiciosa en la aplicación de instrumentos para el control de los niveles inflacionarios de la economía. A partir de la apertura económica, la inflación ha tenido un comportamiento particular, no solo por el hecho de la creciente demanda efectiva de la economía, sino por efectos del proceso de globalización que acompaña todas las actividades en el día a día. Inflation, considered one of the main indicators of economic welfare, is one of the elements to be taken into account when making economic policy decisions. Colombia is no exception; there are numerous studies aimed at finding the causes of price variation, in order to provide sufficient tools for decision-making and thus comply, among other things, with the constitutional mandate of the monetary authority in reference to the control of the price level within the economy to guarantee the purchasing power of the population. In Colombia, monetary policy has been very judicious in the application of instruments to control inflationary levels in the economy. Since the opening of the economy, inflation has had a particular behaviour, not only because of the growing effective demand of the economy, but also due to the effects of the globalisation process that accompanies all activities on a daily basis. Magíster en Ciencias Económicas Maestría

In 2012, Kenya's economy has been on a tightrope. Policy makers have had to walk a fine line between stabilizing the economy and maintaining the growth momentum. While inflation has declined, the exchange rate stabilized, and the fiscal position improved, fundamental economic imbalances continue to make Kenya vulnerable to shocks. In the absence of economic and social turbulence, Kenya should grow at 5 percent in 2012 and 2013, which will still be substantially below its neighbors. Kenya has been benefitting from the integration and growth momentum in the East African Community (EAC), which has become one of the most vibrant economic regions in the world. However, despite impressive increases in trade between the five EAC partners in recent years, there is still a large untapped potential. EAC trade can increase several-fold if unnecessary restrictions in the trade of goods and services particularly nontariff barriers were removed.

The pace of economic activity is gradually returning to pre-crisis levels. After a roller-coaster of sharp drops, vigorous rebounds and mild contractions, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was up 4.8 percent in the last quarter of 2010 on a seasonally-adjusted annualized (SAAR) basis, closer to pre-crisis, normal levels. For 2010 as a whole, GDP expanded by 7.8 percent from 2009. Growth was broad-based, with significant contributions from external and domestic demands. Thailand's economy is one of the most energy intensive in the region because of the large (and growing) share of energy-intensive manufacturing in the economy and high proportion of cargo transported by trucks. Thailand can reduce its vulnerability to oil price shocks by raising fuel standards, improving tax incentives for conservation and relying more on rail for cargo transport.

Growth has slowed down since the second quarter, but exceeded expectations. Considering the 1) political turmoil; 2) robust growth during the rebound; and 3) slowdown in advanced economies, the Thai economy was expected to contract by more than it did in the second and third quarters. The output of the manufacturing sector expanded in the second quarter, led by still-growing exports and robust private consumption. Demand indeed appears to have been higher than production, as some orders had to be filled by drawing down on inventories. However, a sharp contraction in tourism led Gross Domestic product (GDP) overall to contract in the quarter. The FY10 fiscal deficit was much smaller than initially feared when the budget was proposed. The budget for FY10 was prepared at the trough of the global financial crisis in February 2009 and anticipated only 1.35 trillion baht in revenues. Inflation levels have been low and stable but persistent increases in food prices could pose risks. Overall, slower growth in advanced economies will translate into lower GDP growth Thailand for the next two to three years. Notwithstanding a deceleration in the second half because of the waning global inventory cycle, year-on-year growth in 2010 is expected at 7.5 percent due to the low base of 2009 and the strong first half. Quarter-to-quarter growth will pick up modestly in 2011 to average over 4 percent, but the relatively high base in 2010 results in a year-on-year growth rate of 3.2 percent for 2011.

European Comparison Project data (years 1999-2008) are used for an estimation of cross-country systems (AIDS) of consumer demand functions defined over durable and non-durable tradable goods and non-tradable services. General exchange equilibrium models of inter-EU trade generate equalized relative prices of tradable goods. But domestic relative prices of services become more dispersed and can move the PPP/ER ratios away from unity. PPP/ER discrepancies may be sustained even when there are no impediments to free trade.

The global crisis is now in the rear view mirror and world growth is being restored. In sharp contrast with past episodes of global turmoil, this time the recovery is led by the periphery, specifically by the larger and more dynamic emerging markets (Brazil, China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand). For this group of emerging markets (EMs), the contraction in economic activity was much smaller than that of rich countries, the recovery started earlier, and the rebound has been much steeper. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are second among emerging regions, after Asia, in the strength of the recovery. The first part of the report focuses on macroeconomic and financial aspects, emphasizing the outlook going forward. Finally, the second part examines some aspects of the adjustment in labor markets during this crisis in comparison to previous ones.

South Africa has rapidly reduced trade barriers since the end of Apartheid, yet agricultural production and exports have remained sluggish. Also, poverty and unemployment have risen and become increasingly concentrated in rural areas. This paper examines the extent to which remaining price distortions, both domestic and foreign, are contributing to the underperformance of the agricultural sector vis-a-vis the rest of the economy. The author draws on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) and micro-simulation model of South Africa that is linked to the results of a global trade model. This framework is used to examine the effects of eliminating global and domestic price distortions. Model results indicate that South Africa's agricultural sector currently benefits from global price distortions, and that removing these will create more jobs for lower-skilled workers, thereby reducing income inequality and poverty. The author also fined that South Africa's own policies are biased against agriculture and that removing domestic distortions will raise agricultural production. Job losses in nonagricultural sectors will be outweighed by job creation in agriculture, such that overall employment rises and poverty falls. Overall, the findings suggest that South Africa's own policies are more damaging to its welfare, poverty and inequality than distortionary policies in the rest of the world. Existing national price distortions may thus explain some of the poor performance of South Africa's agricultural sector and rural development.

This paper analyzes the economic effects of agricultural price and merchandise trade policies around the world as of 2004 on global markets, net farm incomes, and national and regional economic welfare and poverty, using the global economy wide Linkage model, new estimates of agricultural price distortions for developing countries, and poverty elasticity's approach. It addresses two questions: to what extent are policies as of 2004 still reducing rewards from farming in developing countries and thereby adding to inequality across countries in farm household incomes? Are they depressing value added more in primary agriculture than in the rest of the economy of developing countries, and earnings of unskilled workers more than of owners of other factors of production, thereby potentially contributing to inequality and poverty within developing countries (given that farm incomes are well below non-farm incomes in most developing countries and that agriculture there is intensive in the use of unskilled labor)? Results are presented for the key countries and regions of the world and for the world as a whole. They reveal that, by moving to free markets, income inequality between countries will be reduced at least slightly, all but one-sixth of the gains to developing countries will come from agricultural policy reform, unskilled workers in developing countries the majority of whom work on farms will benefit most from reform, net farm incomes in developing countries will rise by 6 percent compared with 2 percent for non-agricultural value added, and the number of people surviving on less than US$1 a day will drop 3 percent globally.

This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income spectrum. Price support policies of advanced economies hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. On the other hand, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century, both directly (e.g., export taxes) and also indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting imports of manufactures. Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries' agricultural price and international trade policies. The authors summarize these and realted stylized facts that can be drawn from a new World Bank database that is worthy of the attention of political economy theorists, historians and econometricians. These indicators can be helpful in addressing such questions as the following: where is there still a policy bias against agricultural production? To what extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some developing-country food producers are now being protected from import competition along the lines of the examples of earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the political economy forces behind the more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those in less-successful countries where major distortions in agricultural incentives remain? And what explains the pattern of distortions across not only countries but also industries and in the choice of support or tax instruments within the agricultural sector of each country?

According to the Dutch Disease core model a boom in natural resources will eventually lead to a shift of production between sectors: from tradable goods to non-tradable goods. The authors found it interesting to research if United Arab Emirates has been a subject to any of the effects caused by the disease, due to the oil boom during the 1970s and the huge development that has appeared in the country. If the United Arab Emirates would be a vic-tim of the disease the decline in exports of the natural resource will result in a decline in the non-oil tradable goods which will affect the country negatively. Furthermore, the disease can also make it more difficult for the country to deal with the problem of high inflation. A time series covering the period 1975-2005 is used to analyse if the United Arab Emirates has experienced symptoms of the disease. Results show that the country has experienced some symptoms of the Dutch Disease during the period 1975-198 since changes in the price of oil caused tradables to shift to the non-tradable sector. Another sign of the disease is the high inflation rate Unite Arab Emirates experienced during the selected period, how-ever high inflation rate could be caused by other factors as well. Furthermore, the larger in-crease in the non-tradable sector compared to the tradable sector is also an indication of the disease in the country. According to these findings the authors can conclude that United Arab Emirates has experienced symptoms of the disease, however, it cannot be concluded that it has been a victim of the disease.

How hospitable will the global environment be for economic growth in the developing world as we come out of the present financial crisis? The answer depends on how well the author manage the following tension. On the one hand, global macro stability requires that we prevent external imbalances from getting too large. On the other hand, growth in poor nations requires that the world economy be able to absorb a rapid increase in the supply of tradable produced in the developing world. It is possible to render these two requirements compatible, but doing so requires greater use of explicit industrial policies in developing countries, which have the potential of encouraging of modern tradable activities without spilling over into trade surpluses. The 'price' to be paid for greater discipline on real exchange rates and external imbalances is greater use (and permissiveness) towards industrial polices.

The large U.S. current account deficit over the last decade-and the corresponding surpluses in China and elsewhere-has been interpreted in two very different ways. Many mainstream economists view the phenomena as primarily the outcome of a low rate of national saving in the United States, beginning with a large budget deficit (the other half of the 'twin deficits'). In this first view, the current account deficit is unsustainable, and will eventually result in a sharp depreciation of the dollar. But this unsustainability view has been challenged by a variety of other economists, with equally impeccable credentials. This paper enumerates eight arguments that they have given as to why we need not worry about the current account deficit. The paper is skeptical of all eight, and sides with the unsustainability view. But they deserve a hearing. The eight are: 1) the siblings are not twins; 2) alleged investment boom; 3) low U.S. private savings; 4) global savings glut; 5) its a big world; 6) valuation effects pay for it; 7) intermediation rents pay for it; and 8) second Bretton woods.

After presenting the institutional construction during the pre-accession and post-accession to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the exchange rate mechanisms (ERM) in several countries and the convergence criteria, we go on with a brief analysis of the way the CEE countries cope with the convergence criteria in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty. Then, the study deals with a topic often discussed in the scientific literature and included on the agenda of decision-makers at various levels, in order to clarify the following major issues: a shorter transition to the euro, the exchange rate equilibrium versus the inflation rate diminution and the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the exchange rates and the exchange rate deviation index, evidences concerning the real exchange rate equilibrium and the appreciation of the exchange rate in the CEE countries.

This paper proposes three tasks. It briefly delineates the character of the civilizing mission and the interests it served, especially the colonization of Asia and Africa. In addition, the claims of the civilizing mission and the neoclassical theory of trade are tested empirically by comparing growth rates of sovereign countries and colonies, and of colonies before and after they gained sovereignty. Finally, we offer a quick review of the changing dynamics of the global economy as goods which were hitherto non-tradable become increasingly tradable.

Economic reform programs assume that major goods are tradable, such that depreciation of the real exchange rate raises the value of output compared to factor costs in domestic currency. In Tanzania, major food staples that account for most real income are non-tradables in at least one-quarter of the country. This is demonstrated and implications assessed for the constraints imposed on macroeconomic-led adjustment strategies.

Despite a trend toward more flexible rates, more than half the world's countries maintain fixed or managed exchange rates. In the 1980s and 1990s, developing countries as a group progressively liberalized their trade regimes, but some governments defend their exchange rate in actions that run counter to long-run plans for liberalization. Without discussing the relative merits of fixed and flexible exchange rate systems, the authors note that exchange rate management in many countries has resulted in overvaluation of the real exchange rate. Roughly twenty five percent of the countries for which data are available have overvalued exchange rates, with black market premiums from 10 percent to more than 100 percent. After surveying the literature, the authors present lessons from experience about what has worked (or not) in response to crises involving external shocks and external trade deficits - and why. Trying to defend an overvalued exchange rate with protectionist trade policies is a classic pattern, but experience shows such protection does significantly retard the country's growth, and delay its integration into the world trading community. In fact, and overvalued exchange rate is often the root cause of protection, preventing the country from returning to more liberal trade policies that allow growth and integration into the world community without exchange rate adjustment. Most developing countries have downward price and wage rigidities and, with an external trade deficit, require some form of nominal exchange rate adjustment to restore external equilibrium. The authors present cross-country econometric and case study evidence - citing examples from Argentina, Chile, Ghana, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Sub-Saharan Africa (including the CFA zone) - that overvalued exchange rates reduce economic growth. Defending the exchange rate, they show, has nor no medium-term benefits, since falling reserves will eventually force devaluation. Better to have devaluation occur without further debilitating losses in reserves and lost productivity because of import controls. After devaluation the exchange rate will reach a new equilibrium, strongly influenced by government and central bank policies.

Now that import-substitution policies have failed and been discredited, there has been a shift in favor of interventions on behalf of export interests. The author argues that close scrutiny reveals these arguments to be as flawed as the old arguments for import substitution. Among other things, the author concludes that: 1) Under perfect competition, a country trying to retaliate against a trading partners export subsidies by instituting its own export subsidies, will only hurt itself. 2) The argument that export subsidies may be useful for neutralizing import tariffs, is spurious. In most practical situations, this is not possible. Removal of tariffs is a far superior policy. 3) In principle, a case can be made for protecting infant export industries in the presence of externalities. But the empirical relevance of externalities remains as illusory for export industries as it was for import-substituting industries. 4) Adverse selection and moral hazard can lead to the thinning of the market for credit insurance, but that is not a case for government intervention. 5) India's experience shows export subsidies to have little impact on exports. Brazil and Mexico's experience shows export subsidies to be a costly instrument of export diversification. 6) Those who argue that pro-export interventions were important in East Asia have not provided convincing evidence of a casual relationship between the interventions and growth.