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2. Political Power and Market Power

Author

Cowgill, Bo, Prat, Andrea, and Valletti, Tommaso

Subjects
Economics - General Economics
Abstract

We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. We present a joint model of political influence and market competition: an oligopoly lobbies the government over regulation, and competes in the product market shaped by this influence. We show broad conditions for mergers to increase lobbying, both on the intensive margin and the extensive margin. We combine data on mergers with data on lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions in the US from 1999 to 2017. We document a positive association between mergers and lobbying, both by individual firms and by industry trade associations. Mergers are also associated with extensive margin changes such as the formation of in-house lobbying teams and corporate PACs. We find some evidence for a positive association between mergers and higher campaign contributions.

Published
2021

29. Unscrambling the eggs: breaking up consummated mergers and dominant firms.

Author

Kwoka, John and Valletti, Tommaso

Subjects
REGULATED industries, PRIVATE sector, ANTITRUST law, BUSINESS enterprises, MERGERS & acquisitions
Abstract

Entrenched dominant firms and anticompetitive consummated mergers pose growing problems for antitrust agencies throughout the world. A lot of thought is being given as to how to address these situations but perhaps the most obvious idea—breaking up such firms—is generally dismissed as impractical, the equivalent of trying to unscramble eggs. We disagree. We show that there have been a substantial number of successful breakups of firms, some in antitrust, more in regulated industries, and even more in the private sectors of the USA and UK as firms initiate their own restructuring. We believe that a policy of breakups can have a much greater chance at success compared to efforts to regulate such firms through rule-making conduct remedies. And we argue that breaking up such firms is facilitated by the fault lines that reveal the natural break points of these heavily merged firms. We recommend that breakups be on the policy menu for competition agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2021
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35. Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization

Author

Lotti, Clarissa, Muço, Arieda, Spagnolo, Giancarlo, and Valletti, Tommaso

Subjects
centralization, H57, public contracts, ddc:330, L88, procurement, H11, L38, H83, D44, informational externalities
Abstract

Centralization of public procurement can lower prices for the government's direct purchase of goods and services. This paper focuses on indirect savings. Public administrations that do not procure directly through a central procurement agency might benefit from the availability of centrally-procured goods. We exploit the introduction of a central purchasing agency in Italy and find that prices came down by 22% among administrations that bought autonomously. These indirect effects appear to be driven by informational externalities, especially for less competent public buyers purchasing technologically more complex goods. Accounting for indirect savings increases the estimate of direct ones.

Published
2023

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