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The COVID-19 pandemic has seen opponents of public health mandates deploy a range of populist and anti-elite arguments. The 2021 Canadian federal election was an exceptional “pandemic election” in which the COVID-19 health crisis took centre stage. But the election campaign also saw the populist People's Party of Canada (PPC) rise to prominence by opposing pandemic-related public health restrictions. While the party failed to win a seat, it did manage to triple its vote share (1.6 per cent to 4.9 per cent). It is unclear, however, what factors led to the rise in support for the PPC. To explore this issue, we draw on an original post-election survey (n = 18,950) and focus on populist attitudes and opposition to COVID-19-related public health restrictions. Results from regression models and structural equation models (SEMs) indicate that opposition to public health restrictions was a much stronger factor than populism in shaping support for the PPC.

When individuals evaluate policies, they consider both the policy’s content and its endorsers. In this study, we investigate the conditions under which these sometimes competing factors guide preferences. In an effort to combat the spread of COVID-19, American President Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau bilaterally agreed to close their shared border to refugee claimants and asylum seekers. These ideologically opposed leaders endorsing a common policy allows us to test the influence of a well-known foreign neighbor on domestic policy evaluations. With a large cross-national survey experiment, we first find that Canadians and Americans follow ideological positions in evaluating the policy, with right-leaning respondents offering the most support. With an experiment, we reveal how both populations shift their views when told about their neighboring leader’s endorsement. Our findings highlight ideologically motivated reasoning across an international border, with broad implications for understanding how individuals weigh a policy’s content against its political cues.

Recent events have placed a spotlight on Muslim-majority relations in Australia, yet research on majority-group Australians’ attitudes toward Muslims is scarce. Drawing on recent survey data augmen...

Public support for the welfare state – and the policies constituting it – has long been a topic of research. Previous research on support for redistribution has tended to focus on how either country-level characteristics (particularly those relating to the macro-economy such as levels of economic development or income inequality) or individual-level political factors (such as left-right political orientation and sociodemographic factors) shape support for redistribution. To date, empirical research has insufficiently tested how macroeconomic context and individual political orientations interact. Research has also obscured whether the effects of macroeconomic context hold cross-sectionally (across country contexts) or longitudinally (within countries over time). Drawing on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), this article examines the cross-sectional (between-country) and longitudinal (within-country) interactive relationships involving economic development and income inequality (on one hand) and left–right political orientations (on the other) in shaping preferences for redistribution. Results indicate that there are larger left–right cleavages in attitudes in wealthier countries, more unequal countries, and countries where inequality is increasing. These findings challenge the dominant practice of focusing exclusively on additive effects of individual-level or country-level factors by showing the importance of paying attention to cross-level interactions.

Empirical models illustrating how mass publics organise their views on foreign policy issues abound. Models that posit militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism as the two factors structuring mass foreign policy attitudes and that typically rely on American survey data have given way to models positing a larger number of underlying factors supported by cross-national survey data. Still, there are few studies assessing the cross-national validity of multi-factor models. Further, middle power states that must navigate between international leadership and followership remain understudied. This article draws on new survey data from Canada and Australia—two archetypal middle power states—to replicate a recent and influential model of foreign policy attitudes comprised of four factors: cooperative internationalism, militant internationalism, isolationism, and support for global justice. Using an exploratory structural equation modelling (ESEM) framework, it finds that the four-factor structure of foreign policy attitudes observed in the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany obtains among the Canadian and Australian publics, yet there are country-specific nuances that suggest differences in the ways Canadians and Australians perceive foreign policy options.

Growth in racial, ethnic, and religious minority populations in western societies has coincided with the growing success of nativist and radical right political parties. A leading target for nativist politicians has been Islamic religious symbols, particularly mosques. But does the presence of mosques within citizens’ milieux influence their political behaviour? To explore this question, we draw on longitudinal survey data from the Netherlands augmented by a web-scraped list of Dutch mosques to investigate the influence of local context – both architectural context in the form of spatial proximity to mosques and local demographic context in the form of visible diversity – on support for the Party for Freedom (PVV), a radical right, nativist political party. Our analyses reveal that while proximity to a mosque increases support for the radical right, proximity to a mosque with a minaret exerts a stronger effect. Also, closer proximity to a mosque with a minaret and greater local diversity amplify the differences in party support between the left and right. These findings allow us to better understand the impact of symbolic cultural threat on voting for nativist parties.

People form political attitudes to serve psychological needs. Recent research shows that some individuals have a strong desire to incite chaos when they perceive themselves to be marginalized by society. These individuals tend to see chaos as a way to invert the power structure and gain social status in the process. Analysing data drawn from large-scale representative surveys conducted in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, we identify the prevalence of Need for Chaos across Anglo-Saxon societies. Using Latent Profile Analysis, we explore whether different subtypes underlie the uni-dimensional construct and find evidence that some people may be motivated to seek out chaos because they want to rebuild society, while others enjoy destruction for its own sake. We demonstrate that chaos-seekers are not a unified political group but a divergent set of malcontents. Multiple pathways can lead individuals to ‘want to watch the world burn’. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.

People form political attitudes to serve psychological needs. Recent research shows that some individuals have a strong desire to incite chaos when they perceive themselves to be marginalized by society. These individuals tend to see chaos as a way to invert the power structure and gain social status in the process. Analysing data drawn from large-scale representative surveys conducted in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, we identify the prevalence of Need for Chaos across Anglo-Saxon societies. Using Latent Profile Analysis, we explore whether different subtypes underlie the uni-dimensional construct and find evidence that some people may be motivated to seek out chaos because they want to rebuild society, while others enjoy destruction for its own sake. We demonstrate that chaos-seekers are not a unified political group but a divergent set of malcontents. Multiple pathways can lead individuals to ‘want to watch the world burn’. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.

The Australian public voted in November 2017 in favour of changing the law to allow for same-sex marriage – only the second such national popular vote after Ireland in 2015. Though 61.6% of the Australian public voting in the Marriage Law Postal Survey voted Yes in support of marriage equality, this support was not uniformly distributed across the country, with support at the electoral division level varying between 26.1% and 83.7%. What, then, explains such variation in support for same-sex marriage among the Australian public? In this article, we advance an aggregate, electoral division-level explanation of the Yes vote that links support for the legalisation of same-sex marriage to a set of local-level political and socio-demographic factors.

This article investigates the quality of cancer reporting from a time of prosperity to a time of austerity for the press. Australia is a useful case study because of its concentrated press media market that has experienced a decline in the number of newsroom reporters from the 20th to the 21st century. We undertake a content analysis of news stories published in 1997 and 2017 about cancer treatments and cancer medical research. Using keyword searching techniques of the news database Factiva, 633 news reports about cancer were detected. Of these, 120 stories met the research criteria. Each story was assessed across eight variables using a coding tool, the Media Quality Index (MQI). The study finds 2017 stories had lower scores (equating to less quality) across all eight variables compared to the 1997 cohort. Of statistical significance, 2017 stories were less likely to quantify the benefits of a proposed intervention, while stories discussing medical research were less comprehensive about research findings. The 2017 stories were less likely to discuss side effects or the potential for harm, and were more sensational, with incongruent headlines compared to content. The empirical evidence pointing to a deterioration in mainstream media reporting about cancer has implications for broader health literacy. It may foster unrealistic patient expectations about clinical practice and treatment options, with public policy implications such as overutilization of health services. The study serves as a reminder to medical practitioners that health communication directly with patients is vital as media reporting alone cannot reliably inform patients about their cancer diagnosis and treatment.

Even as the world’s sole superpower, the United States requires the cooperation of other states to achieve many of its foreign policy objectives. The President of the United States thus often serve...

The tumultuous 2016 US presidential election featured a range of policy proposals to address the issue of illegal immigration. Channeling anxieties around the economic and social consequences of illegal immigration with claims of porous, unsecured borders, Republican candidate Donald Trump notably committed to building a wall the length of the US–Mexico border. At the same time, border security is not a new issue on the American policy agenda. Drawing on spatially-referenced survey data from 2006 to 2016, this article explores two questions. First, how have attitudes toward border security shifted over time in response to changes in the partisan political environment? Second, how does spatial context – namely proximity to the US–Mexico border – shape attitudes toward the proposed border wall? Findings point to both time and space, in conjunction with individual-level political attitudes, as key factors shaping attitudes toward US–Mexico border security.

The 2015 Canadian federal election campaign put into focus relations between Muslim communities in Canada and wider Canadian society, featuring debates around banning the niqab, and a “barbaric cultural practices” hotline. At the same time, challenges in relations between Muslims and majority-group Canadians were not a new development in 2015: they had in the past faced periodic strains due to terrorism-related events, and attacks targeting Muslims in Canada. The Canadian case is in fact reflective of a challenge in intergroup relations facing several Western democracies. In light of this, what accounts for majority-group Canadians’ attitudes toward Muslims in Canada? Drawing on data from the 2011 and 2015 Canadian Election Studies and theories linking outgroup perceptions to intergroup contact (friends), local demographic context at both the micro-level (neighbours) and meso-level (townspeople), and political factors (parties), this article seeks to explain why majority-group Canadians hold alternately positive or negative views of Muslims.

Increasing discussion over the safety of natural resource extraction and transportation to facilitate international energy needs has given rise to controversy over the prospect of large quantities of bitumen and crude oil flowing through trans-national pipelines. This debate, incorporating the voices of industry, government and advocacy groups, has gained traction in the news media, alternately framed as an environmental, economic, trade, human rights or public safety concern. It is possible, however, that such coverage may vary substantially with regional interests and perceptions of costs and benefits, locally or nationally. To uncover how the framing of energy transportation varies with proximity considerations, regional and national media coverage in Canada and the United States of the Keystone XL pipeline from 2010 to 2014 is analyzed. National and local papers frame the pipeline according to different considerations, as do cities near to and distant from the pipeline route.

The 2015 Canadian federal election campaign brought to the fore partisan cleavages in approaches to immigration policy, refugee policy, and multiculturalism. At the level of mass public opinion, research on attitudes toward immigration in Canada and other immigrant-receiving countries has pointed to a variety of explanatory factors. These include partisanship, economic interests, and feelings of cultural threat. There is also a growing literature on the effects of local demographic (specifically ethnic or immigrant) context in shaping attitudes toward immigration. Such a contextually-oriented approach, however, has been pursued by relatively few analysts of Canadian public opinion. This article endeavours to fill this gap. It brings together recent survey data and local-level demographic data to answer the question of what leads Canadians to hold open or restrictionist attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, focusing on the roles of partisanship, contextual measures of local immigrant populations, and perceptions of economic and cultural threat.

While public opinion about foreign policy has been studied extensively in the United States, there is less systematic research of foreign policy opinions in other countries. Given that public opinion about international affairs affects who gets elected in democracies and then constrains the foreign policies available to leaders once elected, both comparative politics and international relations scholarship benefit from more systematic investigation of foreign policy attitudes outside the United States. Using new data, this article presents a common set of core constructs structuring both American and European attitudes about foreign policy. Surveys conducted in four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) provide an expanded set of foreign policy-related survey items that are analysed using exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM). Measurement equivalence is specifically tested and a common four-factor structure that fits the data in all four countries is found. Consequently, valid, direct comparisons of the foreign policy preferences of four world powers are made. In the process, the four-factor model confirms and expands previous work on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. The article also demonstrates the capability of ESEM in testing the dimensionality and cross-national equivalence of social science concepts.

The study of foreign policy attitudes lies at the intersection of political psychology and international relations. Despite a shared interest in both fields in the psychological bases of political phenomena, research exploring the links between personality traits and foreign policy attitudes is scarce. This article pursues a set of questions intended to bring these agendas together. Do personality traits influence attitudes toward foreign policy? Are the links between personality traits and foreign policy the same, or do they differ across different national contexts? In exploring these questions, this article draws on data from a series of large-scale public opinion surveys in six western democracies: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia.

The acceptance of newcomers as either immigrants or asylum seekers has been a recurring issue in Australian politics. Both the size of Australia's intake of economic migrants and the resettlement of asylum seekers held offshore have been contentious political issues. Research in other immigrant-receiving countries has identified numerous factors shaping attitudes toward immigration and asylum policy. These include political factors (such as party identification) and local demographic context - both immigrant concentration and change in immigrant concentration over time. Still, few studies of Australia have considered the effects of genuinely local demographic context, or how local context moderates the effects of political factors on attitudes toward immigration and asylum policy. Drawing on survey data from the Australian Election Study (2010-2016) and local-level census data, this article advances an explanation of Australians' attitudes toward immigration and asylum policy centring on the roles of party identification, local demographic context, and their interaction.

The politics of oil pipelines have become increasingly salient in American politics in recent years. In particular, debates about economic benefits, energy security and environmental impact have been provoked by the proposed Keystone XL pipeline expansion intended to take bitumen from northern Alberta in Canada to refineries on the Gulf Coast in Texas. Drawing on data from recent surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center, this article asks a series of questions. What levels of support for (and opposition to) the pipeline exist among the American public? What are the roles of political factors (such as party identification and ideology), economic attitudes, environmental attitudes and proximity to the proposed pipeline route in shaping attitudes toward the pipeline? And how do political factors and proximity to the pipeline interact? We find that partisanship and ideology drive attitudes toward the Keystone XL pipeline, and that the effect of ideology is attenuated by proximity to the proposed route. The policy implications of these findings for energy infrastructure siting controversies are discussed.

Canada's 2015 federal election was an exiting, as well as a nostalgia provoking, contest. After nine years in office, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and the governing Conservatives were defeated by the resurgent Liberals led by Justin Trudeau. Trudeau is the son of Pierre Trudeau, perhaps Canada’s best known prime minister. Analyses of national survey data demonstrate that party leader images—a major component of the "valence politics" model of electoral choice—were important in both cases. Unlike his father, Justin Trudeau was castigated as a "lightweight" and "just not ready." However, articulating plausible policies to jump-start Canada's sluggish economy and espousing "sunny ways," the younger Trudeau was warmly received by many voters. In contrast, Harper's image of managerial competence was tarnished by bad economic news, and his attempt to refocus the campaign on emotionally charged cultural issues failed. The result was a Liberal majority government and a prime minister named Trudeau.

Illegal immigration is a contentious issue on the American policy agenda. To understand the sources of public attitudes toward immigration, social scientists have focused attention on political factors such as party identification; they have also drawn on theories of intergroup contact to argue that contact with immigrants shapes immigration attitudes. Absent direct measures, contextual measures such as respondents' ethnic milieu or proximity to salient geographic features (such as borders) have been used as proxies of contact. Such a research strategy still leaves the question unanswered - is it contact or context that really matters? Further, which context, and for whom? This article evaluates the effects of party identification, personal contact with undocumented immigrants, and contextual measures (county Hispanic population and proximity to the US-Mexico border) on American attitudes toward illegal immigration. It finds that contextual factors moderate the effects of political party identification on attitudes toward illegal immigration; personal contact has no effect. These findings challenge the assumption that contextual measures act as proxies for interpersonal contact.

Similar to other recent Canadian elections, foreign policy did not feature prominently in the 2011 federal election campaign. In fact, many doubt Canadian public opinion on international affairs is linked to the actions taken by recent Governments. In this paper, we examine Canadian public opinion toward a range of foreign policy issues and argue that the survey questions measure two latent dimensions —militarism and internationalism. Our survey evidence indicates the existence of an “issue public” which is prepared to endorse military action and is skeptical of human rights and overseas aid programs, and this group is far more supportive of Prime Minister Harper and the Conservative Party than other Canadians. The absence of an elite discussion, either among politicians or between media elites, about the direction of Canadian foreign policy does not prevent the Canadian voter from thinking coherently about questions pertaining to this issue domain and employing these beliefs to support or oppose political parties and their leaders.

There has been renewed interest in recent years in both the foreign perceptions of the United States as well as the foreign policy attitudes of the American public. In this light, it is interesting to observe that there is a substantial body of research on Canadian public opinion toward the United States but relatively little on American public opinion toward Canada. Further, most literature neglects the effect of spatial proximity to the other country on perceptions. This article addresses both shortcomings in the literature. It investigates the mutual perceptions of the Canadian and American publics drawing on public opinion data from both Canada and the US. The explanation of attitudes toward the other country has three main foci: the roles of political party identification and political ideology; the role of spatial proximity to the Canada–US border; and the interactive relationship between political attitudes and border proximity.

The study of public attitudes toward continental integration has a long lineage in Canada. Still, the research literature has neglected the effect of spatial proximity to the United States. This maintains even though the cross-border trade, travel, and social ties constituting the daily reality of Canada-U.S. relations concentrate near the Canada-U.S. border. This article advances a spatially informed analysis of Canadian attitudes toward North American integration drawing on data from the Canadian Election Studies (1997-2011). The explanation it advances has three main foci: The roles of political party identification and political ideology; the role of spatial proximity to the Canada-U.S. border; and the interactive relationship between political views and border proximity.

Antimicrobial resistance represents one of the world’s most pressing public health problems. Governments around the world have—and will continue to—develop policy proposals to deal with this problem. However, the capacity of government will be constrained by very low levels of trust in government. This stands in contrast to ‘medical scientists’ who are highly trusted by the public. This article tests to what extent trusted sources can alter attitudes towards a policy proposal to regulate the use of antibiotics. We find that respondents are much more likely to support a policy put forward by ‘medical scientists.’ This article provides some initial evidence that medical scientists could be used to gain support for policies to tackle pressing policy challenges such as AMR.

Historic Canadian elections in 2015, both federally and provincially, created an opportunity for action on climate policy. While climate scientists have developed high resolution data sets on the distribution of Canadian climate risks, we still lack comparable data on the local distribution of public climate change opinions. This paper provides the first effort to estimate local climate and energy opinion variability outside the United States. Using a multi-level regression and post-stratification (MRP) approach, we estimate opinion in federal electoral districts and provinces. We demonstrate that a majority of the Canadian public consistently believes that climate change is happening. Belief in climate change's causes varies geographically, with more attributing it to human activity in urban as opposed to rural areas. Most prominently, we find majority support for carbon cap and trade policy in every province and district. By contrast, support for carbon taxation is more heterogeneous. Compared to the distribution of US climate opinions, Canadians believe climate change is happening at higher levels. This new opinion data set will support climate policy analysis and climate policy decision making at national, provincial and local levels.