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The aim of this paper is to assess the views of market participants concerning the institutional investors’ role in implementing book-building pricing of IPOs as Nepal seeks to implement it. A total of 125 market participants were approached for data collection using a structured questionnaire that took a six-month period from January to June 2020. Descriptive and inferential statistics were employed to analyze the collected data. The study found that the role of institutional investors in the prevailing stock market is brutally meager because of the restrained regulatory provisions. Market participants opined that institutional investors play a vital role in developing the stock market and executing book building. Implementation of book building demands a rigorous amendment in the existing regulations that allow institutional investors to enter and play in the market. A precise classification and definition of the potential roles of institutional investors are essential so that the application of the building pricing mechanism could be expected to be more effective. Market participants believed that the active participation of institutional investors will help lure manufacturing and real sector companies, trading houses and hotels into the capital market for public offerings. Issue managers, portfolio managers, share registrars, and stockbrokers agree that the role of institutional investors is inevitable in implementing book-building pricing.

Research Purposes. This study aims to enrich findings about the underpricing phenomenon and to find underpricing trends in various economic conditions that affect stock market activity in the period of the year used in this study. Research Method. The underpricing phenomenon in this study was carried out in a reasonably long research period of 5 years from 2015 to 2019. A total of 72 companies were used as samples in the study. Data were analyzed using multiple regression analysis. Research Result and Findings. The results found that company size as measured by the number of company assets is the most significant factor for investors in determining their investment for companies that have just listed shares on the stock exchange. An assessment of a company's assets can be the basis for measuring risk, prospects, and the ability to provide returns in the future.

Copyright of Unternehmung: Swiss Journal of Business Research & Practice is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We introduce a new market making algorithm, the Signal-adaptive (SA) strategy, that takes into account the empirical recurrences of the historical intra-day price series of IPOs and the current risk properties addressed by the market maker. Empirical analysis on IPO high-frequency data allows to compare the performance of the SA strategy with two state-of-art competing strategies, suggesting that the SA strategy could be suitable for the price support activity of the IPO in the first days of its issuance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The system of high-quality risk-management is a provider of financial resistance and stability for insurance company. The point raised in this publication is the lack of formed methodology for creating organized system of effective risk control, and the second one is insufficient professional level of education of underwriter and surveyor - core experts in this system.

Using a unique data set of dealer-level trading data in bookbuilding initial public offerings (IPOs), we find strong evidence that lead underwriter trades in IPO firms are significantly related to subsequent IPO abnormal returns. This relation is concentrated among issues in which underwriters' information advantage is likely greater, specifically among IPOs with higher information asymmetry or subject to higher investor sentiment and among underwriters with the most industry experience. In contrast, we find no similar relation for trades by other syndicate members, who are not involved in due diligence or pricing, or around auction IPOs, which are characterized by less underwriter involvement. Our results are consistent with the joint hypothesis that underwriters of bookbuilding IPOs gain unique insight into the values of these client firms and that they trade on this information advantage. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to elucidate the main differences between certain types of professional appraisers of risks and losses in the insurance market infrastructure of Ukraine. Analyzing and summarizing the provisions of regulatory legal acts and the results of researches by leading scientists in the field of insurance, it is determined that the range of functions of the underwriter at the stage preceding the conclusion of the insurance contract are somewhat wider than those of the surveyor, and the range of functions of the emergency commissioner at the stage of settlement of the insured event are wider than those of the appraiser, the average adjuster and the adjuster. Taking into account that professional appraisers of risks and losses as well as actuaries are responsible for the appraisals and recommendations provided by them, it is advisable to insure their professional responsibility. It is found that the number of certified emergency commissioners and actuaries is low in Ukraine, which requires further stimulation of the development of the insurance market infrastructure in terms of these components. Due to the fact that the work of the surveyor and adjuster is not legally regulated in Ukraine, these issues constitute prospects for further researches in this area.

The article reveals the essence of banking scoring and the importance of compiling high-quality scoring models for assessing risks when working with borrowers. The complexity of processing surface information about the borrower and the need for clarification with additional questions are indicated. The history and causes of the appearance of scoring modeling in the middle of the 20th century are described. The main criteria for scoring used to create algorithms for assessing the financial reliability of the borrower are listed. The contribution of post-Soviet scientists to the improvement of scoring models is indicated. Further prospects of banking scoring and its relevance in the light of the emergence of more progressive evaluation programs.

The research about abnormal return of initial offering has been carried out by many other researchers. The results indicated that underpricing which signed by positive abnormal returns occurred in the short time. However, the effects that has caused underpricing was still indicate inconsistency. The objective of this research is to examine the differences of abnormal return between company that carry out initial public offering in the period before and during monetary crisis,with a special reference to Jakarta Stock Exchange. Furthermore, it also aims to find out effects of stock value uncertainty and company value that proxied by standard deviation and age, effect of informed demand proxied by delay time, and effect of underwriter reputation on abnormal return. Results indicated that there was significant abnormal return difference between the periods before and during monetary crisis. The factor that effected abnormal return in the period before monetary crisis was delay variable and underwriter reputation. The results was contrary with initial assumption. The significant factor that influenced abnormal return in the period during monetary crisis was standard deviation and age

Insurance is critical to the fabric of modern societies and economies, but the insurance industry continues to suffer deep cycles and periodic crises. These have a great socio-economic cost as insurance cover can become prohibitively expensive or unavailable, damaging livelihoods, property, belongings and employment. These phenomena are poorly understood. A set of socio-anthropological and behavioural hypotheses have recently been posited. We investigate these explanations by means of an agent-based simulation model. The model is parameterized on actual property insurance industry data and is carefully validated. Our main result is that simple behaviour and interaction at the individual level can result in complex cyclical industry-wide behaviour. Heterogeneity and interaction at a micro level must therefore be understood if cycles and crises in the insurance industry are to be managed and prevented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The capital-intensive nature of the port industry and the long payback period of port investments traditionally determine high financial needs for operating the business. Due to the growing financial requirements for developing greenfield mega-projects and feeding international terminal operators’ overseas expansion, equity markets are expected to extend their role in promoting the industry. In this perspective, the underpricing phenomenon, which represents a direct cost for the issuer during initial public offering (IPO) and discourages companies from going public, is neglected by port literature. The paper explores the antecedents of IPO underpricing in ports. Building upon extant finance and port literature, firm characteristics, transaction features, and country-specific variables are tested as determinants of IPOs’ initial returns. For the aim of this study, 58 port-related IPOs taking place on international stock exchanges are examined, and ordinary least squares regression analysis is performed. The study offers unprecedented understandings of the phenomenon and supports port managers in facing financial challenges. Before launching the IPO, financial executives are invited to carefully identify time-window opportunities, and to monitor underwriters’ reputation when selecting financial partners. Findings bring insights for policymakers, as the public listing of port companies emerges a viable option for implementing port reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Problems of Economy is the property of Research Centre for Industrial Developmen Problems of Nas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines what determines the offer price for a ChiNext IPO and discusses how we can improve the current "Chinese-style" bookbuilding process. We establish that the ChiNext IPO underwriter relies upon the institutional investors to discover the issuer's intrinsic value (in the form of a preliminary price), and that the same underwriter adjusts the preliminary price to establish the final offer price, based on its assessment of the institutional investors' motivations. Since the underwriter does not have discretionary power in new share allocation, this "Chinese-style" bookbuilding process contains certain pitfalls from an information asymmetry standpoint. The institutional investors mainly use "simple and direct" variables that do not adequately reflect the issuer's true intrinsic value to develop the preliminary price, while the underwriter adjusts that price downward to establish the offer price to clear the market, as a measure to counter a perceived free-rider issue among the institutional investors. This process, in effect, contributes to initial IPO underpricing and causes principal-agent conflicts between the underwriter and the issuer. We argue that such a pricing inefficiency could be improved by an innovative "bookbuilding plus price discretionary auction" process, which is a combination of the modified OpenIPO and Taiwan-style auctioned IPO approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The extant literature offers extensive support for the significant role played by institutions in financial markets, but implicit regulation and monitoring have yet to be examined. This study fills this void in the literature by employing unique Chinese datasets to explore the implicit regulation and penalties imposed by the Chinese government in regulating the initial public offering (IPO) market. Of particular interest are the economic consequences of underwriting IPO deals for client firms that violate regulatory rules in China’s capital market. We provide evidence to show that the associated underwriters’ reputations are impaired and their market share declines. We further explore whether such negative consequences result from a market disciplinary mechanism or a penalty imposed by the government. To analyze the possibility of a market disciplinary mechanism at work, we investigate (1) the market reaction to other client firms whose IPO deals were underwritten by underwriters associated with a violation at the time the violation was publicly disclosed and (2) the under-pricing of IPO deals undertaken by these underwriters after such disclosure. To analyze whether the government imposes an implicit penalty, we examine the application processing time for future IPO deals underwritten by the associated underwriters and find it to be significantly longer than for IPO deals underwritten by other underwriters. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the market penalizes underwriters for the rule-violating behavior of their client firms in China. Instead, the Chinese government implicitly penalizes them by imposing more stringent criteria on and lengthening the processing time of the IPO deals they subsequently underwrite.

We examine conflicts of interests arising from the pricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in underwritten dividend reinvestment plans (DRIPs). A DRIP is a type of SEO that enables shareholders automatically to reinvest their dividend entitlements in the issuing company's shares. The underwriters have an incentive to sell stock during the DRIP pricing period in order to hedge price risk and/or to reduce the price at which shares are issued. Using individual brokers' transactions, we show that underwriting brokers engage in an abnormally high level of selling during the issue pricing period. Comparison of pricing period returns between stocks with underwritten DRIPs and a matched sample of non-underwritten DRIPs shows that significantly more negative returns accrue to firms that have their issues underwritten. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El propósito central del presente artículo se fundamenta en conocer la regulación específica hasta el año 2013, del contrato Underwriting en cuanto a la emisión de bonos en Colombia, para determinar si puede dar lugar al lavado de activos; para ello se hace necesario un abordaje normativo acerca de la emisión de bonos en el mercado bursátil colombiano con fundamento en planteamiento de orden doctrinal, jurisprudencial y de derecho comparado; de igual forma, se toma en consideración una definición precisa sobre el contrato de Underwriting, entendido éste como una modalidad contractual atípica, e identificando a la vez sus características, ventajas y desventajas; finalmente, se indaga sobre la normatividad que sanciona el lavado de activos y su correspondiente relación con la emisión de bonos.

The basic means to ensure the investor protection and market efficiency in an initial public offering transaction is to provide full information concerning the securities and issuers of those securities. The appropriate way to make this information available is to publish a prospectus. The structure and content of the prospectus documents are subject to detailed legal regulation in the European Union. Furthermore, to facilitate the coherent and reliable drafting of prospectuses, a separate liability regime attaches to the content of these documents in the law of capital markets. This takes a fairly similar characteristic in the developed economies, such as in the European Union and the United States. Also the techniques of mitigating this kind of liability risk have evolved. With conducting a complex, so-called due diligence examination, belief can be acquired about the reliability and entirety of the published information, and so legal risks can be mitigated or avoided. In this Article the authors would like to provide insight into this core issue of initial public offering transactions, which could be relevant for all investors and capital market lawyers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how underwriter-issuer matching choices and firm risks affect the cost of equity issuance. We show that underwriter-issuer matching is not random; it reflects underwriter reputation and risk concerns, issuers' quality, and equity market conditions. We apply Heckman self-selection estimation model to control for the endogenous underwriter-issuer matching. We find that the matching choice leads to considerable heterogeneity in pricing of issuer systematic and firm-specific risks in seasoned equity offering (SEO) underwriting fees. Low-reputation underwriters require compensation for bearing issuer's systematic risk but not for firm-specific risk, while high-reputation underwriters do the opposite. Moreover, evidence in this paper suggests that the underwriter-issuer matching decision entails a non-linear relation between SEO spread and underwriter reputation: high- and low- reputation underwriters earn higher spreads than medium-reputation underwriters. Our findings highlight the importance of accounting for underwriter-issuer matching in assessing SEO underwriting contracts. The results are robust to alternative underwriter reputation measure, model specifications, sample periods, and different samples of firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between the intended use-of-proceeds and the bank characteristics and the bank underwriters' certification effect in Japan. We find that the bank underwriters are positively associated with the announcement return and the post-issue performance. However, if an issuer discloses that the intended use-of-proceeds is the repayment of loans, the bank underwriters are no longer associated with the announcement return and the post-issue performance. We also find that the banks' equity holdings are negatively associated with the announcement return. We conclude that the bank certification effect differs depending on the disclosed intended use-of-proceeds and the bank characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study updates previous analyses of banks' activities in equity offerings in the Brazilian market. Using data for the 2004–2007 period, the study tests the hypotheses that banks with the highest reputations coordinate offerings with lower initial returns, lower levels of risk and charge more for their services. Three measures of reputation were constructed in line with measures used for the US market. None of the measures showed a statistically significant relationship with returns, risk, or remuneration. The difference between the mid-point of the preliminary price range and the offering price constituted the most significant element in the forecasting of returns. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: The extant literature offers extensive support for the significant role played by institutions in financial markets, but implicit regulation and monitoring have yet to be examined. This study fills this void in the literature by employing unique Chinese datasets to explore the implicit regulation and penalties imposed by the Chinese government in regulating the initial public offering (IPO) market. Of particular interest are the economic consequences of underwriting IPO deals for client firms that violate regulatory rules in China’s capital market. We provide evidence to show that the associated underwriters’ reputations are impaired and their market share declines. We further explore whether such negative consequences result from a market disciplinary mechanism or a penalty imposed by the government. To analyze the possibility of a market disciplinary mechanism at work, we investigate (1) the market reaction to other client firms whose IPO deals were underwritten by underwriters associated with a violation at the time the violation was publicly disclosed and (2) the under-pricing of IPO deals undertaken by these underwriters after such disclosure. To analyze whether the government imposes an implicit penalty, we examine the application processing time for future IPO deals underwritten by the associated underwriters and find it to be significantly longer than for IPO deals underwritten by other underwriters. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the market penalizes underwriters for the rule-violating behavior of their client firms in China. Instead, the Chinese government implicitly penalizes them by imposing more stringent criteria on and lengthening the processing time of the IPO deals they subsequently underwrite. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper examines the accuracy of security analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for firms in 13 European countries. We document at least three key findings. First, we find strong evidence that lead and co-lead underwriter analysts’ earnings estimates and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic than those provided by unaffiliated analysts. Second, we find that lead and co-lead underwriter analysts’ earnings forecast and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic for underwriter stocks than for those they provide for other stocks. Third, we also find evidence that these biases found within earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are not driven by one particular country. In short, these findings suggest that affiliated analysts are more optimistic perhaps to maintain investment banking relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reexamines the validity of Baron’s (J Financ 37:955–976, ) model of IPO underpricing, in which IPO underpricing is caused by asymmetric information between issuers and investment bankers. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (J Financ Econ 24:125–135, ) find that lead-manager IPOs are significantly more underpriced than non-self-marketed IPOs and conclude that their empirical results do not support Baron’s model. We compare self-marketed underwriters’ IPOs with non-self-marketed underwriters’ IPOs and with IPOs they lead. Our empirical results show that it is premature to reject Baron’s model of IPO underpricing when we take issuer incentives into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies show that co-managers mainly affect initial public offering (IPO) aftermarket activities. We investigate the role of co-managers in IPO pre-market activities. We argue that co-managers help reduce IPO placement risk and hypothesize that IPO issuers hire more co-managers when placement risk is higher. We find the number of co-managers is positively associated with three proxies for placement risk. IPOs with more price uncertainty and high-tech IPOs hire more co-managers, while IPOs in regulated industries hire fewer co-managers. We also find larger IPOs, recent IPOs, and IPOs with more reputable lead underwriters hire more co-managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One hundred and sixty two venture-capital-backed internet and software companies were examined that floated IPOs in 1998 and 1999 to see how the quality of the venture capital firm and the quality of the underwriter affected market capitalization. It was found that companies backed by top venture capital firms and taken public by top underwriters had higher market capitalizations and produced higher returns for their venture capitalists than other companies. In the post-IPO market, only the quality of the underwriter made a difference to the market capitalization. It was also found that there was a noticeable deterioration in the overall pre-IPO financial performance in the 1998-1999 era compared with the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

[Display omitted] We examine a period in Korea during which a price supporting regulation called the putback option was imposed on the IPO underwriter. Under the regulation, individual investors of IPO had put options which can be exercised at 90% of IPO price. We find that during the regulation period, institutional investors' flipping activity is evident not on the days following the IPO but on the days following the expiration of putback option. Our study shows that the regulation results in merely delaying the institutional investors' documented trading behavior and provides evidence that the relationship between the underwriter and the institutional investors affects the trading of institutional investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]