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11 results on '"Ubeda, Luis"'

3. A model of multiple equilibria in geographic labor mobility

Author

Spilimbergo, Antonio and Ubeda, Luis

Subjects
Unemployment insurance -- Laws, regulations and rules, Emigration and immigration -- Analysis, Labor market, Government regulation, Business, Economics
Abstract

We develop a model of double matching in the labor market and the social environment in order to explain different migration patterns in response to local economic shocks. This approach explains the different behaviors of workers in different groups, regions, or countries in an endogenous way by showing the existence of multiple equilibria, rather than in an exogenous manner by introducing ex ante regulations or unemployment benefits. This model can also explain why individuals from some communities form 'sister' communities in some cases and not in others. JEL classification: J61; E24; R23 Keywords: Migration; Double matching; Social integration; Sister villages; Unemployment

Published
2004

7. Capacity precommitment and price competition yield cournot outcomes

Author

Moreno, Diego and Ubeda, Luis

Subjects
Economía
Abstract

We study an industry of a homogeneous good where n firms with identical technology compete by first building capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choosing a "reservation price" at which they are willing to sell their entire capacities. We show that every pure strategy equilibrium yields the Cournot outcome, and that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.

Published
2001

8. Capacity precommitment and price competition yield cournot outcomes

Author

Ubeda, Luis and Moreno, Diego

Abstract

We study an industry of a homogeneous good where n firms with identical technology compete by first building capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choosing a "reservation price" at which they are willing to sell their entire capacities. We show that every pure strategy equilibrium yields the Cournot outcome, and that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.

Published
2001

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