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We consider a market where consumers mix goods offered by two firms differentiated a la Hotelling, and show how tariff structures affect consumers, profits, and location decisions. As compared to linear pricing, when firms charge two-part tariffs they make higher profits while consumers are worse off. The resulting allocation is not efficient since firms choose extreme locations and too little mixing occurs. Still, under competition in flat subscription fees only there is no mixing at all, and the outcome is Pareto-dominated by competition in the other types of tariffs. Results are discussed with a particular emphasis on the media industry. JEL classification: L13; L82 Keywords: Two-part tariffs; Flat fees; Combinable products; Media economics; Pay-per-view

The use of a microsimulation computable general equilibrium (CGE) model on individual households showed that Zimbabwe's tariff removal alleviated poverty and improved income distribution. Details on the country's trade liberalization and model development are discussed.

A study evaluating the appropriateness of the current tariffs for district heating in Korea, is presented. For this purpose, the duality concept applied to the output distance function is adopted and used to estimate the shadow price of heat produced from cogeneration. Also the analytical model is used for calculating labor, capital and fuel as inputs of cogeneration.

This paper studies preferences of customs union (CU) members over common external tariff (CET) levels and extends the literature on delegation decisions over trade policy in models with production. In a model with similar CU members, we prove that most-preferred CETs can be ranked with the help of compensated price elasticities of import demand functions. In the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, we show these elasticities depend on inter-country differences in relative factor endowments and inter-sectoral differences in technology. This helps identify the optimal policy maker in a CU and demonstrates delegation decisions over trade policy can be integrated into mainstream trade theory.

In this paper ad valorem and unit taxation are compared on a model that allows for various monopolistic pricing policies, including uniform pricing and all three types of Pigouvian price discrimination. It shows that, for any given unit tax on a non-uniform pricing monopoly (1) there exists an output-neutral ad valorem tax rate that gives rise to a higher tax yield than the unit tax, and (2) there exists an ad valorem tax rate that welfare dominates the unit tax not only in the aggregate sense but also in the Pareto sense.

An analysis of ad valorem and unit taxes' Pareto rankings in oligopoly and monopoly markets show that in oligopoly and monopoly markets, ad valorem taxes are welfare superior to unit taxes. Results revealed that for every imposition of a unit tax on a monopoly, a Pareto dominating ad valorem tax occurs leading to bigger profit, tax revenue and consumer surplus. Furthermore, results also showed the situations wherein Pareto dominance stretches to Cournot-Nash oligopoly.

A new kind of value-added tariff could substitute for all rules of origin. This proposed tariff is expected to reduce the dispersion in the actual tariff rates paid on all goods entering a country and will be able to promote the right incentives such as motivating producers to obtain imports from the least expensive source inside or outside the area. In addition, the value-added tariff will not demotivate producers from enhancing factor productivity.

The effects of taxation on spatial oligopoly in a small open economy were determined. It was shown that mill prices by domestic producers may be lowered by tariff thereby benefiting some domestic consumers. An evaluation of a small open economy was also evaluated on the basis of the source of the utility, mobility of consumers and the adjustment of location patterns and land rents to tax-induced changes in mill prices.

The effects of increasing block tariffs (IBTs) for water utilities is analyzed for developing countries. Analysis shows that IBTs serve to increase the average amount low income households have to pay for water because of the lack of individual households meters or the need to buy from an outside source. Numerous households using one meter and increased costs incurred by water vendors serve to push up the price of the commodity for end-users.

The present paper develops a general model with one imported, one exported, many non-traded goods, where some factors of production are internationally mobile. Within this framework, the analysis establishes the validity of some earlier results and extends others. That is, (i) a tariff increase reduces the country's welfare; (ii) tariff-induced international factor flows reduce a country's welfare; (iii) an improvement in a country's terms of trade in the presence of a tariff raises its welfare more when factors are internationally mobile than when not; and (iv) with preferential trading agreements, trade creation always improves the country's welfare, while trade diversion may or may not.

A computable general equilibrium model is used to examine effects of removing U.S. tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. The model differs from traditional disaggregated trade models in its attention to intertemporal decision making, adjustment dynamics, and international capital mobility. Unilateral elimination of tariffs would reduce the welfare of U.S. households by 0.4 per cent. Elimination of quantitative restrictions, in contrast, would increase U.S. welfare by 1.1 per cent. The international cross-ownership of capital associated with internationally mobile capital significantly influences the distribution of capital gains and losses from trade liberalization. Disregarding cross-ownership leads to understatement of the domestic welfare losses from tariff removal and overstatement of the domestic welfare gains from eliminating quantitative restrictions.