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In this article, we study the M/M/1 queueing systems with negative customers and unreliable repairers. The arrival of a negative customer causes the failure of the server, and the server is repaired immediately. The repairers may successfully repair the server with probability p, and the server continues to serve customers in the system. Otherwise, once the repair fails, the system will be cleared and all customers are forced to leave the system. By analyzing the quasi-birth-and-death process and using the probability generating function method, we obtain the steady-state probability and some performance measures of the system. Then, based on the reward-cost structure, we discuss the strategic behavior of customers and consider the equilibrium strategy. Finally, the effects of system parameters on the performance measures, individual benefit, and social benefit are analyzed by numerical examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies an M/M/1 retrial queue with negative customers, passive breakdown, and delayed repairs. Assume that the breakdown behavior of the server during idle periods is different from that during busy periods. Passive breakdowns may occur when the server is idle, due to the lack of monitoring of the server during idle periods. When the passive breakdown occurs, the server does not get repaired immediately and enters a delayed repair phase. Negative customers arrive during the busy period, which will cause the server to break down and remove the serving customers. Under steady-state conditions, we obtain explicit expressions of the probability generating functions for the steady-state distribution, together with some important performance measures for the system. In addition, we present some numerical examples to illustrate the effects of some system parameters on important performance measures and the cost function. Finally, based on the reward-cost structure, we discuss Nash equilibrium and socially optimal strategy and numerically analyze the influence of system parameters on optimal strategies and optimal social benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies an unreliable M/G/1 retrial queue with Bernoulli preventive maintenance, in which the server may break down while providing service to customers. Before the start of each service, the server is subjected to preventive maintenance with a certain probability, which extends the lifetime of the server. If arriving customers find the server unavailable, they decide to balk or enter the orbit based on the linear reward-cost structure. First, the stationary distribution of system states and some important performance measures are derived. Then, we investigate the equilibrium joining strategies of customers in both cooperative and non-cooperative cases, respectively. Next, the optimal pricing strategy is considered from the perspective of the social planner. Finally, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the influence of system parameters on customer equilibrium joining probabilities and the optimal pricing strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the customers' equilibrium and socially optimal joining–balking behavior in a single-server Markovian queue with a single working vacation and Bernoulli interruptions. The model is motivated by practical service systems where the service rate can be adjusted according to whether or not the system is empty. Specifically, we focus on a single-server queue in which the server's service rate is reduced from a regular to a lower one when the system becomes empty. This lower rate period is called a working vacation for the server which may represent that part of the service facility is under a maintenance process or works on other non-queueing job, or simply for saving the energy (for a machine server case). In this paper, we assume that the working vacation period is terminated after a random period or with probability p after serving a customer in a non-empty system. Such a system is called a queue with single working vacation and Bernoulli interruptions. Customers are strategic and can make choice of joining or balking based on different levels of system information. We consider four scenarios: fully observable, almost observable, almost unobservable, and fully unobservable queue cases. Under a reward-cost structure, we analyze the customer's equilibrium and social-optimal strategies. In addition, the effects of system parameters on optimal strategies are illustrated by numerical examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the customers' equilibrium and socially optimal joining-balking behavior in single-server Markovian queues with a single working vacation and multiple vacations. Arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk based on the system states and a linear reward-cost structure, which incorporates the desire of customers for service and their dislike to wait. We consider that the system states are almost unobservable and fully unobservable, respectively. For these two cases, we first analyze the stationary behavior of the system, and get the equilibrium strategies of the customers and compare them to socially optimal balking strategies using numerical examples. We also study the pricing problem that maximizes the server's profit and derive the optimal pricing strategy. Finally, the social benefits of the almost and fully unobservable queues are compared by numerical examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]