Search

I INTRODUCTION The year 2021 marks 40 years since the commencement of Australia's GAAR in pt IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA36). (1) The GAAR has been [...], This article explores aspects of the legislative evolution of Australia's general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in pt IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA36) and considers how it shapes up after 40 years. It considers the legislative interaction of the GAAR with other parts of the income tax statute and explores the GAAR in an international context, including the Multinational AntiAvoidance Law (MAAL) and Diverted Profits Tax (DPT) inserted into pt IVA. It concludes with consideration of the role and legitimacy of the GAAR in respect of both domestic and international economic and legal transactions.

ABSTRACT The transnational free flow of capital represents one of the core factors driving the globalization of the world since the beginning of the Bretton-Woods era. Under the "traditional" Neoliberal [...]

I. INTRODUCTION Multinational corporations (MNCs) face the challenge of, and opportunity for, multijurisdictional tax planning (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010; Desai, 2009). One primary goal of multijurisdictional planning is to allocate [...], U.S. income tax rules may encourage a U.S.-headquartered multinational corporation (MNC) to adopt a structure with a tax haven parent. We study data from firms that conducted initial public offerings in the United States between 1997 and 2010 and offer evidence that U.S.-headquartered MNCs rarely incorporate in tax havens. Of the 918 U.S.-headquartered MNCs that we identify, only 27 are incorporated in tax havens. Others have pointed to the recent increase in the proportion of firms conducting U.S. IPOs that incorporate in tax havens as possible evidence that more U.S.-headquartered MNCs make this decision. We show instead that Chinese-headquartered firms drive this increase. Keywords: international taxation, initial public offerings, tax havens, headquarters, incorporation JEL Codes: H25, F23

IV. THE AFTERMATH--LITIGATION EVERYWHERE After 2004, all of Yukos within Russia was either seized or crippled. But because the company had an international dimension, the government and its cat's-paw courts [...]

I. INTRODUCTION II. THE RISE--YUKOS IN THE ERA OF COWBOY CAPITALISM A. The Yeltsin Period--1990 to 1999 B. The Putin Period--2000 to 2008 III. THE FALL--EXPROPRIATION BY LITIGATION IV. THE [...]

I. Introduction 860 II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 861 A Introduction to International Taxation 862 B. The Difference Between Secrecy Jurisdictions, Tax 863 Havens, and Off shore Financial Centers C. Reasons to [...]

I. INTRODUCTION 540 II. THE HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF SWISS BANKING LAW 541 A. Threats of Seizure by France's Herriot Government 541 B. Economic Espionage by Nazi Germany 542 C. [...]

"Watch the police and the tax man miss me, I'm goin' mobile." --The Who I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION Optimal taxation is shorthand for the normative theory of taxation--how should we [...], Most models of optimal taxation with mobility deal only with real mobility, in the sense that moving out of a jurisdiction's tax base entails a physical movement. But often escaping a jurisdiction's tax net does not necessarily entail any physical movement, is often an avoidance (or even evasion) device, and can be accomplished by the "mere stroke of a pen." The cost of such movement, and therefore the base elasticity, is endogenous to both private agent actions and government policy actions. In this paper, I explore the implications of expanding our notion of mobility by first defining it and then addressing its place in optimal taxation. Keywords: optimal taxation, mobility JEL Code: H21

I. INTRODUCTION II. BACKGROUND: SWITZERLAND, UBS, AND A LOOK TO THE FUTURE A. Switzerland and Its Role in Offshore Tax Evasion B. Recent Controversies Surrounding Union Bank of Switzerland C. [...]

Educational endowments, private employer-sponsored pension plans, and other tax-exempt organizations (collectively, "tax-exempt entities") invest a substantial amount of capital in various sectors of the economy, and tax consequences can determine [...]

I. INTRODUCTION 600 A. The World's Current View on Taxation of MNEs 601 B. Definitions: Transfer Pricing and Transfer Pricing 602 Abuses C. Magnitude of the Transfer Pricing Problem in [...]

I. INTRODUCTION Through the abuse of offshore tax havens, the United States loses roughly $100 billion in tax revenue annually. (1) Frustrated with this revenue loss, the Internal Revenue Service [...]

I. INTRODUCTION The recent Liechtenstein and UBS tax affairs have put the topic of harmful tax practices under the spotlight. In the first case, the German secret service secretly bought [...], The recent uncovered cases of tax evasion in the European Union and the United States have revived the fight against harmful tax practices and spurred impressive progress in the adoption of international standards on information exchange. This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on harmful tax practices and information exchange on the size and consequences of the existence of tax havens and harmful tax regimes. The paper also describes the multilateral approaches developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union and examines recent developments in fighting harmful tax practices.

Taxation of foreign-direct investment in non-haven African countries has been geographically and industrially concentrated. An analysis of whether this taxation scheme is the most efficient way of raising revenue for African countries, as well as the increasing tax haven problem that the state is facing, is discussed.

INTRODUCTION One of the main current policy issues in corporate taxation is the proliferation of preferential tax regimes in national tax codes. These discriminatory tax measures come in one of [...], Current policy initiatives taken by the EU and the OECD aim at abolishing preferential corporate tax regimes. This note extends Keen's (2001) analysis of symmetric capital tax competition under preferential (or discriminatory) and non-discriminatory tax regimes to allow for countries of different size. Even though size asymmetries imply a redistribution of tax revenue from the larger to the smaller country, a non-discrimination policy is found to have similar effects as in the symmetric model: it lowers the average rate of capital taxation and thus makes tax competition more aggressive in both the large and the small country.