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"The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War" by Parks M. Coble is a book that revisits the reasons behind the Kuomintang's (KMT) defeat in China's civil war. Coble focuses on Chiang Kai-shek's fiscal policies, which led to hyperinflation and corruption, alienating the urban population and compromising the morale and combat effectiveness of the KMT's armies. The book draws on primary sources such as Chiang's diaries and the papers of KMT leaders T.V. Soong and H.H. Kung. Coble argues that Chiang's financial policy was a disaster, attributing it to his belief in the importance of a large army and his habit of covering budget deficits by increasing the money supply. The book also acknowledges the complexities of economic recovery in the aftermath of Japanese occupation and the legacy of colonialism. Overall, this concise and engaging reassessment of the KMT's defeat will be of interest to historians and accessible to students. [Extracted from the article]

Historians have explained the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war (1945-49) in terms of either "standard" or "guerrilla" warfare. Analysis of the Communist experience in Manchuria, 1945-47, demonstrates that the Communists initially adopted a conventional war strategy and doctrine. As the situation developed, the Party faced a contradiction between economic and political necessity on the one hand and strategic reality on the other that sometimes put Communist forces into indefensible positions. After setbacks, the Communists recovered and developed a decisive hybrid strategy and doctrine that enabled them to turn the tide of the civil war and to make a second, more successful transition from guerrilla to mobile and base warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]