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The paper reinterprets Kant’s Copernican revolution as a transcendental-psychological transformation in the approach to metaphysics. It tackles the prevalent scholarly view that Kant’s theory of the faculty of cognition appears incompatible with his broader metaphysical framework of transcendental idealism, primarily due to difficulties in integrating cognitive faculties such as sensibility and understanding within the dichotomy of appearances and things in themselves. The paper proposes that Kant’s transcendental psychology is neither a metaphysical-rational doctrine of the noumenal mind, nor an empirical-naturalized study of the phenomenal mind. Instead, it presents a theory centered on the transcendental subject as an abstract entity, positing it as the hypothetical bearer of the cognitive functions necessary for all potential finite cognizers, with humans exemplifying a particular empirical realization. While empirical realizations of cognitive functions manifest through temporal-causal mechanisms, their transcendental grounds consist of abstract functional structures defined by unschematized categories. These transcendental functions, which determine the necessary conditions for objective cognition, also inherently define the fundamental structure of all possible objects of cognition. Kant’s metaphysical inquiry into the structure of reality is thus conducted through an examination of the faculty of cognition, showcasing a revolutionary transcendental-psychological approach to metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schelling's transcendental idealism is determined by the necessary motivation of thinking within a principle and presenting philosophy as a system grounded on this principle. In his System, the immediate and direct principle of knowledge provides a solution to the problem from which all knowledge begins. Selfconsciousness, as the highest principle of knowledge and a kind of knowing, posits an absolute that is both the cause and effect of itself. On this ultimate ground, self-consciousness unifies the subjective realm with objective nature, attaining the identity of subjective and objective. The whole system can be deduced from the supreme principle of knowledge within this transcendental unity. The general character of the system is determined by the structure of this establishing principle. Within the framework of the System of Transcendental Idealism, the difference from Spinoza, Kant, and Fichte will be revealed, thus the self-positing ground of systematic thought and knowledge from the first principle will be explicated. In this regard, Schelling's approach can be read as the highlighting of the subjectivity that Spinoza failed to explain and left incomplete. Furthermore, the positing of a principle as the possibility of the beginning of being and knowing is identified as the condition for the starting of thinking processes and is crucial as a foundational basis for ontological and epistemological elucidations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In discussion with Kant, neo-Kantianism, and contemporary transcendental philosophy on the one hand and Hegel’s speculative idealism on the other, Krijnen discusses the philosophical form in which post neo-Kantian idealism has a future. First, he determines the type of Kantian transcendental idealism that constitutes its most advanced form. Here, Krijnen distinguishes intersubjectivity-theoretical forms of transcendental philosophy from phenomenology and neo-Kantianism and focusses on phenomenology and neo-Kantianism. In Krijnen’s analysis, a programmatic foundational deficit of phenomenology appears. In terms of a theory of principles, phenomenology falls behind Kant’s conception of philosophical foundations, whereas neo-Kantianism and the contemporary transcendental philosophers discussed continue the relevant programmatic line of Kant’s reasoning. Krijnen subsequently shows that even in its most advanced form, transcendental idealism suffers from formalism. This is due to the fact that transcendental philosophy misses the methodical moment of the ‘realization of the concept’ in the sense Hegel’s speculative idealism. For this reason, ‘form’ and ‘content’ remain opposed to each other externally. Hegel’s reproach of formalism does not state that Kant’s forms are merely empty shells, neglecting the content-logical character of principles in the sense of transcendental idealism. In contrast, Hegel’s reproach concerns a methodical problem that hinders transcendental idealism to actualize its own ambitions. Finally, Krijnen makes clear in what sense a Hegelian sublation of transcendental idealism into speculative idealism is of the essence for the future of post-neo-Kantian idealism.

The article explores the concept of the phenomenon in the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl, arguing for the intricate connections and divergences between their philosophical frameworks. Kant’s transcendental idealism, rooted in the a priori knowledge and the conditions for human cognition, marks a pivotal shift from previous rationalist beliefs in non-empirical knowledge. By emphasizing phenomena as the ultimate objects of human cognition and asserting that the conditions for experience are inherent in the human mind, Kant lays the groundwork for a critical analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. In contrast, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology introduces a methodical approach to uncovering the essence of consciousness and phenomena. Central to Husserl’s transcendental idealism is the concept of intentionality, which serves as a bridge between consciousness and objects of knowledge. Unlike metaphysical idealism, Husserl’s transcendental idealism focuses on the correlation between phenomena and consciousness rather than solely on internal cognitive operations. The article navigates the evolution from Kant’s critical idealism to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, highlighting their shared emphasis on phenomena as the focal point of human cognition.

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This paper offers an assessment of some of the central aspects of Edith Stein's conception of intentional acts proposed in Potency and Act. Studies Towards a Philosophy of Being. Her account hinges upon a combination of Thomistic and Husserlian concepts. She borrows from Aquinas two conceptual pairs that are central to his metaphysics and theory of knowledge: the actuality-potency dichotomy; and the distinction between sensible and intelligible species. The distinction and relevant articulation between sensible and intelligible species provide Stein with the basis to present her own conception of intentionality (with special focus on perception): the sensible species is regarded as the correlate of the object's Gestalt; by contrast, the intelligible species is mobilised to account for what Husserl labels noesis-noema correlation. But Stein's ambition is also to inscribe her account of the species sensibilis within an overall (critical) interpretation of Husserl's transcendental idealism. This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation, financing the project "Intentionality and Person in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology" (GAČR 21-08256S). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper examines the work of Immanuel Kant in the light of a new theory on the nature of truth, knowledge and falsehood (the Inversion Theory of Truth). Kant’s idea that knowledge could be absolutely certain, and that its truth must correspond with reality, is discredited by a dissection of the Correspondence Theory of Truth. This examination of the nature of truth, as well as knowledge and falsehood, is conducted with reference to Sir Karl Popper’s writings on regulative ideas, the criterion of demarcation and the principle of falsifiability. It is argued that if truth is to be regarded as certain, it should be used to describe objects and events in the objective (noumenal) state, and that subjective knowledge must contain (and is improved by) falsehood. Perceptions and knowledge are obtained by the biological and evolutionary process of Active Subjectivism. Ideas we have knowledge of can be metaphysical or scientific, according to Popper’s Criterion of Demarcation. Kant’s “Copernican revolution” claim that our intellect imposes absolutely true laws on nature could not allow for the possibility that ideas might be constructed from fallible perceptions, and hence that all knowledge is uncertain. Instead, he developed a Critique of Practical Reason in which religion, though not provable through logical reasoning, could be proved by our innate moral sense, giving us a Categorical Imperative that could lead to perverse results. By rejecting the absolute certainty of a priori knowledge, and admitting a degree of essential falsehood, we arrive at a more reasonable grounding for moral behavior.

Schelling's goal is to find a total consciousness for human; therefore, in the philosophy of nature, he tries to reach from the real to the ideal. On the other hand, the conscious spirit is a product of human subjectivity, so, an unconscious spirit manages things. Therefore, Schelling's transition from natural philosophy to the system of transcendental idealism occurs. Reaching this level of consciousness is possible when [I] goes through different stages. The first stage is sensation, then reflection and after that comes praxis. But since the will of the subject of and the will of nature are the same, and ethics is in the realm of practical reason, then the subject of action does not have free will. Therefore, there is a gap between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy that Schelling must somehow fill. He solves this problem with the free and creative will of an artist, a will that acts not out of necessity but freely. Schelling reaches the absolute from the identity of natural philosophy and transcendental idealism. The absolute is the result of identity of the real and the ideal. It is crystal clear that expounding how to objectify the absolute leads to a better comprehension of Schelling's philosophical system. In this article, it is investigated that among theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom and art, which one Schelling deems the most functional mechanism to objectify the absolute, and what are the roles of genius and the beauty through this path.

Friedrich Jacobi (1743-1819) is known mainly as a representative of the “philosophy of feeling and faith” and as one of the first critics of Kant, who drew attention to the fundamental contradiction in his system: without the concept of “thing in itself” (or “thing in oneself”) it is impossible to enter into his “Critique of Pure Reason”, but it is equally impossible to remain in it with this concept. The consistent development of the transcendental philosophy system leads to the elimination of its own initial, fundamental premise. The discovery of this contradiction and the indication of its significance for the evaluation of critical philosophy was often seen as almost the only contribution of Jacobi to world philosophy. In the historical and philosophical literature, the opinion prevails is that Jacobi, by and large, simply did not understand Kant and was in comparison with him, just a “grumpy scoundrel” (Heinrich Heine) and a “lower monad” (Kuno Fischer). This pejorative assessment significantly simplifies and distorts both Jacobi’s philosophy and Jacobi’s actual attitude towards Kant, which was not so unambiguous. It should be considered in a much broader historical and problematic context. The study briefly examines the history of the long and difficult relationship between the “privileged heretic” and the “gray eminence” of the German philosophical classics with the creator of the transcendental philosophy system. The main directions of a deeply thought-out and well-founded serious criticism of Kant’s philosophy (i.e. its inconsistency, idealism, rational intellectualism, subjectivism, “speculative egoism”, etc.) are outlined and analyzed from the positions of radical realism, common sense, Christian faith, metaphysical “sense of the supersensible”, direct knowledge of the most important truths for a person, the absolute values of life, moral intuition, freedom, and dignity of the individual.

The publication of the Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant marked the beginning of an intellectual revolution not only in Philosophy, but also in other spheres of intellectual activity. Every year interest to this work is only growing up, especially in the context of the development of cognitive sciences and technologies related to the development and implementation of artificial intelligence systems. However, both Kant’s contemporaries and subsequent generations of researchers had questions about the basic concepts, outlined in the first Critique. Nikolay Lossky became one of such outstanding experts in Kant’s philosophy, who carried out a metacritique of transcendental idealism. His analysis is interesting because it is characterized by consistency, depth and inclusiveness, despite the fact that he was not a supporter of Kant’s philosophy. The proposed article explicates the main points of the metacritique of pure reason carried out by Lossky. The aim is to systematize the advantages and disadvantages of transcendental idealism highlighted by him in order to assess the validity of objections and identify points that paradoxically escaped Lossky’s attention. In particular, it is shown that the highest evaluation of Lossky is awarded to Kant’s efforts to create an epistemology that does not rely as presuppositions on any other branches of human knowledge; the resolution of contradictions between Empiricism and Rationalism; the creation of the doctrine of synthetic rationality and transcendental logic; the idea of the need for the immanence of knowledge to consciousness. Lossky identified as the key shortcomings of transcendental idealism a range of contradictions grouped around such concepts as the things in themselves, affection, experience, inner sense, transcendental schema, and unity of apperception. At the same time, it is shown that such a key concept for Kant’s theoretical philosophy as transcendental reflection has disappeared from the Lossky’s field of consideration. The study is preceded by a brief description of Lossky’s characteristics, including personal ones, as a meta-critic of pure reason.

This paper examines the work of Immanuel Kant in the light of a new theory on the nature of truth, knowledge and falsehood (the Inversion Theory of Truth). Kant's idea that knowledge could be absolutely certain, and that its truth must correspond with reality, is discredited by a dissection of the Correspondence Theory of Truth. This examination of the nature of truth, as well as knowledge and falsehood, is conducted with reference to Sir Karl Popper's writings on regulative ideas, the criterion of demarcation and the principle of falsifiability. It is argued that if truth is to be regarded as certain, it should be used to describe objects and events in the objective (noumenal) state, and that subjective knowledge must contain (and is improved by) falsehood. Perceptions and knowledge are obtained by the biological and evolutionary process of Active Subjectivism. Ideas we have knowledge of can be metaphysical or scientific, according to Popper's Criterion of Demarcation. Kant's "Copernican revolution" claim that our intellect imposes absolutely true laws on nature could not allow for the possibility that ideas might be constructed from fallible perceptions, and hence that all knowledge is uncertain. Instead, he developed a Critique of Practical Reason in which religion, though not provable through logical reasoning, could be proved by our innate moral sense, giving us a Categorical Imperative that could lead to perverse results. By rejecting the absolute certainty of a priori knowledge, and admitting a degree of essential falsehood, we arrive at a more reasonable grounding for moral behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schelling's goal is to find a total consciousness for human; therefore, in the philosophy of nature, he tries to reach from the real to the ideal. On the other hand, the conscious spirit is a product of human subjectivity, so, an unconscious spirit manages things. Therefore, Schelling's transition from natural philosophy to the system of transcendental idealism occurs. Reaching this level of consciousness is possible when [I] goes through different stages. The first stage is sensation, then reflection and after that comes praxis. But since the will of the subject of and the will of nature are the same, and ethics is in the realm of practical reason, then the subject of action does not have free will. Therefore, there is a gap between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy that Schelling must somehow fill. He solves this problem with the free and creative will of an artist, a will that acts not out of necessity but freely. Schelling reaches the absolute from the identity of natural philosophy and transcendental idealism. The absolute is the result of identity of the real and the ideal. It is crystal clear that expounding how to objectify the absolute leads to a better comprehension of Schelling's philosophical system. In this article, it is investigated that among theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom and art, which one Schelling deems the most functional mechanism to objectify the absolute, and what are the roles of genius and the beauty through this path. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This chapter examines the role of humour in §54 of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment in relation to reconstructive readings provided by Kantian scholars. While Kant claims that humour is primarily an irrational, corporeal phenomenon, these scholars have argued that his discussion of humour suggests otherwise and they have proposed readings according to which humour constitutes a pure aesthetic judgement akin to those of beauty and the sublime. This issue is investigated over the course of four sections. First, I briefly sketch Kant's two types of pure aesthetic judgement. Second, I summarize Kant's discussion of laughter in §54. Third, I debate some of the reconstructions that have been given in the scholarship that attempt to accord a more important role to humour within Kant's project: John Marmysz' interpretation of the funny as an unthreatening form of the sublime; Annie Hounsokou's interpretation of the funny as a species of both the beautiful and the sublime; Peter T. Giamaro's claim that the funny is the most basic aesthetic judgement; and James Creed Meredith's suggestion that the funny should be seen as a third and distinct type of aesthetic judgement. I conclude by proposing a reconstructive reading that draws on Meredith's and Giamaro's accounts while avoiding the problems highlighted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some Kant scholars argue that appearances and things in themselves are distinct things (Two Objects View). Others argue that they are the same things (One Object View). This last view is often understood as the claim that appearances and things in themselves are numerically identical (Numerical Identity). However, Walker (2010) and Stang (2014) show that Numerical Identity clashes against Kant’s claim that we lack knowledge of things in themselves (Noumenal Ignorance). I propose a weaker version of the One Object View that is not couched in terms of Numerical Identity and, consequently, avoids the problem raised by Walker and Stang. My case is based on a sustained analogy with perceptual experience that aims at showing that appearances and things in themselves are the same things in the following sense: the very same things can be presented under the mode of sensory intuition or (possibly) under the mode of intellectual intuition. Those things presented under the mode of sensory intuition are appearances; presented under the (possible) mode of intellectual intuition are things in themselves. This way of construing appearances and things in themselves preserves the core insight of the One Object View. At the same time, as it does not entail any isomorphism between appearances and things in themselves, it does not clash against Noumenal Ignorance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The founding fathers of modern philosophy of culture, the neo-Kantians, and especially the Southwest school, brought the concept of culture into play as a counter concept to that of nature. Taking Heinrich Rickert’s conception of culture as a starting point, the article shows how culture is conceived of as a self-formation of the (concrete) subject (agent). It leads to transcendental idealism of freedom, typical of a Kantian type of transcendental philosophy. However, in this self and world formation of the subject it is presupposed that nature is to any extent formable by values and thus by freedom. This presupposition cannot be accounted for properly within transcendental idealism. Hegel, by contrast, conceives of culture as a manifestation of the idea, leading to speculative idealism of freedom. The origin of culture, i.e., its original determinacy, should not be conceived of in terms of an opposition to nature, and consequently in the fashion of a subject (agent) of thought and action that forms itself by forming its world, culture. Rather, it should be conceived of in terms of a manifestation of the idea as the truly transcendental subject qua absolute ground of validity and thus the ground of being too. Nature and culture are both primarily determined by their ideal character and the relationships emerging therefrom.

Freedom is a central question in Philosophy. It has always been asked: How do determinism and freedom cohere in a human being? How can the fact that humans exist and undertake life projects in a thoroughgoingly deterministic world be reconciled with the claim that human acts remain free and efficacious? This work explores the problem of freedom and determinism using Kant’s answer in the Third Antinomy in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and using Transcendental Idealism as epistemological framework for a possible resolution to this problem. If one could assume with Kant that what we know are not things in themselves, then freedom is possible in a determined world as a practical power of choice through the transcendental freedom of the human being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The writings of Alfred Sohn-Rethel, an obscure figure on the margins of the Frankfurt School, provide the clearest instance of the project of reconciling Marx's historical materialism with Kant's transcendental idealism. Sohn-Rethel's Marx is an unorthodox Kantian who concedes that objects of knowledge reflect the mind, while insisting that the mind is itself formed by modes of economic production. The categories and forms of intuition derive from the "real abstraction" inherent in the practice of commodity exchange. In situating the transcendental conditions in this practice itself, Sohn-Rethel's project differs from other attempts (by Cassirer and Heidegger) to socialize and historicize the a priori. Moreover, it has broad philosophical relevance, opening up a rapprochement between neo-Kantian strains of analytic philosophy and Marx. The recent analytic rehabilitation of Hegel provides a possible blueprint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I attempt to deal with Husserl's transcendental turn in connection with the reception by the Göttingen circle through three different aspects. My contribution aims to be chiefly historical, in order to provide a general picture of one of the most important events in the history of phenomenology, but also to enact possible systematic consequences related to the interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology after this event. First, I briefly recover the background within which Husserl erected with his Logische Untersuchungen, going over his development until the publication of his Ideen I, reconstructing the main points and features expounded in the latter that characterized transcendental phenomenology. Secondly, I put forward a general characterization of some of the main critiques raised by his students at the time, namely the concept of pure consciousness and world, as well as the performance of the phenomenological method. Thirdly, I attempt to expose, by means of Husserl's later texts, some of his main responses to misunderstandings regarding his phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to analyze the reasons that led Husserl to transcendental idealism. Starting from an essay by Roman Ingarden, disciple of Husserl, we will see and deepen three of the main reasons, namely, the attempt to make philosophy a rigorous science, problems about the true method of knowledge and some results about outer perception and inner perception. With this, we will better understand Husserl's relationship with transcendental idealism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the systematic connections between Fink and Fichte. For this purpose, three points are emphasized. The text that is mainly referred to is the VI. Cartesian Meditation. The first point concerns the notion of "construction", which is methodologically central to the genuine mode of knowledge of transcendental idealism; secondly, a consideration will be given to the extent to which "reflection of reflection" provides crucial insights for the basic position of phenomenological transcendental idealism; and third, in a concluding consideration of the status of transcendental idealism, several points will be made which should allow us to grasp "transcendental idealism" in Kant, Fichte, Husserl, and Fink as precisely as possible. These considerations make it their task to contribute to counteract the indeterminacy of this concept within this entire tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a critical analysis of the influence of I. Kant's ideas on the work of analytical philosophers. It is substantiated the thesis on the independence of Kantian ontology from transcendental epistemology. The article investigated possible areas of integration for various aspects of Kantian ontology and epistemology in the theories of a number of analytical philosophers (P. F. Strawson, W. V. O. Quine), who were directly influenced by I. Kant's ideas. A semantic analysis of the concepts they use does not confirm the hypothesis about the evolutionary influence of Kantian transcendental epistemology on the ontological aspects of the works of analytical philosophers (ontology of language, logical-semantic concepts, notions of proposition and modality, categories of particulars and universals)

Kant officially argues that the role of the representation of time in the synthetic a priori judgments of arithmetic and the general theory of motion implies that time must be an a priori condition of intuition. In this paper, I claim that the ideality of the representation of time is independently supported also by Kant's explanation of the possibility of temporal experience. I show that two suppositions motivate Kant's claim that time cannot be a determination of outer appearances and that it must rather belong to inners sense. According to Kant, sensations are momentary states, and parts of time exist in succession. I demonstrate that similar suppositions underlie Locke's account of the empirical acquisition of the ideas of succession and duration that influenced Kant's discussion. I then single out the flaws in Locke's theory. I clarify why given Locke and Kant's suppositions, the representation of time cannot originate from perceiving in inner sense a stream of motionless ideas, as Locke supposed. Locke's account does not involve memory. Nevertheless, in the final section I clarify why given the aforementioned suppositions, the representation of time cannot originate also from memory. It must originate from pure imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper presents an elucidation of Kant’s notion of judgment, which clearly is a central challenge to the understanding of the Critic of Pure Reason, as well as of the Transcendental Idealism. In contrast to contemporary interpretation, but taking it as starting point, the following theses will be endorsed here: i) the synthesis of judgment expresses a conceptual relation understood as subordination in traditional Aristotelian logical scheme; ii) the logical form of judgment does not comprise intuitions (or singular representations); iii) the relation to intuition is not a judgment concern; iv) the response to the question about the ‘x’ that grounds the conceptual relation in judgments must be sought in transcendental aspects: 1) on construction in pure form of intuition, 2) in experience and 3) in the requirements to experience, respectively to mathematical, empirical, and philosophical judgments. The overall purpose is to build up an understanding of judgment that supports a latter assessment of Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

One of the core issues where interpreters of Kant disagree concerns his alleged Noumenalism—the claim that the objects of our experience, which are in space and time, are underpinned by entities that are not spatio-temporal and that non-spatio-temporally cause our representations of empirical objects. Although there is much textual evidence in favour of Noumenalism, non-Noumenalists have also gathered a significant number of philosophical and exegetical challenges to such a reading of Kant. I present a novel way of understanding the Noumenalist view, which characterises the distinction between appearances and things in themselves as the distinction between referents and truthmakers. I show that, on this interpretation of Kant, the most pressing problems for the Noumenalist reading are primarily based on equivocations between features of reference and features of truthmaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Edith Stein was first one of Husserl's disciples and adopted her method of "eidetic reduction" (as a way to reach the essence of things). She then discovered Thomas of Aquinas' metaphysics, a realism which Husserl's later work seemed to betray. However Edith Stein's Thomism is not a literal return to the thinking of Aquinas: indeed, her fidelity to Husserl's essentialism drove her to a conception of being withought which the me-subject plays an essential role in the way to the knowledge of the truth. On can then wonder if the philosophical work of Edith Stein leads to a genuine synthesis between the two sources of her thinking. Our hypothesis is that saint Augustine's metaphysics enables her to articulate the theocentrical vision of the world, coming from Thomism, and a philosophy of mind taken from Husserl, for which the truth cannot only be discovered in the interiority of her consciousness. Thus can we characterize Edith Stein's thinking as the expression of "Augustinian Thomism". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Much recent attention has been paid to Kant’s account of the unity of space in the Critique of Pure Reason, not least because of the significant implications of that view for other key critical-period doctrines. But far less attention has been paid to the development of Kant’s account of the unity of space. This paper aims to offer a systematic account of Kant’s pre-critical account of the unity of space. On the view presented herein, Kant’s early account of the unity of space is deeply rooted in his pre-critical cosmological views. In particular, I argue that Kant sees the unity of space as grounded in the cosmological unity of the world of substances, which is itself rooted in the divine conservation of all substances in relations of mutual causal dependence. I contend that the seeds of this view are present in the late 1740s and 1750s, but that this view receives its fullest and most complete expression in the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation. The final section of the paper considers the fate of Kant’s pre-critical account of the unity of space. I contend that the theory is excluded from the Critique of Pure Reason in light of the strict epistemological strictures adopted in that text. But considerable textual evidence shows that Kant continues to aver the theory throughout the 1770s and 1780s in the looser epistemic context of his lectures. I contend, then, that this theory is not abandoned at all. Rather, like Kant’s 1763 proof of the existence of God, it is epistemically demoted: it is Kant’s preferred view, but one that falls short of the demanding epistemic standards of the critical philosophy.

In this paper I intend to offer an interpretation to the “Second proposition” of practical philosophy — Chapter IV of the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800). From this textual delimitation my hypothesis is restricted to suggest that the relationship of reciprocal and indirect interaction between self-consciousnesses occupies a strategic “place” in Schelling's argument, since, it enables, at least initially, two problems to be solved: (1) the one concerning the contradiction rooted in the original limit of the transcendental acts of intelligence’s self-constitution as individual and free consciousness; and (2) the one regarding the articulation between theoretical and practical philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]