Search

We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or controlled processing compete with each other for survival. Agents using automatic processing act quickly and so are more likely to acquire resources, but agents using controlled processing are better planners and so make more effective use of the resources they have. Using the replicator equation, we characterize the conditions under which automatic or controlled agents dominate, when coexistence is possible, and when bistability occurs. We then extend the replicator equation to consider feedback between the state of the population and the environment. Under conditions where having a greater proportion of controlled agents either enriches the environment or enhances the competitive advantage of automatic agents, we find that limit cycles can occur, leading to persistent oscillations in the population dynamics. Critically, however, these limit cycles only emerge when feedback occurs on a sufficiently long time scale. Our results shed light on the connection between evolution and human cognition, and demonstrate necessary conditions for the rise and fall of rationality., Comment: 9 pages, 7 figures

We analyze the replicator-mutator equations for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Various graph-theoretic patterns of mutation are considered, ranging from a single unidirectional mutation pathway between two of the species, to global bidirectional mutation among all the species. Our main result is that the coexistence state, in which all three species exist in equilibrium, can be destabilized by arbitrarily small mutation rates. After it loses stability, the coexistence state gives birth to a stable limit cycle solution created in a supercritical Hopf bifurcation. This attracting periodic solution exists for all the mutation patterns considered, and persists arbitrarily close to the limit of zero mutation rate and a zero-sum game., Comment: 6 pages, 5 figures

We explore a replicator-mutator model of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma involving three strategies: always cooperate (ALLC), always defect (ALLD), and tit-for-tat (TFT). The dynamics resulting from single unidirectional mutations are considered, with detailed results presented for the mutations TFT $\rightarrow$ ALLC and ALLD $\rightarrow$ ALLC. For certain combinations of parameters, given by the mutation rate $\mu$ and the complexity cost $c$ of playing tit-for-tat, we find that the population settles into limit cycle oscillations, with the relative abundance of ALLC, ALLD, and TFT cycling periodically. Surprisingly, these oscillations can occur for unidirectional mutations between any two strategies. In each case, the limit cycles are created and destroyed by supercritical Hopf and homoclinic bifurcations, organized by a Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation. Our results suggest that stable oscillations are a robust aspect of a world of ALLC, ALLD, and costly TFT; the existence of cycles does not depend on the details of assumptions of how mutation is implemented., Comment: 18 pages, 9 figures