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Der Beitrag analysiert die Voraussetzungen für stabiles Geld und setzt sich dabei grundlegend mit Hayeks Thesen zu alternativen Währungssystemen sowie dessen fundamentaler Kritik an der Möglichkeit zur Gestaltung der Geldpolitik auf wissenschaftlicher Basis auseinander. Er prüft Hayeks Vorschlag zur Entnationalisierung des Geldes und seine Thesen zur Überlegenheit des im privaten Wettbewerb geschaffenen Geldes. In diesem Zusammenhang schlägt der Beitrag einen Bogen zur aktuellen Diskussion über Kryptowährungen und wirft die Frage auf, ob virtuelle Währungen wie etwa Bitcoin geeignet sind, den Hayekschen Währungswettbewerb zu entfalten. Sodann wird im Gegensatz zu Hayeks Forderung nach einer Abschaffung der Zentralbanken deren entscheidende Rolle für anhaltendes Wachstum bei stabilen Preisen skizziert und die Wichtigkeit der Unabhängigkeit von Notenbanken für die dauerhafte Durchführung einer stabilitätsorientierten Geldpolitik hervorgehoben. Gleichwohl ergeht der Hinweis, dass Notenbanken mit der Überschreitung ihres Mandats auf lange Sicht gesehen selbst den Status ihrer Unabhängigkeit unterminieren können und damit die Rückübertragung der Kompetenz für zentrale geldpolitische Entscheidungen auf Regierung und Parlament provozieren. Die Gefahren der weitgehenden Unabhängigkeit einiger weniger an der Spitze der Notenbanken anerkennend wird anschließend die Bedeutung ihrer Rechenschaftspflicht und Transparenz ihrer Entscheidungen unterstrichen.

Die Euro- und Finanzkrise stellt den Erhalt der Europäischen Währungsunion in Frage. Dirk Meyer, Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg, sieht in der Einführung von temporären nationalen Parallelwährungen einen Weg für die schwächeren Eurostaaten, rechtzeitig auf Fehlentwicklungen ihrer Volkswirtschaften zu reagieren bei gleichzeitigem Verbleib in der EWU. Für Michael Vogelsang, Bundesverband mittelständische Wirtschaft, ist das Hauptargument für eine Doppelwährung die dadurch gegebene Möglichkeit der Nachbildung der Abwertungsfunktion bei flexiblen Wechselkursen. Eine temporäre oder dauerhafte Einführung einer Parallelwährung – neben einer europäischen Geldwährung (Euro) –, in der z.B. Gehälter, Renten, staatliche Leistungen und immobile Güter bemessen werden und die einem wechselkursartigen Regelmechanismus unterliegt, könnte nach Ansicht von Anton Beer, Initiative www.rettet-die-eu.de, und auch von André ten Dam helfen, die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der schwächeren Euroländer wiederherzustellen.

In the currency wars of the 1920s and 1930s, various nations fell off the gold standard and in so doing experienced deep devaluations. But under the postwar dollar standard, the central position of the US was key to maintaining the peace, until the Bretton Woods system of fixed dollar exchange parities fell apart after the so-called "Nixon Shock" of 1971. Now, without much fear of retaliation, the US can initiate more limited currency warfare - as with American "Japan bashing" from the late 1970s to mid-1990s to appreciate the yen, or "China bashing" since 2002 to appreciate the renminbi. Japan succumbed to this bashing, and the yen appreciated too much in 1985, with the result that Japan fell into a zero-interest liquidity trap and economic stagnation for almost two decades. However, in 2013, through massive quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan (BOJ), the yen depreciated about 25% against the dollar, stoking fears of a return to Japan bashing by the US. However, this sharp depreciation simply restored the purchasing power parity of the yen with the dollar so it should even out in the long run. In the short run, we show that yen depreciation could adversely affect the smaller East Asian economies. Since 2008, quantitative easing by the BOJ has been similar to that carried out by the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank. So the BOJ can only be faulted as a currency belligerent if there is a further significant yen depreciation. Led by the US, now all mature industrial countries are addicted to near-zero interest liquidity traps in both the short and long terms. These ultra low interest rates are causing lasting damage to the countries' financial systems, and to those of emerging markets, which naturally have higher interest rates. But exiting from the trap creates a risk of chaos in long-term bond markets and is proving surprisingly difficult.

The paper identifies based on the monetary overinvestment theories by Wicksell (1898), Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) monetary policy mistakes in large industrial countries issuing international currencies. It its argued that a neglect towards monetary policy reform in a world dominated by financial markets has led to the erosion of the allocation and signaling function of the interest rate, which has triggered an excessive rise of the government debt and structural distortions in the world economy. The backlash of high government debt levels on monetary policy making is argued to have led to a hysteresis of the liquidity trap. In this context, monetary reform is discussed with respect to the exit from low interest rate and high debt policies, an adaption of monetary policy rules to financial market dominated economic development, and the displacement of the prevalent world monetary system. Enhanced competition between dollar and euro as international currencies moderated by East Asia is proposed to constitute a more stable international monetary system.

Dirk Meyer, Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Hamburg, stellt ein Konzept nationaler Parallelwährungen für die Eurozone vor. Dadurch könnte im Falle einer Staatsinsolvenz ein Austritt aus der Währungsunion bei gleichzeitiger Nutzung des Euro als Zahlungsmittel erfolgen. Die Einführung nationaler Parallelwährungen gestattet den jeweiligen Staaten, ihre Probleme durch Wechselkursanpassungen und Zugriff auf eine eigenständige Geldpolitik zu lösen.

In Ergänzung zu den Beiträgen im Schnelldienst 23/2011 schlägt Udo Neuhäußer, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, vor, das griechische Staatsvermögen in ein Sondervermögen einzubringen und zur Deckung mit einer griechischen Parallelwährung »Neue Drachme« zu unterlegen. Durch diese Monetisierung des Staatsvermögens kann das Land in großem Umfang entschuldet und ihm eine verbesserte Erholungsperspektive eröffnet werden.

In reaction to the monetary turmoil created by the financial crisis of September 2008, both legislative and constitutional reforms have been proposed in different Countries to introduce Commodity Money alongside existing National Fiat Currency. A thorough evaluation of the Economic consequences of these new proposals is warranted. This paper surveys some of the existing knowledge in Monetary and Financial Economics for the purpose of answering the significant Economic questions raised by these new political initiatives.

This paper suggests that the dollar is not threatened as the hegemonic international currency, and that most analysts are incapable of understanding the resilience of the dollar, not only because they ignore the theories of monetary hegemonic stability or what, more recently, has been termed the geography of money; but also as a result of an incomplete understanding of what a monetary hegemon does. The hegemon is not required to maintain credible macroeconomic policies (i.e., fiscally contractionary policies to maintain the value of the currency), but rather to provide an asset free of the risk of default. It is argued that the current crisis in Europe illustrates why the euro is not a real contender for hegemony in the near future.

This paper assesses whether the international monetary system is already tripolar and centred around the US dollar, the euro and the Chinese renminbi (RMB). It focuses on what we call China’s “dominance hypothesis”, i.e. whether the renminbi is already the dominant currency in Asia, exerting a large influence on exchange rate and monetary policies in the region, a direct reference to the old “German dominance hypothesis” which ascribed to the German mark a dominant role in Europe in the 1980s-1990s. Using a global factor model of exchange rates and a complementary event study, we find evidence that the RMB has become a key driver of currency movements in emerging Asia since the mid-2000s, and even more so since the global financial crisis. These results are consistent with China’s dominance hypothesis and with the view that the international monetary system is already tri-polar. However, we also find that China’s currency movements are to some extent affected by those in the rest of Asia.

Droht der Welt als Folge der Finanzkrise ein Währungskrieg? Wird die Welt nach mehr als 50 Jahren der Kooperation wieder in den Kampf jedes gegen jeden zurückfallen? Namhafte Stimmen haben davor in jüngster Vergangenheit gewarnt. Wir stellen die Debatte zu dieser Problematik dar, untersuchen die ökonomischen Argumente und diskutieren die Handlungsoptionen für die internationale Wirtschaftspolitik. Am Ende steht die Erwartung, dass ein Währungskrieg zumindest zwischen den führenden Industrieländern unwahrscheinlich ist. Die Geld- und Währungspolitik dieser Länder steht derzeit vor völlig anderen Herausforderungen. Eher schon könnte ein Währungskrieg das Verhältnis der Schwellenländer untereinander betreffen, was jedoch aufgrund der währungspolitisch untergeordneten Bedeutung dieser Länder die Stabilität der Weltwirtschaft nicht bedrohen würde.

The emergence of the gold standard has for a long time been viewed as inevitable. Fluctuations of the gold-silver exchange rate in world markets were accused to lead to brutal and unsustainable switches of bimetallic countries' money supplies. However, more recent work has shown that the option character of bimetallism provided a stabilizing feedback loop. Using original data, this paper provides support to the new view. Using quotation prices for Indian Government bonds, we analyze agents' expectations between 1860 and 1890. The intuition is that the spread between gold and silver bonds issued by the same entity (India) and backed by a credible agent (Britain) is a "pure" measure of the silver risk. The analysis shows that up until 1874 markets were expecting bimetallism to last. It is only after this date that markets gradually started requiring a premium to hold silver bonds indicating their belief that gold would eventually become the only metallic standard.

After a thirty-year pause, discussions on the future of the international monetary system (IMS) have restarted. This is partly due to the fact that the IMS has facilitated, or at least not prevented, the economic and financial imbalances that led to the recent crisis. This paper argues that the international position of the US dollar is likely to erode in the coming years, though the speed of the process is uncertain. This will create a demand for other currencies to be used internationally as means of payment and store of value. The most likely candidates for filling the partial vacuum created by the dollar’s decline are the euro and the Chinese renminbi. The probability that the renminbi will eventually become one of the world’s key currencies is very high, but the speed of the process is uncertain. As far as the euro is concerned, much will depend on if and how the sovereign debt crisis is resolved. Our view is that the crisis will be dealt with and that it will result in radical steps towards fiscal and financial integration. If such steps are taken, the euro will secure both internal stabilisation and a growing international role.

Die chinesische Wahrungspolitik steht weltweit in der Kritik. Die Dollarbindung des Yuan hat sich jedoch als Stabilitatsanker fur die ostasiatische Region bewahrt. Der globale Handel profi tiert von der stabilen Wirtschaftsentwicklung in dieser Region. Allerdings fuhrt das Festhalten an einem real unterbewerteten Yuan zu Verzerrungen der Wirtschaftsstruktur bei China und seinen Handelspartnern.

This paper studies bank runs in a model with coexistence of fiat money and private money. When fiat money is the only medium of exchange, there exist a bank run equilibrium and an equilibrium that achieves the optimal risk sharing. In contrast, when private money is also a medium of exchange, there exists a unique equilibrium where no one demands early withdrawals of fiat money and agents in need of liquidity only use private money to finance consumption. The unique equilibrium achieves the first-best outcome and eliminates bank runs without having resort to any government intervention.

This paper investigates bond issuance of non-financial corporations in advanced economies during the period 1999-2003, attempting to understand motives for issuing in foreign currency, and determinants for the choice of currency. We consider the following influences on the currency choice when issuing foreign currency denominated debt: the microeconomic characteristics of the firm, the macroeconomic institutional environment and the financial particularities of the bond issue. We find that in addition to cost minimisation, hedging motives and the desire to establish an investor base influences the choice of currency. At the same time, market conventions and regulation also affect the choice.

Complementarity of money mean that two or more kinds of monies together fulfil the demand of the users better than they would without the existence of the other(-s). In this paper we study complementarity between paper monies in Sweden. We address four questions: 1) What was used as money on a macro level (money supply) and on a micro level (monetary remittances)? 2) What was the relative value of different monies in parallel circulation? 3) Was there seasonal variations in use and/or value? 4) Was there geographical variations in use and value? What we find is that the complementarity helped to solve the problem of providing sufficient liquidity domestically over time and space and thus and to keep a stable value of the currency.

Might the dollar eventually follow the precedent of the pound and cede its status as leading international reserve currency? Unlike the last time this question was prominently discussed, ten years ago, there now exists a credible competitor: the euro. This paper econometrically estimates determinants of the shares of major currencies in the reserve holdings of the world's central banks. Significant factors include: size of the home country, inflation rate (or lagged depreciation trend), exchange rate variability, and size of the relevant home financial center (as measured by the turnover in its foreign exchange market). We have not found that net international debt position is an important determinant. Network externality theories would predict a tipping phenomenon. Indeed we find that the relationship between currency shares and their determinants is nonlinear (which we try to capture with a logistic function, or else with a dummy leader” variable for the largest country). But changes are felt only with a long lag (we estimate a weight on the preceding year's currency share around 0.9). The advent of the euro interrupts the continuity of the historical data set. So we estimate parameters on pre-1999 data, and then use them to forecast the EMU era. The equation correctly predicts a (small) narrowing in the gap between the dollar and euro over the period 1999-2004. Whether the euro might in the future rival or surpass the dollar as the world's leading international reserve currency appears to depend on two things: (1) do enough other EU members join euroland so that it becomes larger than the US economy, and (2) does US macroeconomic policy eventually undermine confidence in the value of the dollar, in the form of inflation and depreciation. What we learn about functional form and parameter values helps us forecast, contingent on these two developments, how quickly the euro might rise to challenge the dollar. Under two important scenarios the remaining EU members, including the UK, join EMU by 2020 or else the recent depreciation trend of the dollar persists into the future the euro may surpass the dollar as leading international reserve currency by 2022.

In a surprisingly growing number of regions in Germany private "regional currencies" are issued as a cash substitute for the euro. Currently, these regional currencies are conceived almost exclusively as Schwundgeld (depreciative currency), which loses value on a predetermined timescale. This loss of value is intended to encourage the money owners to spend their money quickly in order to boost local demand. The paper shows that the issuance of unofficial parallel currencies is not a fundamentally new phenomenon neither in Germany nor in other European countries. The theoretical assumptions of the Schwundgeld concept (Silvio Gesell (1862 – 1930)) are highly flawed and suboptimal from a welfare-theoretical perspective. However, the current economic welfare losses resulting from the issuance of Schwundgeld are negligibly small.

Die Emission von Regionalwährungen in Deutschland weist gegenwärtig eine erstaunliche Dynamik auf. Handelt es sich dabei um Gutscheine oder Geld? Wie bedeutend sind diese neuen Zahlungsmittel? Lässt sich dieses Phänomen in ein Gesamtkonzept (in-)offizieller Geldformen integrieren?

Countries aspiring to join the euro area—the so-called accession countries—are increasingly binding their economic activity, external and internal, to the euro-area countries. This phenomenon is observed in the currency invoicing of international trade transactions, where accession countries have reduced their use of the U.S. dollar in invoicing such transactions. According to theory, the optimal invoicing choice for an accession country depends on its composition of exports and imports and on the macroeconomic fluctuations faced by its trade partners, with both factors bearing out the role of herding and hedging considerations within exporter profitability. These considerations yield country-specific estimates of the optimal degree of euro-denominated invoicing of exports. I find that the exporters in some accession countries might be pricing too much of their trade in euros rather than in U.S. dollars, even in their trade transactions with the euro-area and other European Union countries, and thus may be taking on excessive risk in international markets.

This paper brings together the literature on determination of home bias in equity holdings and the portfolio balance model of exchange rates to consider whether the dollar might be affected by a change in transactions costs that alters international portfolio allocations. The empirical findings lend support to the view that transactions costs have a significant influence on US portfolio holdings, even after accounting for float market share. In addition, new survey evidence on the equity holdings of European firms indicates home bias for European investors, and points to a reduction in the magnitude of this home bias since 1997.

We develop a dual currency search model to study equilibrium currency exchange and the determination of nominal exchange rates. Agents hold portfolios consisting of two distinct currencies. We study equilibria in which the two currencies are identical and equilibria in which the two currencies differ according to their relative purchasing power risk. We use numerical methods to solve for the steady-state distributions of currency portfolios, nominal exchange rates and value functions. When one of the currencies is 'risky', equilibria exist in which the safe currency trades for multiple units of the risky currency with the observed ratio being the nominal exchange rate. However, due to the decentralized trading environment, we obtain a steady state distribution of nominal exchange rates. The mean and variance of the nominal exchange rate distribution are based on the fundamentals of the model and change in predictable ways when the fundamentals change. Wir entwickeln ein Modell mit zwei Währungen, um das Gleichgewicht beim Austausch der Währungen und die nominalen Wechselkurse zu bestimmen. Die Wirtschaftssubjekte halten Portfolios, die aus den zwei verschiedenen Währungen bestehen. Wir untersuchen Gleichgewichte, in denen die zwei Währungen identische Eigenschaften haben und Gleichgewichte, in denen sich die zwei Währungen hinsichtlich ihres Kaufkraftrisikos unterscheiden. Es werden numerische Methoden verwendet, um die Verteilungen der Währungsportfolios, der nominalen Wechselkurse und der Wertfunktionen im langfristigen Gleichgewicht zu bestimmen. Wenn eine der Währungen risikobehaftet ist, dann existieren Gleichgewichte, in denen die sichere Währung gegen mehrere Einheiten der risikobehafteten Währung gehandelt wird. Das Austauschverhältnis ist der nominale Wechselkurs. Da der Handel dezentral erfolgt, ergibt sich eine Gleichgewichtsverteilung der Wechselkurse. Der Mittelwert und die Varianz dieser Verteilung hängt von den Fundamentalfaktoren des Modells ab. Wenn sich die Fundamentalfaktoren ändern, dann ändert sich diese Verteilung in vorhersehbarer Weise.