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David Lewis argues at length against haecceitism and goes as far as claiming that, on a certain counterpart-theoretic construal, the doctrine is unintelligible or inconsistent. I argue, contra Lewis, that both qualitative and non-qualitative counterpart theory are in fact committed to haecceitism, but that this commitment is harmless since what is really at stake for a counterpart theorist such as Lewis are more general supervenience claims that are independent of haecceitism. I further argue that Lewis's formulation of the doctrine suffers from two important defects that, once remedied, free counterpart theory of its haecceitistic commitments. Along the way I discuss an objection to the effect that the cheap substitute is inconsistent in the presence of an 'actually' operator. This paper therefore brings together important critical discussion on haecceitism and counterpart theory.

Counterfactuals abound in science, especially when reasoning about and with models. This often requires entertaining counterfactual conditionals with nomologically or metaphysically impossible antecedents, namely, counternomics or counterpossibles. In this paper I defend the make-believe view of scientific counterfactuals, a naturalised fiction-based account of counterfactuals in science which provides a means to evaluate their meanings independently of the possibility of the states of affairs their antecedents describe, and under which they have non-trivial truth-values. Fiction is here understood as imagination (in contrast with its most typical association with falsity), characterised as a propositional attitude of pretense or ‘make-believe’ (Walton 1990). The application of this theory to scientific counterfactuals makes their evaluation a game of make-believe: a counterfactual is (fictionally) true iff its antecedent and the rules of the game prescribe the imagining of its consequent (Kimpton-Nye 2020). The result is a practice-based account of counterfactuals and counterfactual reasoning in science which incorporates insights from theoretical and experimental analytic philosophy as well as cognitive science. This way, the make-believe view of scientific counterfactuals shows that the evaluation of scientific counterfactuals is none other than a question of scientific representation in disguise.

Panpsychism claims that the vast majority of conscious subjects in our world are inanimate and physical. Ensemble explanations account for striking phenomena by placing them within an ensemble of outcomes, most of which are not striking. This paper develops an explanatory problem for panpsychism: panpsychism renders two appealing ensemble explanations unsatisfactory. Specifically, we argue that panpsychism renders unsatisfactory the multiverse explanation of why a universe supports life and the many-planets explanation of why a planet supports life.

Anscombe’s 1971 inaugural lecture at Cambridge, entitled ‘Causality and Determination’, has had a lasting influence on a remarkably broad range of philosophers and philosophical debates, touching on fundamental topics in philosophy of science, action theory, the free will debate, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. Especially where anti-reductionist or pluralist strands of philosophical thought are being seriously considered, one should not be surprised to find references to Anscombe’s lecture. Moreover, there appears to be a growing interest in Anscombe’s comprehensive philosophical outlook, as attested by the recent publication of a weighty collection of essays spanning that outlook in its full breadth in the prestigious Routledge Philosophical Minds series. Against this background it is apt that now, 50 years after the original lecture, a Topical Collection sees the light, circling around the most central themes from Anscombe’s lecture, with a particular emphasis on the question how these hang together, how they form part of the larger philosophical project that Anscombe obviously intended the lecture to highlight. This Introduction motivates the Topical Collection, and introduces the various contributions against that background.

We prove how to validly quantify into hyperpropositional contexts de dicto in Transparent Intensional Logic. Hyperpropositions are sentential meanings and attitude complements individuated more finely than up to logical equivalence. A hyperpropositional context de dicto is a context in which only co-hyperintensional propositions can be validly substituted. A de dicto attitude ascription is one that preserves the attributee’s perspective when one complement is substituted for another. Being an extensional logic of hyperintensions, Transparent Intensional Logic validates all the rules of extensional logic, including existential quantification. Yet the rules become more exacting when applied to hyperintensional contexts. The rules apply to only some types of entities, because the existence of only some types of entities is entailed by a hyperpropositional attitude de dicto. The insight that the paper offers is how a particular logic of hyperintensions is capable of validating quantifying-in in a principled and rigorous manner. This result advances the community-wide understanding of how to logically manipulate hyperintensions.

In her seminal essay ‘Causality and Determination’, Elizabeth Anscombe very decidedly announced that “physical indeterminism” is “indispensable if we are to make anything of the claim to freedom”. But it is clear from that same essay that she extends the scope of that claim beyond freedom–she suggests that indeterminism is required already for animal self-movement (a position recently called ‘agency incompatibilism’ by Helen Steward). Building on Anscombe’s conception of causality and (in)determinism, I will suggest that it extends even further: life as such already requires physical indeterminism. Furthermore, I show that we can, on this basis, arrive at the idea of varieties of (in)determinism, along with a corresponding variety of incompatibilist theses. From this Anscombean vantage point, the free will discussion takes on a quite different outlook. The question whether free agency can coexist with determinism on the level of blind physical forces, which preoccupies the philosopher of free will, turns out to conflate a whole series of compatibility questions: not just whether life is compatible with physical determinism, but also whether animal self-movement is compatible with ‘biological determinism’, and whether free agency is compatible with ‘animal determinism’.

Background Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, physical distancing and hand washing have been used as effective means to reduce virus transmission in the Netherlands. However, these measures pose a societal challenge as they require people to change their customary behaviours in various contexts. The science of habit formation is potentially useful for informing policy-making in public health, but the current literature largely overlooked the role of habit in predicting and explaining these preventive behaviours. Our research aimed to describe habit formation processes of physical distancing and hand washing and to estimate the influences of habit strength and intention on behavioural adherence. Methods A longitudinal survey was conducted between July and November 2020 on a representative Dutch sample (n = 800). Respondents reported their intentions, habit strengths, and adherence regarding six context-specific preventive behaviours on a weekly basis. Temporal developments of the measured variables were visualized, quantified, and mapped onto five distinct phases of the pandemic. Regression models were used to test the effects of intention, habit strength, and their interaction on behavioural adherence. Results Dutch respondents generally had strong intentions to adhere to all preventive measures and their adherence rates were between 70% and 90%. They also self-reported to experience their behaviours as more automatic over time, and this increasing trend in habit strength was more evident for physical-distancing than for hand washing behaviours. For all six behaviours, both intention and habit strength predicted subsequent adherence (all ps < 2e-16). In addition, the predictive power of intention decreased over time and was weaker for respondents with strong habits for physical distancing when visiting supermarkets (B = -0.63, p B = -0.54, p Conclusions People’s adaptations to physical-distancing and hand washing measures involve both intentional and habitual processes. For public health management, our findings highlight the importance of using contextual cues to promote habit formation, especially for maintaining physical-distancing practices. For habit theories, our study provides a unique dataset that covers multiple health behaviours in a critical real-world setting.

In recent decades, deliberation about public issues has become a central theme in citizenship education. In line with an increasing philosophical and political appreciation of the importance of deliberation within democracy, schools, as training grounds for democratic citizenship, should foster high-level deliberative skills. However, when this insight is translated into practical formats, these formats suffer from a number of shortcomings. Specifically, they can be criticised on philosophical grounds for advantaging select societal groups, and on empirical grounds for facilitating groupthink mechanisms. This paper aims to address these shortcomings by suggesting a role for debating techniques within deliberative education. Because debating stimulates the contestation of diverse opinions, it may counteract the silencing of minority viewpoints and the proliferation of groupthink. At the same time, debating-based formats must be closely regulated in order to not imperil compromise formation. A concrete format is presented that balances these considerations and may therefore contribute to more effective deliberation in the classroom.

In recent years, the philosophy and psychology of reasoning have made a ‘social turn’: in both disciplines it is now common to reject the traditional picture of reasoning as a solitary intellectual exercise in favour of the idea that reasoning is a social activity driven by social aims. According to the most prominent social account, Mercier and Sperber’s interactionist theory, this implies that reasoning is not a normative activity. As they argue, in producing reasons we are not trying to ‘get things right’; instead our aims are to justify ourselves and persuade others to accept our views. I will argue that even if interactionism has played a crucial role in bringing about the ‘social turn’ in our thinking about reasoning, it does not convince in its claim that reasoning is not a normative activity. Moreover, I argue that it is in fact perfectly possible to understand reasoning as a social tool that is also aimed at getting things right. I will propose that Gilbert Ryle’s conceptualization of reasoning as ‘didactic discourse’ offers one possible way to understand reasoning as both social and normative activity, and that as such his ideas could be of great value for the social turn in our thinking about reasoning.

In interdisciplinary education, students find out that even basic concepts such as time, freedom or control mean different things for different disciplines and individuals. Through such encounters, students develop an ever-richer conceptual toolbox for making sense of the world. But, how do concepts travel (Bal, 2002) in an interdisciplinary classroom? I address this question from the perspective of behavior settings theory, which shows how the concrete spatiotemporal characteristics of an environment structure and guide the behavior of its participants. By means of a case study, I analyze the interdisciplinary classroom as a behavior setting and argue that concepts can travel when the setting stimulates students and teachers to spend time and interact with each other in specific ways.

We develop an account of how mutually inconsistent models of the same target system can provide coherent information about the system. Our account makes use of ideas from the debate surrounding robustness analysis and draws on the idea of a shared structure among models. To illustrate, we consider a case study from international trade-theory.

Connectives such as Tonk have posed a significant challenge to the inferentialist. It has been recently argued (Button 2016; Button and Walsh 2018) that the classical semanticist faces an analogous problem due to the definability of “nasty connectives” under non-standard interpretations of the classical propositional vocabulary. In this paper, we defend the classical semanticist from this alleged problem.

What attitude does someone manifesting implicit bias really have? According to the default representationalist picture, implicit bias involves having conflicting attitudes (explicit versus implicit) with respect to the topic at hand. In opposition to this orthodoxy, dispositionalists argue that attitudes should be understood as higher-level dispositional features of the person as a whole. Following this metaphysical view, the discordance characteristic of implicit bias shows that someone’s attitude regarding the topic at hand is not-fully-manifested or ‘in-between’. However, so far few representationalists have been convinced by dispositionalist arguments, largely because dispositionalism cannot provide explanations in terms of underlying processes. We argue that if dispositionalism wants to be a genuine contender, it should make clear what it has to offer in terms of understanding of implicit bias. As a concrete proposal, we combine dispositionalist metaphysics with the idea that our normative practices of attitude ascription partly determine what it means to have an attitude. We show that such regulative dispositionalism can account for two prominent normative features of implicit bias. We conclude by suggesting that in order to engage in a meaningful debate with representationalism, dispositionalists might have to put the question ‘what counts as a good explanation?’ back on the table.

The thesis investigates classical and intuitionistic modal logics via proof-theoretic methods for two important and widely applied topics in logic: uniform interpolation and admissible rules. Both topics are treated in separate parts of the thesis. Part I studies uniform interpolation which is a stronger property than the well-known Craig interpolation property in which the interpolant only depends on the antecedent or the succedent of the implication. Our investigation is inspired by Iemhoff (2019a,b) who characterizes sufficient conditions for sequent calculi for proving uniform interpolation. We provide (terminating) sequent calculi for two intuitionistic modal logics, iGL and iSL (both have connections to provability). We give syntactic cutelimination proofs based on a non-trivial cut-elimination strategy for classical GL (Valentini, 1983). We establish the Craig interpolation property for both logics and we use the termination to develop a countermodel construction for iSL. In addition, we show that intuitionistic modal logics iK4 and iS4 do not have the uniform interpolation property. In light of the negative results from Iemhoff (2019a,b), we obtain that these logics cannot be described by certain terminating sequent calculi. In addition, we study uniform interpolation for classical modal logics via nested sequents and hypersequents. We develop a method to reprove uniform interpolation for logics K, T, D, and S5. We construct uniform interpolants via terminating nested sequent calculi and hypersequent calculi. To the best of our knowledge, this provides a first constructive definition of uniform interpolants for S5. Although the interpolants are defined constructively, our proof incorporates semantic reasoning based on so-called bisimulation quantifiers. Part II provides an investigation of admissible rules. The admissible rules of a logic are those rules that can be added to the logic without changing its valid formulas. This thesis provides a first study of admissible rules for intuitionistic modal logics. We are able to provide full characterizations in terms of bases for the admissible rules in six intuitionistic modal logics with the coreflection principle: iCK4, iCS4 ≡ IPC, iSL, KM, mHC, and PLL. In addition, we show decidability of admissibility for these logics. Our technique relies on a proof theory for admissibility based on (Iemhoff and Metcalfe, 2009b). This proof theory is special because it does not reason on the level of formulas, but it contains rules that reason about rules. The proof also relies on a semantic approach developed by Ghilardi (1999, 2000) about the interaction between so-called projective formulas and the extension property. We analyse their importance in the field of admissible rules.

In the present paper, we explore an idea of Harvey Friedman to obtain a coordinate-free presentation of consistency. For some range of theories, Friedman's idea delivers actual consistency statements (modulo provable equivalence). For a wider range, it delivers consistency-like statements. We say that a sentence C is an interpreter of a finitely axiomatised A over U iff it is the weakest statement C over U, with respect to U-provability, such that U+C interprets A. A theory U is Friedman-reflexive iff every finitely axiomatised A has an interpreter over U. Friedman shows that Peano Arithmetic, PA, is Friedman-reflexive. We study the question which theories are Friedman-reflexive. We show that a very weak theory, Peano Corto, is Friedman-reflexive. We do not get the usual consistency statements here, but bounded, cut-free, or Herbrand consistency statements. We illustrate that Peano Corto as a base theory has additional desirable properties. We prove a characterisation theorem for the Friedman-reflexivity of sequential theories. We provide an example of a Friedman-reflexive sequential theory that substantially differs from the paradigm cases of Peano Arithmetic and Peano Corto. Interpreters over a Friedman-reflexive U can be used to define a provability-like notion for any finitely axiomatised A that interprets U. We explore what modal logics this idea gives rise to. We call such logics interpreter logics. We show that, generally, these logics satisfy the Löb Conditions, aka K4. We provide conditions for when interpreter logics extend S4, K45, and Löb's Logic. We show that, if either U or A is sequential, then the condition for extending Löb's Logic is fulfilled. Moreover, if our base theory U is sequential and if, in addition, its interpreters can be effectively found, we prove Solovay's Theorem. This holds even if the provability-like operator is not necessarily representable by a predicate of Gödel numbers. At the end of the paper, we briefly discuss how successful the coordinate-free approach is.

In the 1980s, Pollock’s work on default reasons started the quest in the AI community for a formal system of defeasible argumentation. The main goal of this paper is to provide a logic of structured defeasible arguments using the language of justification logic. In this logic, we introduce defeasible justification assertions of the type t : F that read as “t is a defeasible reason that justifies F”. Such formulas are then interpreted as arguments and their acceptance semantics is given in analogy to Dung’s abstract argumentation framework semantics. We show that a large subclass of Dung’s frameworks that we call “warranted” frameworks is a special case of our logic in the sense that (1) Dung’s frameworks can be obtained from justification logic-based theories by focusing on a single aspect of attacks among justification logic arguments and (2) Dung’s warranted frameworks always have multiple justification logic instantiations called “realizations”. We first define a new justification logic that relies on operational semantics for default logic. One of the key features that is absent in standard justification logics is the possibility to weigh different epistemic reasons or pieces of evidence that might conflict with one another. To amend this, we develop a semantics for “defeaters”: conflicting reasons forming a basis to doubt the original conclusion or to believe an opposite statement. This enables us to formalize non-monotonic justifications that prompt extension revision already for normal default theories. Then we present our logic as a system for abstract argumentation with structured arguments. The format of conflicting reasons overlaps with the idea of attacks between arguments to the extent that it is possible to define all the standard notions of argumentation framework extensions. Using the definitions of extensions, we establish formal correspondence between Dung’s original argumentation semantics and our operational semantics for default theories. One of the results shows that the notorious attack cycles from abstract argumentation cannot always be realized as justification logic default theories.

We motivate five constraints on theorizing about sensory experience. We then propose a novel form of naturalistic intentionalism that succeeds where other theories fail by satisfying all of these constraints. On the proposed theory, which we call structure matching tracking intentionalism, brains states track determinables. Internal structural features of those states select determinates of those determinables for presentation in experience. We argue that this theory is distinctively well-positioned to both explain internal-phenomenal structural correlations and accord external features a role in fixing phenomenology. In addition, we use the theory to shed light on how one comes to experience “missing shades”.

MSO and MHE are grateful to Annemarie Kalis, Josephine Pascoe, Eline de Groot, Rebecca Zeilstra, and two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and suggestions. MSO's research for this article was supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery Project "Mind in Skilled Performance" (DP170102987) and the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek VIDI Research Project "Shaping our action space: A situated perspective on self-control" (VI.VIDI.195.116). MHE has written this paper thanks to a 2018 Leonardo Grant for Researchers and Cultural Creators, BBVA Foundation (The Foundation accepts no responsibility for the opinions, statements and contents included in the project and/or the results thereof, which are entirely the responsibility of the authors), and the research projects FFI2016-80088-P and PID2019-109764RB-I00 funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, and the FiloLab Group of Excellence, University of Granada (Spain)., A widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representational) account of skilled action that combines ecological psychology and the Deweyan theory of habits. According to our proposal, skilful performance can be understood as composed of sequences of mutually coherent, task-specific perceptual-motor habits. Such habits play a crucial role in simplifying both our exploration of the perceptual environment and our decision- making. However, we argue that what keeps habits situated, precluding them from becoming rote and automatic, are not mental representations but the agent’s conscious attention to the affordances of the environment. It is because the agent is not acting on autopilot but constantly searching for new information for affordances that she can control her behavior, adapting previously learned habits to the current circumstances. We defend that our account provides the resources needed to understand how skilled action can be intelligent (flexible, adaptive, context-sensitive) without having any representational cognitive processes built into them., Australian Research Council DP170102987, Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek VIDI Research Project "Shaping our action space: A situated perspective on self-control" VI.VIDI.195.116, Spanish Government FFI2016-80088-P PID2019-109764RB-I00, FiloLab Group of Excellence, University of Granada (Spain) FFI2016-80088-P PID2019-109764RB-I00

According to Jago (2014a), logical omniscience is really part of a deeper paradox. He develops an epistemic logic with principles of indeterminate closure to solve this paradox, but his official semantics is difficult to navigate, it is motivated in part by substantive metaphysics, and the logic is not axiomatized. In this paper, I simplify this epistemic logic by adapting the hyperintensional semantic framework of Sedlár (2021). My first goal is metaphysical neutrality. The solution to the epistemic paradox should not require appeal to a metaphysics of truth-makers, situations, or impossible worlds, by contrast with Jago’s official semantics. My second goal is to elaborate on the proof theory. I show how to axiomatize a family of logics with principles of indeterminate epistemic closure.

Belnap-Dunn logic (BD), sometimes also known as First Degree Entailment, is a four-valued propositional logic that complements the classical truth values of True and False with two non-classical truth values Neither and Both. The latter two are to account for the possibility of the available information being incomplete or providing contradictory evidence. In this paper, we present a probabilistic extension of BD that permits agents to have probabilistic beliefs about the truth and falsity of a proposition. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for the framework defined and also identify policies for conditionalization and aggregation. Concretely, we introduce four-valued equivalents of Bayes’ and Jeffrey updating and also suggest mechanisms for aggregating information from different sources.

Theories of structured meanings are designed to generate fine-grained meanings, but they are also liable toovergeneratestructures, thus drawing structural distinctions without a semantic difference. I recommend the proliferation of very fine-grained structures, so that we are able to draw any semantic distinctions we think we might need. But, in order to contain overgeneration, I argue we should insert some degree of individuation between logical equivalence and structural identity based onstructural isomorphism. The idea amounts to forming an equivalence class of different structures according to one or more formal criteria and designating a privileged element as a representative of all the elements, i.e., afirst among equals. The proposed method helps us to a cluster of notions ofco-hyperintensionality. As a test case, I consider a recent objection levelled against the act theory of structured propositions. I also respond to an objection against my methodology.

We observe that Jc Beall's shrieking and shrugging strategy gives us an opportunity to reflect on the Australian plan for negation in FDE, a basic subclassical logic that is used in Beall's argument for subclassical logics. An implication of our observation is applied to a recent defense of the Australian plan for negation by Francesco Berto and Greg Restall.

Experiences tend to be followed by states for which they provide normative reasons. Such harmonious correlations cry out for explanation. Theories that answer or diminish these cries thereby achieve an advantage over theories that do neither. I argue that the main lines of response to these cries that are available to biological theorists—theorists who hold (roughly) that conscious subjects are generally biological entities—are problematic. And I argue that panpsychism—which holds (roughly) that conscious subjects are ubiquitous in nature—provides an attractive response to these explanatory cries. Taken together, these considerations underwrite a kind of ‘psychophysical fine-tuning’ argument in support of panpsychism, one that is reminiscent of cosmological fine-tuning arguments in favor of multiverse hypotheses.

This paper explores the analysis of ability, where ability is to be understood in the epistemic sense—in contrast to what might be called a causal sense. There are plenty of cases where an agent is able to perform an action that guarantees a given result even though she does not know which of her actions guarantees that result. Such an agent possesses the causal ability but lacks the epistemic ability. The standard analysis of such epistemic abilities relies on the notion of action types—as opposed to action tokens—and then posits that an agent has the epistemic ability to do something if and only if there is an action type available to her that she knows guarantees it. We show that these action types are not needed: we present a formalism without action types that can simulate analyzes of epistemic ability that rely on action types. Our formalism is a standard epistemic extension of the theory of “seeing to it that”, which arose from a modal tradition in the logic of action.