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This paper provides a parallel linguistic and conceptual reading of Wittgenstein’s and Beckett’s works. More specifically, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations are looked at in relation to the absurd plays Not I and Waiting for Godot, respectively. The limits of language as described in the Tractatus are part of theverbally and conceptually asphyxiating world brought on stage by Beckett in the monologue Not I, while the transition to ‘language games’ of the Philosophical Investigations can be identified in parts of Waiting for Godot. The suggested conclusion isthat Wittgenstein’s expression of the ineffable, the problematic use of language and (its) meaning can be and have been expressed in a form of art, while the meanings of Wittgenstein’s writings are in harmony with their stylistic form, his concept of ‘showing’ further illustrating this idea.

In his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According to this thought, grammar – or semantics, in a more recent idiom – is essentially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue for a potential connection between Wittgenstein’s autonomy argument and some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that the later Wittgenstein’s comments on grammar and meaning stand in opposition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism.

The text begins with the analysis of two terms regarding life crucial to both Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy. These are life form and nature, specifically, human nature. Wittgenstein treats both concepts in a very specific manner, different from the traditional approach of philosophy. He also criticized philosophical attempts to attribute special characteristics to human intellectual abilities which would separate them from natural processes. A particular 'spiritual' status of epistemic and other rational powers disappears when there is an insight into their dependence on discursive practices and specific forms of life on which these powers are based. Concepts such as certainty, knowledge, or explanations do not rest on a rational foundation, that is, they do not refer to processes with particular un-natural properties. Nor can they be reduced to neuro-physiological processes, either. Instead, it is a specific grammar of their usage that makes them different from other concepts describing physical or biological processes. In that sense, Wittgenstein develops a non-reductionist version of naturalism which preserves the diversity of human relations in the world.