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Chemistry possesses a distinctive theoretical lens--a distinctive set of theoretical concerns regarding the dynamics and transformations of a perplexing variety of organic and nonorganic substances--to which it must be faithful. Even if it is true that chemical facts bear a special (reductive) relationship to physical facts, nonetheless it will always still be true that the theoretical lenses of the two disciplines are distinct. This has consequences for how chemists pursue their research, as well as how chemistry should be taught.

This essay identifies foundational questions, all metaphysical in character, which must be answered before the enterprise of epistemology proper can begin to prosper, and in the process draws attention to fundamental conflicts between the demands of epistemology and the demands of prudence. It concludes that knowledge is not, as such, a directive of prudence, and thus that the enterprise of knowledge does not fall under the category of what is practically required.

Feminists should accept the traditional view of epistemological foundations, which holds that logical questions of belief justification are independent of generation issues concerning how beliefs are affected by social systems. Consistency in evaluating inference patterns can only be attained by separating logic from factors related to the evaluation of subjects. As long as feminists have a need for ranking certain inference patterns as better than others, they also need to base their arguments on traditional epistemological foundations. Alternative epistemologies provide no basis for choosing between conflicting viewpoints.