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What are the critical characteristics that we can use to assess Indigenous digital projects? We have examined the literature, developed an assessment framework, and used the framework to analyze twenty-one online platforms in order to answer this question. Our framework identifies five characteristics of Indigenous digital projects with accompanying evaluative questions: (1) traditional knowledge protection, (2) design and interaction, (3) description and classification, (4) community relationships, and (5) sustainability. Our analysis shows the range of work being done in this complex area of digital practice. Our goal is to offer a set of questions that encourage critical reflection, not a one-size-fitsall requirement checklist for those working on digital projects in cultural heritage institutions. KEYWORDS: Indigenous digital projects, Indigenous collections, evaluation, DIGITAL PROJECTS THAT AIM TO SERVE AND ENGAGE Indigenous communities have grown in the past twenty years. Through digitization, scholars, librarians, archivists, museum professionals, and Indigenous communities have facilitated greater [...]

CONTENTS I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM II. HOW THE COPYRIGHT WORK EVOLVED III. WHAT IS THE COPYRIGHT WORK? IV. WHAT CONSTRAINS THE INFRINGEMENT FUNCTION THAT DEFINES THE COPYRIGHT WORK? V. GENERATIVE [...], The "work of authorship" lies at the heart of the Copyright Act of 1976. It is what copyright protects. Central though the concept is, the Act never defines what a work of authorship might be. According to the Act, it can be perceived in tangible ^fixations, but is distinct^ from the fixations. The Act also provides examples: writings, drawings, computer programs, but never describes how these might be distinguished from their fixations. Unlike the Patent Act, where "metes and bounds" of a patentable invention are defined by a patent's claims, the Copyright Act provides no guidance as to what the "metes and bounds" of a copyright work of authorship might be. Most copyright practitioners and commentators are so inured to the concept that they never pause to consider what the "work of authorship" is, and what it means to say that it exists independently of its fixations. This paper addresses these questions. It will consider when and how the copyright concept of an incorporeal "work of authorship" (which for brevity I will call the copyright Work) arose in federal US law. The paper will compare the concept to Platonic forms, outline the forces that supported its creation, and conclude that the concept is a manifestation of cultural and technological developments in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries that required the range of copyright infringement to expand. The paper will then address the question of how the copyright Work might be defined, concluding that it is not distinct from its fixations, but is instead a set of fixations, defined by the rules of copyright infringement. Building on this definition, the paper then considers whether cultural and technological developments in the current Century, including social media, streaming, open-source licensing, and, most recently, generative artificial intelligence, will shrink the range of copyright infringement, and as a result, diminish the size of the set comprising the copyright Work. Finally, the paper will extrapolate from these copyright developments to suggest some more general conclusions about the nature of law as something that cannot be separated from a particular culture, technology, and time.

This supplementary essay aims to respond to and clarify the misunderstandings concerning the concept of cosmotechnics, the ambiguities of the term cosmos arisen in the article 'For a Cosmotechnical Event,' as well as the reason for the neologism of cosmotechnics., Author(s): Yuk Hui [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.35030.35, 0000 0004 1792 6846, School of Creative Media, City University of Hong Kong, , Hong Kong, China During a recent dinner with [...]

In this commentary, I scrutinize Coeckelbergh's criticism of postphenomenology, and question whether postphenomenology indeed tends to neglect the social dimension of technology use (ontic), and must necessarily be conceived as being in opposition to transcendental philosophy (ontological). Second, I suggest that the Wittgensteinian concepts that Coeckelbergh introduces are interesting additions to the concepts used in postphenomenology, but that his use of the term 'transcendental' seems up to now primarily to be a rhetorical means enabling him to distance himself from postphenomenology., Author(s): Bas de Boer [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.6214.1, 0000 0004 0399 8953, University of Twente, , Enschede, The Netherlands Introduction In this review commentary, I focus on what I [...]

On the one hand, AI is a functional tool for emancipating people from routine work tasks, thus expanding the possibilities of their self-realization and the utilization of individual interests and aspirations through more meaningful spending of time. On the other hand, there are undisputable risks associated with excessive machine autonomy and limited human control, based on the insufficient ability to monitor the performance of these systems and to prevent errors or damage (Floridi et al. Minds & Machines 28, 689-707, 2018 (See CR8)). In connection with the use of ethical principles in the research and development of artificial intelligence, the question of the social control of science and technology opens out into an analysis of the opportunities and risks that technological progress can mean for security, democracy, environmental sustainability, social ties and community life, value systems, etc. For this reason, it is necessary to identify and analyse the aspects of artificial intelligence that could have the most significant impact on society. The present text is focused on the application of artificial intelligence in the context of the market and service sector, and the related process of exclusion of people from the development, production and distribution of goods and services. Should the application of artificial intelligence be subject to value frameworks, or can the application of AI be sufficiently regulated by the market on its own?, Author(s): Roman Rakowski [sup.1] , Petr Polak [sup.2] , Petra Kowalikova [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.440850.d, 0000 0000 9643 2828, VSB - Technical University of Ostrava, , Ostrava, Czech Republic [...]

In the digital era, we witness the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) to solve problems, while improving productivity and efficiency. Yet, inevitably costs are involved with delegating power to algorithmically based systems, some of whose workings are opaque and unobservable and thus termed the 'black box'. Central to understanding the 'black box' is to acknowledge that the algorithm is not mendaciously undertaking this action; it is simply using the recombination afforded to scaled computable machine learning algorithms. But an algorithm with arbitrary precision can easily reconstruct those characteristics and make life-changing decisions, particularly in financial services (credit scoring, risk assessment, etc.), and it could be difficult to reconstruct, if this was done in a fair manner reflecting the values of society. If we permit AI to make life-changing decisions, what are the opportunity costs, data trade-offs, and implications for social, economic, technical, legal, and environmental systems? We find that over 160 ethical AI principles exist, advocating organisations to act responsibly to avoid causing digital societal harms. This maelstrom of guidance, none of which is compulsory, serves to confuse, as opposed to guide. We need to think carefully about how we implement these algorithms, the delegation of decisions and data usage, in the absence of human oversight and AI governance. The paper seeks to harmonise and align approaches, illustrating the opportunities and threats of AI, while raising awareness of Corporate Digital Responsibility (CDR) as a potential collaborative mechanism to demystify governance complexity and to establish an equitable digital society., Author(s): Karen Elliott [sup.1] , Rob Price [sup.2] , Patricia Shaw [sup.3] , Tasos Spiliotopoulos [sup.1] , Magdalene Ng [sup.1] , Kovila Coopamootoo [sup.1] , Aad van Moorsel [sup.1] Author [...]

Financial Technology (FinTech) has become a disruptive innovation. Being one form of FinTech financing, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending has been widely developed and has grown rapidly for the last few years. The main challenge for P2P lending is on managing risks. FinTech with artificial intelligence (AI) can be used as a strategic tool in mitigating risks for FinTech companies in assessing creditworthiness of a potential customer. However, AI-enabled assessment has created several ethical issues and dilemmas for the stakeholders in the industry. This paper aims to examine the ethical issues and dilemmas by deploying theories of consequentialism and deontology in assisting an ethical decision-making process. An AI-enabled risk assessment will automate processes in understanding potential applicants for P2P lending. The automation process can potentially mitigate any ethical shortcomings as well as the negative impacts in mining the potential customer's data., Author(s): Muhammad Anshari [sup.1] [sup.2] , Mohammad Nabil Almunawar [sup.1] , Masairol Masri [sup.1] , Milan Hrdy [sup.3] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.440600.6, 0000 0001 2170 1621, School of Business and [...]

This essay argues for a reboot of Afrofuturism: a thoughtful engagement with the Black everyday, enacted through technoculture, to ground continued speculation on possible Afro Futures. This approach has the benefit of eschewing the White-normative deficit perspective of the digital divide, while interrogating Black internet and social media use from a libidinal, rather than solely political, economic perspective. In doing so, Black technoculture acknowledges the libidinal and sensual tensions powering Black digital practice, tensions which inform speculative fictions such as Black Panther (2018) as well as online political movements such as Black Lives Matter and #metoo. Drawing upon the experience of Black folk in the United States, I argue that digital enactments of everyday blackness, representing discursive enactments of everyday Black life, exemplify Black technoculture, which should be understood as a conceptual and pragmatic augmentation to Afrofuturism., The individual is not swept up in the overarching movement of history toward the inevitable future, nor is he trapped by the eternal recurrence of history; he resides in a [...]

We conducted a section-by-section and line-by-line comparison of the ethical codes published by the American Psychological Association (APA) and the American Counseling Association (ACA). Overall, 144 differences exist between the two codes and, here we focus on two constructs where 36 significant differences exist: technology and culture. Of this number, three differences were direct conflicts between the APA and ACA ethical codes' expectations for technology and cultural behavior. The other 33 differences were omissions in the APA code, meaning that specific elements in the ACA code were explicitly absent from the APA code altogether. Of the 36 total differences pertaining to technology and culture in the two codes, 27 differences relate to technology and APA does not address 25 of these 27 technology differences. Of the 36 total differences pertaining to technology and culture, nine differences relate to culture and APA does not address eight of these issues., Author(s): Michael W. Firmin [sup.1], Kristin DeWitt [sup.1], Aubrey L. Shell [sup.2], Lauren A. Smith [sup.3], Taylor E. Zurlinden [sup.4] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.411974.e, 0000 0004 0386 6432, Cedarville University, [...]

THE OPENING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY has witnessed what film scholars have described as a 'zombie renaissance' (Bishop, 'Dead Man' 16-25; Bishop, American Zombie 16; Dendle, Encyclopedia 172; Hubner, Leaning, [...]

This paper explores the imbrications between vital processes and technical processes in Oceania, from the angle of technical activities. Grounded in the ethnography of yam cultivation among the Abules-Speakers ('Abelam') of Papua New Guinea, it builds on previous critiques of the modernist bias sustaining concepts of 'technology' and 'production' to revaluate the analytical potential of the study of material activities and their ontogenetic properties as suggested by Gilbert Simondon. By paying attention to the temporality and the scale of practices, it suggests that the ethnography of techniques allows the unveiling of both emic dimensions of practices (or indigenous underlying theories of actions), and emic properties of entities in the world, be they living beings or artefacts. These dimensions and properties, to be tapped into and controlled, are thus made visible or elicited both within and through technical practices, via the work of imagination. Thus, processes, vital, and/or technical, made visible through their performance or through their results, can take the shape of images, be they living beings or artefacts, presenting to society the possibility of reproduction and stability, without excluding their ontogenetic capacities. Keywords: technology, techniques, ontogenesis, action, magic, images, Abelam., Consider the following encounter in Nyamikum, an Abules-speaking (Abelam) village in the East Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea, between Ganbakiya, a renowned yam grower in his 40s, and me. [...]

Persuasion, propaganda-(political), advertising (commercial), and news, in the context of a technical society, present us with different images of a 'reality' that is both imaginary and fictitious. And yet for [...]

Author(s): Tsjalling Swierstra [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) Maastricht, Netherlands Michel Puech's plea for an old art of living in a new technological world is original and thought provoking. Not only [...]

This paper provides a phenomenological analysis of postphenomenological philosophy of technology. While acknowledging that the results of its analyses are to be recognized as original, insightful, and valuable, we will argue that in its execution of the empirical turn, postphenomenology forfeits a phenomenological dimension of questioning. By contrasting the postphenomenological method with Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology as developed in his early Freiburg lectures and in Being and Time, we will show how the postphenomenological method must be understood as mediation theory, which adheres to what Heidegger calls the theoretical attitude. This leaves undiscussed how mediation theory about ontic beings (i.e.,technologies) involves a specific ontological mode of relating to beings, whereas consideration of this mode is precisely the concern of phenomenology. This ontological dimension is important to consider, since we will argue that postphenomenology is unwittingly technically mediated in an ontological way. The upshot of this is that in its dismissal of Heidegger's questioning of technology as belonging to 'classical philosophy of technology,' postphenomenology implicitly adheres to what Heidegger calls technology as Enframing. We argue that postphenomenology overlooks its own adherence to the theoretical attitude and ultimately to Enframing, and we will conclude with calling for a phenomenological questioning of the dimension that postphenomenology presently leaves unthought, meaning that we will develop a plea for a rehabilitation of the ontological dimension in the philosophy of technology., Author(s): Jochem Zwier[sup.1] , Vincent Blok[sup.2] , Pieter Lemmens[sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) Faculty of Science, Institute for Science, Innovation, and Society, Dept. of Philosophy and Science Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, [...]

Cultural evolutionists typically emphasize the informational aspect of social transmission, that of the learning, stabilizing, and transformation of mental representations along cultural lineages. Social transmission also depends on the production of public displays such as utterances, behaviors, and artifacts, as these displays are what social learners learn from. However, the generative processes involved in the production of public displays are usually abstracted away in both theoretical assessments and formal models. The aim of this paper is to complement the informational view with a generative dimension, emphasizing how the production of public displays both enable and constrain the production of modular cultural recipes through the process of innovation by recombination. In order to avoid a circular understanding of cultural recombination and cultural modularity, we need to take seriously the nature and structure of the generative processes involved in the maintenance of cultural traditions. A preliminary analysis of what recombination and modularity consist of is offered. It is shown how the study of recombination and modularity depends on a finer understanding of the generative processes involved in the production phase of social transmission. Finally, it is argued that the recombination process depends on the inventive production of an interface between modules and the complex recipes in which they figure, and that such interfaces are the direct result of the generative processes involved in the production of these recipes. The analysis is supported by the case study of the transition from the Oldowan to the Early Acheulean flake detachment techniques., Author(s): Mathieu Charbonneau[sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) Science Studies Program, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Oktober 6 street 7, First floor, Room 133, 1051, BudapestHungary Introduction A central mechanism [...]