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Abstract Transition of highly pathogenic clade 2.3.4.4b H5 avian influenza virus (HPAIV) from epizootic to enzootic status in Northern European countries was associated with severe losses and even mass mortalities among various wild bird species. Both avian and mammalian raptors hunting infected debilitated birds or scavenging on virus-contaminated avian carcasses contracted HPAIV infection. This precarious pathogen-prey-predator relation further worsened when in 2021 and 2022 outbreaks in Germany overlapped with the hatching season of avian raptor species. Retro- and prospective surveillance revealed avian raptors as important indicators of HPAIV and its genetic diversity on the one hand. On the other hand, their role as victims of HPAIV is stipulated. The first case of an HPAIV H5N1-related death of a white-tailed sea eagle (Haliaeetus albicilla; WTSE) hatch in Germany, 2021, followed by several such cases in 2022, and a low overall seropositivity rate of 5.0–7.9% among WTSE nestlings, raised fears of a serious negative impact on reproduction rates of WTSEs and other birds of prey when HPAIV becomes enzootic in an ecosystem. However, comparably stable breeding success of WTSE in the study area in 2022 and a potentially evolving natural immunity raises hope for a less severe long-term impact.

Abstract Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) of H5 clade 2.3.4.4b pose an ongoing threat worldwide. It remains unclear whether this panzootic situation would favor low virulent phenotypes expected by the ‘avirulence hypothesis’ of viral evolution. Assessing virulence in Pekin ducklings in an intramuscular infection model revealed that the two genotypes that dominated the epidemiological situation in Germany during the period 2021 and 2022 (EU-RL:CH and EU-RL:AB) were of high virulence. In contrast, rare genotypes were of intermediate virulence. The genetic constellation of these reassortants pointed to an important role of the viral polymerase complex (RdRP), particularly the PB1 genome segment, in shaping virulence in ducklings. Occulo-nasal infection of ducklings confirmed the phenotypes for two representative viruses and indicated a more efficient replication for the high virulence strain. These observations would be in line with the ‘virulence-transmission trade-off’ model for describing HPAIV epidemiology in wild birds in Germany.

Abstract Background Within the last decades industrial swine herds in Europe grown significantly, creating an optimized reservoir for swine influenza A viruses (swIAV) to become enzootic, particularly in piglet producing herds among newborn, partly immunologically naïve piglets. To date, the only specific control measure to protect piglets from swIAV is the vaccination of sows, which provides passive immunity through maternally derived antibodies in colostrum of vaccinated sows. Interruption of infection chains through management practices have had limited success. This study focused on weaned piglets in five enzootically swIAV infected swine herds in North-West and North-East Germany and aimed to better understand swIAV infection patterns to improve piglet protection and reduce zoonotic risks. Participating farms fulfilled the following inclusion criteria: sow herd with ≥ 400 sows (actual size 600–1850 sows), piglets not vaccinated against influenza A virus and a history of recurrent respiratory problems associated with continuing influenza A virus infection. Influenza vaccination was performed in all sow herds, except for one, which discontinued vaccination during the study. Results First swIAV detections in weaned piglets occurred at 4 weeks of age in the nursery and continued to be detected in piglets up to 10 weeks of age showing enzootic swIAV infections in all herds over the entire nursery period. This included simultaneous circulation of two subtypes in a herd and co-infection with two subtypes in individual animals. Evidence for prolonged (at least 13 days) shedding was obtained in one piglet based on two consecutive swIAV positive samplings. Possible re-infection was suspected in twelve piglets based on three samplings, the second of which was swIAV negative in contrast to the first and third sampling which were swIAV positive. However, swIAV was not detected in nasal swabs from either suckling piglets or sows in the first week after farrowing. Conclusions Predominantly, weaned piglets were infected. There was no evidence of transmission from sow to piglet based on swIAV negative nasal swabs from sows and suckling piglets. Prolonged virus shedding by individual piglets as well as the co-circulation of different swIAV subtypes in a group or even individuals emphasize the potential of swIAV to increase genetic (and potentially phenotypic) variation and the need to continue close monitoring. Understanding the dynamics of swIAV infections in enzootically infected herds has the overall goal of improving protection to reduce economic losses due to swIAV-related disease and consequently to advance animal health and well-being.

Abstract Swine influenza A viruses (swIAV) cause an economically important respiratory disease in modern pig production. Continuous virus transmission and antigenic drift are difficult to control in enzootically infected pig herds. Here, antibody-positive piglets from a herd enzootically infected with swIAV H1N2 (clade 1 A.3.3.2) were immunized using a homologous prime-boost vaccination strategy with novel live attenuated influenza virus (LAIV) based on a reassortment-incompetent bat influenza-swIAV chimera or a vesicular stomatitis virus-based replicon vaccine. Challenge infection of vaccinated piglets by exposure to H1N2 swIAV-infected unvaccinated seeder pigs showed that both LAIV and replicon vaccine markedly reduced virus replication in the upper and lower respiratory tract, respectively, compared to piglets immunized with commercial heterologous or autologous adjuvanted whole-inactivated virus vaccines. Our novel vaccines may aid in interrupting continuous IAV transmission chains in large enzootically infected pig herds, improve the health status of the animals, and reduce the risk of zoonotic swIAV transmission.

Several subtypes and many different genotypes of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of subtype H5 clade 2.3.4.4b have repeatedly caused outbreaks in Germany. Four new highly pathogenic avian influenza genotypes emerged in November 2023 after reassortment with low pathogenicity precursors, replacing genotype BB, which had dominated in Europe since 2022.

Abstract Background Monitoring of infectious diseases on swine farms requires a high diagnostic sensitivity and specificity of the test system. Moreover, particularly in cases of swine influenza A virus (swIAV) it is desirable to include characterization of the virus as precisely as possible. This is indispensable for strategies concerning prophylaxis of swIAV and furthermore, to meet the requirements of a purposeful monitoring of newly emerging swIAV strains in terms of vaccine design and public health. Within the present cross-sectional study, we compared the diagnostic value of group samples (wipes of surfaces with direct contact to mouth/nose, dust wipes, udder skin wipes, oral fluids) to individual samples (nasal swabs, tracheobronchial swabs) for both swIAV identification and characterization. Sampling included different stages of pig production on 25 sow farms with attached nursery considered as enzootically infected with swIAV. Firstly, samples were analyzed for IAV genome and subsequently samples with Ct-values

Abstract Selecting appropriate diagnostic methods that take account of the type of vaccine used is important when implementing a vaccination programme against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). If vaccination is effective, a decreased viral load is expected in the samples used for diagnosis, making molecular methods with high sensitivity the best choice. Although serological methods can be reasonably sensitive, they may produce results that are difficult to interpret. In addition to routine molecular monitoring, it is recommended to conduct viral isolation, genetic sequencing and phenotypic characterisation of any HPAI virus detected in vaccinated flocks to detect escape mutants early. Following emergency vaccination, various surveillance options based on virological testing of dead birds (‘bucket sampling’) at defined intervals were assessed to be effective for early detection of HPAIV and prove disease freedom in vaccinated populations. For ducks, virological or serological testing of live birds was assessed as an effective strategy. This surveillance could be also applied in the peri‐vaccination zone on vaccinated establishments, while maintaining passive surveillance in unvaccinated chicken layers and turkeys, and weekly bucket sampling in unvaccinated ducks. To demonstrate disease freedom with > 99% confidence and to detect HPAI virus sufficiently early following preventive vaccination, monthly virological testing of all dead birds up to 15 per flock, coupled with passive surveillance in both vaccinated and unvaccinated flocks, is recommended. Reducing the sampling intervals increases the sensitivity of early detection up to 100%. To enable the safe movement of vaccinated poultry during emergency vaccination, laboratory examinations in the 72 h prior to the movement can be considered as a risk mitigation measure, in addition to clinical inspection; sampling results from existing surveillance activities carried out in these 72 h could be used. In this Opinion, several schemes are recommended to enable the safe movement of vaccinated poultry following preventive vaccination.

In a 1-year survey of wild terrestrial predators in northern Germany, we found that 5 of 110 foxes were infected with contemporary avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses, forming a temporal cluster during January‒March 2023. Encephalitis and strong cerebral virus replication but only sporadic mammalian-adaptive viral polymerase basic 2 protein E627K mutations were seen.

We found that nasal and alimentary experimental exposure of pigs to highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b was associated with marginal viral replication, without inducing any clinical manifestation or pathological changes. Only 1 of 8 pigs seroconverted, pointing to high resistance of pigs to clade 2.3.4.4b infection.

Recent reports documenting sporadic infections in carnivorous mammals worldwide with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b have raised concerns about the potential risk of adaptation to sustained transmission in mammals, including humans. We report H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b infection of two grey seals (Halichoerus grypus) from coastal waters of The Netherlands and Germany in December 2022 and February 2023, respectively. Histological and immunohistochemical investigations showed in both animals a non-suppurative and necrotising encephalitis with viral antigen restricted to the neuroparenchyma. Whole genome sequencing showed the presence of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b strains in brain tissue, which were closely related to sympatric avian influenza viruses. Viral RNA was also detected in the lung of the seal from Germany by real-time quantitative PCR. No other organs tested positive. The mammalian adaptation PB2-E627K mutation was identified in approximately 40% of the virus population present in the brain tissue of the German seal. Retrospective screening for nucleoprotein-specific antibodies, of sera collected from 251 seals sampled in this region from 2020 to 2023, did not show evidence of influenza A virus-specific antibodies. Similarly, screening by reverse transcription PCR of tissues of 101 seals that had died along the Dutch coast in the period 2020–2021, did not show evidence of influenza virus infection. Collectively, these results indicate that individual seals are sporadically infected with HPAIV-H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, resulting in an encephalitis in the absence of a systemic infection, and with no evidence thus far of onward spread between seals.

Respiratory disease is a significant economic issue in pig farming, with a complex aetiology that includes swine influenza A viruses (swIAV), which are common in European domestic pig populations. The most recent human influenza pandemic in 2009 showed swIAV’s zoonotic potential. Monitoring pathogens and disease control are critical from a preventive standpoint, and are based on quick, sensitive, and specific diagnostic assays capable of detecting and distinguishing currently circulating swIAV in clinical samples. For passive surveillance, a set of multiplex quantitative reverse transcription real-time PCRs (mRT-qPCR) and MinION-directed sequencing was updated and deployed. Several lineages and genotypes of swIAV were shown to be dynamically developing, including novel reassortants between human pandemic H1N1 and the avian-derived H1 lineage of swIAV. Despite this, nearly 70% (842/1216) of individual samples from pigs with respiratory symptoms were swIAV-negative, hinting to different aetiologies. The complex and synergistic interactions of swIAV infections with other viral and bacterial infectious agents contribute to the aggravation of pig respiratory diseases. Using a newly developed mRT-qPCR for the combined detection of swIAV and the recently described porcine respirovirus 1 (PRV1) and swine orthopneumovirus (SOV) widespread co-circulation of PRV1 (19.6%, 238/1216 samples) and SOV (14.2%, 173/1216 samples) was evident. Because of the high incidence of PRV1 and SOV infections in pigs with respiratory disease, these viruses may emerge as new allies in the porcine respiratory disease syndrome.

Three avian viral pathogens circulate in Germany with particular importance for animal disease surveillance due to their zoonotic potential, their impact on wild bird populations and/or poultry farms: Highly pathogenic (HP) avian influenza virus (AIV) of subtype H5 (HPAIV H5), Usutu virus (USUV), and West Nile virus (WNV). Whereas HPAIV H5 has been mainly related to epizootic outbreaks in winter, the arthropod-borne viruses USUV and WNV have been detected more frequently during summer months corresponding to peak mosquito activity. Since 2021, tendencies of a potentially year-round, i.e. enzootic, status of HPAIV in Germany have raised concerns that Orthomyxoviruses (AIV) and Flaviviruses (USUV, WNV) may not only circulate in the same region, but also at the same time and in the same avian host range. In search of a host species group suitable for a combined surveillance approach for all mentioned pathogens, we retrospectively screened and summarized case reports, mainly provided by the respective German National Reference Laboratories (NRLs) from 2006 to 2021. Our dataset revealed an overlap of reported infections among nine avian genera. We identified raptors as a particularly affected host group, as the genera Accipiter, Bubo, Buteo, Falco, and Strix represented five of the nine genera, and highlighted their role in passive surveillance. This study may provide a basis for broader, pan-European studies that could deepen our understanding of reservoir and vector species, as HPAIV, USUV, and WNV are expected to further become established and/or spread in Europe in the future and thus improved surveillance measures are of high importance.

Avian influenza viruses (AIV) have been classified on the basis of 16 subtypes of hemagglutinin (HA) and 9 subtypes of neuraminidase. Here we describe genomic evidence for a new candidate HA subtype, nominally H19, with a large genetic distance to all previously described AIV subtypes, derived from a cloacal swab sample of a Common Pochard (Aythya ferina) in Kazakhstan, in 2008. Avian influenza monitoring in wild birds especially in migratory hotspots such as central Asia is an important approach to gain information about the circulation of known and novel influenza viruses. Genetically, the novel HA coding sequence exhibits only 68.2% nucleotide and 68.5% amino acid identity with its nearest relation in the H9 (N2) subtype. The new HA sequence should be considered in current genomic diagnostic AI assays to facilitate its detection and eventual isolation enabling further study and antigenic classification.

ABSTRACTInfluenza A viruses (IAV) cause annual epidemics and occasional pandemics in humans. The most recent pandemic outbreak occurred in 2009 with H1N1pdm09. This virus, which most likely reassorted in swine before its transmission to humans, was reintroduced into the swine population and continues circulating ever since. In order to assess its potential to cause reassortants on a cellular level, human origin H1N1pdm09 and a recent Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine IAV were (co-)passaged in the newly generated swine lung cell line C22. Co-infection with both viruses gave rise to numerous reassortants that additionally carry different mutations which can partially be found in nature as well. Reassortment most frequently affected the PB1, PA and NA segments with the swine IAV as recipient. These reassortants reached higher titers in swine lung cells and were able to replicate in genuine human lung tissue explants ex vivo, suggesting a possible zoonotic potential. Interestingly, reassortment and mutations in the viral ribonucleoprotein complex influence the viral polymerase activity in a cell type and species-specific manner. In summary, we demonstrate reassortment promiscuity of these viruses in a novel swine lung cell model and indicate a possible zoonotic potential of the reassortants.

Abstract Several vaccines have been developed against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), mostly inactivated whole‐virus vaccines for chickens. In the EU, one vaccine is authorised in chickens but is not fully efficacious to stop transmission, highlighting the need for vaccines tailored to diverse poultry species and production types. Off‐label use of vaccines is possible, but effectiveness varies. Vaccines are usually injectable, a time‐consuming process. Mass‐application vaccines outside hatcheries remain rare. First vaccination varies from in‐ovo to 6 weeks of age. Data about immunity onset and duration in the target species are often unavailable, despite being key for effective planning. Minimising antigenic distance between vaccines and field strains is essential, requiring rapid updates of vaccines to match circulating strains. Generating harmonised vaccine efficacy data showing vaccine ability to reduce transmission is crucial and this ability should be also assessed in field trials. Planning vaccination requires selecting the most adequate vaccine type and vaccination scheme. Emergency protective vaccination is limited to vaccines that are not restricted by species, age or pre‐existing vector‐immunity, while preventive vaccination should prioritise achieving the highest protection, especially for the most susceptible species in high‐risk transmission areas. Model simulations in France, Italy and The Netherlands revealed that (i) duck and turkey farms are more infectious than chickens, (ii) depopulating infected farms only showed limitations in controlling disease spread, while 1‐km ring‐culling performed better than or similar to emergency preventive ring‐vaccination scenarios, although with the highest number of depopulated farms, (iii) preventive vaccination of the most susceptible species in high‐risk transmission areas was the best option to minimise the outbreaks' number and duration, (iv) during outbreaks in such areas, emergency protective vaccination in a 3‐km radius was more effective than 1‐ and 10‐km radius. Vaccine efficacy should be monitored and complement other surveillance and preventive efforts.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of hemagglutinin type H5 and clade 2.3.4.4b have widely spread within the northern hemisphere since 2020 and threaten wild bird populations, as well as poultry production. We present phylogeographic evidence that Iceland has been used as a stepping stone for HPAIV translocation from northern Europe to North America by infected but mobile wild birds. At least 2 independent incursions of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b assigned to 2 hemagglutinin clusters, B1 and B2, are documented for summer‒autumn 2021 and spring 2022. Spread of HPAIV H5N1 to and among colony-breeding pelagic avian species in Iceland is ongoing. Potentially devastating effects (i.e., local losses >25%) on these species caused by extended HPAIV circulation in space and time are being observed at several affected breeding sites throughout the North Atlantic.

Abstract Background Swine influenza caused by influenza A viruses (IAV) directly affects respiratory health and indirectly impairs reproduction rates in pigs causing production losses. In Europe, and elsewhere, production systems have intensified featuring fewer holdings but, in turn, increased breeding herd and litter sizes. This seems to foster swine IAV (swIAV) infections with respect to the entrenchment within and spread between holdings. Disease management of swine influenza is difficult and relies on biosecurity and vaccination measures. Recently discovered and widely proliferating forms of self-sustaining modes of swIAV infections in large swine holdings challenge these preventive concepts by generating vaccine-escape mutants in rolling circles of infection. Main body The most recent human IAV pandemic of 2009 rooted at least partly in IAV of porcine origin highlighting the zoonotic potential of swIAV. Pigs constitute a mixing vessel of IAV from different species including avian and human hosts. However, other host species such as turkey and quail but also humans themselves may also act in this way; thus, pigs are not essentially required for the generation of IAV reassortants with a multispecies origin. Since 1918, all human pandemic influenza viruses except the H2N2 virus of 1958 have been transmitted in a reverse zoonotic mode from human into swine populations. Swine populations act as long-term reservoirs of these viruses. Human-derived IAV constitute a major driver of swIAV epidemiology in pigs. Swine-to-human IAV transmissions occurred rarely and mainly sporadically as compared to avian-to-human spill-over events of avian IAV. Yet, new swIAV variants that harbor zoonotic components continue to be detected. This increases the risk that such components might eventually reassort into viruses with pandemic potential. Conclusions Domestic pig populations should not be globally stigmatized as the only or most important reservoir of potentially zoonotic IAV. The likely emergence from swine of the most recent human IAV pandemic in 2009, however, emphasized the principal risks of swine populations in which IAV circulate unimpededly. Implementation of regular and close-meshed IAV surveillance of domestic swine populations to follow the dynamics of swIAV evolution is clearly demanded. Improved algorithms for directly inferring zoonotic potential from whole IAV genome sequences as well as improved vaccines are still being sought.

In brain tissue of three harbor seals of the German North Sea Coast, high virus loads of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N8 were detected. Identification of different virus variants indicates high exposure to HPAIV circulating in wild birds, but there is no evidence for H5 specific antibodies in healthy seals. Replication of avian viruses in seals may allow HPAIV to acquire mutations needed to adapt to mammalian hosts as shown by PB2 627 K variants detected in these cases.

ABSTRACT Phylogenetic evidence from the recent resurgence of high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) virus subtype H5N1, clade 2.3.4.4b, observed in European wild birds and poultry since October 2021, suggests at least two different and distinct reservoirs. We propose contrasting hypotheses for this emergence: (i) resident viruses have been maintained, presumably in wild birds, in northern Europe throughout the summer of 2021 to cause some of the outbreaks that are part of the most recent autumn/winter 2021 epizootic, or (ii) further virus variants were reintroduced by migratory birds, and these two sources of reintroduction have driven the HPAI resurgence. Viruses from these two principal sources can be distinguished by their hemagglutinin genes, which segregate into two distinct sublineages (termed B1 and B2) within clade 2.3.4.4b, as well as their different internal gene compositions. The evidence of enzootic HPAI virus circulation during the summer of 2021 indicates a possible paradigm shift in the epidemiology of HPAI in Europe.

Abstract Surveillance of swine influenza A viruses (swIAV) allows timely detection and identification of new variants with potential zoonotic risks. In this study, we aimed to identify swIAV subtypes that circulated in pigs in Belgium and the Netherlands between 2014 and 2019, and characterize their genetic and antigenic evolution. We subtyped all isolates and analyzed hemagglutinin sequences and hemagglutination inhibition assay data for H1 swIAV, which were the dominant HA subtype. We also analyzed whole genome sequences (WGS) of selected isolates. Out of 200 samples, 89 tested positive for swIAV. swIAV of H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 subtypes were detected. Analysis of WGS of 18 H1 swIAV isolates revealed three newly emerged genotypes. The European avian-like H1 swIAV (lineage 1C) were predominant and accounted for 47.2% of the total isolates. They were shown to evolve faster than the European human-like H1 (1B lineage) swIAV, which represented 27% of the isolates. The 2009 pandemic H1 swIAV (lineage 1A) accounted for only 5.6% of the isolates and showed divergence from their precursor virus. These results point to the increasing divergence of swIAV and stress the need for continuous surveillance of swIAV.

Abstract Background Newcastle disease is a devastating disease in poultry caused by virulent Newcastle disease virus (NDV), a paramyxovirus endemic in many regions of the world despite intensive vaccination. Phylogenetic analyses reveal ongoing evolution of the predominant circulating genotype 2.VII, and the relevance of potential antigenic drift is under discussion. To investigate variation within neutralization-sensitive epitopes within the protein responsible for receptor binding, i.e. the Hemagglutinin-Neuraminidase (HN) spike protein, we were interested in establishing genotype-specific monoclonal antibodies (MAbs). Methods An HN-enriched fraction of a gradient-purified NDV genotype 2.VII was prepared and successfully employed to induce antibodies in BalbC mice that recognize conformationally intact sites reactive by haemagglutination inhibition (HI). For subsequent screening of mouse hybridoma cultures, an NDV-ELISA was established that utilizes Concanavalin A (ConA-ELISA) coupled glycoproteins proven to present conformation-dependent epitopes. Results Six out of nine selected MAbs were able to block receptor binding as demonstrated by HI activity. One MAb recognized an epitope only present in the homologue virus, while four other MAbs showed weak reactivity to selected other genotypes. On the other hand, one broadly cross-reacting MAb reacted with all genotypes tested and resembled the reactivity profile of genotype-specific polyclonal antibody preparations that point to minor antigenic differences between tested NDV genotpyes. Conclusions These results point to the concurrent presence of variable and conserved epitopes within the HN molecule of NDV. The described protocol should help to generate MAbs against a variety of NDV strains and to enable in depth analysis of the antigenic profiles of different genotypes.

We report a zoonotic infection of a pig farmer in the Netherlands with a Eurasian avian-like swine influenza A(H1N1) virus that was also detected in the farmed pigs. Both viruses were antigenically and genetically characterized. Continued surveillance of swine influenza A viruses is needed for risk assessment in humans and swine.

Analyses of HPAI H5 viruses from poultry outbreaks across a wide Eurasian region since July 2020 including the Russian Federation, Republics of Iraq and Kazakhstan, and recent detections in migratory waterfowl in the Netherlands, revealed undetected maintenance of H5N8, likely in galliform poultry since 2017/18 and both H5N5 and H5N1. All viruses belong to A/H5 clade 2.3.4.4b with closely related HA genes. Heterogeneity in Eurasian H5Nx HPAI emerging variants threatens poultry production, food security and veterinary public health.

Abstract Background Due to the frequent reassortment and zoonotic potential of influenza A viruses, rapid gain of sequence information is crucial. Alongside established next-generation sequencing protocols, the MinION sequencing device (Oxford Nanopore Technologies) has become a serious competitor for routine whole-genome sequencing. Here, we established a novel, rapid and high-throughput MinION multiplexing workflow based on a universal RT-PCR. Methods Twelve representative influenza A virus samples of multiple subtypes were universally amplified in a one-step RT-PCR and subsequently sequenced on the MinION instrument in conjunction with a barcoding library preparation kit from the rapid family and the MinIT performing live base-calling. The identical PCR products were sequenced on an IonTorrent platform and, after final consensus assembly, all data was compared for validation. To prove the practicability of the MinION-MinIT method in human and veterinary diagnostics, we sequenced recent and historical influenza strains for further benchmarking. Results The MinION-MinIT combination generated over two million reads for twelve samples in a six-hour sequencing run, from which a total of 72% classified as quality screened, trimmed and mapped influenza reads to produce full genome sequences. Identities between the datasets of > 99.9% were achieved, with 100% coverage of all segments alongside a sufficient confidence and 4492fold mean depth. From RNA extraction to finished sequences, only 14 h were required. Conclusions Overall, we developed and validated a novel and rapid multiplex workflow for influenza A virus sequencing. This protocol suits both clinical and academic settings, aiding in real time diagnostics and passive surveillance.

Abstract An intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) of > 1.2 in chickens or, in case of subtypes H5 and H7, expression of a polybasic hemagglutinin cleavage site (HACS), signals high pathogenicity (HP). Viruses of the H9N2-G1 lineage, which spread across Asia and Africa, are classified to be of low pathogenicity although, in the field, they became associated with severe clinical signs and epizootics in chickens. Here we report on a pre-eminent trait of recent H9N2-G1 isolates from Bangladesh and India, which express a tribasic HACS (motif PAKSKR-GLF; reminiscent of an HPAIV-like polybasic HACS) and compare their features to H9Nx viruses with di- and monobasic HACS from other phylogenetic and geographic origins. In an in vitro assay, the tribasic HACS of H9N2 was processed by furin-like proteases similar to bona fide H5 HPAIV while some dibasic sites showed increased cleavability but monobasic HACS none. Yet, all viruses remained trypsin-dependent in cell culture. In ovo, only tribasic H9N2 viruses were found to replicate in a grossly extended spectrum of embryonic organs. In contrast to all subtype H5/H7 HPAI viruses, tribasic H9N2 viruses did not replicate in endothelial cells either in the chorio-allantoic membrane or in other embryonic tissues. By IVPI, all H9Nx isolates proved to be of low pathogenicity. Pathogenicity assessment of tribasic H9N2-G1 viruses remains problematic. It cannot be excluded that the formation of a third basic amino acid in the HACS forms an intermediate step towards a gain in pathogenicity. Continued observation of the evolution of these viruses in the field is recommended.

We detected a novel reassortant highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N2) virus in 3 poultry farms in Egypt. The virus carried genome segments of a pigeon H9N2 influenza virus detected in 2014, a nucleoprotein segment of contemporary chicken H9N2 viruses from Egypt, and hemagglutinin derived from the 2.3.4.4b H5N8 virus clade.

We genetically characterized highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A(H5N6) clade 2.3.4.4b isolates found in Germany in 2017–2018 and assessed pathogenicity of representative H5N5 and H5N6 viruses in ferrets. These viruses had low pathogenicity; however, continued characterization of related isolates is warranted because of their high potential for reassortment.

During autumn/winter in 2016–2017 and 2020–2021, highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) caused severe outbreaks in Germany and Europe. Multiple clade 2.3.4.4b H5 HPAI subtypes were responsible for increased mortality in wild birds and high mortality and massive losses in the poultry sector. To clarify putative entry sources and delineate interconnections between outbreaks in poultry holdings and wild birds, we applied whole-genome sequencing and phylodynamic analyses combined with the results of epidemiological outbreak investigations. Varying outbreak dynamics of the distinct reassortants allowed for the identification of individual, putatively wild bird-mediated entries into backyard holdings, several clusters comprising poultry holdings, local virus circulation for several weeks, direct farm-to-farm transmission and potential reassortment within a turkey holding with subsequent spill-over of the novel reassorted virus into the wild bird population. Whole-genome sequencing allowed for a unique high-resolution molecular epidemiology analysis of HPAIV H5Nx outbreaks and is recommended to be used as a standard tool. The presented detailed account of the genetic, temporal, and geographical characteristics of the recent German HPAI H5Nx situation emphasizes the role of poultry holdings as an important source of novel genetic variants and reassortants.

Repeated outbreaks due to H3N1 low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (LPAIV) in Belgium were associated with unusually high mortality in chicken in 2019. Those events caused considerable economic losses and prompted restriction measures normally implemented for eradicating high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIV). Initial pathology investigations and infection studies suggested this virus to be able to replicate systemically, being very atypical for H3 LPAIV. Here, we investigate the pathogenesis of this H3N1 virus and propose a mechanism explaining its unusual systemic replication capability. By intravenous and intracerebral inoculation in chicken, we demonstrate systemic spread of this virus, extending to the central nervous system. Endoproteolytic viral hemagglutinin (HA) protein activation by either tissue-restricted serine peptidases or ubiquitous subtilisin-like proteases is the functional hallmark distinguishing (H5 or H7) LPAIV from HPAIV. However, luciferase reporter assays show that HA cleavage in case of the H3N1 strain in contrast to the HPAIV is not processed by intracellular proteases. Yet the H3N1 virus replicates efficiently in cell culture without trypsin, unlike LPAIVs. Moreover, this trypsin-independent virus replication is inhibited by 6-aminohexanoic acid, a plasmin inhibitor. Correspondingly, in silico analysis indicates that plasminogen is recruitable by the viral neuraminidase for proteolytic activation due to the loss of a strongly conserved N-glycosylation site at position 130. This mutation was shown responsible for plasminogen recruitment and neurovirulence of the mouse brain-passaged laboratory strain A/WSN/33 (H1N1). In conclusion, our findings provide good evidence in natural chicken strains for N1 neuraminidase-operated recruitment of plasminogen, enabling systemic replication leading to an unusual high pathogenicity phenotype. Such a gain of function in naturally occurring AIVs representing an established human influenza HA-subtype raises concerns over potential zoonotic threats.

Wild aquatic birds are the main natural host reservoir of avian influenza viruses (AIV). Migratory aquatic birds can translocate AI viruses over wide geographic distances. AIV may be transmitted reciprocally at the wild bird–poultry interface, increasing viral variability and potentially driving the zoonotic potential of these viruses. A cross-sectional study on AIV and several further avian viral pathogens conducted in 396 trapped migratory aquatic birds traded at live bird markets (LBM) in northern Iran identified 11 AIV-positive cases. The 10 identified H9N2 viral sequences fell into wild bird H9 lineage Y439; in addition, an H10N3 virus of Eurasian lineage was detected. Ten samples contained low viral loads of avian coronavirus but could not be further characterized. Although traditional trading of live-trapped wild birds provides income for hunters, particularly during fall migration periods, it increases the risk of introducing new AIV strains from the natural reservoir to poultry kept at LBMs and, potentially, to traders and customers. Banning these birds from poultry trading lines would lower such risks considerably.

Summary: Background: In December, 2019, a novel zoonotic severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus emerged in China. The novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) became pandemic within weeks and the number of human infections and severe cases is increasing. We aimed to investigate the susceptibilty of potential animal hosts and the risk of anthropozoonotic spill-over infections. Methods: We intranasally inoculated nine fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus), ferrets (Mustela putorius), pigs (Sus scrofa domesticus), and 17 chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus) with 105 TCID50 of a SARS-CoV-2 isolate per animal. Direct contact animals (n=3) were included 24 h after inoculation to test viral transmission. Animals were monitored for clinical signs and for virus shedding by nucleic acid extraction from nasal washes and rectal swabs (ferrets), oral swabs and pooled faeces samples (fruit bats), nasal and rectal swabs (pigs), or oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs (chickens) on days 2, 4, 8, 12, 16, and 21 after infection by quantitative RT-PCR (RT-qPCR). On days 4, 8, and 12, two inoculated animals (or three in the case of chickens) of each species were euthanised, and all remaining animals, including the contacts, were euthanised at day 21. All animals were subjected to autopsy and various tissues were collected for virus detection by RT-qPCR, histopathology immunohistochemistry, and in situ hybridisation. Presence of SARS-CoV-2 reactive antibodies was tested by indirect immunofluorescence assay and virus neutralisation test in samples collected before inoculation and at autopsy. Findings: Pigs and chickens were not susceptible to SARS-CoV-2. All swabs, organ samples, and contact animals were negative for viral RNA, and none of the pigs or chickens seroconverted. Seven (78%) of nine fruit bats had a transient infection, with virus detectable by RT-qPCR, immunohistochemistry, and in situ hybridisation in the nasal cavity, associated with rhinitis. Viral RNA was also identified in the trachea, lung, and lung-associated lymphatic tissue in two animals euthanised at day 4. One of three contact bats became infected. More efficient virus replication but no clinical signs were observed in ferrets, with transmission to all three direct contact animals. Mild rhinitis was associated with viral antigen detection in the respiratory and olfactory epithelium. Prominent viral RNA loads of 0–104 viral genome copies per mL were detected in the upper respiratory tract of fruit bats and ferrets, and both species developed SARS-CoV-2-reactive antibodies reaching neutralising titres of up to 1/1024 after 21 days. Interpretation: Pigs and chickens could not be infected intranasally by SARS-CoV-2, whereas fruit bats showed characteristics of a reservoir host. Virus replication in ferrets resembled a subclinical human infection with efficient spread. Ferrets might serve as a useful model for further studies—eg, testing vaccines or antivirals. Funding: German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

Avian influenza virus (AIV) variants emerge frequently, which challenges rapid diagnosis. Appropriate diagnosis reaching the sub- and pathotype level is the basis of combatting notifiable AIV infections. Real-time RT-PCR (RT-qPCR) has become a standard diagnostic tool. Here, a total of 24 arrayed RT-qPCRs is introduced for full subtyping of 16 hemagglutinin and nine neuraminidase subtypes of AIV. This array, designated Riems Influenza A Typing Array version 2 (RITA-2), represents an updated and economized version of the RITA-1 array previously published by Hoffmann et al. RITA-2 provides improved integration of assays (24 instead of 32 parallel reactions) and reduced assay volume (12.5 µL). The technique also adds RT-qPCRs to detect Newcastle Disease (NDV) and Infectious Bronchitis viruses (IBV). In addition, it maximizes inclusivity (all sequences within one subtype) and exclusivity (no intersubtypic cross-reactions) as shown in validation runs using a panel of 428 AIV reference isolates, 15 reference samples each of NDV and IBV, and 122 clinical samples. The open format of RITA-2 is particularly tailored to subtyping influenza A virus of avian hosts and Eurasian geographic origin. Decoupling and re-arranging selected RT-qPCRs to detect specific AIV variants causing epizootic outbreaks with a temporal and/or geographic restriction is possible.

Abstract Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) infection in poultry caused devastating mortality and economic losses. HPAIV of subtypes H5 and H7 emerge from precursor viruses of low pathogenicity (LP) by spontaneous mutation associated with a shift in the susceptibility of the endoproteolytic cleavage site of the viral hemagglutinin protein from trypsin- to furin-like proteases. A recently described natural pair of LP/HP H7N7 viruses derived from two spatio-temporally linked outbreaks in layer chickens was used to study how a minority of mutated HP virions after de novo generation in a single host might gain primacy. Co-infection experiments in embryonated eggs and in chickens were conducted to investigate amplification, spread and transmissionof HPAIV within a poultry population that experiences concurrent infection by an antigenically identical LP precursor virus. Simultaneous LPAIV co-infection (inoculum dose of 106 egg-infectious dose 50% endpoint (EID50)/0.5 mL) withincreasing titers of HPAIV from 101 to 105.7 EID50/0.5 mL) had a significant impeding impact on HP H7 replication, viral excretion kinetics, clinical signs and histopathological lesions (in vivo) and on embryo mortality (in ovo). LP/HP co-infected chickens required a hundredfold higher virus dose (HPAIV inoculum of 105 EID50) compared to HPAIV mono-infection (HPAIV inoculum of 103 EID50) to develop overt clinical signs, mortality and virus spread to uninfected sentinels. Escape and spread of HP phenotypes after de novo generation in an index host may therefore be highly precarious due to significant competition with co-circulating LP precursor virus.

Abstract Low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIV) of the subtypes H5 and H7 are known to give rise to highly pathogenic (HP) phenotypes by spontaneous insertional mutations which convert a monobasic trypsin-sensitive endoproteolytical cleavage site (CS) within the hemagglutinin (HA) protein into a polybasic subtilisin-sensitive one. Sporadic outbreaks of notifiable LPAIV H7 infections are continuously recorded in Europe and in Asia, and some lineages showed zoonotic transmission. De novo generation of HPAIV H7 from LPAIV precursors has been reported several times over the past decade. Rapid differentiation between LP and HP H7 virus strains is required as a prerequisite to emplace appropriate control measures. Here, reverse transcription real-time PCR assays (RT-qPCR) were developed and evaluated that allow LP and HP pathotype identification and distinction by probe-assisted detection of the HACS. These new RT-qPCRs allow a sensitive and highly specific pathotype identification of Eurasian subtype H7 AIV in allantoic fluids as well as in diagnostic field samples. RT-qPCR assisted pathotyping presents a rapid and sensitive alternative to pathotyping by animal inoculation or nucleotide sequencing.

In November 2016, an influenza A(H5N8) outbreak caused deaths of wild birds and domestic poultry in Germany. Clade 2.3.4.4 virus was closely related to viruses detected at the Russia–Mongolia border in 2016 but had new polymerase acidic and nucleoprotein segments. These new strains may be more efficiently transmitted to and shed by birds.

The main findings of the post-mortem examination of poultry infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) include necrotizing inflammation and viral antigen in multiple organs. The lesion profile displays marked variability, depending on viral subtype, strain, and host species. Therefore, in this study, a semiquantitative scoring system was developed to compare histopathological findings across a wide range of study conditions. Briefly, the severity of necrotizing lesions in brain, heart, lung, liver, kidney, pancreas, and/or lymphocytic depletion in the spleen is scored on an ordinal four-step scale (0 = unchanged, 1 = mild, 2 = moderate, 3 = severe), and the distribution of the viral antigen in parenchymal and endothelial cells is evaluated on a four-step scale (0 = none, 1 = focal, 2 = multifocal, 3 = diffuse). These scores are used for a meta-analysis of experimental infections with H7N7 and H5N8 (clade 2.3.4.4b) HPAIV in chickens, turkeys, and ducks. The meta-analysis highlights the rather unique endotheliotropism of these HPAIV in chickens and a more severe necrotizing encephalitis in H7N7-HPAIV-infected turkeys. In conclusion, the proposed scoring system can be used to condensate HPAIV-typical pathohistological findings into semiquantitative data, thus enabling systematic phenotyping of virus strains and their tissue tropism.

Avian influenza virus (AIV) remains a huge challenge for poultry production with negative repercussions for micro- and macro-economy and public health in Bangladesh. High (HP) H5N1 and low pathogenicity (LP) H9N2 AIV are currently endemic in poultry, and both have been reported to infect humans sporadically. Multiple virus introductions of different clades of HPAIV H5N1, reassorted genotypes, and on-going diversification of LPAIV H9N2 create a highly volatile virological environment which potentially implicates increased virulence, adaptation to new host species, and subsequent zoonotic transmission. Allotropy of poultry rearing systems and supply chains further increase the risk of virus spreading, which leads to human exposure and fosters the emergence of new potentially pre-pandemic virus strains. Here, we review the epidemiology, focusing on (i) risk factors for virus spreading, (ii) viral genetic evolution, and (iii) options for AIV control in Bangladesh. It is concluded that improved control strategies would profit from the integration of various intervention tools, including effective vaccination, enhanced biosecurity practice, and improved awareness of producers and traders, although widespread household poultry rearing significantly interferes with any such strategies. Nevertheless, continuous surveillance associated with rapid diagnosis and thorough virus characterization is the basis of such strategies.

A novel H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) was detected in a greater white-fronted goose in January 2020 in Brandenburg, Germany, and, in February 2020, in domestic chickens belonging to a smallholding in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Germany. Full-genome sequencing was conducted on the MinION platform, enabling further phylogenetic analyses. The virus of clade 2.3.4.4b holds six segments from a Eurasian/Asian/African HPAIV H5N8 reassortant and two segments from low pathogenic avian influenza H3N8 subtype viruses recently detected in wild birds in Central Russia. These new entries continue to show the reassortment potential of the clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx viruses, underlining the necessity for full-genome sequencing and continuous surveillance.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N8) virus, like the recently described H5N8 strain from Korea, was detected in November 2014 in farmed turkeys and in a healthy common teal (Anas crecca) in northeastern Germany. Infected wild birds possibly introduced this virus.

Abstract Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non‐wild bird pathways were identified having a non‐negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV‐infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures.

In contrast to previous incursions of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAIV) H5 viruses, H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses caused numerous cases of lethal infections in white-tailed sea eagles (Haliaeetus albicilla) affecting mainly young eagles (younger than five years of age) in Germany during winter 2016/2017. Until April 2017, 17 HPAIV H5N8-positive white-tailed sea eagles had been detected (three found alive and 14 carcasses) by real-time RT-PCR and partial nucleotide sequence analyses. Severe neurological clinical signs were noticed which were corroborated by immunohistopathology revealing mild to moderate, oligo- to multifocal necrotizing virus-induced polioencephalitis. Lethal lead (Pb) concentrations, a main factor of mortality in sea eagles in previous years, could be ruled out by atomic absorption spectrometry. HPAIV H5 clade 2.3.4.4b reportedly is the first highly pathogenic influenza virus known to induce fatal disease in European white-tailed see eagles. This virus strain may become a new health threat to a highly protected species across its distribution range in Eurasia. Positive cloacal swabs suggest that eagles can spread the virus with their faeces.

Epizootic diseases causing considerable mortality in harbour seal populations have mainly been reported from the waters of the United States and Europe. Such die-offs were largely attributable to viral infections. Several hundred individuals died from respiratory infections caused by Influenza A viruses at the coast of New England, USA, in 1979, 1980 and 1982. More than 53,000 harbour seals were killed in European waters by Phocine Distemper Virus (PDV), a morbillivirus,in two outbreaks in 1988 and 2002. For several other epizootics of smaller scale in the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific coast of the USA and, most recently, in Danish and Swedish waters in 2007 the causes remain unclear, although characteristic respiratory symptoms and interstitial pneumonia suspicious of viral etiology were detected as well as occasionally bacterial infections caused by Erysipelothrix rhusiopathiae and Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Mass mortalities caused by biotoxins, direct human interactions or changes in oceanographic conditions have so far not been described for harbour seals. However, high organochlorine loads detected in European harbour seal populations and suspected to impede immune functions, were considered an aggravating factor in the 1988 morbillivirus epizootic. Establishing supranational stranding networks is a key prerequisite for the detection of future unusual die-offs in marine mammals. Detailed post-mortem investigations of all organ systems are essential for targeted etiological studies towards the causes of mass mortalities in seals.

Adult, healthy mute swans were experimentally infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A/Cygnus cygnus/Germany/R65/2006 subtype H5N1. Immunologically naive birds died, whereas animals with preexisting, naturally acquired avian influenza virus–specific antibodies became infected asymptomatically and shed virus. Adult mute swans are highly susceptible, excrete virus, and can be clinically protected by preexposure immunity.

Because fatal infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) virus subtype H5N1 have been reported in birds of prey, we sought to determine detailed information about the birds’ susceptibility and protection after vaccination. Ten falcons vaccinated with an inactivated influenza virus (H5N2) vaccine seroconverted. We then challenged 5 vaccinated and 5 nonvaccinated falcons with HPAI (H5N1). All vaccinated birds survived; all unvaccinated birds died within 5 days. For the nonvaccinated birds, histopathologic examination showed tissue degeneration and necrosis, immunohistochemical techniques showed influenza virus antigen in affected tissues, and these birds shed high levels of infectious virus from the oropharynx and cloaca. Vaccinated birds showed no influenza virus antigen in tissues and shed virus at lower titers from the oropharynx only. Vaccination could protect these valuable birds and, through reduced virus shedding, reduce risk for transmission to other avian species and humans.

Accurate and rapid characterization of influenza A virus (IAV) hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) sequences with respect to subtype and clade is at the basis of extended diagnostic services and implicit to molecular epidemiologic studies. ClassyFlu is a new tool and web service for the classification of IAV sequences of the HA and NA gene into subtypes and phylogenetic clades using discriminatively trained profile hidden Markov models (HMMs), one for each subtype or clade. ClassyFlu merely requires as input unaligned, full-length or partial HA or NA DNA sequences. It enables rapid and highly accurate assignment of HA sequences to subtypes H1-H17 but particularly focusses on the finer grained assignment of sequences of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of subtype H5N1 according to the cladistics proposed by the H5N1 Evolution Working Group. NA sequences are classified into subtypes N1-N10. ClassyFlu was compared to semiautomatic classification approaches using BLAST and phylogenetics and additionally for H5 sequences to the new "Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Clade Classification Tool" (IRD-CT) proposed by the Influenza Research Database. Our results show that both web tools (ClassyFlu and IRD-CT), although based on different methods, are nearly equivalent in performance and both are more accurate and faster than semiautomatic classification. A retraining of ClassyFlu to altered cladistics as well as an extension of ClassyFlu to other IAV genome segments or fragments thereof is undemanding. This is exemplified by unambiguous assignment to a distinct cluster within subtype H7 of sequences of H7N9 viruses which emerged in China early in 2013 and caused more than 130 human infections. http://bioinf.uni-greifswald.de/ClassyFlu is a free web service. For local execution, the ClassyFlu source code in PERL is freely available.

Swine influenza causes concern for global veterinary and public health officials. In continuing two previous networks that initiated the surveillance of swine influenza viruses (SIVs) circulating in European pigs between 2001 and 2008, a third European Surveillance Network for Influenza in Pigs (ESNIP3, 2010-2013) aimed to expand widely the knowledge of the epidemiology of European SIVs. ESNIP3 stimulated programs of harmonized SIV surveillance in European countries and supported the coordination of appropriate diagnostic tools and subtyping methods. Thus, an extensive virological monitoring, mainly conducted through passive surveillance programs, resulted in the examination of more than 9 000 herds in 17 countries. Influenza A viruses were detected in 31% of herds examined from which 1887 viruses were preliminary characterized. The dominating subtypes were the three European enzootic SIVs: avian-like swine H1N1 (53.6%), human-like reassortant swine H1N2 (13%) and human-like reassortant swine H3N2 (9.1%), as well as pandemic A/H1N1 2009 (H1N1pdm) virus (10.3%). Viruses from these four lineages co-circulated in several countries but with very different relative levels of incidence. For instance, the H3N2 subtype was not detected at all in some geographic areas whereas it was still prevalent in other parts of Europe. Interestingly, H3N2-free areas were those that exhibited highest frequencies of circulating H1N2 viruses. H1N1pdm viruses were isolated at an increasing incidence in some countries from 2010 to 2013, indicating that this subtype has become established in the European pig population. Finally, 13.9% of the viruses represented reassortants between these four lineages, especially between previous enzootic SIVs and H1N1pdm. These novel viruses were detected at the same time in several countries, with increasing prevalence. Some of them might become established in pig herds, causing implications for zoonotic infections.

Four calves were experimentally inoculated with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A/cat/Germany/R606/2006 (H5N1) isolated from a cat in 2006. All calves remained healthy, but several animals shed low amounts of virus, detected by inoculation of nasal swab fluid into embryonated chicken eggs and onto MDCK cells. All calves seroconverted.

Approximately 21,700 seals died during a morbillivirus epidemic in northwestern Europe in 2002. Phocine distemper virus 1 was isolated from seals in German waters. The sequence of the P gene showed 97% identity with the Dutch virus isolated in 1988. There was 100% identity with the Dutch isolate from 2002 and a single nucleotide mismatch with the Danish isolate.

Avian influenza (AI) is an infectious viral disease of birds, including domestic poultry, which has been causing outbreaks worldwide, leading to several millions of dead wild birds and culled poultry. AI is mainly found in birds, but recently, there was an increase in reported infections in mammals, ranging from no symptoms to mass mortality events and some human cases. Epidemiologically of great concern, evidence of mammalian adaptations have been found, but the transmission routes and pathogenesis in mammals are still to be defined. Hence, it is paramount to address all facets of AI viruses epidemiology, including investigating taxa not customarily thought to be involved in the transmission and/or trafficking of AI, such as wild mammals. The scope of this report was to assess the role of mammals in AI epidemiology, virology and pathology, i.e. AI maintenance, reservoir role, immunity, role of mammals in a potential pandemic. To do so, we performed an all‐encompassing review of the literature on the topic with a two‐fold approach: a systematic review of the published AI cases in wild mammals and a narrative approach to provide an expert opinion on the role of mammals in AI spread. The final number of peer‐reviewed papers included in the systematic literature review was 76, resulting in 120 unique infection records with AI in wild mammal species. The most represented taxa were included in the order Carnivora. The risk of infection was identified mainly as predation (or feeding) upon infected birds or contact with avian species. Evidence of mammal‐to‐mammal transmission in the wild is only circumstantial and yet to be confirmed. Cases of AI from the systematic review of experimental findings were discussed concerning epidemiology, pathology and virology. Knowledge gaps and potential pandemic drivers were identified. In summary, although a greater number of infections in wild mammals have been reported, there is no hard evidence for sustained mammal‐to‐mammal transmission in the wild. The factors contributing to the increased number of infections found in wild carnivores are not clear yet, but the unprecedented global spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses creates ample opportunities for intense, mostly alimentary, contact between infected wild birds and carnivores. Close surveillance of circulating strains and continued assessment of new epidemiological situations are crucial to quickly identify strains with enhanced mammalian fitness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]