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The video deficit is a well-documented effect whereby children learn less well about information delivered via a screen than the same information delivered in person. Research suggests that increasing social contingency may ameliorate this ‘video deficit’ (Nielsen et al., 2008). The current study instantiated social contingency to screen-based information by embodying the screen within a socially interactive robot. We failed to document any difference between 22- to 26-month-old children’s (N = 80) imitation of screen-based information embedded in a social robot and in person humans. Further, we were unable to replicate the video deficit with children imitating at similar levels regardless of the presentation medium. This failure to replicate supports the findings of a recent meta-analysis of video deficit research whereby there appears to be a steady decrease over time in the magnitude of the video deficit effect. We postulate that the video deficit may soon be a historical artifact as children begin perceiving technology as relevant and meaningful in everyday life more and more. This research finds that observational-based learning material can be successfully delivered in person, via a screen, or via a screen embedded in a social robot.

Objective\ud To evaluate changes in electronic screen-based media use in 3- to 7-year-old children across 6 countries as a result of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.\ud \ud Study design\ud Between April and July 2020, parents of 2516 children completed online survey measures reporting current (“now”) and retrospective (“before the pandemic”) screen-based media use for the purposes of entertainment, educational app use, and socializing with family and friends. Parents also reported family socioeconomic characteristics and impacts of the pandemic to their physical wellbeing (eg, whether a family member or friend had been diagnosed with COVID-19) and social disruption (eg, whether family experienced a loss of income or employment due to the pandemic).\ud \ud Results\ud On average, children engaged with screens more than 50 minutes more during the pandemic than before. This was largely driven by increases in screen use for entertainment purposes (nearly 40 minutes) and for use of educational apps (over 20 minutes). There was no overall change in screen use for socializing with family and friends. Children from lower socioeconomic status households increased screen use both for entertainment and educational app use more so than did children from higher socioeconomic status households.\ud \ud Conclusions\ud The global pandemic caused by COVID-19 has increased overall electronic screen-based media use. As lives become increasingly digital by necessity, further research is needed to better understand positive and negative consequences of electronic screen-based media use.

We examined Turkish participants’ mindreading accuracy toward ingroup versus outgroup targets. Three hundred and fifty-four Turkish participants were randomly assigned to one of three target groups: Turkish, Syrian, or Norwegian. The mindreading accuracy for these targets was measured along with the perceived cultural similarity of the target to the ingroup, as well as prejudice and threat perception. Participants evidenced higher mindreading accuracy toward Turkish targets compared with Syrian and Norwegian targets. Mindreading accuracy for the Syrian and Norwegian targets did not differ, but lower perceived similarity to the Turkish ingroup significantly predicted lower mentalizing for Syrian and Norwegians. In the Syrian target group, lower perceived similarity interacted with lower education and higher prejudice, resulting in a further reduction in mindreading. For Norwegian targets, lower similarity impaired mindreading through an interaction with higher threat perception. Results indicate that even when mentalizing capacity is mature, intergroup factors are linked with the deployment of mindreading.

Moral evaluations of prosocial lies and selfish lies were examined in 156 children aged 6 to 12 years (77 Australian; 79 Singaporean; mean age 9.38 years) along with theory of mind (ToM) and cognit...

Maternal depression is a potent risk factor for poor child development across a number of domains but the mechanisms of transmission are poorly understood. This study aimed to test competing mediators of the association between pre-conception maternal depression and child psychosocial functioning. In 2016, mothers in the 1973-1978 cohort of the Australian Longitudinal Study on Women's Health were asked to be part of the Mothers and their Children's Health study and to complete surveys on the health of their three youngest children under 13 years. The current study includes children aged 0-12 years (N = 5532, M = 6.99 years, SD = 3.22 years) and their mothers (N = 2917). We used the CESD-10 to measure depression and the PedsQL to measure psychosocial functioning, and used multilevel structural equation modeling to test hypotheses. Pre-conception maternal depression was associated with poorer maternal mental health and parenting after birth. The effect of pre-conception maternal depression was mediated by post-birth maternal depression in children aged 0-4 years (unstandardized regression coefficient (B) = - 0.26, 95%CI - 0.38, - 0.13) and children aged 5-12 years (B = - 0.25, 95%CI - 0.34, - 0.16), and by post-birth maternal stress (B = - 0.04, 95%CI - 0.08, - 0.01), and parenting (B = - 0.03, 95%CI - 0.04, - 0.02) in children aged 5-12 years. Post-birth maternal depression was the strongest mediator. Pre-conception is the optimal time for depression intervention. Post-birth interventions should include a focus on reducing depression and improving negative parenting aspects such as hostility and discipline.

We examined the associations between theory of mind (ToM) and peer cooperation among preschoolers in two play contexts. Fifty-eight 3-to-5-year-old children from middle class suburbs of Brisbane, Australia were tested for ToM and observed in same-age and same-gender dyads for peer cooperation. To measure ToM, we administered the 5-step ToM scale. With an implicit false belief task, children's eye gaze responses to indirect action anticipation prompt were assessed. To measure peer cooperation, we used independent and joint play contexts and coded communicative and coordinated behaviours. Performance on the ToM scale, but not implicit false belief, was associated with peer cooperation in the independent play, but not the joint play context. Dyadic data analysis showed that in the independent play context, ToM played a critical role for cooperation, both as an actor and a partner. These results support recommendations for ToM training in early childhood to support children's cooperative behaviours.

Neonatal imitation is a cornerstone in many theoretical accounts of human development and social behavior, yet its existence has been debated for the past 40 years. To examine possible explanations for the inconsistent findings in this body of research, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis synthesizing 336 effect sizes from 33 independent samples of human newborns, reported in 26 articles. The meta-analysis found significant evidence for neonatal imitation ( d = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.39, 0.96], p < .001) but substantial heterogeneity between study estimates. This heterogeneity was not explained by any of 13 methodological moderators identified by previous reviews, but it was associated with researcher affiliation, test of moderators ( QM) (15) = 57.09, p < .001. There are at least two possible explanations for these results: (a) Neonatal imitation exists and its detection varies as a function of uncaptured methodological factors common to a limited set of studies, and (2) neonatal imitation does not exist and the overall positive result is an artifact of high researcher degrees of freedom.

Thirty-one infants, 7 to 14 months of age, were tested on object and mother permanence using a delayed response task (Diamond, 1985), in which a delay period is enforced before infants are allowed to search for hidden objects. Infants were tested in 2 separate conditions in which they searched for their mothers and a large toy, both of which were hidden under curtained tables. The delay period before search was allowed was incremented after each successful trial until infants either failed to search or searched in the wrong location. Infants were scored for the maximum delay preceding a successful search. The results from 17 infants showed that infants were able to withstand significantly longer delays before successful search for the mother than for the toy. These results support previous studies showing that mother permanence precedes object permanence in infants older than 8 months.

This experiment explored whether or not 2-year-olds would engage in synchronic imitation with human hands. Sixty-four 24-month-old infants participated. In a test of synchronic imitation, infants were given a toy while a model simultaneously performed novel actions on an identical toy. Infants were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 model conditions: a familiar person, an unfamiliar person, disembodied human hands, and disembodied robotic pincers. Infants were as likely to synchronically imitate disembodied hands as a person. Imitation of the pincers was significantly lower. This pattern suggests that 2-year-olds will engage socially with human hands in the absence of the rest of the body.

Neonatal imitation is widely accepted as fact and cited as evidence of an inborn mirror neuron system that underpins human social behaviour, even though its existence has been debated for decades. The possibility that newborns do not imitate was reinvigorated recently by powerful longitudinal data and novel analyses. Although the evidence is still mixed, recent research progresses the debate by ruling out some long-standing explanations for why the effect might be difficult to detect, by showing that only some research groups observe it, and by revealing indications that the published literature is biased. Further advances will be made with updated testing procedures and reporting standards, and investigation of new research questions such as how infants could learn to imitate.

Traditionally, infants have learned how to interact with objects in their environment through direct observations of adults and peers. In recent decades these models have been available over different media, and this has introduced non-human agents to infants' learning environments. Humanoid robots are increasingly portrayed as social agents in on screen, but the degree to which infants are capable of observational learning from screen-based robots is unknown. The current study thus investigated how well 1- to 3-year-olds (N = 230) could imitate on-screen robots relative to on-screen and live humans. Participants exhibited an imitation deficit for robots that varied with age. Furthermore, the well-known video deficit did not replicate as expected, and was weak and transient relative to past research. Together, the findings documented here suggest that infants are learning from media in ways that differ from past generations, but that this new learning is nuanced when novel technologies are involved.

This study explored theory of mind (ToM) development in school-aged deaf children. To address new questions, we gave a standard, well-controlled false-belief test to a large (n = 200) sample of severely-to-profoundly deaf children aged 8–15 years in a non-Western culture (Thailand). There were 190 deaf children of hearing parents and 10 deaf native signers with signing deaf parents, consistent with overall population ratios. Comparing our Thai sample’s ToM performance on standard tests of false-belief understanding with that reported in past studies, our results showed a 67% ToM success rate for Thai severely-to-profoundly deaf children of hearing parents similar to collective findings from past research on smaller samples in Australia, Estonia, France, Great Britain, Sweden, and the United States. Our Thai deaf native signers likewise performed equivalently to native signers of similar age studied in past research in Australia and the United States. Collectively, the detailed findings of our study suggest promising new directions for future studies to pursue in order to build upon this novel and theoretically provocative evidence about how ToM development and ToM delay unfold for school-aged deaf children growing up in varied cultures, school settings, and family circumstances.

We investigated whether embodied ownership is evident in early childhood. To do so, we gifted a drinking bottle to children (aged 24–48 months) to use for 2 weeks. They returned to perform reach–grasp–lift–replace actions with their own or the experimenter’s bottle while we recorded their movements using motion capture. There were differences in motor interactions with self- vs experimenter-owned bottles, such that children positioned self-owned bottles significantly closer to themselves compared with the experimenter’s bottle. Age did not modulate the positioning of the self-owned bottle relative to the experimenter-owned bottle. In contrast, the pattern was not evident in children who selected one of the two bottles to keep only after the task was completed, and thus did not ‘own’ it during the task (Experiment 2). These results extend similar findings in adults, confirming the importance of ownership in determining self–other differences and provide novel evidence that object ownership influences sensorimotor processes from as early as 2 years of age.

The current sentence is in the discussion (sub-section The role of pre-conception maternal depression) and reads: "Pre-conception treatment of mental health issues is also associated with substantial savings in health care costs (Chojenta et al., 2018)."

Individual differences in preschoolers’ theory of mind (ToM) development were studied in relation to parents’ preferences for using mental state language in conversations with their child in 121 German families from two different socioeconomic (SES) levels in a 3-phase longitudinal design. We also cross-sectionally tested 47 Australian mother-child dyads to explore similarities and differences to the German sample and to validate a shortened version of the Maternal Mentalistic Input Inventory (MMSII: Peterson & Slaughter, 2003). Results made a number of novel contributions. For the German sample SES contrasts in children’s ToM development were evident at all three longitudinal measurement points. Furthermore, results for the middle SES German and Australian groups replicated past studies in showing links between parents’ self-reported use of elaborated mentalistic conversation and children’s higher ToM scores. Additional longitudinal analyses for the German sample revealed contrasting effects of parents’ preferences for the use of elaborated versus simple non-elaborated mental state language according to SES. Lower SES German children gained ToM understanding at a faster rate from age 3 to age 5 when their parents showed a high preference for using non-elaborated mental state language. By contrast, in middle-class German families, a high preference for causally elaborated mental state language was positively linked with children’s developmental path of ToM. These associations between parental conversational style and children’s ToM varying with SES were discussed in terms of their implications both for developmental theory and for future research.

Children’s theory of mind (ToM) unfolds reliably through a sequence of conceptual milestones including, but not limited to, false belief. Sequences vary with culture, one observed previously in Wes...

Theory of mind, or mentalising, refers to our uniquely human capacity to infer what is in other people's minds in order to make sense of what they do and say. Recent research suggests that this skill can be seen as early as the second year of life, in infants' spontaneous helping and communicative behaviours. More sophisticated mentalising skills emerge in the preschool period; these are closely linked both to language development and to children's social competence. Research with typically developing children as well as those with social-communicative disorders suggests that exposure to conversation about feelings, desires and thoughts is likely to promote theory of mind development. [Summary]

Commensurate with constant technological advances, social robots are increasingly anticipated to enter homes and classrooms; however, little is known about the efficacy of social robots as teaching tools. To investigate children's learning from robots, 1- to 3-year-olds observed either a human or a robot demonstrate two goal-directed object manipulation tasks and were then given the opportunity to act on the objects. Children exhibited less imitation from robotic models that varied with task complexity and age, a phenomenon we term the "robot deficit." In addition, the more children engaged with the robot prior to administration of the imitation task, the more likely they were to replicate the robot's actions. These findings document how children are able to learn from robots but that ongoing design of robotic platforms needs to be oriented to developing more socially engaging means of interacting.

Using a between-groups design and random assignment, this study examined 214 Turkish children's (M = 11.66 years) mindreading and general reasoning about in-group members (Turks), similar out-group members (Syrians within Turkey) and dissimilar out-group members (Northern Europeans). Children heard four mindreading and four general reasoning stories with in-group or out-group members as targets. Whereas children's general reasoning about three groups was equivalent, accuracy of mental state inferences differed by target with more accurate mindreading of in-group targets compared to both sets of out-group targets. In this Turkish sample, mindreading of Syrian targets was the least accurate. Prejudice and perceived realistic threat predicted lower mindreading. These findings have important implications for understanding how similarity and intergroup processes play a role in children's mindreading.

Past research has indicated that young children have a propensity to adopt the causally unnecessary actions of an adult, a phenomenon known as overimitation. Among competing perspectives, social accounts suggest that overimitation satisfies social motivations, be they affiliative or normative, whereas the "copy-all/refine-later" account proposes that overimitation serves a functional purpose by giving children the greatest opportunity to acquire knowledge with little error. Until recently, these two accounts have been difficult to extricate experimentally, but the development of humanoid robots provides a novel test. Here we document that children overimitate robots, but to a lesser degree than humans and regardless of whether the redundant actions are seen to be ritualistic or functional. These results are best explained with a combined account of overimitation, whereby children approach a learning task with a copy-all/refine-later motivation, but the fidelity of the reproduction of novel behaviors is modulated by the social availability of the demonstrator.

Research Findings: An emerging consensus is that casual, direct contact with nature influences the development of children’s biological knowledge. Here we review the existing literature on this topic, focusing on the effects of (a) rural versus urban rearing environments and (b) pet ownership and care on children’s biological concepts and reasoning. Although the research is limited, the evidence suggests that these factors positively influence children’s understanding of specific biological phenomena (e.g., internal organ function, biological inheritance) and reasoning patterns (e.g., anthropocentrism, ecological reasoning). Practice or Policy: In the modern context of diminishing outdoor playtime and limited experience with nature, this review highlights the importance of direct exposure to the natural world for children’s conceptual development in the domain of biology.

Human children copy others' actions with high fidelity, supporting early cultural learning and assisting in the development and maintenance of behavioral traditions [1]. Imitation has long been assumed to occur from birth [2-4], with influential theories (e.g., [5-7]) placing an innate imitation module at the foundation of social cognition (potentially underpinned by a mirror neuron system [8, 9]). Yet, the very phenomenon of neonatal imitation has remained controversial. Empirical support is mixed and interpretations are varied [10-16], potentially because previous investigations have relied heavily on cross-sectional designs with relatively small samples and with limited controls [17, 18]. Here, we report surprising results from the most comprehensive longitudinal study of neonatal imitation to date. We presented infants (n = 106) with nine social and two non-social models and scored their responses at 1, 3, 6, and 9 weeks of age. Longitudinal analyses indicated that the infants did not imitate any of the models, as they were just as likely to produce the gestures in response to control models as they were to matching models. Previous positive findings were replicated in limited cross-sections of the data, but the overall analyses confirmed these findings to be mere artifacts of restricted comparison conditions. Our results undermine the idea of an innate imitation module and suggest that earlier studies reporting neonatal imitation were methodologically limited.

Consequences of theory of mind (ToM) development for daily social lives of children are uncertain. Five to 13-year-olds (N = 195) with typical development, autism, or deafness (both native and late signers) took ToM tests and their teachers reported on their social skills for peer interaction (e.g., leadership, group entry). Groups differed in both ToM understanding (with late-signing deaf children especially delayed even relative to autistic children) and peer social skills (with autistic children especially delayed even relative to deaf late signers). Crucially, for the typically developing hearing children and deaf children alike, ToM understanding independently predicted peer social skills over and above age, gender, language ability, and, for deaf children, status as native- or late-signer. These novel findings offer some of the best evidence to date of the relevance of ToM cognitions to real-world social behavior for both these groups. However, for those with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) the pattern was different. The apparent link of ToM to peer competence was not a direct one but instead was significantly mediated by language ability. Several possible explanations for this intriguing autism-specific result were also discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

It has been argued that children who possess an advanced theory of mind (ToM) are more likely to act prosocially, yet the empirical findings are mixed. To address this issue definitively, a meta-analytic integration of all prior literature that met appropriate inclusion criteria was conducted. In total, 76 studies including 6,432 children between 2 and 12 years of age contributed to these analyses. Collapsed across all studies, a significant association emerged (r = .19), indicating that children with higher ToM scores also received higher scores on concurrent measures of prosocial behavior. The magnitude of this effect was similar across ToM assessments requiring identification of others' cognitions versus emotions, and it existed irrespective of whether the ToM measure imposed demands on false belief reasoning or not. The association with ToM was also evident for different subtypes of prosocial behavior (helping, cooperating, comforting). ToM had a similar effect for boys and girls, but was slightly stronger in children aged 6 years or older, relative to their younger peers. Taken together, these findings provide the strongest evidence to date that being able to explicitly consider what other people are thinking and feeling is related to children's tendencies to act prosocially, although the magnitude of the association is relatively weak. (PsycINFO Database Record

Background Both siblings and parents are important interactional partners for children with ASD, but we know little about whether these interactions differ between these two groups, or between older and younger siblings. Aims To gather data about how parents perceive the interactional behaviors displayed by their child with ASD in play with their typically developing siblings and their parents. Methods and procedures Parents completed a questionnaire developed for this study about the behaviors their children with ASD demonstrated when interacting with a sibling or parent. Following factor analysis, a 29-item instrument with two factors was revealed. Factors were labelled Prosocial Interaction and Withdrawal/Agonism. Outcomes and results In some families, children with ASD were reported to display significantly higher levels of negative interaction when playing with their older siblings in comparison to younger siblings. When playing with their children with ASD, parents reported significantly more negative interactions compared to when their children with ASD played with younger siblings. There were few differences reported for play behaviors with parents versus older siblings. Conclusions and implications Children with ASD appear to display different interactional behaviors depending upon their play partners within the family unit. This study could be used to inform researchers of different interaction strategies which may be useful in creating interventions.

The Observation of Human-Animal Interaction for Research (OHAIRE) is a coding tool developed to capture the behavior of children when interacting with social partners and animals in naturalistic settings. The OHAIRE behavioral categories of focus are emotional displays, social communication behaviors toward adults and peers, behaviors directed toward animals or experimental control objects, and interfering behaviors. To date, the OHAIRE has been used by 14 coders to code 2,732 min of video across four studies with a total of 201 participants ages 5 to 18 years (M = 10.1, SD = 2.5). Studies involved animal-assisted intervention with three species (i.e., dogs, horses, and guinea pigs) and three populations (i.e., autism spectrum disorder, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, and typically developing children) in a school, a therapeutic horseback riding program, a group therapy program, and the hospital setting. We explored the psychometric properties of the OHAIRE through analyses of its inter-rater reliability, intra-rater reliability, convergent and divergent validity, and internal structure, using data from these four human-animal interaction studies. The average inter-rater reliability was excellent (kappa = 0.81), with good reliability in most of the behavioral categories coded. Intra-rater reliability was consistently excellent (0.87 ≤ kappa ≤0.96). Internal structure analyses with Cronbach's alpha supported the exploratory use of subscales to measure social communication behaviors toward peers (α = 0.638) and adults (α = 0.605), and interactions experimental control objects (α = 0.589), and the use of a subscale to measure interactions with animals (α = 0.773). Correlation analyses with multiple questionnaires showed a convergence between positive emotional display and social behaviors as assessed by the OHAIRE and social skills as assessed by the Social Skills Rating System (SSRS) and the Social Communication Questionnaires (SCQ). Little concordance was found between the OHAIRE and the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) or the Aberrant Behavior Checklist-Community (ABC). The OHAIRE shows promise for wider use in the field of Human-Animal Interaction, with a need for generalization across more settings and ages.

In the last century, decreases in infant and child mortality, urbanization and increases in healthcare efficacy have reduced children's personal exposure to death and dying. So how do children acquire accurate conceptions of death in this context? In this paper, we discuss three sources of children's learning about death and dying, namely, direct experience of death, parental communication about death and portrayals of death in the media and the arts. We conclude with recommendations about how best to teach modern children about this aspect of life. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary thanatology: impacts of the dead on the living in humans and other animals’.

Theory of mind, or mindreading, refers to our uniquely human capacity to infer what is in other people's minds. Recent research suggests that “implicit” elements of this ability can be seen as early as the second year of life, in infants’ spontaneous helping, communicative, and eye-gaze behaviours. More “explicit” verbally mediated mindreading skills emerge in the preschool period, and these are positively linked to social competence. Research with typically developing children as well as those with autism spectrum disorders suggests that exposure to conversation about mental states promotes theory of mind development.

Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) experience high rates of social stress and anxious arousal. Preliminary evidence suggests that companion animals can act as buffers against the adverse effects of social stress in adults. We measured continuous physiological arousal in children with ASD and typically developing (TD) children in a social context during four conditions: (a) a baseline of reading silently, (b) a scripted classroom activity involving reading aloud, (c) free play with peers and toys, and (d) free play with peers and animals (guinea pigs). Our results confirmed heightened arousal among children with ASD compared to TD children in all conditions, except when the animals were present. Children with ASD showed a 43% decrease in skin conductance responses during free play with peers in the presence of animals, compared to toys. Thus, animals may act as social buffers for children with ASD, conferring unique anxiolytic effects.

Chronic friendlessness in childhood predicts adverse mental health outcomes throughout life, yet its earliest roots are poorly understood. In theory, developing a theory of mind (ToM) should help children gain mutual friends and one preschool study (Peterson and Siegal, 2002. Br J Dev Psychol, 20, 205) suggested a cross-sectional connection. We therefore used a 2-year prospective longitudinal design to explore ToM as a predictor of mutual friendship in 114 children from age 5 to 7 years after controlling potential confounds including language ability and group popularity. Confirming friendship's distinctiveness from group sociometric status, numerous group-rejected children (53%) had a mutual friend whereas 23% of those highest in group status did not. Five-year-olds with a mutual friend significantly outperformed their friendless peers on a comprehensive ToM battery (basic and advanced false belief). Longitudinally, chronically friendless 7-year-olds (no friends at either testing time) stood out for their exceptionally poor Time 1 ToM understanding even after controlling for group popularity, age, and language skill. Extending previous evidence of ToM's predictive links with later social and cognitive outcomes, these results for mutual friendship suggest possible interventions to help reduce the lifelong mental health costs of chronic friendlessness. © 2014 The British Psychological Society.

Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaughter, and de Rosnay (2014) conducted a prospective longitudinal study showing that theory-of-mind (ToM) development at school entry (mean age 5.61 years) significantly predicted friendlessness both concurrently and 2 years later. Friendlessness (defined as lacking any friendship that is mutually reciprocated) is conceptually and empirically distinct from group popularity and independently predicts adverse mental health outcomes throughout life. Here, we respond to the thoughtful commentaries by Wellman (Brit. J. Dev. Psychol, 2015; 33, 24-26), Mizokawa and Koyasu (Brit. J. Dev. Psychol, 2015; 33, 21-23), and Lerner and Lillard (Brit. J. Dev. Psychol, 2015; 33, 18-20) with a focus on three key issues, namely (a) the definition and measurement of friendship, (b) the measurement of advanced ToM development beyond the preschool years, and (c) the exciting future potential for ToM-based training and intervention studies to combat chronic friendlessness.

Una pregunta que aún se mantiene sin responder dentro de la literatura de Teoría de la Mente es si experimentamos limitaciones para entender y atribuir estados mentales a personas que pertenezcan a culturas diferentes a la nuestra. Para responder este interrogante, un estudio reciente de nuestro laboratorio proporcionó evidencia sobre cómo la pertenencia a una misma cultura o a culturas diferentes influye sobre el grado de precisión y el tiempo de generación de explicaciones mentalistas que damos a la conducta de los demás. Los resultados sugieren que somos más lentos y menos precisos al interpretar en términos mentalistas el comportamiento de personas pertenecientes a grupos culturales diferentes al nuestro.

Persuasion is an essential social skill. Yet its development and underpinnings are poorly understood. In 2 studies, a total of 167 children aged 3 to 12 years took theory of mind (ToM) tests and participated in unscripted, seminaturalistic persuasive conversations. Children were typically developing (TD) or had deafness or autism spectrum disorder (ASD). High-level, informationally rich persuasive arguments increased with age in all groups in both studies, as did ToM. In both studies, ToM scores predicted persuasion skill over and above age, language ability, and deafness/ASD status. In Study 1, TD 8-year-olds outperformed age-matched deaf and autistic children in ToM but only equaled them in persuasive skill. Study 2 employed more challenging persuasion tasks and revealed superior persuasion performance by school-aged TD children compared with same-aged children with deafness or ASD. Deaf and ASD groups did better on Study 1's straightforward persuasion tasks than on Study 2's more challenging ones, whereas TD children rose to the added challenge without their persuasion performance suffering. (PsycINFO Database Record

Keven & Akins (K&A) propose that neonatal “imitation” is a function of newborns' spontaneous oral stereotypies and should be viewed within the context of normal aerodigestive development. Their proposal is in line with the result of our recent large longitudinal study that found no compelling evidence for neonatal imitation. Together, these works prompt reconsideration of the developmental origin of genuine imitation.

In this article, we summarize research on the development of mind reading in different cultural contexts. Much of this work has focused on the mind-reading concept of false belief, that is, children's ability to predict what an actor is likely to do based on what he or she thinks. In all cultures tested, individuals acquire this skill in childhood, but differ cross-culturally in the age of acquisition. Studies exploring the development of other aspects of mind reading reinforce the conclusion that culture influences when and how children understand the mind. Child

For more than three decades, considerable research effort has been expended in documenting children’s development of a theory of mind (ToM), or the recognition that behavior is determined by mental states. Studies comparing ToM development in children from Western and non-Western countries have shown differences in patterns of development in various ToM tasks. Specifically, Iranian children are slower than their Australian counterparts to acknowledge that people have diverse beliefs, but at the same time they have relatively advanced understanding of how people acquire new knowledge. In the current study, our aim was to further investigate this cross-cultural pattern by evaluating 3- and 4-year-old Australian and Iranian children’s belief and knowledge understanding across a range of distinct tasks designed to reflect culturally familiar situations. Results confirmed that the Iranian children were faster than the Australians in mastering tasks assessing the understanding of how and when knowledge is acquired. Iranian children, however, lag behind in passing diverse belief tasks. Scores in false belief tasks were comparable across both countries. These findings are discussed with reference to socio-cultural differences across the two countries.