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We measure the marginal effects of two crucial dimensions of the Investment Game design of Gneezy and Potters (1997, GP97) and its replications: time frequency and time horizon. To this aim, we randomize between subjects five different time frequencies: 1 round ("High Frequency" in GP97), 3 rounds ("Low Frequency"), but also 6, 9 and 12 rounds. As for time horizon, we compare the baseline GP97 horizon (9 rounds) with smaller (3 and 6 rounds), but also higher (12 rounds) alternatives. We find that, holding the time horizon constant, subjects invest more when they evaluate their investments less frequently, but this result is significant only when time horizon is sufficiently long. We also find that lower frequencies increase the marginal investment at a decreasing rate. As for time horizon, we find that, holding time frequency constant, the higher the horizon, the lower the investment (although, as in the previous case, investment lowers at a decreasing rate). Our reduced form results also show that subjects' behavior is sensitive to the endowment stock provided along the experiment, independently of time frequency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents two models to explain experimental data on binary public goods. While a Regret model and a Warm-glow model both fit the data better than the standard Bayesian model, the Warm-glow model fits best. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Experimental evidence suggests that the frequency with which individuals get feedback information on their investments has an effect on their risk-taking behavior. In particular, when they are given information sufficiently often, they take less risks compared with a situation in which they are informed less frequently. We find that this result still holds when subjects do not know the probabilities of the lotteries they are betting upon. We also detect significant gender effects, in that the frequency with which information is disclosed mostly affects male betting behavior, and that males become more risk-seeking after experiencing a loss. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper studies, both theoretically and experimentally, framing effects in the context of a public good game in which players have to make a costly contribution either (i) to achieve or (ii) not to lose a non-excludable monetary prize. Our protocol leads to public good provision (not deterioration) only if a certain contribution level is achieved. Since both frames differ with respect to the reference point, we apply Prospect Theory to derive testable predictions. In particular, Prospect Theory predicts—and our experimental evidence confirms—greater contribution in the “loss” (“gain”) frame when the contribution threshold is high (low). We also estimate the parameters which better suit our experimental evidence and partly confirm previous results in the literature. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Highlights • We test experimentally the dominant view that gender differences in trading activity are due to gender differences in overconfidence. • We find clear gender differences in trading activity and confidence in the expected direction. • However, neither confidence nor overconfidence explain any portion of the gender gap in trading activity. • Alternative mechanisms such as competitiveness, risk aversion or financial literacy appear to play no role either. Abstract The fact that men trade more than women in financial markets has been attributed to men's overconfidence. However, evidence supporting this view is only indirect. We directly test this conjecture experimentally, by measuring confidence using monetary incentives before participants trade in a simulated market. We find that men are more confident than women in our trading task. Men also trade more, and they hold larger and less diversified portfolios than women. However, we do not find that differences in confidence explain any portion of the gender gap in trading activity. We explore alternative candidate channels such as risk aversion, financial literacy or competitiveness but find that these factors are also unlikely to play a role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]