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In the last half of the century, public diplomacy has gained great popularity worldwide, becoming one of the basic components of diplomatic practices. From this perspective, it is important to study how the concept of soft power is currently perceived and understood in China at the national level as well as by civil society and the target of China’s public diplomacy. Various Chinese scholars from major Chinese universities concerned with the issue of soft power have published numerous articles systematically describing China’s perspective on the concept and where their country stands at the beginning of the 2000s, with the intention of defining the concept and charting a trajectory for their country. Looking at the Chinese sources and comparing them with the general notions of soft power presented by Joseph Nye, we can state that we are witnessing a new process of assimilation and adaptation in China of a theorythat does not originate in Asia. This article aims to illustrate how China defines soft power and how it has implemented this new tool of the new diplomacy by analyzing the specialized materials published in China during the period 2005-2017.

In the past few decades soft power has become, , the most commonly used foreign term on the Asian continent and has received special attention both from specialists in International Relations and from the representatives of the Chinese Communist Party. Stepping into the third millennium, China shows a tendency of reconfiguration for its position and role in relation to the other great powers of the world, and adopts the soft power strategy, which is adapted to assert itself globally. For almost two decades in which the concept of soft power has been studied and attempts to adapt it to the country’s values have been made, China concludes that its tradition, culture, history and philosophy can be an advantage in creating links with the other countries from Asia as well as those outside the Asian continent. In this regard, the Chinese government is allocating a generous amount of money for the establishment of Chinese language, culture and literature centers, named Confucius Institute around the world, starting with Asia. At present, China argues that their role is particularly important, as these centers, built on the model of English, French, or Spanish language centers, are not only aimed at the Chinese-speaking public, but are an intermediary between China and the host country, in order to establish cooperative relations, presenting Chinese culture, history and civilization and attracting as many sympathizers as possible. The article presents, describes and analyzes the structure and operation of the Confucius Institutes from a Chinese perspective, and illustrates the relationship between China’s soft power policy and their operating program, as exposed by Chinese sources as well

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Copyright of Studii de Ştiintă şi Cultură is the property of Studii de Stiinta si Cultura and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Studii de Ştiintă şi Cultură is the property of Studii de Stiinta si Cultura and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

China's diplomacy has been marked by drastic changes since 2020, following the emergence of the virus known as SARS-CoV-2. The rapid spread of this virus both within China and beyond its borders, and subsequently globally, has led to a situation of crisis that has never been seen before in China, a situation that the Chinese leadership has had to mobilize and act upon, both internally, as most provinces in China have been affected, and externally, where the situation has taken on a greater scale than in the country that first reported the first coronavirus case. China is stepping in and assuming its role as a major power, taking swift action and implementing a series of drastic measures aimed at isolating the virus and combating the pandemic. China's global involvement, particularly in the countries most affected by the coronavirus crisis, has been viewed diplomatically not only with gratitude, as in the case of Italy, but also with suspicion and criticism of its political involvement in the humanitarian aid process. The present article proposes an analysis of both the Western and Chinese perspectives on China's handling of the SARS-CoV-2 crisis and at the same time traces the direction of diplomatic relations between China and the major world powers, i.e. political alliances once the pandemic is over. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Philologia is the property of Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)