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We show that two horizontally differentiated banks can implement separating equilibria in markets for bank loans by using non-linear price schedules. The optimal strategies of the banks induce 'high-risk' borrowers to patronize their preferred, that is closer, bank. 'Low-risk' borrowers accept offers from their less preferred bank, which offers lower interest rates. The revelation mechanism is sensitive to the degree of competition between the banks, and credit rationing will be minimized at an intermediate level of competition. Copyright 2013 Oxford University Press 2012 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.

This paper examines blanket guarantee, deposit insurance and restructuring decisions with respect to a multinational bank (MNB) using Nash bargaining when the threat of a bank panic motivates countries to make decisions quickly. Failure of the bank would unevenly distribute externalities across countries, influencing the restructuring incentives. In equilibrium, the bank is either liquidated or one of the countries – or both – recapitalizes it. A partition of the recapitalization costs is sensitive to the country-specific benefits and costs from recapitalization, panic and liquidation. The home regulator benefits from the advantage that it is the only entity that can legally liquidate the MNB. Rational expectations regarding the bargaining result affect the incentives to declare a blanket guarantee.

If combining insurance and banking services generates scope economies in terms of monitoring the customers, competition in the financial markets becomes more intense after financial conglomeration. The pro-competitive effect reduces the prices of the financial services, increases monitoring and improves financial stability. Increased monitoring allows financial regulators apply lower capital requirements for financial conglomerates.

We investigate optimal forest conservation in a strategic-trade framework. Exporting firms produce wood products with domestic timber and use investments to reduce production costs. Conservation influences the industry equilibrium through higher timber prices and a price premium generated by the products’ green image. Higher timber prices reduce the firm's investments and output, but a strong demand effect reverses the result. The optimal conservation level is therefore lower than the first-best, unless the demand effect is strong. The equilibrium of a multilateral policy game involves higher industry profit and higher conservation requirements in both producing countries, when the demand effect is strong.

A topical concern in public policy debate is that the current capital adequacy regulation designed for stand-alone financial institutions exhibits several weaknesses due to the emergence of large financial institutions combining several activities under common control. This paper will address these concerns in the framework for capital regulation of financial institutions proposed in the economic literature. It will first describe the potential reasons that led to the emergence of financial conglomerates. Secondly, it will consider the theoretical background for the regulation of financial institutions, especially insurance and banking companies. Finally, it will use this framework to examine the limitations of the current regulatory framework in controlling the risks in financial conglomerates. The conclusions of the paper give little support for the view that regulatory approach should be modified toward harmonisation.

This paper examines blanket guarantee and restructuring decisions in respect of a multinational bank (MNB) using Nash bargaining, when the threat of a panic motivates countries to take decisions quickly. The failure of the bank would cause unevenly distributed externalities between the countries concerned, which influences restructuring incentives. In equilibrium, the bank is either liquidated or one – or both of the countries – recapitalizes it. The partition of the recapitalisation costs is sensitive to the country-specific benefits and costs from recapitalisation, panics and liquidation. The home regulator benefits from the privilege of being the only entity that can legally liquidate the MNB. Rational expectations regarding the bargaining result affect the incentives to declare a blanket guarantee.

This paper presents a model where the central government cannot ensure that regional governments manage risks prudentially, due to soft budget constraint. Competition for project funding induces the regional governments use financial instruments as commitment devices as a signal of prudential risk management. A Public-Private Partnership contract, which delegates the monitoring task to a financial institute, is the most efficient commitment device provided that private financiers have an access to the same monitoring technology the regional governments fail to employ. The optimal capital structure of a PPP contract is a combination of public funds and debt from financial institutes. JEL Classification: D8, L3, H54, H57

This study deals with the matter to what extent the costs of the EU Emission Trade System (EU ETS) end up in the electricity prices. The study encompasses both a theoretical and an empirical review of electricity price formation. It includes an econometric analysis of electricity price formation and the impact of EU ETS on power prices. On the basis of the econometric analysis is concluded that cost compensation due to EU ETS is indeed occurring. On average, about 75% to 95% of a price change in EU ETS is passed on to the Finnish NordPool spot price. The analysis also shows that the degree of utilisation of generation capacity (and hence the network loads) have an effect on electricity prices. This hints at possible market imperfections and can aggravate the price effects of EU ETS.

We study the adverse selection problem in imperfectly competitive credit markets and illustrate the circumstances where a separating equilibrium emerges, even without collateral. The borrowers are heterogeneous in their preferences concerning the banks. Separation obtains in market segments where the 'high risk' borrowers receive credit from their preferred bank. The 'low risk' borrowers choose the ex-ante less-preferred bank that offers loan contracts with lower interest rates. The availability of credit will be maximized under an intermediate level of competition, a prediction that is supported by recent empirical evidence.

This paper studies the competitive and efficiency implications of financial conglomeration driven by cost-efficiency gains in monitoring credit and insurance customers. The analysis shows that conglomeration is conducive to tougher competition in the credit market and increases profit in insurance. The aggregate profit in the financial sector does not increase, because the conglomerates pass the cost-efficiency gains on to the borrowers in full. More competitive market for financial services also reduces the aggregate risk in the financial markets, indicating that capital requirements in both sectors should be lower in the presence of financial conglomerates.