Search

Social relationships play an important role in healthy ageing, with positive social interaction experiences predicting better mental and physical health. Research into social-cognitive abilities has often focused on the development of these abilities in childhood. This chapter will look at the other end of the lifespan, examining changes in social cognition abilities in older individuals as a result of healthy ageing. In particular, it focuses on several social processes, including Theory of Mind, empathy, emotion recognition, action understanding, and imitation, looking at reported changes in these abilities as a result of advancing age, and factors that may influence these changes across individuals. It also discusses potential intervention protocols aimed at reducing social-cognitive declines in older age, and how these reported abilities influence day-to-day functioning in the social world.

Executive functions demonstrate variable developmental and aging profiles, with protracted development into early adulthood and declines in older age. However, relatively few studies have specifically included middle-aged adults in investigations of age-related differences in executive functions. This study explored the age-related differences in executive function from late childhood through to old age, allowing a more informed understanding of executive functions across the lifespan. Three hundred and fifty participants aged 10 to 86 years-old completed a battery of tasks assessing the specific roles of inhibitory control, working memory, cognitive flexibility, and planning. Results highlighted continued improvement in working memory capacity across adolescence and into young adulthood, followed by declines in both working memory and inhibitory control, beginning from as early as 30–40 years old and continuing into older age. Analyses of planning abilities showed continued improvement across adolescence and into young adulthood, followed by a decline in abilities across adulthood, with a small (positive) change in older age. Interestingly, a dissociation was found for cognitive flexibility; switch costs decreased, yet mixing costs increased across the lifespan. The results provide a description of the developmental differences in inhibitory control, working memory, cognitive flexibility and planning, above any effects of IQ or SES, and highlight the importance of including middle-aged adults in studies seeking to establish a more comprehensive picture of age-related differences in executive function.

The current study examined how social cognition – specifically, belief-state processing – changes across the lifespan, using a large sample (N = 309) of participants aged 10–86 years. Participants completed an event-related brain potential study in which they listened to stories involving a character who held either a true- or false-belief about the location of an object, and then acted in a manner consistent or inconsistent to this belief-state. Analysis of the N400 revealed that when the character held a true-belief, inconsistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than consistent outcomes. In contrast, when the character held a false-belief, consistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than inconsistent outcomes, indicating that participants interpreted the character's actions according to their own more complete knowledge of reality. Importantly, this egocentric bias was not modulated by age in an early time window (200–400 msec post-stimulus onset), meaning that initial processing is grounded in reality, irrespective of age. However, this egocentric effect was correlated with age in a later time window (400–600 msec post-stimulus onset), as older adults continued to consider the story events according to their own knowledge of reality, but younger participants had now switched to accommodate the character's perspective. In a final 600–1000 msec time window, this age modulation was no longer present. Interestingly, results suggested that this extended egocentric processing in older adults was not the result of domain-general cognitive declines, as no significant relationship was found with executive functioning (inhibitory control and working memory).

Despite being able to rapidly and accurately infer their own and other peoples’ visual perspectives, healthy adults experience difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective when the two perspectives are in conflict; they experience egocentric and altercentric interference. We examine for the first time how the age of an observed person (adult versus child avatar) influences adults’ visual perspective-taking, particularly the degree to which they experience interference from their own or the other person’s perspective. Participants completed the avatar visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in a visual scene according to either their own or an on-screen avatar’s perspective (Experiments 1 and 2) or only from their own perspective (Experiment 3), where the two perspectives could be consistent or in conflict. Age of avatar was manipulated between (Experiment 1) or within (Experiments 2 and 3) participants, and interference was assessed using behavioural (Experiments 1-3) and ERP (Experiment 1) measures. Results revealed that altercentric interference is reduced or eliminated when a child avatar was present, suggesting that adults do not automatically compute a child avatar’s perspective. We attribute this pattern to either enhanced visual processing for own-age others or an inference on reduced mental awareness in younger children. The findings argue against a purely attentional basis for the altercentric effect, and instead support an account where both mentalising and directional processes modulate automatic visual perspective-taking, and perspective-taking effects are strongly influenced by experimental context.

To speculate about counterfactual worlds, children need to ignore what they know to be true about the real world. Prior studies yielding individual differences data suggested that counterfactual thinking may be related to overcoming prepotent responses. In two experiments, we manipulated how 3- to 5-year-olds responded to counterfactual conditional and syllogism tasks. In Experiment 1 (N=39), children's performance improved on both conditional and syllogism tasks when they responded with an arrow rather than pointing with a finger. In Experiment 2 (N=42), 3- and 4-year-olds benefited from both an arrow manipulation and, separately, the introduction of a delay before responding. We suggest that both manipulations help children to overcome an impulsive prepotent response to counterfactual questions arising from a default assumption that information about the past is true.

Autism spectrum disorders are defined by difficulties across a range of areas: social and communication difficulties and restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests. It has been suggested that this triad of symptoms cannot be explained by a single cause at the genetic, neural or cognitive level. This article reviews the evidence for a ‘fractionable’ autism triad at the cognitive level, highlighting questions for future research.

The mirroring of actions is performed by a specialized system of neurons found in the sensorimotor cortex, termed the mirror neuron system. This system is considered an important mechanism that facilitates social understanding. We present a pre-registered experiment that used EEG to investigate whether short-term training via physical rehearsal or observational learning elicit distinct changes in mirror neuron activity for unfamiliar hand actions, and whether these training effects are influenced by the degree of familiarity (i.e., the frequency of action repetitions during training). Sixty adults completed a pre- and post-training EEG action observation task. Half of the participants completed 30 min of execution training (i.e., observing and performing unfamiliar hand actions), and half completed observation-only training (i.e., observing unfamiliar hand actions being performed). Post-training familiarity was manipulated by varying the number of training repetitions for each hand action (from 0 to 50 repetitions). Results revealed that sensorimotor cortex activity to the observation of hand actions increased following execution training, but did not change when training was simply observational. Moreover, the frequency of training repetitions did not modulate sensorimotor cortex activation after training, suggesting that short-term physical rehearsal enhances general processes involved in action understanding, rather than specific motor representations.

The degree to which executive function (EF) abilities (including working memory [WM], inhibitory control [IC], and cognitive flexibility [CF]) can be enhanced through training is an important question; however, research in this area is inconsistent. Previous cognitive training studies largely agree that training leads to improvements in the trained task, but the generalisability of this improvement to other related tasks remains controversial. In this article, we present a pre-registered experiment that used an adaptive training procedure to examine whether EFs can be enhanced through cognitive training, and directly compared the efficacy and generalisability across sub-components of EF using training programmes that target WM, IC, or CF versus an active control group. Participants ( n = 160) first completed a battery of tasks that assessed EFs, then were randomly assigned to one of the four training groups, and completed an adaptive procedure over 21 days (10 training sessions) that targeted a specific sub-component of EF (or was comparatively engaging and challenging, but did not train a specific EF). At post-test, participants returned to the lab to repeat the battery of EF tasks. Results revealed robust direct training effects (i.e., on trained task), but limited evidence to support near (i.e., same EF, different task) and far (i.e., different EF and task) transfer effects. Where indirect training benefits emerged, the effects were more readily attributable to the overlapping training/assessment task routines, rather than more general enhancements to the underlying cognitive processes or neural circuits.