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To enhance service delivery and local democracy, legislators have tinkered with size or status of local governments in the Philippines. This elasticity in local borders has been more evident at the province level, the highest local government tier. Since 1987, a new province is birthed roughly every three years. As the determinants and mechanisms of contemporary province fragmentation are under-examined, this article investigates, at several policymaking levels and dimensions, attempts to redraw borders of Philippine provinces. Framed by an institutional framework and a case-study approach, and employing a veto-player analysis, heuristic cases of two provinces (Quezon and Zamboanga del Sur) were unpacked and compared. Findings reveal that there is a large and fragmented veto-player group in the area of territorial rescaling of provinces. Congruence of preferences among veto players was observed to be influenced by territorial leveraging, pivot on networks and reciprocity norm, and mirroring of preferences. The tenacity and strategic actions of reform agent or policy entrepreneur (usually the congressman), sometimes assisted by social movement, is likewise found crucial in the pathways leading to reform outcomes. In a simple cross-case analysis of recent reform attempts, findings also suggest that the provinces' core-periphery location pattern, and proposed type of spatio-jurisdictional partition are associated with reform outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agricultural productivity improvements are essential for achieving overall economic growth. The Philippine performance on both counts has been disappointing. Agricultural extension which is one way of improving productivity has undergone substantial change in the last thirteen years through devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991. Whether devolution has improved agricultural extension delivery is a key question. Devolution generally has yielded some positive outcomes: cooperation between local government units (LGUs) and with the private sector and nongovernment organizations (NGOs); recognition of the realities of globalization; and use of modern management and communication. But problems of capacity building, partisan local politics and uncertain lines of financial and decision making accountability between central and local government remain. These general lessons apply to agricultural extension. Moreover, even the best extension service, whether delivered by local or central government, is unlikely to be effective where farmer decision making is unduly influenced by government controls and pricing policies and where security of tenure is weak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]