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Ethics dumping is the practice of undertaking research in a low- or middle-income setting which would not be permitted, or would be severely restricted, in a high-income setting. Whilst Kenya operates a sophisticated research governance system, resource constraints and the relatively low number of accredited research ethics committees limit the capacity for ensuring ethical compliance. As a result, Kenya has been experiencing cases of ethics dumping. This article presents 11 challenges in the context of preventing ethics dumping in Kenya, namely variations in governance standards, resistance to double ethics review, resource constraints, unresolved issues in the management of biological samples, unresolved issues in the management of primary data, unsuitable informed consent procedures, cultural insensitivity, differing standards of care, reluctance to provide feedback to research communities, power differentials which facilitate the exploitation of local researchers and lack of local relevance and/or affordability of the resultant products. A reflective approach for researchers, built around the values of fairness, respect, care and honesty, is presented as a means of taking shared responsibility for preventing ethics dumping.

The impact of the SARS‐CoV‐2 (COVID‐19) pandemic on medical education is well described. Here, we describe an aspect that has received little attention so far, namely the ethical implications of continued bedside teaching. As a team of clinical educators supported by one of our students and an ethicist, we describe this unexpected challenge and how we navigated it in an already existing sea of COVID‐induced issues and uncertainty.

This article looks at what anarchism has to offer in debates concerning health and healthcare. I present the case that anarchism’s interest in supporting the poor, sick, and marginalized, and rejection of state and corporate power, places it in a good position to offer creative ways to address health problems. I maintain that anarchistic values of autonomy, responsibility, solidarity, and community are central to this endeavor. Rather than presenting a case that follows one particular anarchist theory, my main goal is to raise issues and initiate debate in this underresearched field in mainstream bioethics.

Policy makers from around the world are trying to emulate successful innovation systems in order to support economic growth. At the same time, innovation governance systems are being put in place to ensure a better integration of stakeholder views into the research and development process. In Europe, one of the most prominent and newly emerging governance frameworks is called Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). This article aims to substantiate the following points: (1) The concept of RRI and the concept of justice can be used to derive similar ethical positions on the nano-divide. (2) Given the ambitious policy aims of RRI (e.g. economic competitiveness enhancer), the concept may be better suited to push for ethical outcomes on access to nanotechnology and its products rather than debates based on justice issues alone. It may thus serve as a mediator concept between those who push solely for competitiveness considerations and those who push solely for justice considerations in nano-technology debates. (3) The descriptive, non-normative Systems of Innovation approaches (see below) should be linked into RRI debates to provide more evidence on whether the approach advocated to achieve responsible and ethical governance of research and innovation (R&I) can indeed deliver on competitiveness (in nano-technology and other fields).

Cross-sectorial, dynamic, and innovative partnerships are essential to resolve the challenges of humankind in the 21st century. At the same time, trust in each other’s integrity and good will is a precondition for the solution of any complex problem, and certainly for the success of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda. Experience shows that a nation’s economic and social success is at its greatest if, and when, there is cooperation and even cocreation involving a fair division of labor and responsibility among the different societal stakeholders. This paper uses Ralf Dahrendorf’s seminal work on obligations, as well as the European Commission’s Science with and for Society unit’s definition of responsible research and innovation (RRI), to motivate industry responsibilities to make the world a healthier place.

In justifying punishment we sometimes appeal to the idea that the punished offender has, by his criminal action against others, forfeited his moral right (and therefore his legal right) against hard treatment by the state. The imposition of suffering, or deprivation of liberty, loses its prima facie morally objectionable character, and becomes morally permissible.\ud \ud Philosophers interrogating the forfeited right theory generally focus on whether the forfeiting of the right constitutes a necessary or a sufficient condition for punishment to be permissible; rarely do they ask whether the idea of a right that can be forfeited is itself morally illuminating. The article examines and criticizes various versions of this theory. It concludes that the forfeited right arguments add little other than rhetorical dignity to the existing repertoire of justifications for punishment. They can be most usefully understood as communicating the thought that the offender cannot reasonably complain about the violation of rights he himself has violated. But the incapacitation of the offender's reasonable complaint does not entail that we are justified in punishing him.

This study aimed to critically review methods for ranking risks related to food safety and dietary hazards on the basis of their anticipated human health impacts. A literature review was performed to identify and characterize methods for risk ranking from the fields of food, environmental science and socio-economic sciences. The review used a predefined search protocol, and covered the bibliographic databases Scopus, CAB Abstracts, Web of Sciences, and PubMed over the period 1993-2013. All references deemed relevant, on the basis of of predefined evaluation criteria, were included in the review, and the risk ranking method characterized. The methods were then clustered - based on their characteristics - into eleven method categories. These categories included: risk assessment, comparative risk assessment, risk ratio method, scoring method, cost of illness, health adjusted life years, multi-criteria decision analysis, risk matrix, flow charts/decision trees, stated preference techniques and expert synthesis. Method categories were described by their characteristics, weaknesses and strengths, data resources, and fields of applications. It was concluded there is no single best method for risk ranking. The method to be used should be selected on the basis of risk manager/assessor requirements, data availability, and the characteristics of the method. Recommendations for future use and application are provided.

The use of non-human primates in biomedical research is a contentious issue that raises serious ethical and practical concerns. In the European Union, where regulations on their use are very tight, the number of non-human primates used in research has been in decline over the past decade. However, this decline has been paralleled by an increase in numbers used elsewhere in the world, with less regard for some of the ethical issues (e.g. genetic manipulations). There is evidence that researchers from high-income countries (HICs), where regulations on the use of non-human primates are strict, may be tempted to conduct some of their experiments in countries where regulation is less strict, through new collaborative efforts.\ud In collaborative ventures, equivalence in the application of ethical standards in animal research, regardless of location, is necessary to avoid this exploitation

Despite some clear positives, the draft text of the Sustainable Development Goals does not fulfill its self-proclaimed purpose of inspiring and guiding a concerted international effort to eradicate severe poverty everywhere in all of its forms. We offer some critical comments on the proposed agreement and suggest 10 ways to embolden the goals and amplify their appeal and moral power. While it may well be true that the world’s poor are better off today than their predecessors were decades or centuries ago, to judge whether this is moral progress, we must bring into view what was possible then and what is possible now. We may well find that there have never been so many people avoidably subjected to life threatening deprivations as there are today, and if this is the case, we should insist that our governments end this oppression immediately through appropriate institutional reforms to be prominently outlined in their post-2015 agenda.

The claim that the answers we give to many of the central questions in genethics will depend crucially upon the particular rationality we adopt in addressing them is central to Matti Häyry’s thorough and admirably fair-minded book, Rationality and the Genetic Challenge. That claim implies, of course, that there exists a plurality of rationalities, or discrete styles of reasoning, that can be deployed when considering concrete moral problems. This, indeed, is Häyry’s position. Although he believes that there are certain features definitive of any type of thinking that can accurately be labeled rational, he maintains that nothing about that set of features compels us to conclude that there is a single rationality. What is more, and significantly for the way in which Häyry’s book develops, there is no Archimedean point from which we are licensed to pronounce one flavor of rational deliberation to be intrinsically superior to any other or to be justified to the exclusion of all others. To this belief that “there are many divergent rationalities, all of which can be simultaneously valid,” we can perhaps give the name “the Doctrine of the Plurality of Rationalities” or, for short, “DPR.”

In contrast to the vast literature on retributive theories of punishment, discussions of private revenge are rare in moral philosophy. This paper reviews some examples, from both classical and recent writers. It detects, both in the philosophical tradition and in contemporary moral discourse, uncertainty and equivocation over the ethical significance of acts of revenge, and in particular over their possible resemblances, in motive, purpose or justification, to acts of lawful punishment. A key problem for the coherence of our ethical conception of revenge, it suggests, is the consideration that certain acts of revenge may be just (at least in the minimal sense that the victim of revenge has no grounds for complaint against the revenger) and yet be generally agreed to be morally wrong. It argues that the challenge of explaining adequately why private revenge is morally wrong poses particular difficulty for purely retributive theories of punishment, since without invoking consequentialist reasons it does not seem possible adequately to motivate an objection to just and proportionate acts of revenge. The paper concludes by identifying some of the directions in which further reflection on the moral and political significance of revenge might proceed.

For everything that happens at the edge of the orifices (of orality, but also of the ear, the eye-and all the ‘senses’ in general) the metonymy of ‘eating well’ [bien manger] would always be the rule. - Derrida ‘Eating Well’\ud \ud The beguiling 2008 film adaptation of Lord Dunsany’s 1936 novella, Dean Spanley, prescribes what I call an ‘animal cure’ for the melancholia of an elderly man. This man, Fisk, maintains an extremely formalised relationship with his surviving son, Henslowe, with whom he can scarcely discuss the recent deaths of his wife and his other son. Henslowe becomes fascinated with the highly convincing stories produced by the local clergyman, the eponymous Dean, of his life as a dog when enjoying the scent of the Hungarian liquor, Tokay. Realising that the dog, in whose name the Dean speaks, uncannily recalls the lost pet of his father’s childhood, Henslowe effects his animal cure through the means of a dinner party. From the moment that this pet, Wag, is ‘returned’ through the medium of the Dean’s apparent recollections, Fisk can begin to cry and thus to admit his grief. Yet from this moment too, the intoxication with Dean Spanley fades: the last scene sees a happy Fisk accompanied by a new pet dog.\ud \ud Through the inhalation of Tokay, the Dean is transformed. His olfactory intake of the other speaks of an identification named in the narrative as reincarnation but that invites speculation on death, mourning, transference and friendship among and for animals, specifically the dog (as man’s best friend). Women may inhabit the periphery of this film, but the motivation and the action of Dean Spanley remain within the homosocial preserve of men and/as male dogs. With the turning point of the film located around the dinner table, this homosociality has the sense of the mythical ‘band of brothers’ enjoying the primal feast, gorging on the adventures told by the Dean and gloriously depicted by the film matching human voice-over to canine action. \ud \ud This essay will explore the interrelated oral processes of incorporation and introjection in the double mourning at stake in Dean Spanley, as exemplified by the terse Fisk and loquacious Dean (and as theorized by Abraham and Torok). While the Dean inadvertently teaches Fisk how to ‘eat well,’ in Derrida’s phrase, which is to say how to mourn, this essay will examine the uneven relation to mourning for humans and for animals, specifically that exceptional animal or exception to ‘animality’, the pet dog.

Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) has emerged as a science policy framework that attempts to import broad social values into technological innovation processes whilst supporting institutional decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. When looking at RRI from a ‘principled’ perspective, we consider responsibility and justice to be important cornerstones of the framework. The main aim of this article is to suggest a method of realising these principles through the application of a limited Rawlsian Difference Principle in the distribution of public funds for research and innovation.\ud \ud There are reasons why the world's combined innovative capacity has spewed forth iPhones and space shuttles but not yet managed to produce clean energy or universal access to clean water. (Stilgoe 2013, xii)\ud \ud I derive great optimism from empathy's evolutionary antiquity. It makes it a robust trait that will develop in virtually every human being so that society can count on it and try to foster and grow it. It is a human universal.\ud (de Waal 2009, 209)\ud \ud Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) has emerged as a science policy framework that attempts to import broad social values into technological innovation processes whilst supporting institutional decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. In this respect, RRI re-focuses technological governance from standard debates on risks to discussions about the ethical stewardship of innovation.\ud \ud This is a radical step in Science & Technology (S&T) policy as it lifts the non-quantifiable concept of values into the driving seat of decision-making. The focus of innovation then goes beyond product considerations to include the processes and – importantly – the purposes of innovation (Owen et al. 2013, 34). Shared public values are seen as the cornerstone of the new RRI framework, while market mechanisms and risk-based regulations are of a secondary order.\ud \ud What are the values that could drive RRI? There are different approaches to the identification of public values. They can be located in democratically agreed processes and commitments (such as European Union treaties and policy statements) or they can be developed organically via public engagement processes. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. For instance, although constitutional values can be regarded as democratically legitimate, their application to specific technological fields can be difficult or ambiguous (Schroeder and Rerimassie 2015). On the other hand, public engagement can accurately reflect stakeholder values but is not necessarily free from bias and lobbyist agenda setting.\ud \ud We argue that if RRI is to be more successful in resolving policy dilemmas arising from poorly described and uncertain technological impacts, basic universal principles need to be evoked and applied.\ud \ud When looking at RRI from a ‘principled’ perspective, we consider responsibility and justice to be important cornerstones of the framework. One could describe them in the following manner:\ud Research and innovation should be conducted responsibly.\ud Publicly funded research and innovation should be focused fairly on socially beneficial targets. Research and innovation should promote and not hinder social justice.\ud \ud The main aim of this article is to suggest a method of realising these principles through the application of a limited Rawlsian Difference Principle in the distribution of public funds for research and innovation.\ud \ud This paper is in three parts. The first part discusses the above principles and introduces the Rawlsian Difference Principle. The second part identifies how RRI is currently applied by public funding bodies. The third part discusses the operationalisation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle in responsible funding decisions.

The use of technology and innovation in developing long-term global food security, and ensuring sustainable and adequate food production, is contextualized by values and controversies associated with food technologies. The framing and context of these technologies may impact on consumer perceptions and acceptance. In some countries this can influence policy decisions. Analysis of the public discourses on the themes of innovation, risk, power and control, and their socio-economic and ethical implications, is applied to explain the utility of novel and emerging food technologies. Potential differences in stakeholder interests are taken into account in different economic and regulatory environments, contrasting Europe with the emerging economies of China and India. In the case of India, there is considerable public debate on finding a balance between various technological choices for food production, viz transgenic, traditional breeding and organic production. In China, the debate about technological innovation is driven largely by political and scientific elites with relatively little consumer debate. European agri-technological innovation is framed by ‘post-productivism’, which informs both implementation strategies and regulatory and governance issues. Economic values cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the European innovation process, in particular in relation to investment and scientific endeavour.

Values based practice (VBP) is a radical view of the place of values in medicine which develops from a philosophical analysis of values, illness and the role of ethical principles. It denies two attractive and traditional but misguided views of medicine: that diagnosis is a merely factual matter and that the values that should guide treatment and management can be codified in principles. But, in the work of KWM (Bill) Fulford, it goes further in the form of a radical liberal view: that the idea of an antecedently good outcome should be replaced by that of a right process. That however leads to a dilemma as to whether it can account for its own normative status. Given that difficulty, why might one adopt the radical version? I sketch a possible motive drawing on Rorty’s rejection of authoritarianism which replaces objectivity with solidarity as the aim of judgement. But I argue that, nevertheless, this does not justify the rejection of the more modest particularist version of VBP.

Antibiotic resistance is a critical threat to human and animal health. Despite the importance of antibiotics, regulators continue to allow antibiotics to be used in low-value applications - subtherapeutic dosing in animals, and spraying tobacco plants for blue mold, for example - where the benefits are unlikely to outweigh the costs in terms of increased resistance. We explore the application of a user fee in non-human uses of antibiotics. Such a fee would efficiently deter low value uses while also providing funding to support the development of the urgently needed new antibiotics.

Various ethical issues are associated with agrifood nanotechnology, linked to the ethical concepts of autonomy, beneficence, non-malfeasance and justice (ensuring safety, effective risk assessment, transparency, consumer benefits and choice, animal welfare and environmental protection). Nanotechnology applications are currently covered by legislative instruments originally designed for other purposes. Risk assessment procedures are in most cases not specific to (agrifood) nano-materials, resulting in uncertainty regarding the nature and extent of potential risks. There are currently no requirements for nano-materials used in agrifood production to be labelled. Ethical principles, and societal acceptance require labelling of food products that are produced using nanotechnology.

Recent developments in genomic science hold out the tantalizing prospect of soon being able to treat and prevent a wide variety of medical conditions through gene therapy. In time, it may be possible to use similar techniques not simply to combat disease but also to enhance, or improve on, normal human functioning.

J. S. Mill's case against censorship rests on a conception of relevant communications as truth apt. If the communication is true, everyone benefits from the opportunity to exchange error for truth. If it is false, we benefit from the livelier impression truth makes when it collides with error. This classical liberal model is not however adequate for today's world. In particular, it is inadequate for dealing with the problem of stereotyping. Much contemporary communication is not truth apt. Advertising and journalism, film and fashion portray images that can be neither verified nor refuted. Moreover, where these images do bear some relation to reality, any truth they may possess is not necessarily beneficial. Cultural stereotypes, for example, can be harmful even when true, to the extent that they reflect a distorted reality (the realities of life under conditions of injustice and exploitation). Exposure to such stereotypes affects a community's self-conception. The resulting harms may be direct or indirect. Indirect harm is done when a stereotype affects a community's capacity for self-determination, perpetuating existing inequalities by restricting the options its members understand to be available to them. Direct harm is done when a stereotype induces a distorted self-conception. Pace Kant, human dignity is not purely a function of our capacity to be authors of a universal moral law. It also resides in our capacity to achieve an undistorted self-conception. Thus true communications that reflect a distorted historical reality may threaten our dignity, through their effects on our self-conception, independent of any consequences they may have for self-determining action.

The guilty get a good run in our judicial system while victims can be a dirty word. It's the world turned upside down…. Prominent defence lawyer Rob Stary, a member of the Law Institute's Criminal ...

Dying before one’s time has been a prominent theme in classic literature and poetry. Catherine Linton’s youthful death in Wuthering Heights leaves behind a bereft Heathcliff and generations of mourning readers. The author herself, Emily Brontë, died young from tuberculosis. John Keats’ Ode on Melancholy captures the transitory beauty of 19th century human lives too often ravished by early death. Keats also died of tuberculosis, aged 25. “The bloom, whose petals nipped before they blew, died on the promise of the fruit” is how Percy Bysshe Shelley expressed his grief over Keats’ death. Emily Dickinson wrote So Has a Daisy Vanished, being driven into depression by the early loss of loved ones from typhoid and tuberculosis.

The distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research is a familiar one in research ethics. This chapter argues that the term “therapeutic research” is a misnomer. I consider two broad types of ostensibly therapeutic research: controlled trials, and innovative/experimental treatments. I argue that in the former case the term therapeutic research is a misnomer because no reasonable researcher can expect patients/subjects to derive any therapeutic advantage from being entered into an ethically conducted controlled trial. In the latter case, while accepting that there may well be a reasonable expectation of therapeutic benefit from innovative treatments, I argue that the decision whether it is in the interests of a given patient to receive a given treatment is properly made on purely clinical grounds. There is no special feature of the research situation, in either of these types of case, which serves to ensure that participation, qua research subject, is in a patient’s interests.

This paper looks at certain features of games of chance to examine in greater detail the ways in which they thrive in a ‘mythical’ temporality. By examining the origins of modern gambling in the emergence of reason and its creation of an ontological excess that we refer to as ‘chance’, I argue that in order to understand the real significance of gambling in an age of virtual reality and virtual gaming, we must be able to grasp its existential dimensions and the ecstatic ‘disappearance’ it permits. I suggest that the ways in which chance has been manifested as the non-human or automatic in gambling draw us closer to the essence of its existential character. Games of chance are explored as encounters with the sacred or divine which, in their connection to a mythic temporality, are seen as precursors of virtual gaming, whose technologies are now driving the growth of gambling.

The paper considers acts of private (in the sense of individually motivated and extra-legal) revenge, and draws attention to a special kind of judgement we may make of such acts. While endorsing the general view that an act of private revenge must be morally wrong, it maintains that under certain special conditions (which include its being just) it is susceptible of a rational respect from others which is based on its standing outside morality, as a choice by the revenger not to act morally but to obey other compelling motives. This thesis is tested against various objections, notably those which doubt the intelligibility or application of such non-moral ‘respect,’ or would assimilate it to moral approval; and it is distinguished from various positions with which it might be confused, such as the ‘admirable immorality’ of Slote, or the Nietzschean critique of morality.

“Dissecting Bioethics,” edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics.\ud \ud The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people's actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-evident issues are therefore particularly appreciated.\ud \ud The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, naturalness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration.

On September 28, 2002, 11-year-old Jakob von Metzler, a banker's son, was abducted on the way to his parents' house in Frankfurt. A sum of one million Euro was demanded for his release. Three days after Jakob's disappearance, Magnus Gafgen, a 32-year-old law student, collected the ransom from the arranged tram stop in Frankfurt during the night. While under observation by the police, he ordered a new Mercedes and booked a holiday abroad. Seventy-six hours after Jakob's disappearance, the police arrested Gafgen and his 16-year-old girlfriend while simultaneously searching his flat. There they found the missing ransom, but no sign of Jakob.I would like to thank participants of the Newport, University of Wales, Research Seminar, the Amsterdam Bioethics Retreat, and the London School of Economics Political Theory Seminar for very valuable comments. Thanks also to Peter Herissone-Kelly, Armin Schmidt, and Katrin Flikschuh for comments on an earlier version.“Health and Human Rights,” edited by Doris Schroeder, welcomes contributions on all areas outlined below. Submitted papers are peer-reviewed (short discussion papers will be reviewed by at least one, full papers by at least two reviewers). To submit a paper or to discuss suitable topics, please e-mail Doris Schroeder at dschroeder@uclan.ac.uk.

C ampaigners are calling on policy makers at next week's sixth World Trade Organization ministerial conference in Hong Kong to make trade fairer for and improve the lives and health of the world's poorest people. This broad and important aim may dominate the headlines, but ministers will also be discussing technical issues surrounding international patenting laws. One issue with implications for the development of medical products is the tension between international patenting laws and benefit sharing requirements, which may threaten agreements on protecting biodiversity. If the biodiversity door shuts because of protests in developing countries, pharmaceutical research will be seriously hampered. In Hong Kong the World Trade Organization can stop the exploitation of non-human genetic material and traditional knowledge by aligning the trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement with the Convention on Biological Diversity. Over the past decade benefit sharing has become a recurrent theme in international debates on human and non-human genetics. The term arose from the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted at the 1992 earth summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.1 The convention …

This paper explores the usefulness of the ‘ethical matrix’, proposed by Ben Mepham, as a tool in technology assessment, specifically in food ethics. We consider what the matrix is, how it might be useful as a tool in ethical decisionmaking, and what drawbacks might be associated with it. We suggest that it is helpful for fact-finding in ethical debates relating to food ethics; but that it is\ud much less helpful in terms of weighing the different ethical problems that it uncovers. Despite this drawback, we maintain that, with some modifications, the ethical matrix can be a useful tool in debates in food ethics. We argue that useful modifications might be to include future generations amongst the stakeholders in the matrix, and to substitute the principle of solidarity for the principle of justice.

Governments and their international agencies (FAO, World Bank) conceive of the eradication of hunger and poverty as a worthy wish that will eventually be realized through economic growth. They also make great cosmetic efforts to present as good-looking trend pictures as they can. Citizens ought to insist that the eradication of severe deprivations is a human rights\ud correlative duty that permits no avoidable delay. Academics ought to collaborate toward providing a systematic alternative monitoring of what progress has really been made against undernourishment and other povertyrelated deprivations.

Through an analysis of critical reviews and other commentaries on the annual Turner Prize shortlist exhibitions, I examine a philosophical problem which has put into question the rational basis for evaluation in art criticism: the lack of any agreed criteria for the evaluation of artworks. This problem has been most often addressed within philosophical aesthetics through two contrasting approaches: the attempt to formulate evaluative criteria, and the denial that such criteria are either possible or necessary. My response to this meta-critical issue is an interdisciplinary study, in the form of an analysis of published commentaries on the Turner Prize, that examines theories of critical evaluation against an empirical investigation of actual critical practice. \ud The Turner Prize has a number of advantages as a case study. Extensive media coverage of the competition means that it is possible to study a wide range of sources intended for the art-going public, that contain a large body of examples of comparative critical evaluation, and as an annual event it offers the opportunity for both synchronic and diachronic analyses. Moreover, the regular presence of artists whose work has been characterised as ‘conceptual, ensures that many of the commentaries focus on an area of art that presents a particular challenge to aesthetic theory and critical practice. In order to develop a critique of criteria based approaches, the contrasting approaches to art criticism taken by Noel Carroll and Frank Sibley are explored within an analysis of the critical reasons given to justify evaluations of Turner Prize exhibits. Suggestions are offered for ways of developing alternative approaches, drawing upon theories of the aesthetic developed by Suzanne Langer and Kendall Walton.

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 came into force in England and Wales in 2007. Its primary purpose is to provide “a statutory framework to empower and protect people who may lack capacity to make some decisions for themselves.” Examples of such people are those with dementia, learning disabilities, mental health problems, and so on. The Act also gives those who currently have capacity a legal framework within which they can make arrangements for a time when they may come to lack it. Toward this end, it allows for them to make advance decisions (in effect, refusals of consent to certain forms of treatment) or to appoint proxy decision makers with lasting powers of attorney.

This dissertation examines the role and actions of the Roman Catholic clergy from Britain who served as military chaplains during the First World War, including the external influences and pressures that may have contributed to their behaviour. In doing so it looks at international themes relating to the Catholic Church as a transnational body as well as the more national and parochial issues that were unique to the status of the faith in the different combatant nations included in the study. While Catholicism was very much a minority religion in the British Isles during the 1914-1919 war, it has been argued that the faith came out of the conflict with its reputation enhanced. This has often been put down to the actions of the Catholic chaplains at the 'sharp end', or most dangerous part, of the battlefield. This dissertation re-examines a number of the themes that have been presented in previous academic works as having provided the evidence for such an assertion. While finding substantive evidence to support a number of the claims (including the advantages bestowed on the RC chaplains by the nature of the Catholic landscape in many of the key battlegrounds, as well as the importance of the delivery of the Sacraments), it also argues that the more aggressive attitude and role of the 'home' clergy in France and Belgium was to have a significant influence on the British chaplains. Furthermore, it is argued that some of the reasons previously given for the behaviour of the RC chaplains, and particularly those with regard to their class and ethnicity, are misleading and in need of further serious examination.