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The extent to which rules in a governing arrangement addresses its local conditions is usually defined in the environmental governance literature as the problem of fit. Actors in governing arrangements with decision‐making authority are capable of choosing and designing specific policy tools in order to address specific policy problems. In this manuscript, we combine insights from the literature on policy design and the literature on common‐pool resource governance to assess the extent to which Nebraska's Natural Resources Districts (NRDs), which were created to provide context‐specific solutions to local water problems, design plans, and programs that fit their social‐ecological contexts. Using semi‐automated text analysis approaches and Qualitative Comparative Analysis, we assess how the design of plans and programs created by NRDs vary, to fit their social‐ecological contexts. Results indicate that the biophysical context plays a role in shaping the content of plans and programs, but that broader top‐down institutional mandates may play an even stronger role in shaping the outputs produced by NRDs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a two‐stage model to study the strategic interaction between a politician (the principal) and a bureaucrat (the agent) over the level of infrastructure provision with uncertainty about possible weather shocks. The bureaucrat chooses how much effort to contribute to infrastructure maintenance and the politician offers either a lump‐sum wage (non‐corrupt) contract or proportional bribe (corrupt) contract to induce effort. The degree of uncertainty about weather shocks, the size of the fixed wage, and the level of external monitoring to detect corruption all interact to affect (a) the politician's choice of contract and (b) whether this choice improves infrastructure outcomes. Our results suggest that curbing corruption is most likely to yield improvements in infrastructure provision when climate uncertainty is low and when bureaucratic wages are relatively high. If climate uncertainty is high, increasing monitoring has an unambiguous negative effect on infrastructure provision. Previous literature has focused either on public goods provision but not corruption or on bribery in a regulatory context that lacks public goods provision. We extend both literatures by analyzing how bribes between government officials affect a principal's ability to more effectively incentivize public goods provision by her agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. highway system is an iconic example of civil infrastructure. Yet it also exemplifies the challenges of infrastructure sustainability. The American Society for Civil Engineers gave the American road infrastructure a grade of "D" since the roads "are often crowded, frequently in poor condition, chronically underfunded, and are becoming more dangerous." In this paper, we seek to understand the intertwined social and technical processes that lead to this unsustainability by examining the U.S. highway system from the perspective of coupled infrastructure systems (CIS), a transdisciplinary framework that aims to analyze governance challenges of shared resources from a dynamic systems perspective. We use highways as a special example of the broader challenge of providing and maintaining the shared infrastructure of all types. Our analysis of historical data concludes that the unsustainability of highways as coupled infrastructure systems can be explained from dysfunctional information feedbacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]